# U.O.I. & Ors v. Govind Narain Mishra

- **Citation:** (2025) 6 ILRA 104
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-06-10
- **Case number:** Writ - A No. 6603 of 2025
- **Bench:** Saurabh Lavania, Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/u-o-i-ors-v-govind-narain-mishra-53558
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950 -
Article 226 - Writ Petition - Delay and Laches
- Discretionary Relief Denied: Unexplained delay
of 363 days in challenging Tribunal's order on
disciplinary proceedings against a
retiring
employee bars extraordinary relief under Article

## Text

104 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
64. Further, the remedy to question
the preliminary decree is under Section 97
CPC by filing appeal and not by making
any application for recalling the order dated
07.05.2012 as it is not an ex-parte order
and was contested between the parties
litigating therein.

65. It was also emphasised by the
petitioner that application was moved in Final
Decree Case No.111 of 1980, while the order
has been passed on Final Decree Case No.33
of 1997. This Court finds that both the final
decree cases were going on together, though
formal order was not passed for consolidating
the two cases. Case No.111 of 1980 was filed
by the plaintiff- Chandi Das Basu while Case
No.33 of 1997 was filed by the subsequent
purchaser Motilal Guptal. The application
was moved in Case No.111 of 1980, but
order reflected in the order-sheet of Case
No.33 of 1997 cannot be construed as a
deliberate attempt or any major lapse so as to
invite the Court to recall the order dated
07.05.2012.

66. The intent of the said order was
to modify the preliminary decree dated
27.11.1979 varying the share of the cosharer after the death of Chandi Charan
Basu. The modification would not affect
the final outcome as only the shares of cosharers of branch of Shrish Chandra Gupta
has been varied. Another attempt was made
from the petitioner's side that after order
dated 09.05.2005, the Final Decree case
had attained finality and the Court was not
correct to allow the application 65-C.

67. It is clear that against the order
dated 09.05.2005, Civil Appeal No.142 of
2005 was filed which was allowed in the
year 2008 and the said order was set aside
and the matter was remitted back for
reconsideration on 12.11.2008.
68. Considering the facts and
circumstance of the case, I find that no
interference is required in the orders
impugned dated 23.09.2024 passed in Civil
Revision No.92 of 2024 passed by
Additional District Judge/ Special Judge
(E.C. Act), Prayagraj, and order dated
29.05.2024 passed by Judge, Small Cause
Court, Prayagraj.

69. Writ petition fails and is hereby
dismissed.

70. Registry is directed to transmit
the records of the Court below forthwith.
----------
(2025) 6 ILRA 104
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 10.06.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH LAVANIA, J.
THE HON'BLE SYED QAMAR HASAN RIZVI, J.

Writ - A No. 6603 of 2025

U.O.I. & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Govind Narain Mishra ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Varun Pandey

Counsel for the Respondent:

A. Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950 -
Article 226 - Writ Petition - Delay and Laches
- Discretionary Relief Denied: Unexplained delay
of 363 days in challenging Tribunal's order on
disciplinary proceedings against a
retiring
employee bars extraordinary relief under Article
226. Courts must scrutinize laches to prevent
injustice from stale claims, even in cases
involving fundamental rights. Shiv Dass Vs
U.O.I., (2007) 9 SCC 274; UP Jal Nigam Vs
Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 (Paras 8, 9,
10, 11).
6 All. U.O.I. & Ors. Vs. Govind Narain Mishra
105
B. Central Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 - Rule 16
- Disciplinary Proceedings - Recovery of Loss:
Recovery of Rs. 20,000 from employee at
retirement for irregularities by another official
(SPM) is unsustainable without direct culpability.
Tribunal's finding of lack of fair hearing
opportunity
upheld,
rendering
proceedings
vitiated. Tridip Kumar Dingal Vs St.of W.B.,
(2009) 1 SCC 768; Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd.
Vs K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 (Paras 12,
13).

