# Triveni Engineering & Industries Ltd v. State of U.P. and others

- **Citation:** (2008) 3 ILRA 857
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2006-02-24
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 13135 of 2002
- **Bench:** Shishir Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/triveni-engineering-industries-ltd-v-state-of-u-p-and-others-41247
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Constitution of India Article 226-Back
wages-lower Court award challenged-on
the ground-petitioner being Registered
Company running seasonal Industry for
manufacturing crystal sugar through
"vacuum pan process"-workman never
worked after 1992-93-in terms of award
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
858
as per interim direction of writ Courtreinstated the workman and paying
regular salary for the last seven yearsCourt
declined
to
interfere
with
modification of no back wages for the
period not actually worked.

Held: Para 15

But as the facts remains, respondent
no.3 has been reinstated and back wages
from the date of award till date of
reinstatement has been paid as informed
by the counsel for the parties, therefore,
at this stage, after a lapse of about six or
seven years, when the respondent No.3
is working, it will not be appropriate to
pass an order to set aside the award. But
in the facts and circumstances of present
case award dated 24.4.1998 is modified
to the extent that respondent no.3 will
not be entitled for any back wages from
1994 till the date of award.
Case law discussed:
1995 Judgement Today (6), Supreme Court,
547, 2004 (8) Supreme Court Cases 246,
2005(8) Supreme Court Cases 750, 2007(115)
FLR 619, 2005 (8) Supreme Court Cases 481.

## Text

3 All] Triveni Engineering & Industries Ltd. V. State of U.P. and others
857
down trodden students who are unable to
get proper education, in primary or
coaching institutions.

8. Even Charitable hospitals have
been included in the definition of industry
by virtue of decision rendered by the
Apex Court in A.1.R. 1978 S.C. 548
Banglore Water Supply and Sewerage
board Vs. A Rajappa and others. This
decision still holds good, therefore,
Dharmashala run by the society may be
for charity and engaged in providing
social services and means as stated above,
but its employees are not governed by the
objects of the society and minimum
wages are required to be paid to them.
Those objects are of the society running
Dharmashala and not of its employees,
therefore, in my opinion, Dharmashala is
also an industry and notification can be
issued by the Government for bringing it
within the schedule employment and
minimum wages can be fixed according to
the procedure prescribed under the
Minimum Wages Act.

9. Counsel for the petitioner has
failed
to
place
any
document
to
substantiate his submission that report
submitted by the committee constituted
for comparative study of minimum wages,
was not placed in the meeting of the
Advisory Board and minimum wages was
fixed without consultation with Advisory
Board or that there was any clerical
mistake in not granting exemption to the
petitioner. Therefore, parity cannot be
sought
with
the
notification
dated
31.1.1991 in which exemption has been
granted to private coaching classes,
private schools including nursery school
and private technical institutions, for
benefit of education to next generation.
The notification dated 31.1.1991 is for the
benefit of society at large by the
Government as it also includes Balbadi
run by the U.P. Council for Child welfare
and recognized Private school receiving
government aid. It cannot be compared
with Dharmashala and there is no
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

10. For the reasons stated above, no
case is made out for quashing the
schedule
employment
"Dharmashala"
notified in column 2 at serial no. 24 of
Schedule-1 of impugned notification
dated 24.2.2006 and the inspection note
dated 27.5.2008.

11. The writ petition is accordingly
dismissed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 28.08.2008

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SHISHIR KUMAR, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 13135 of 2002

Triveni Engineering & Industries Limited

...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri. Dilip Singh.
Sri. S.P. Singh.

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri. Siddtarth
S.C.

Constitution of India Article 226-Back
wages-lower Court award challenged-on
the ground-petitioner being Registered
Company running seasonal Industry for
manufacturing crystal sugar through
"vacuum pan process"-workman never
worked after 1992-93-in terms of award
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
858
as per interim direction of writ Courtreinstated the workman and paying
regular salary for the last seven yearsCourt
declined
to
interfere
with
modification of no back wages for the
period not actually worked.

Held: Para 15

But as the facts remains, respondent
no.3 has been reinstated and back wages
from the date of award till date of
reinstatement has been paid as informed
by the counsel for the parties, therefore,
at this stage, after a lapse of about six or
seven years, when the respondent No.3
is working, it will not be appropriate to
pass an order to set aside the award. But
in the facts and circumstances of present
case award dated 24.4.1998 is modified
to the extent that respondent no.3 will
not be entitled for any back wages from
1994 till the date of award.
Case law discussed:
1995 Judgement Today (6), Supreme Court,
547, 2004 (8) Supreme Court Cases 246,
2005(8) Supreme Court Cases 750, 2007(115)
FLR 619, 2005 (8) Supreme Court Cases 481.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shishir Kuamr, J.)

