# U.P. Civil Secretariat Primary Co-Operative Bank Ltd. Lko v. U.P. Co-Operative Tribunal Lko & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 4 ILRA 841
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-04-20
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 13574 of 2018
- **Bench:** Pankaj Bhatia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/u-p-civil-secretariat-primary-co-operative-bank-ltd-lko-v-u-p-co-operative-48353
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article 226, - U.P. Co-Operative Societies
Act, 1965 - Sections 3, 3(2), 66, 68 & 68(2):
- Registrar - Surcharge - Primary Cooperative Societies - Complaint received
alleging irregularities committed by the
employees & members of Committee of
Management - an investigating committee
was constituted - prima facie certain
irregularities were revealed - impugned
proceeding as well as order passed by Joint
Registrar/Additional
Commissioner
&
Additional Registrar Co-operative - appeals
before
Tribunal
-
tribunal
set
aside
impugned orders same to be without
jurisdiction - writ petition - the powers can
be exercise only by the person upon whom
the powers are delegated specifically - It is
well established that the court cannot read
a statutory provisions contrary to its
language unless the same is prohibited
under the Act or has the potential to lead to
absurd results - matter remanded back to
tribunal to decide the matter afresh.
 (Para- 26, 29, 32).

Writ Petition Allowed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited: -

## Text

_Characters 0–39,994 of 40,784. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39994 for what follows._

4 All. U.P. Civil Secretariat Primary Co-Operative Bank Ltd. Lko Vs. U.P. Co-Operative
 Tribunal Lko & Ors.
841
Cooperative Societies Act would thus be
binding on this court. The judgment in the
case of K.A. Annamma (supra) does not
take
into
consideration
the
earlier
judgments of the Supreme Court in the case
of Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank Ltd.
(supra) and in the case of Prabhu Dayal
(supra) and the same is also rendered in
the context of the provisions of Kerala
Cooperative Societies Act.

12. Thus, in the facts of the present
case, the law as propounded by the
Supreme Court in the case of Ghaziabad
Zila Sahkari Bank Ltd. (supra) would
hold the field.

13. The issue with regard to the
cooperative society being an 'industry' as
defined under section 2(k) of the Industrial
Disputes Act were neither raised before the
labour court nor contested.

14. In the light of the said, I am of the
firm view that the labour court has erred in
passing the award for the period 2001 up to
2006. There being no dispute that the
award dated 29.03.2004 has already been
satisfied, the order dated 17.04.2017 is not
sustainable and is set aside.

15. The writ petition stands disposed
off in terms of the said order.
----------
(2022)04ILR A841
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 20.04.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ BHATIA, J.

Writ-C No. 13574 of 2018
alongwith other connected matters

U.P. Civil Secretariat Primary Co-Operative
Bank Ltd. Lko ...Petitioner
Versus
U.P. Co-Operative Tribunal Lko & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Vinod Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Anurag Srivastava, Rakesh Srivastava

Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article 226, - U.P. Co-Operative Societies
Act, 1965 - Sections 3, 3(2), 66, 68 & 68(2):
- Registrar - Surcharge - Primary Cooperative Societies - Complaint received
alleging irregularities committed by the
employees & members of Committee of
Management - an investigating committee
was constituted - prima facie certain
irregularities were revealed - impugned
proceeding as well as order passed by Joint
Registrar/Additional
Commissioner
&
Additional Registrar Co-operative - appeals
before
Tribunal
-
tribunal
set
aside
impugned orders same to be without
jurisdiction - writ petition - the powers can
be exercise only by the person upon whom
the powers are delegated specifically - It is
well established that the court cannot read
a statutory provisions contrary to its
language unless the same is prohibited
under the Act or has the potential to lead to
absurd results - matter remanded back to
tribunal to decide the matter afresh.
 (Para- 26, 29, 32).

Writ Petition Allowed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited: -

1. Ravi Pratap Srivastava & ors.Vs Co-operative
Tribunal, U.P., Lucknow & ors.(Misc. Single
No.1712 of 2010 decided on dated 09.04.2010),

2. Sultana Begum Vs Prem Chand Jain, (1997) 1
SCC 373),

3. Maya Mathew Vs St. of Kerala & ors., (2010)
4 SCC 498),
842 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
4. Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan Vs M/s
Binani Cements Ltd. & anr., (2014) 8 SCC 319)

5. St. of Kerala Vs P.B. Sourabhan & ors., (2016)
4 SCC 102),

6. Smt. Lilawati & ors. Vs U.P. Co-operative
Tribunal, Lucknow & ors., 2020 (3) ADJ 622),

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Bhatia, J.)