C. Doctrine of Laches - Application in
Service Matters - Laches applies in pension
and service disputes; delay defeats equity and
causes prejudice. Writ courts exercise discretion
judiciously, refusing relief where negligence or
inaction is evident, even for continuing causes
of action. Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply &
Sewerage Board Vs T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4
SCC 108 (Paras 13).

Writ Petition Dismissed.

List of Cases cited:

1. Shiv Dass Vs U.O.I., (2007) 9 SCC 274 (Para
8).

2. UP Jal Nigam Vs Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11
SCC 464 (Para 9).

3. Tridip Kumar Dingal Vs St.of W.B., (2009) 1
SCC 768 (Para 12).

4.
Karnataka
Power
Corpn.
Ltd.
Vs
K.
Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 (Para 12).

5. Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply &
Sewerage Board Vs T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4
SCC 108 (Para 13).

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania, J.
&
Hon'ble Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi, J.)

1. Heard Sri Varun Pandey, learned
Counsel for the petitioner and perused the
records.

2. In view of order proposed to be
passed, issuance of notice to the privaterespondent(s) is hereby dispensed with.

3. The present petition has been
filed for the following main reliefs:-

 "Issue a writ, order or direction
in the nature of certiorari quashing
impugned judgment and order dated
22.05.2024
(reserved
on
07.05.2024)
passed
in
Original
Application
No.
332/00378/2013 Govind Narain Mishra Vs
Union of India & Others, contained as
(Annexure no. 1) to the writ petition."

4. Under challenge is the order
passed by the Central Administrative
Tribunal at Lucknow (in short 'Tribunal') in
Original Application No. 332/00378/2013
(Govind Narayan Mishra Versus Union of
India and others).

5. Before further proceedings, it
would be apt to indicate that in the year
2013,
the
applicant-Govind
Narayan
Mishra, who has been impleaded as private
opposite party in the present petition, was
aged about 63 years and accordingly at
present he would be around 74 years old.

6. Brief facts of the case are as
under:

 (i)
The
Govind
Narayan
Mishra/private opposite party, was going to
superannuated in the month of July 2010
from the post of Assistant Post Master,
Chowk, Lucknow.

 (ii) Just prior to date of retirement
a charge-sheet dated 16.07.2010 was served
upon
Govind
Narayan
Mishra/private
opposite party.
106 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
 (iii)
For
the
purposes
of
submission of reply to the charge-sheet
dated
16.07.2010,
Govind
Narayan
Mishra/private opposite party, preferred an
application dated 21.07.2010, requesting
therein to grant permission to inspect the
records.

 (iv) The permission to inspect the
record was granted on 26.07.2010.

 (v)
Thereafter,
the
Govind
Narayan Mishra/private opposite party,
inspected the record on 27.07.2010.

 (vi)
On
28.07.2010
Govind
Narayan Mishra/private opposite party,
replied to the charge-sheet issued on
16.07.2010.

 (vii)
On
29.07.2010,
the
impugned order dated 29.07.2010 was
passed by Senior Superintendent of Post
Office, Lucknow Division, Lucknow, the
relevant portion of the same reads as
under:-

 "I
have
gone
through
the
chargesheet, defence representation and
other relevant records and found that the
official had performed the work of APM
SBSOS for a short period as a stop gap
arrangement as mentioned in memo of
charges. However, He is responsible for
the irregularities committed during the
aforesaid period."

 (viii) Challenging the order dated
29.07.2010, a departmental appeal was
filed by the Govind Narayan Mishra/private
opposite party, which was also dismissed
by the appellate authority namely Director,
Postal Service, HQ, Lucknow vide order
dated 31.01.2013. Relevant portion of the
same are extracted hereinunder:-
 "3. The appellant has raised
following arguments in his appeal dated
09.09.2010 for consideration:-