1. This writ petition has been filed
for quashing the award dated 24th April,
1998, passed in Adjudication Case No.
146 of 1995, contained in Annexure 1 to
the writ petition passed by respondent
no.2.

2. The facts as stated in the writ
petition are that petitioner- Triveni
Engineering
&
Industries
Limited,
Deoband, Saharanpur is a company
incorporated under the Indian Companies
Act, 1956, having its registered office at
Deoband, Saharanpur. The company
formally known as 'Gangeshwar Limited,
Deoband,
Saharanpur.
Petitioner
is
engaged in the manufacture of crystal
sugar through 'vacuum pan process'.

3. Petitioner is a seasonal industry
and relationship between the sugar factory
and its employees is regulated and
governed by Standing Orders issued
under Section 3 of the Act for vacuum
pan industries known as Standing Orders
covering the condition of employment of
workmen in Vacuum Pan Sugar Factories
in U.P. The workmen, who are classified
in Class B of the Standing Orders are
thus:

"B. Classification of workmen
(i) Permanent,
(ii) Seasonal,
(iii) Temporary,
(iv) Probationers,
(v) Apprentices, and
(vi) Substitutes."

4. When there is an excess
sugarcane, sugar factory necessarily needs
more man-power to deal with the
production and supply of sugarcane and
when there is a shortage of sugarcane in
any given year, the need of employee -
workmen also goes down. It has been
stated that to meet these exigencies of
service, requirement keeps fluctuating and
that there is a temporary need, it is open
to sugar factory to engage temporary
hands to meet the temporary need. The
respondent No.3 was engaged as an
apprentice/ causal labour to meet the
exigencies of services from time to time.
However, the respondent No.3 had a
reference raised stating that he has been
deprived of work from season 1994-95.
The workman filed a written statement on
19th January, 1996. Petitioner also filed
his written statement clearly stating
therein that respondent No.3 Luxman
Singh has worked as a causal labour to
meet the requirements of work. Rejoinder
statement was also been filed clearly
3 All] Triveni Engineering & Industries Ltd. V. State of U.P. and others
859
stating therein that workman had never
worked beyond 21st October, 1993 and
therefore, had no cause of action for filing
the case. In paragraph 17 of the rejoinder
statement, petitioner has clearly stated the
period in which respondent no.3 had
worked as a temporary/causal workman
and, therefore, no cause of action arose in
the season 1994-95. The evidence was
adduced and the award has been given in
favour
of
respondent
no.3
for
reinstatement with full back wages.

5. It has been submitted on behalf of
petitioner that workman concerned was
unable to establish that he had worked for
the whole of the second half of crushing
season 1993-94 because unless the
workman would established that he has
worked for season 1993-94 up to end he
would have no right to be called as
seasonal workman in coming season in
1994-95. Although labour court has
recorded
a
finding
that
respondent
workmen has shifted his stand from time
to time yet has given no reason for
believing the pleadings and evidence as
given by workmen. Although from the
award, it clearly appears that labour court
has refused respondent No.3 as seasonal
workmen but has given him benefit as
seasonal workman and directed the
petitioner to reinstate him in the status of
permanent work. The said order of labour
court is contrary to the judgement of the
Apex Court reported in 1995 Judgement
Today (6), Supreme Court, 547, Morinda
Co-op. Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Ram Kisan
and others. From perusal of the Standing
Orders of the vacuum pan Sugar Factories
under Clause 2-K of special condition,
which governs the seasonal workman is
defined. Petitioner submits that labour
court has not examined the issue whether
the
workman
concerned had infact
fulfilled the requirement of Clause 2-K in
giving benefit under Clause 2-K. As
workman concerned is unable to establish
that he has worked for whole of the
second half of crushing season 1993-94,
he would have no right to be called as
seasonal workman in coming season
1994-95. In the absence of the aforesaid
finding labour Court has no jurisdiction to
pass order in favour of workman
concerned.