1. Heard Sri Vinod Kumar Singh,
learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as
Sri Pankaj Srivastava along with Sri
Shashank
Bhasim,
learned
Counsel
appearing on behalf of the State and Sri
Rakesh
Srivastava,
learned
Counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent no.5
in leading Writ-C No.13574 of 2018.

2. All the petitions arise out of a
common order, as such, the same are being
decided by means of this common
judgment.

3. For the sake of brevity, the facts as
emerge from Writ-C No.13574 of 2018 are
being recorded.

4. By means of the present writ
petitions, the petitioners have challenged
the judgment and order dated 21.03.2018
passed by the U.P. Co-operative Tribunal,
Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as "the
Tribunal"), whereby the appeals preferred
against the order dated 23.01.2017 have
been allowed.

5. The facts in brief are that in the
year 2013, a complaint was received
alleging irregularities committed by the
employees as well as the members of the
Committee of Management of the U.P.
Civil Secretariat Primary Co-operative
Bank Limited, on which, initially a
Committee was constituted under Section
66 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act,
1965 (in short "the 1965 Act") and the
matter was got investigated. It is stated that
prima facie, certain irregularities were
revealed. The proceedings were instituted
under Section 68(2) of the 1965 Act. After
hearing the parties, an order came to be
passed under Section 68(2) on 23.01.2017
by an officer designated as the Joint
Commissioner
and
Joint
Registrar/
Additional Commissioner and Additional
Registrar Co-operative.

6. Aggrieved against the said order, the
persons against whom the said orders were
passed (respondents herein) preferred appeals
before the Tribunal. In all nine appeals, the
main argument of the appellants was that the
order
dated
23.01.2017
is
without
jurisdiction. In support of the said argument,
the appellants relied upon the notification
issued by the State Government in exercise of
powers conferred under Section 3(2) of the
1965 Act on 05.07.1969 as well as the
subsequent notification dated 27.12.1975.
They also placed reliance on the judgment of
this Court dated 09.04.2010 passed in Misc.
Single No.1712 of 2010 [Ravi Pratap
Srivastava and others vs Co-operative
Tribunal, U.P., Lucknow and others]. The
Tribunal relying upon the judgment dated
09.04.2010 passed in the case of Ravi Pratap
Srivastava (supra) allowed the appeals vide
order dated 21.03.2018 and set aside the
orders dated 23.01.2017 holding the same to
be without jurisdiction and further observed
that in case, any irregularity comes to light,
the orders can be passed under Section 68 of
the 1965 Act in accordance with law. The
said order dated 21.03.2018 is under
challenge before this Court.

7. The Counsel for the petitioner
argues that the orders passed by officer
designated as the Joint Commissioner and
4 All. U.P. Civil Secretariat Primary Co-Operative Bank Ltd. Lko Vs. U.P. Co-Operative
 Tribunal Lko & Ors.
843
Joint Registrar/ Additional Commissioner
and Additional Registrar Co-operative was
well within jurisdiction. He argues that
Section 3 of the 1965 Act provides for a
Registrar and the State Government is
under an obligation to appoint a person to
be the Registrar of the Co-operative
Societies for the State. Sub-section (2) of
Section 3 confers additional powers on the
State Government to appoint other persons
to assist the Registrar by a general or
special order and confer upon them all or
any of the powers of the Registrar. Section
3 is quoted hereinbelow:

"3.
Registrar.
-
(1)
The
State
Government may appoint a person to be the
Registrar of Cooperative Societies for the
State.

(2) The State Government may, for the
purposes of this Act, also appoint other
persons to assist the Registrar and by
general or special order confer on any such
person all or any of the powers of the
Registrar.

(3) Where any order has been made
under sub-section (2) conferring on any
person all or any of the powers of the
Registrar under any provision of this Act,
such order shall be deemed to confer on
him all the powers under that provision as
may be amended from time to time."