 (i)
That
the
Disciplinary
Authority admitted the late posting of
vouchers of sub- offices including Blunt
Square in Para 6(1) of punishment order
but any how held that the appellant could
not get them immediately and regularly
posted in the concerning ledgers which
resulted non- detection of irregulatities
committed by SPM Blunt Square. The
appellant also failed to bring this facts to
the notice of higher authorities. The
reasons given by disciplinary authorities
are not correct, but misleading and also
not
based
on
documentary
evidence
otherwise the receipt book under which
vouchers
relating
to
01.01.2006
to
30.10.2006 were submitted to SBCO would
have been provided to the appellant for the
inspection before submission of defence
representation dated 28.07.2010. Hence the
punishment order is not based on factual
position but it is biased attitude of the
disciplinary authorities to any how impose
monetary loss to the appellant at the time
of retirement.

 (ii) That the back posting was in
the knowledge of inspecting authorities
who noted it in respective OBRS regularly.
Non-posting of vouchers received during
the period of the appellant is not relevant
to the differences of balances but it is lack
of inspecting authorities, who inspected
Blunt Square P.O. during period mentioned
in the statement of imputation, who could
not notice the irregularities persisting at
Blunt Square Post office.

 (iii) That the appellant had got
submitted the vouchers to the SBCO during
the period mentioned in the statement of
6 All. U.O.I. & Ors. Vs. Govind Narain Mishra
107
imputation of misconduct for the dates
which were took place for posting during
that period. The receipt book could not be
made available to the appellant by the
Disciplinary
Authority
as
such
his
observation in Para 6(ii) of the punishment
order are baseless and have no legs to
stand.

 (iv)
That
the
Disciplinary
Authority in Para 6 (iii) and (iv)
misinterpreted the provisions of Rule 74 of
SB Manual Volume I in order to suit his
motives
to
impose
penalty
appealed
against.

 (v)
That
the
arguments
submitted by the appellant in defence
representation dated 28.07.2010 in Para
D on page 3 and additional facts at page
3 & 4 were not considered and discussed
in the punishment order as such the
punishment order is not self contained, so
plot making and reasoned order as
required under Govt. of India Instruction
No. below Rule 15 of CCS (CCA) Rule
1965 and also G.I.M.H.A., Dep. and
A.R.O.M. No. 134/1/81 AVD-I dated
13.07.1981 and Dept. Of P&T O.M. No.
134/12/85-AVD-I dated 05.11.1985.

 (vi) That the recovery of 50,000/-
from leave encashment is against the
provision of Rule 39 (iii) of CCS (Pension)
rules as amended upto August 2005 (Part
III of FRSR) under which the disciplinary
authority is imposed to hold while are part
of cash equivalent of Earned leave in the
case of Govt. Servant who is to be retired
and against whom disciplinary/ criminal
proceedings are pending and there is
possibilities are some money becoming
recoverable for adjustment of Govt. dues as
such the punishment order is against the
provisions of rules.
 (vii)
That
the
action
of
disciplinary authority just within fifteen
(15) days of retirement of the appellant was
unjustified.
The
disciplinary
authority
initiated disciplinary action at the last
moment of the retirement of the appellant
in hurried manner without application of
mind on the circumstances under which the
appellant had worked at Chowk HO. As
such, the punishment order is against the
principles of natural justice. He also added
that he was working at PSD Lucknow
during period 01.01.2006 to 06.01.2006 as
such
statement
of
imputation
is
in
fructuous.

 4. I have gone through the
arguments made by the appellant in his
appeal with the relevant documents of the
case. The position emerged as under:-

 (i) The appellant was posted as
APM SBSO Chowk HO during the period
as mentioned in memo of charges. Being,
the supervisor of SBSO branch of Chowk
HO, he was required to supervise the work
of Ledger Assistants who were assigned the
duties
of
posting
of
Saving
Bank
Transactions, preparation of compilation
and transfer of vouchers to SBCO Chowk
HO and get this work completed day by day
but instead of doing so, this work was kept
in arrears. Due to his slackness, the
misappropriation
of
Govt.
money
committed by the then SPIvi Blunt Square
could not be detected early which resulted
a huge misappropriation of Govt. money by
the then SPM Blunt Square PO Lucknow in
SB accounts. As such, the pleading of the
appellant is not admitted.