6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order,
writ petition was filed before this Court
and by order dated 30.10.2003, this Court
has passed an order that subject to
petitioner's reinstating respondent no.3
within three weeks from today and paying
back wages from the date of award till the
date of reinstatement and continuing to
pay the same in future as and when the
same falls due, further execution of award
shall remain stayed. Petitioner submits
that in view of the order passed by this
Court,
respondent
no.3
has
been
reinstated and order of this Court has been
complied with. But as regards the back
wages prior to the date of award is
concerned, in the facts and circumstances
of the case, petitioner submits that he is
not entitled for the same. Reliance bas
been placed upon a judgement of 2004 (8)
Supreme
Court
Cases,
246
M.P.
Electricity
Board
Vs.
Hariram.
Paragraphs, 4, 5, 8 and 10 are being
reproduced below:-

"4. The appellant-Board denied the
allegations made in the said application
which had termed the non-employment as
retrenchment
of
their
service
by
contending
that
the
question
of
retrenchment does not arise in the nature
of employment because the service of the
respondents were on work requirement
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
860
basis. Before the Labour Court, an
application was made by the respondents
to produce the Muster Rolls for the period
1987 to 1992. That apart no other
material was produced by the respondents
to establish a fact that they had worked
for 240 days continuously in any given
year. Though some other applicants
examined themselves before the Labour
Court no other document was produced.
While the appellant-Board examined
three witnesses who are Engineers-inCharge of the Project and produced the
Muster Rolls for the period between 1986
to 1990 but did not produce the Muster
Rolls for the later period. The Labour
Court after examining the entries in the
Muster Rolls came to the conclusion that
the
respondents-applicants
had
not
worked for 240 days continuously in any
given year, hence, they cannot claim
permanency nor could they term their
non-employment as a retrenchment. On
the said basis, it rejected the applications
of the respondents.

5. Being aggrieved by the said rejection of
their
application,
the
respondents
preferred an appeal before the Industrial
Court at Bhopal Bench. The Industrial
Court noticing the fact that though the
application for production of the Muster
Rolls was for the years 1987 to 1992, the
appellant had only produced the Muster
Rolls for the year ending 1990. Therefore,
an
adverse
inference
against
the
appellant was drawn and solely based on
the said adverse inference it accepted the
case of the Respondents that they had
worked for 240 days continuously in a
given year, hence, proceeded to grant
relief, as stated hereinabove.

8. In these appeals, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellantBoard contended that the Courts below
could not have drawn any adverse
inference against the Board for not
having produced the Muster Rolls for the
year 1990-1992 when it complied with the
request of the respondent by producing
the Muster Rolls for the year 1980-90. It
is submitted that the said Muster Rolls
which were produced before the Court
clearly indicated that the respondents had
not worked continuously for 240 days in a
year, at any point of time between 198890. It is argued that it is not the case of
the respondents that between the year
1990-92 for which period the Muster
Rolls were not produced they had worked
for 240 days continuously only in those
years. Their entire case was that between
1988 and 1992 they have been working in
240 days continuously in a year which
having not been established at least for
the years 1988 and 1990 without there
being a specific allegation that between
1990 and 1992 there was such continuous
employment a mere non-production of the
Muster Rolls for the said year could not
have been made the basis of drawing an
adverse inference by the Courts below. It
is also argued that the non·-employment
of a daily wager when there is no work
would not amount to retrenchment.
Learned counsel also submitted that the
nature of work that was being done by the
appellant was a work for a project and
that project having come to an end,
question of regularising the services of
the
respondents
or
making
them
permanent did not arise.