8. The Counsel for the petitioner
further
argues
that
the
order
dated
23.01.2017 was passed in exercise of
powers under Section 68 of the 1965 Act
which confers the power of levy of
surcharge on the Registrar. Section 68 is
quoted hereinbelow:

"68. Surcharge. - (1) If in the course
of an audit, inquiry, inspection or the
winding up of a co-operative society it is
found that any person, who is or was
entrusted
with
the
organization
or
management of such society or who is or
has at any time been an officer or an
employee of the society, has made or
caused to be made any payment contrary to
this Act, the rules or the bye-laws or has
caused any deficiency in the assets of the
society by breach of trust or wilful
negligence or has misappropriated or
fraudulently retained any money or other
property belonging to such Society, the
Registrar may of his own motion or on the
application of the committee, liquidator or
any creditor, inquire himself or direct any
person authorized by him by an order in
writing in this behalf to inquire into the
conduct of such person:

Provided that no such inquiry shall be
commenced after the expiry of twelve years
from the date of any act or omission
referred to in this sub-section.

(2) Where an inquiry is made under
sub-section (1) the Registrar may, after
affording
the
person
concerned
a
reasonable opportunity of being heard,
made an order of surcharge requiring him
to restore the property or repay the money
or any part thereof with interest at such
rate, or to pay contribution and costs or
compensation to such an extent as the
Registrar may consider just and equitable.

(3) Where-an order of surcharge has
been passed against a person under subsection
(2)
for
having
caused
any
deficiency in the assets of the society by
breach of trust or willful negligence, or for
having misappropriated or fraudulently
retained any money or other property
belonging to such society, such person
shall, subject to the result of appeal, if any,
field against such order, be disqualified
from continuing in or being elected or
appointed to an office in any co-operative
society for a period of five years from the
date of the order of surcharge."
844 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

9. The Counsel for the petitioner
further argues that by means of a specific
notification issued under Section 3(2) of
the 1965 Act on 05.07.1969, the powers to
be exercised by the Registrar were
conferred upon the Deputy Registrar/
Assistant
Registrar,
(in-charge
of
a
Division) under Clause 2 of the said
notification and in the light thereof, all the
powers to be exercised by the Registrar
could also be exercised by the Deputy
Registrar/ Assistant Registrar, (in-charge of
a Division). He further argues that
subsequent
to
the
notification
dated
05.07.1969, another notification was issued
on 27.12.1975 reiterating the delegation of
powers on the Deputy Registrar who could
exercise all the powers conferred on the
Registrar.
Based
upon
the
said
notifications, the Counsel for the petitioner
argues that the Tribunal has erred in
allowing the appeal on the question of
jurisdiction, inasmuch as, the Deputy
Registrar was duly empowered to perform
the functions which are conferred upon the
Registrar in terms of the mandate of the
1965 Act. He further argues that the
judgment of this Court dated 09.04.2010 in
Ravi Pratap Srivastava (supra) does not go
into all these questions and does not take
notice of the notifications and thus merely
placing reliance on the said judgment was
not a proper exercise of power by the
Tribunal. In the light of the aforesaid
arguments, it is argued that the petitions
deserve to be allowed and the order passed
in appeal by the Tribunal is required to be
set aside.

10. The learned Additional Chief
Standing
Counsel
based
upon
the
instructions of Mr. R.K. Kulshrestha, the
Additional Registrar, who is present in
Court, argues that in terms of the
notification issued by virtue of powers
conferred under Section 3 (2) of the 1965
Act, the notification issued on 05.07.1969
conferred simultaneous powers on the
Additional Registrar and the Joint Registrar
for exercise of powers of the Registrar only
in respect of the societies which were given
under the charge of the Additional
Registrar or the Joint Registrar by the
Registrar as well as the Assistant Registrar
was conferred the powers in respect of
Primary Co-operative Societies for exercise
of powers under Section 68. He further
states that subsequently by virtue of
notification dated 27.12.1975, the position
which stood by virtue of Clause (1) of the
notification of 1969 was clarified and
extended to include all the powers of the
Registrar by the Additional Registrar at the
Headquarters or the Deputy Registrar at the
Headquarters in respect of the societies
which were assigned by the Registrar to the
said Additional Registrar or the Deputy
Registrar in respect of the societies within
the division. The Deputy Registrar was
conferred to the powers exercised by the
Registrar within the said division and it was
further clarified that the District Additional
Registrar can exercise the powers only in
respect of the societies which fall within
the area of jurisdiction and to that extent,
the notification dated 05.07.1969 was
clarified.