 (ii) The appellant was responsible
for updation of back posting as mentioned
in the charge sheet. If it was got done by
him the discrepancies/ irregularities in the
108 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
balances would have been come into light
and necessary action committed by the then
SPM Blunt Square, would have been
detected early. As such, the pleading of the
appellant is not acceptable.

 (iii) The pleading of the appellant
cannot be admitted. In view of the fact that
the posting and transfer of vouchers was
done
regularly,
the
irregularities
committed by SPM Blunt Square PO
Lucknow would have been detected early.
The appellant failed to point out any
irregularity during his working period,
which proves that he as not following the
rules and procedures as prescribed by the
Department.

 (iv) As per Rule-74 of SB Manual
Volume-i, the special error book is to be
maintained in respect of accounts in which
transactions have taken place for 1" time
after 31 March and Pass Book of which
have not been received from SOs for
verification of balances and entry of
interest. The contention of the appellant
that the relevant rules are applicable for 1"
March to 31 June of the year is not tenable.
This was the gross negligence on the part
of appellant in proper supervision of sub
ordinate staff working under him and
maintenance of special error book. As
such, the pleading of the appellant is not
convincing.

 (v) Not admitted as the plea of the
appellant was considered and discussed by
Disciplinary Authority in Para IV of the
punishment order. As such, the contention
of appellant is not convincing.

 (vi) Not admitted as the appellant
has been identified as subsidiary offender
in the Blunt Square PO fraud case and due
to the lapses found on his part, the then
SPM Blunt Square PO continued to commit
misappropriation since long and the
Department has sustained a huge loss of
Govt. money. As such, the pleading of the
appellant is not convincing.

 5. From the above facts and
circumstances of the case and on overall
assessment of the case, I have come to the
conclusion that the charges levelled against
the appellant are proved, but keeping in
view the circumstances as stated by the
appellant in his appeal, the penalty
awarded by the Disciplinary Authority vide
memo no. F/SB-5/08-09 dated 29.07.2010
as mentioned above, is reduced to that of
"Recovery
of
Rs.
25,000/-only."
In exercise of powers conferred upon me
under Rule 27 of CCS (CCA) Rules 1965. I
hereby order accordingly."

 (ix) Thereafter, Govind Narayan
Mishra/private opposite party filed an
Original Application No. 332/00378/2013
(Govind Narayan Mishra Versus Union of
India and others) ( in short 'O.A.'), before
the Tribunal challenging the order dated
29.07.2010 passed by the Disciplinary
Authority and order dated 31.01.2013
passed by the Appellate Authority.

 (x) The Tribunal after considering
the pleadings and documents on record
before it, allowed the O.A. filed by Govind
Narayan Mishra/private opposite party vide
order dated 22.05.2024. The relevant
portion
of
the
same
are
extracted
hereinunder:-

 "6.5 The events of the charge
relate
to
the
period
01.01.2006
to
30.10.2006. The charge sheet was issued
on 16.07.2010, i.e., in the month the
applicant was due to retire. Application
requesting for inspection of records was
6 All. U.O.I. & Ors. Vs. Govind Narain Mishra
109
made on 21.07.2010 by the applicant.
Permission was granted on 26.07.2010.
The
applicant
inspected
the
records
available on 27.07.2020 and submitted his
representation
on
28.07.2010.
The
disciplinary authority passed the order
imposing punishment on 29.07.2010. The
speed
with
which
the
disciplinary
proceedings were conducted is explained
by the respondents in that the proceedings
were initiated under rule 16 of CCS (CCA)
Rules and were required to be concluded
before the applicant retired. However, we
find to effective rebuttal of the applicant's
claim that he was not shown records listed
at S. No. 1 and 3 of his application dated
21.07.2010 which were material in relation
to the charge levelled against him. In the
hurry
to
complete
the
disciplinary
proceedings, the principle of affording full
opportunity to the applicant to defend
himself by supplying all relevant documents
has been given short shrift.