10. Having heard the learned counsel for
the parties and having perused the
documents, we notice that the case of the
appellant that these respondents were
employed for the purpose of digging pits
for erecting electric poles in the course of
3 All] Triveni Engineering & Industries Ltd. V. State of U.P. and others
861
drawing electric wire from one point to
another point is not disputed. It is an
accepted finding of the Courts below that
the employment of the respondents have
been
discontinuous
and
intermittent
during the period from 1982 till their
employment was discontinued. We can
take judicial notice of the fact that
drawing of an electric line is in the nature
of project work and once the polls are
erected and the electric wire is drawn
from the starting pole to the ending pole
that work comes to an end. Therefore, it
cannot be contended that the nature of
work which was only to dig pits for the
purpose of erecting poles could be
construed as a permanent job. Of course,
during the course of electrifying more
places, job of this nature may be done by
the Board continuously in different parts
of the State but that does not deviate from
the fact that drawing of electric line from
one point to another at one part of the
State would be a project and not a
continuous job. Therefore, employment of
people in that local area for the limited
job
cannot
be
construed
as
an
employment for a continuous and regular
work of the Board. This fact is also
recorded in the Muster Rolls which shows
that at regular intervals the services of
the respondents were sought obviously for
the reason that there was no continuous
need for such work. A perusal of the
Muster Rolls, a copy of which is
produced. along with the writ appeal
which pertains to the respondents in the
first appeal clearly indicates the above
fact. If as an example, we take the case of
the respondent in CA. No. 2240/01 we
notice that he worked between 16.11.1987
to 15.12.1987 for 30 days. His next
employment was from 16.12.1987 to
15.1.1988 for 26 days. Therefore, it could
be said that during the period 16.11.1987
to 15.1.1988 this respondent worked
continuously for 56 days. He was then not
employed
between
15.1.1988
till
16.2.1988. After the said break he was reemployed from 16.2.1988 to 15.9.1988
which is for a period of 106 days.
Thereafter, he was not employed till
16.11.1988. From 16.11.1988 he was reemployed till 15.12.1988 for 30 days.
Thus it is noticed that the employment
during the period 1987 to 1988 was not
continuous and his total employed days
for one year if taken from 16.11.1987 till
16.11.1988, same comes to 136 days.
Similar is the case if we have a look at a
subsequent employment during the years
1989-1990, this clearly shows the fact
that the employment of the respondent
was on a job required basis and was not
for any continuous services required by
the Board. The respondent, therefore,
cannot claim either permanency or
regularisation since there is no such
permanent post to which he could stake
his claim nor could he claim the benefit of
completion of 240 days of continuous
work in a given year, because as stated
above the figures do not show that the
respondents
whose
particulars
are
referred to hereinabove or the other
respondents for that matter have worked
for
240
days.
In
such
a factual
background, in our opinion, the Industrial
Court or the High Court could not have
drawn an adverse inference for the nonproduction of the Muster Rolls for the
year 1990 to 1992 in the absence of
specific pleading by the respondentsapplicants that at least during that period
they
had
worked
for
240
days
continuously in a given year. "The
application calling for the production of
the documents was for the years 1987 to
1992. As stated above, between the period
1987 to 1990, as a matter of fact, till end
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
862
of the year 1990 the respondents have not
been able to establish the case of
continuous
work
for
240
days.
Considering these facts in our view
drawing of an adverse inference for the
non-production of the Muster Rolls for the
years 1991-92, is wholly erroneous on the
part of the Industrial Court and the High
Court. We cannot but bear in mind the
fact that the initial burden of establishing
the factum of their continuous work for
240 days in a year rests with the
applicants-respondents. "

7. Further reliance has been placed
upon judgement reported in 2005(8)
Supreme
Court
Cases,
750,
Surendranagar District Panchayat Vs.
Dahyabhai Aqmarsingh Reliance has
been placed upon paragraphs 3, 4 and 18
are being quoted below:-

"3. The respondent examined himself
and deposed that he was employed for 10
years at the salary of Rs 470 per month
whereas Mr. Vinod Misra, an official
from the appellant side was examined to
show that the workman never worked for
240 days in a year.

4. Before the Labour Court, oral evidence
was given by the respondent. The Labour
Court relied on the oral evidence of the
respondent-workman
and
drew
an
adverse inference for non-production of
muster roll and the salary register from
the year 1976 to 1986 and held that the
respondent-workman had worked for
more than 240 days and therefore his
termination was illegal. The Labour
Court directed the reinstatement of the
workman with back wages of 20% from
the date of reference for non-compliance
of sections 25F, 25G and 25H.