11. The Counsel for the respondent
Sri Rakesh Srivastava, on the other hand,
argues that it is well settled that the powers
under Section 68 are to be exercised by the
Registrar of the Society and the said
powers can be delegated validly by the
State Government by exercising the powers
under Section 3(2) of the 1965 Act. He,
however, submits that in the notification
dated 05.07.1969 while in Clause (2), the
powers of a Registrar were delegated upon
the Deputy Registrar/ Assistant Registrar,
4 All. U.P. Civil Secretariat Primary Co-Operative Bank Ltd. Lko Vs. U.P. Co-Operative
 Tribunal Lko & Ors.
845
however, in terms of Clause (4), there was
specific delegation of powers on the
District Assistant Registrar for exercise of
powers under Section 68 relating to
Primary Co-operative Societies.

12. The Counsel for the respondent
further
argues
that
the
subsequent
notification of 1975 does not repeal the
earlier notification of 1969, in fact, it
specifically provides that the notification
dated 27.12.1975 is in continuation of the
earlier notification. He argues that although
in the notification dated 27.12.1975, the
powers have been conferred upon the
Deputy Registrar under Clause (2) of the
1975
notification,
however,
the
fact
remains that a specific delegation as
conferred by Clause (4) of the 1969
notification could still not held to be
repealed especially relating to exercise of
power under Section 68 of the 1965 Act
relating to the Primary Co-operative
Societies. On the foundation of the said, he
argues that once the delegation is specific,
the general delegation would not prevail
and the argument of the Counsel for the
petitioner cannot be accepted. In support of
his submission, he places reliance on the
views of the various Authors, while quoting
from "Juridical Review Of Administrative
Action". He relies upon the following
paragraphs:

"A discretionary power must, in
general, be exercised only by the authority
to which it has been committed. It is a wellknown principle of law that when a power
has been confided to a person in
circumstances indicating that trust is being
placed in his individual judgment and
discretion, he must exercise that power
personally unless he has been expressly
empowered to delegate it to another. This
principle, which has often been applied in
the law of agency, trusts and arbitration, is
expressed in the form of the maxim
delegatus
non
potest
delegare
(or
delegari), a maxim which, it has been
suggested, "owes its origin to mediaeval
commentators on the Digest and the
Dcretals, and its vogue in the common law
to the carelessness of a sixteenth-century
printer." The widespread assumption that it
applies only to the sub-delegation of
delegated legislative powers and to the
sub-delegation of other powers delegated
by a superior administrative authority is
unfounded. It applies to the delegation of
all classes of powers, and it was indeed
originally invoked in the context of
delegation of judicial powers. It
is
therefore convenient to travel beyond the
delegation of discretionary powers in the
strict sense and to view the problem as a
whole."

13. The Counsel for the respondent
further relies upon the commentary of
"Administrative Law" of Sir William Wade,
which is as under:

"An element which is essential to the
lawful exercise of power is that it should be
exercised by the authority upon whom it is
conferred, and by no one else. The principle
is strictly applied, even where it causes
administrative inconvenience, except in cases
where it may reasonably be inferred that the
power was intended to be delegable.
Normally the courts are rigorous in requiring
the power to be exercised by the precise
person or body stated in the statute, and in
condemning as ultra vires action taken by
agents, sub-committees or delegates, however
expressly
authorised
by
the
authority
endowed with the power."

14. He further argues that the
Government Orders have to be construed
846 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
harmoniously and specifically relies upon
the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Sultana Begum vs Prem
Chand Jain; (1997) 1 SCC 373 wherein he
places particular emphasis. Paragraphs 11
to 17 and 21 are quoted below:

"11. The statute has to be read as a
whole to find out the real intention of the
legislature.

12. In Canada Sugar Refining Co. vs.
R. (1898) AC 735, Lord Davy observed:-

"Every clause of a statute should be
construed with reference to the context and
other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as
possible, to make a consistent enactment of
the whole statute or series of statutes
relating to the subject-matter."

13. This Court has adopted the same
rule
in
M.
Pentiah
vs
Muddala
Veeramallappa; AIR 1961 SC 1107;
Gamman India Ltd. vs Union of India; AIR
1974
SC
960;
Mysore
State
Road
Transports Corporation vs Mirza Khasim
All Beg; AIR 1977 SC 747; V. Tulsamma
vs. Sesha Reddy; (1977) 3 SCC 99; Punjab
Beverages (P) Ltd. vs Suresh Chand; AIR
1978 SC 995; Commissioner of Income-tax
vs. National Taj Traders; AIR 1980 SC
485; Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd.
vs State of West Bengal; AIR 1962 SC 1044
and J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving
Mills vs State of U.P. AIR 1961 SC 1170.