 6.6 Given the position above, we
are of the opinion that the disciplinary
proceedings against the applicant are
vitiated on account of the respondents not
having provided a fair opportunity to the
applicant to defend himself by not making
available
to
the
applicant
specific
documents requested by him which cannot
be said to be irrelevant to the charge
against him.

 6.7
Considering
that
the
disciplinary proceedings were taken up
against the applicant under rule 16 of the
CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 for events relating
to the year 2006 and the fact that the
applicant retired in July, 2010, no purpose
would be served by remanding the case
back to the respondents at this stage.

 7.1 In view of the foregoing, the
OA is allowed and the order dated
29.07.2010 passed by the disciplinary
authority and order dated 31.01.2013
passed by the appellate authority are
quashed and set aside. The respondents
shall refund the amount deducted to the
applicant within a period of three months
from the date of receipt of certified copy of
this order.

 7.2 Pending MAs, if any, are also
disposed of.

 The Parties shall bear their own
costs."

7. In the aforesaid background of the
case, the present petition challenging the order
dated 22.05.2024 passed by the Tribunal was
presented before the Registry of this Court on
20.05.2025, without explaining the delay and
laches of about 363 days.

8. It is trite law that delay or
latches is one of the factors which should
be
borne
in
mind
while
exercising
discretionary powers under Article 226.
The High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers to revive any stale
claim in case laxity is found on the part of
the applicant.

9. The question of delay or laches
in approaching the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India was
examined in Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India
and others (2007) 9 SCC 274, and it was
held that in a case of pension though the
cause of action continues from month to
month, the same cannot be a ground to
overlook delay in filing the petition. It was
stated thus:-
110 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
 "6. Normally, in the case of
belated approach writ petition has to be
dismissed. Delay or laches is one of the
factors to be borne in mind by the High
Courts
when
they
exercise
their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. In an appropriate
case the High Court may refuse to invoke
its extraordinary powers if there is such
negligence or omission on the part of the
applicant to assert his right as taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time and
other circumstances, causes prejudice to
the
opposite
party.
Even
where
fundamental right is involved the matter is
still within the discretion of the Court as
pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief
Controller of Imports and Exports [(1969)
1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course,
the discretion has to be exercised judicially
and reasonably.

 10. In the case of pension the
cause of action actually continues from
month to month. That, however, cannot be
a ground to overlook delay in filing the
petition. It would depend upon the fact of
each case. If petition is filed beyond a
reasonable period say three years normally
the Court would reject the same or restrict
the relief which could be granted to a
reasonable period of about three years. The
High Court did not examine whether on
merit the appellant had a case. If on merits
it would have found that there was no
scope for interference, it would have
dismissed the writ petition on that score
alone."

10. The basis of the doctrine of
laches and the factors which are to be
considered where delay and laches would be
sufficient to deny relief to the petitioner, were
examined in UP Jal Nigam and another Vs.
Jaswant Singh and another reported in
(2006) 11 SCC 464 and referring to the
statement of law in Halsbury's Laws of
England, para 911, p. 395, it was stated
thus:-

 12. The statement of law has also
been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of
England, para 911, p. 395 as follows:

 In determining whether there has
been such delay as to amount to laches, the
chief points to be considered are:

 (i) acquiescence on the claimant's
part; and

 (ii) any change of position that has
occurred on the defendant's part.

 Acquiescence in this sense does not
mean standing by while the violation of a
right is in progress, but assent after the
violation has been completed and the claimant
has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the
claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he
has done that which might fairly be regarded
as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his
conduct and neglect, though not waiving the
remedy, he has put the other party in a
position in which it would not be reasonable to
place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay
are most material. Upon these considerations
rests the doctrine of laches.