18. In the light of the aforesaid, it was
necessary for the workman to produce the
relevant material to prove that he has
actually worked with the employer for not
less than 240 days during the period
twelve calendar months preceding the
date of termination. What we find is that
apart from the oral evidence the workman
has not produced any evidence to prove
the fact that he has worked for 240 days.
No proof of receipt of salary or wages or
any record or order in that regard was
produced; no co-worker was examined;
muster roll produced by the employer has
not been contradicted. It is improbable
that workman who claimed to have
worked with the appellant for such a long
period
would
not
possess
any
documentary evidence to prove nature of
his engagement and the period of work he
had undertaken with his employer.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that the
workman has failed to discharge his
burden that he was in employment for 240
days during the preceding 12 months of
the date of termination of his service. The
Courts below have wrongly drawn an
adverse inference for non production of
the record of the workman for ten years.
The scope of enquiry before the Labour
Court was confined to only 12 months
preceding the date of termination to
decide the question of continuation of
service for the purpose of Section 25F of
the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman
has never contended that he was regularly
employed in the Panchayat for one year
to claim the uninterrupted period of
service as required under Section 25B( 1)
of the Act. In the fact and situation and in
the light of the law on the subject, we find
that the workman-respondent is not
entitled for the protection or compliance
of Section 25F of the Act before his
service was terminated by the employer.
3 All] Triveni Engineering & Industries Ltd. V. State of U.P. and others
863
As regards non-compliance of Sections
25G and 25H suffice is to say that witness
Vinod Mishra examined by the appellant
has stated that no seniority list was
maintained by the department of daily
wagers. In the absence of regular
employment
of
the
workman,
the
appellant was not expected to maintain
seniority list of the employees engaged on
daily wages and in the absence of any
proof
by
the
respondent
regarding
existence of the seniority list and his so
called seniority no relief could be given to
him for non-compliance of provisions of
the Act. The Courts could have drawn
adverse inference against the appellant
only when seniority list was proved to be
in existence and then not produced before
the Court. In order to entitle the Court to
draw inference unfavourable to the party,
the Court must be satisfied that evidence
is in existence and could have been
proved. "

8. Reliance has been placed upon a
judgement reported in 2007(115) FLR,
619 Ganga Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills
Ltd. Vs. Jaivir Singh (Paragraphs 4, 6, 8,
11 and 12) and another judgement
reported in 2005 (8) Supreme Court
Cases, 481 Batala Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd.
Vs. Sowaran Singh and reliance has been
placed upon paras 4, 6, 8,11 and 12. The
same are being reproduced below:-

"4. The Labour Court was of the view
that though the stand of the employer was
that
the
respondent-workman
was
employed on casual basis on daily wages
for specific work and for specific period,
yet evasive reply was given in respect of
the workman's stand that he was
appointed in April 1986. It was observed
that no attendance record was produced.
There was also no material to show that
the workman had left the job on his own
accord and in any event the employer had
not proved that the workman had worked
for less than 240 days in 12 calendar
months preceding the date of termination.
Accordingly, it was held that there was
violation of Section 25F of the Act.
Direction was given to re-instate the
workman with 50% back wages.

6. In support of the appeal, learned
counsel for the appellant submitted that
both the Labour Court and the High
Court fell in grave error by acting on
factually and legally erroneous premises.
The definite stand of the appellant was
that the workman was engaged on casual
basis on daily wages for specific work
and for specific period. Details in this
regard were undisputedly filed. Therefore,
the provisions of Section 2(oo) (bb) of the
Act are clearly applicable. In addition,
the onus was wrongly placed on the
employer to prove that the workman had
not worked for 240 days in 12 calendar
months preceding the alleged date of
termination. No material was placed on
record by the workman to establish that
the workman had offered himself for job
after 12-2-1994. The award of the Labour
Court does not speak of the requirement
to maintain the muster roll. This point
was taken up suo motu by the High Court
without any opportunity to the appellant
to have its say.

8. We find that the High Court's judgment
is unsustainable on more than one count.
In Morinda Co-op. Sugar Mills Ltd. v.
Ram Kishan and Ors. (1995 (5) SCC 653)
it was observed as follows:
"4. It would thus be clear that the
respondents were not working throughout
the season. They worked during crushing
seasons only. The respondents were taken
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
864
into work for the season and consequent
to closure of the season, they ceased to
work.
5. The question is whether such a
cessation would amount to retrenchment.
Since it is only a seasonal work, the
respondents cannot be said to have been
retrenched in view of what is stated in
clause (bb) of Section 2 (oo) of the Act.
Under these circumstances, we are of the
opinion that the view taken by the Labour
Court and the High Court is illegal.
However, the appellant is directed to
maintain a register for all workmen
engaged during the seasons enumerated
hereinbefore and when the new season
starts the appellant should make a
publication in neighbouring places in
which the respondents normally live and
if they would report for duty, the
appellant
would
engage
them
in
accordance with seniority and exigency of
work.

11. The materials on record clearly
establish that the engagement of the
workman was for specfic period and
specific work.

12. In view of the position as highlighted
in Morinda Co-op. Sugar Mills and Anil
Baburao,s cases (supra), the relief
granted to the workman by the Labour
Court and the High Court cannot be
maintained."