14. This rule of construction which is
also spoken of as "ex visceribus actus"
helps in avoiding any inconsistency either
within a Section or between two different
Section or provisions of the same statute.

15. On a conspectus of the case law
indicated above, the following principles
are clearly discernible:

(1) It is the duty of the courts to avoid
a head-on clash between two Sections of
the Act and to construe the provisions
which appear to be in conflict with each
other in such a manner as to harmonise
them.

(2) The provisions of one Section of a
statute cannot be used to defeat the other
provisions unless the court, in spite of its
efforts, finds it impossible to effect
reconciliation between them.

(3) It has to be borne in mind by all
the courts all the time that when there are
two conflicting provisions in an Act, which
cannot be reconciled with each other, they
should be so interpreted that, if possible,
effect should be given to both. This is the
essence of the rule of "harmonious
construction".

(4) The courts have also to keep in
mind that an interpretation which reduces
one of the provisions as a "dead letter" or
"useless
lumber"
is
not
harmonious
construction.

(5) To harmonise is not to destroy any
statutory provision or to render it otiose.

16. Interpreting the provisions of
Section 47 and Order XXI Rule 2 in the
light of the above principles, there does not
appear to be any antithesis between the two
provisions. Section 47 deals with the power
of the court executing the decree while
Order XXI Rule 2 deals with the procedure
which a court whose duty it is to execute
the decree has to follow in a limited class
of cases relating to the discharge or
satisfaction of decrees either by payment of
money (payable under the decree) out of
court or adjustment in any other manner by
consensual arrangement.

17. Since Section 47 provides that the
question
relating
to
the
execution,
discharge or satisfaction of the decrees
shall be determined by the court executing
the decree, it clearly confers a specific
jurisdiction for the determination of those
questions on the executing court.

21. The problem can be looked into
from another angle on the basis of the
4 All. U.P. Civil Secretariat Primary Co-Operative Bank Ltd. Lko Vs. U.P. Co-Operative
 Tribunal Lko & Ors.
847
maxim
"generalia
specialibus
non
derogant".

15. He also places reliance on the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Maya Mathew vs State of
Kerala and others; (2010) 4 SCC 498
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
on an occasion to consider the applicability
of two Rules applicable to the services of
the employee concerned and specifically
laid
the
law
with
regard
to
the
interpretation as under:

"12. The rules of interpretation when a
subject is governed by two sets of Rules are
well settled. They are:

(i) When a provision of law regulates
a particular subject and a subsequent law
contains a provision regulating the same
subject, there is no presumption that the
later law repeals the earlier law. The rule
making authority while making the later
rule is deemed to know the existing law on
the subject. If the subsequent law does not
repeal the earlier rule, there can be no
presumption of an intention to repeal the
earlier rule;

(ii) When two provisions of law - one
being a general law and the other being
special law govern a matter, the court
should endeavour to apply a harmonious
construction to the said provisions. But
where the intention of the rule making
authority is made clear either expressly or
impliedly, as to which law should prevail,
the same shall be given effect.

(iii) If the repugnancy or inconsistency
subsists in spite of an effort to read them
harmoniously, the prior special law is not
presumed to be repealed by the later
general law. The prior special law will
continue to apply and prevail in spite of the
subsequent general law. But where a clear
intention to make a rule of universal
application by superseding the earlier
special law is evident from the later
general law, then the later general law, will
prevail over the prior special law.

(iv) Where a later special law is
repugnant to or inconsistent with an earlier
general law, the later special law will
prevail over the earlier general law."