11. The principles relating to the
effect of discretion under Article 226 of the
Constitution to interfere in cases of the undue
delay,
laches
and
acquiescence
were
summarised in Union of India Vs. N.
Murugesan 10 (2022) 2 SCC 25 and the
following observations were made:-

 "Delay,
laches
and
acquiescence"
6 All. U.O.I. & Ors. Vs. Govind Narain Mishra
111
 20. The principles governing
delay,
laches,
and acquiescence
are
overlapping and interconnected on many
occasions. However, they have their
distinct characters and distinct elements.
One can say that delay is the genus to
which laches and acquiescence are species.
Similarly, laches might be called a genus to
a species by name acquiescence. However,
there may be a case where acquiescence is
involved, but not laches. These principles
are common law principles, and perhaps
one could identify that these principles find
place in various statutes which restrict the
period of limitation and create nonconsideration of condonation in certain
circumstances. They are bound to be
applied by way of practice requiring
prudence of the court than of a strict
application
of
law.
The
underlying
principle governing these concepts would
be one of estoppel. The question of
prejudice is also an important issue to be
taken note of by the court.

 Laches

 21. The word "laches" is derived
from
the
French
language
meaning
"remissness and slackness". It thus involves
unreasonable delay or negligence in
pursuing a claim involving an equitable
relief while causing prejudice to the other
party. It is neglect on the part of a party to
do an act which law requires while
asserting a right, and therefore, must stand
in the way of the party getting relief or
remedy.

 22. Two essential factors to be
seen are the length of the delay and the
nature of acts done during the interval. As
stated, it would also involve acquiescence
on the part of the party approaching the
court apart from the change in position in
the interregnum. Therefore, it would be
unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer
a remedy on a party who knocks its doors
when his acts would indicate a waiver of
such a right. By his conduct, he has put the
other party in a particular position, and
therefore, it would be unreasonable to
facilitate a challenge before the court.
Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on
equity is not expected to be allowed to avail
a remedy.

 23. A defence of laches can only
be allowed when there is no statutory bar.
The question as to whether there exists a
clear case of laches on the part of a person
seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also
that of prejudice. The said principle may
not have any application when the
existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by
the other side. To determine the difference
between the concept of laches and
acquiescence is that, in a case involving
mere laches, the principle of estoppel
would apply to all the defences that are
available to a party. Therefore, a defendant
can succeed on the various grounds raised
by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned
alone would be amenable to acquiescence.

 Acquiescence

 24. We have already discussed
the relationship between acquiescence on
the one hand and delay and laches on the
other.

 25. Acquiescence would mean a
tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied
and reluctant consent to an act. In other
words, such an action would qualify a
passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence
takes place, it presupposes knowledge
against a particular act. From the
knowledge
comes
passive
acceptance,
112 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
therefore instead of taking any action
against any alleged refusal to perform the
original
contract,
despite
adequate
knowledge of its terms, and instead being
allowed
to
continue
by
consciously
ignoring it and thereafter proceeding
further, acquiescence does take place. As a
consequence, it reintroduces a new implied
agreement between the parties. Once such
a situation arises, it is not open to the party
that acquiesced itself to insist upon the
compliance of the original terms. Hence,
what is essential, is the conduct of the
parties. We only dealt with the distinction
involving a mere acquiescence. When
acquiescence is followed by delay, it may
become laches. Here again, we are inclined
to hold that the concept of acquiescence is
to be seen on a case-to-case basis.

12. Hon'ble Supreme Court has
reiterated
this
principle
in
case
of
Mrinmoy Maity Vs. Chhanda Koley and
others (2024) SCC OnLine SC 551 as
under:

 "9.
Having
heard
rival
contentions raised and on perusal of the
facts obtained in the present case, we are of
the considered view that writ petitioner
ought to have been non-suited or in other
words writ petition ought to have been
dismissed on the ground of delay and
latches itself. An applicant who approaches
the court belatedly or in other words sleeps
over his rights for a considerable period of
time, wakes up from his deep slumber
ought not to be granted the extraordinary
relief by the writ courts. This Court time
and again has held that delay defeats
equity. Delay or latches is one of the
factors which should be born in mind by
the
High
Court
while
exercising
discretionary powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. In a given case,
the High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if laxity on the part
of the applicant to assert his right has
allowed the cause of action to drift away
and attempts are made subsequently to
rekindle the lapsed cause of action.