9. In support of the aforesaid
contention learned counsel for petitioner
submits that award given by labour Court
is liable to be set aside.

10. On the other hand, learned
counsel for the respondents submits that
on basis of relevant record labour court
has given a finding of fact that the
respondent
no.3
being
a
seasonal
employee was entitled to be called for
1994-95 season.

11. The award of labour Court is
based on unfair labour practice adopted
by petitioner by engaging respondent no.3
in
employment
since
1985
when
regularisation of his services which were
passed on admission of documents filed
by workmen respondent No.3.

12. I have considered the submission
made on behalf of petitioner as well as
respondent and have perused the record.

13. From the perusal of the record, it
IS clear that on the basis of application
State Government has referred the dispute
to the labour Court u/s 4K of the
Industrial
Dispute
Act,
same
is
reproduced below:-

"KYA
SEWAYOJAKO
DWARA
APNE
SHRAMIK
SRI
LAKSHMAN
SINGH PUTRA SRI JAIPAL SINGH KO
VARSH
1994-95
KA
SEASON
PRARAMBH HONE PAR KARYA SE
PRITHAK/
VANCHIT
KIYA
JANA
UCHIT TATHA / ATHWA VAIDHANIK
HAI, YADI NAHI, TO SAMBANDHIT
SHRAMIK KYA HITLABH/ ANUTHOSH
(RELIEF) PANE KA ADHIKARI HAI
TATHA
ANYA
VIVRAN
VA
TITHI
SAHIT."

14. Meaning thereby the claim of
respondent no.3 was that he has not been
called to work in the season 1994-95. The
labour court has recorded a finding that
from the statement of one Narendra
Kumar, time keeper, respondent no.3 has
worked in the season 1992-93. A finding
to this effect has also been recorded that
from the oral evidence of the parties it is
3 All] Rajendra Singh V. The State of U.P. and others
865
clear that respondent No.3 has worked up
to 1992-93 season, a finding to this effect
has also been recorded that there is a
mistake in the referring order. But it has
been stated that this will not effect the
right
of
respondent-workman.
In
paragraph 8 of the written statement filed
on behalf of petitioner, it has clearly been
mentioned that "respondent No.3 had
never worked even for a single day
beyond the end of crushing season 199394 hence no cause of action arises to the
respondent No.3 on the alleged date
mentioned in the reference order." The
labour Court has misread the statement
mentioned in the written statement. In
spite of the finding recorded that
respondent No.3 workman is changing the
stand from time to time but in spite of the
aforesaid fact, has given an award in his
favour for reinstatement as well as full
back wages. The Apex Court in cases
mentioned above has clearly held that in
such circumstances, the labour Court
cannot grant the relief of reinstatement
because the status of seasonal employee
and temporary employee are different.

15. But as the facts remains,
respondent no.3 has been reinstated and
back-wages from the date of award till
date of reinstatement has been paid as
informed by the counsel for the parties,
therefore, at this stage, after a lapse of
about six or seven years, when the
respondent No.3 is working, it will not be
appropriate to pass an order to set aside
the
award.
But
in
the
facts
and
circumstances of present case award dated
24.4.1998 is modified to the extent that
respondent no.3 will not be entitled for
any back wages from 1994 till the date of
award.

16. The writ petition is disposed of.
No order as to costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.05.2008

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUNIL AMBWANI, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.14915 of 2008

Rajendra Singh

...Petitioner
Versus
The State of U.P. & others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri D.K.S. Rathor

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Ashok Nath Tripathi
Sri P.K. Tyagi
Smt. Archana Tyagi
S.C.

U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947-Section 95
(I) (g)-ceasure of Administrative and
financial
power
of
village
pradhansatisfaction of District Magistrate based
on no material or malafide-D.M. required
to consider preliminary enquiry report
and
not
the
final-held-can
not
be
interfered under writ jurisdiction.

Held: Para 22

There is nothing to show that the
satisfaction of the District Magistrate
was vitiated by lack of material or
malafides.
The
challenge
to
the
impugned order on the ground that it
does not give reasons has no substance
as elaborate reasons are not required to
be given by the District Magistrate at
this stage. He is required to consider the
preliminary enquiry report, and not a
final enquiry report with the reply given
by
the
petitioner
or
the
material
collected and produced by both the
enquiry officer and supplied by the