 10. The discretion to be exercised
would be with care and caution. If the
delay which has occasioned in approaching
the writ court is explained which would
appeal to the conscience of the court, in
such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid
by the contesting party that for all times to
come the delay is not to be condoned.
There may be myriad circumstances which
gives
rise
to
the
invoking
of
the
extraordinary
jurisdiction
and
it
all
depends on facts and circumstances of each
case, same cannot be described in a
straight jacket formula with mathematical
precision. The ultimate discretion to be
exercised by the writ court depends upon
the facts that it has to travel or the terrain
in which the facts have travelled.

 11. For filing of a writ petition,
there is no doubt that no fixed period of
limitation is prescribed. However, when the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court
is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether
within a reasonable time same has been
invoked and even submitting of memorials
would not revive the dead cause of action
or resurrect the cause of action which has
had a natural death. In such circumstances
on the ground of delay and latches alone,
the appeal ought to be dismissed or the
applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is
found that the writ petitioner is guilty of
delay and latches, the High Court ought to
dismiss the petition on that sole ground
itself, in as much as the writ courts are not
to indulge in permitting such indolent
litigant to take advantage of his own
6 All. U.O.I. & Ors. Vs. Govind Narain Mishra
113
wrong. It is true that there cannot be any
waiver of fundamental right but while
exercising discretionary jurisdiction under
Article 226, the High Court will have to
necessarily take into consideration the
delay and latches on the part of the
applicant in approaching a writ court. This
Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal
v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has
held to the following effect:

 "56. We are unable to uphold the
contention. It is no doubt true that there
can be no waiver of fundamental right. But
while exercising discretionary jurisdiction
under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the
Constitution, this Court takes into account
certain
factors
and
one
of
such
considerations is delay and laches on the
part of the applicant in approaching a writ
court. It is well settled that power to issue a
writ is discretionary. One of the grounds
for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226
of the Constitution is that the petitioner is
guilty
of
delay
and
laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke
jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come
to the Court at the earliest reasonably
possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in
making the motion for a writ will indeed be
a good ground for refusing to exercise such
discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying
object of this principle is not to encourage
agitation of stale claims and exhume
matters which have already been disposed
of or settled or where the rights of third
parties have accrued in the meantime (vide
State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964
SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills
Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC
1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India,
[(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 :
(1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies
even in case of an infringement of
fundamental
right
(vide
Tilokchand
Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC
110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of
Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185]
and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India,
[(1970) 1 SCC 84]).

 58. There is no upper limit and
there is no lower limit as to when a person
can approach a court. The question is one
of discretion and has to be decided on the
basis of facts before the court depending on
and varying from case to case. It will
depend
upon
what
the
breach
of
fundamental right and the remedy claimed
are and when and how the delay arose."

 12. It is apposite to take note of
the dicta laid down by this Court in
Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K.
Thangappan,
(2006)
4
SCC
322
whereunder it has been held that the High
Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary
jurisdiction if there is negligence or
omissions on the part of the applicant to
assert his right. It has been further held
thereunder:

 "6. Delay or laches is one of the
factors which is to be borne in mind by the
High Court when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution. In an appropriate case the
High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if there is such
negligence or omission on the part of the
applicant to assert his right as taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time and
other circumstances, causes prejudice to
the
opposite
party.
Even
where
fundamental right is involved the matter is
still within the discretion of the Court as
pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief
Controller of Imports and Exports, [(1969)
1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course,
114 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the discretion has to be exercised judicially
and reasonably.

 7. What was stated in this regard
by
Sir Barnes
Peacock
in
Lindsay
Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong
Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR 492]
(PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court
in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR
1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v.
Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service,
[(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329].
Sir Barnes had stated:

 "Now, the doctrine of laches in
courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a
technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either
because the party has, by his conduct done
that which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his
conduct and neglect he has though perhaps
not waiving that remedy, yet put the other
party in a situation in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these
cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument
against relief, which otherwise would be
just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay
of course not amounting to a bar by any
statute of limitation, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances
always important in such cases are, the
length of the delay and the nature of the
acts done during the interval which might
affect either party and cause a balance of
justice or injustice in taking the one course
or the other, so far as it relates to the
remedy."

 8. It would be appropriate to note
certain decisions of this Court in which this
aspect has been dealt with in relation to
Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent
that what has been stated as regards that
article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226.
It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v.
Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR
1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to
the petitioner who without any reasonable
explanation approaches this Court under
Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was
stated that though Article 32 is itself a
guaranteed right, it does not follow from this
that it was the intention of the Constitutionmakers that this Court should disregard all
principles and grant relief in petitions filed
after inordinate delay.

 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v.
Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR
1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise
of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the
tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and
the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on
the part of the petitioner and such delay is not
satisfactorily explained, the High Court may
decline to intervene and grant relief in
exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated
that this rule is premised on a number of
factors. The High Court does not ordinarily
permit a belated resort to the extraordinary
remedy because it is likely to cause confusion
and public inconvenience and bring, in its
train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is
exercised after unreasonable delay, it may
have the effect of inflicting not only hardship
and inconvenience but also injustice on third
parties. It was pointed out that when writ
jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay
coupled with the creation of third-party rights
in the meantime is an important factor which
also weighs with the High Court in deciding
whether
or
not
to
exercise
such
jurisdiction."

 13. Reiterating the aspect of
delay and latches would disentitle the
6 All. Dr. Trihuti Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
115
discretionary relief being granted,
this Court in the case of Chennai
Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage
Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC
108 has held:

 "16. Thus, the doctrine of delay
and laches should not be lightly brushed
aside. A writ court is required to weigh the
explanation offered and the acceptability of
the same. The court should bear in mind
that it is exercising an extraordinary and
equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional
court it has a duty to protect the rights of the
citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself
alive to the primary principle that when an
aggrieved person, without adequate reason,
approaches the court at his own leisure or
pleasure, the court would be under legal
obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a
belated stage should be entertained or not.
Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity.
In certain circumstances delay and laches
may not be fatal but in most circumstances
inordinate delay would only invite disaster
for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the
court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction
on the part of a litigant ? a litigant who has
forgotten
the
basic
norms,
namely,
"procrastination is the greatest thief of time"
and second, law does not permit one to sleep
and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in
hazard and causes injury to the lis."

13. Having considered aforesaid,
this Court finds that in the instant case no
interference is required. It is for the
following reasons:-

 (i) Laches of 363 days in
approaching this Court has not been
explained.

 (ii)
Allegations
of
misappropriation are against the then SPM,
Blunt Square Post Office and not against
Govind Narayan Mishra/opposite party and
therefore, to the view of this order to
recover Rs. 20,000/- from Govind Narain
Mishra/opposite party at the verge of
retirement is unsustainable.

 (iii) The finding of the Tribunal
which is to the effect that proper
opportunity of hearing was not given to
Govind Narain Mishra/opposite party has
not been impeached.

14.
Accordingly,
the
present
petition is dismissed.

15. Cost made easy.
----------
(2025) 6 ILRA 115
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.06.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ - A No. 15771 of 2024

Dr. Trihuti Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Rajendra Rai

Counsel for the Respondent:
Avneesh Tripathi, C.S.C., M.N. singh

A. Civil Law - U.P. Government Servant
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rule
7 - Disciplinary Proceedings - Burden of Proof:
In major penalty inquiries, the establishment
must prove charges through documentary and
oral evidence, including witnesses, regardless of
the delinquent's participation. The inquiry officer
cannot presume guilt or rely solely
on
documents without witness testimony. Failure to
produce establishment witnesses vitiates the