16. He also places reliance on another
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Commercial Tax Officer,
Rajasthan vs M/s Binani Cements Limited
and another; (2014) 8 SCC 319 wherein the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held on the
occasion to consider the applicability of two
laws and to decide whether a general law
would apply or special law would apply and
in that context, Hon'ble Supreme Court has
observed as under:

"34. It is well established that when a
general law and a special law dealing with
some aspect dealt with by the general law are
in question, the rule adopted and applied is
one of harmonious construction whereby the
general law, to the extent dealt with by the
special law, is impliedly repealed. This
principle finds its origins in the Latin maxim
of generalia specialibus non derogant i.e.
general law yields to special law should they
operate in the same field on same subject
(Vepa P. Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes,
5th Edn., Eastern Book Company; N.S.
Bindra's Interpretation of Statutes, 8th Edn.,
The Law Book Company; Craies on Statute
Law, S.G.G. Edkar, 7th Edn., Sweet &
Maxwell; Justice G.P. Singh, Principles of
Statutory Interpretation, 13th Edn., Lexis
Nexis;
Craies
on
Legislation,
Daniel
Greenberg, 9th Edn., Thomson Sweet &
Maxwell, Maxwell on Interpretation of
Statutes, 12th Edn., Lexis Nexis).

35. Generally, the principle has found
vast application in cases of there being two
848 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
statutes: general or specific with the latter
treating the common subject-matter more
specifically or minutely than the former.
Corpus Juris Secundum, 82 C.J.S. Statutes
§ 482 states that when construing a general
and a specific statute pertaining to the
same topic, it is necessary to consider the
statutes as consistent with one another and
such
statutes
therefore
should
be
harmonised, if possible, with the objective
of giving effect to a consistent legislative
policy. On the other hand, where a general
statute and a specific statute relating to the
same subject-matter cannot be reconciled,
the special or specific statute ordinarily
will
control.
The
provision
more
specifically directed to the matter at issue
prevails as an exception to or qualification
of the provision which is more general in
nature, provided that the specific or special
statute clearly includes the matter in
controversy (Edmond v. United States [137
L Ed 2d 917 : 520 US 651 (1997)], Warden
v. Marrero [41 L Ed 2d 383 : 417 US 653
(1974)] ).

36. The maxim generalia specialibus
non derogant is dealt with in Vol. 44(1) of
the 4th Edn. of Halsbury's Laws of England
at Para 1300 as follows:

"The principle descends clearly from
decisions of the House of Lords in Seward
v. Vera Cruz [(1884) LR 10 AC 59 : (188185) All ER Rep 216 (HL)] and the Privy
Council in Barker v. Edger [1898 AC 748 :
(1895-99) All ER Rep Ext 1642 (PC)] and
has been affirmed and put into effect on
many occasions.... If Parliament has
considered all the circumstances of, and
made special provision for, a particular
case, the presumption is that a subsequent
enactment of a purely general character
would not have been intended to interfere
with that provision; and therefore, if such
an enactment, although inconsistent in
substance, is capable of reasonable and
sensible application without extending to
the case in question, it is prima facie to be
construed as not so extending. The special
provision stands as an exceptional proviso
upon the general. If, however, it appears
from a consideration of the general
enactment in the light of admissible
circumstances
that
Parliament's
true
intention was to establish thereby a rule of
universal application, then the special
provision must give way to the general."

17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case
of
Commercial
Tax
Officer,
Rajasthan (supra), after discussing the
various judgment on the point aforesaid
finally observed as under:

"47. Having noticed the aforesaid, it
could be concluded that the rule of
statutory construction that the specific
governs the general is not an absolute rule
but is merely a strong indication of
statutory meaning that can be overcome by
textual indications that point in the other
direction.
This
rule
is
particularly
applicable where the legislature has
enacted comprehensive scheme and has
deliberately targeted specific problems
with specific solutions. A subject specific
provision relating to a specific, defined and
descriptable subject is regarded as an
exception to and would prevail over a
general provision relating to a broad
subject."

18. In the light of the aforesaid
arguments and the judgments cited, the
Counsel for the respondents argues that the
petition deserves to be dismissed.

19. In rejoinder, the Counsel for the
petitioner
while
placing
reliance
on
paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court judgment in the case of State of
4 All. U.P. Civil Secretariat Primary Co-Operative Bank Ltd. Lko Vs. U.P. Co-Operative
 Tribunal Lko & Ors.
849
Kerala vs P.B. Sourabhan and others;
(2016) 4 SCC 102 argues that the powers
could be exercised by the Deputy Registrar
as has been rightly done and the tribunal
was wrong in passing the order which is
impugned in the bunch of writ petitions.

20. He also places reliance on the
judgment of this Court in the case of Smt.
Lilawati and six others vs U.P. Cooperative Tribunal, Lucknow and others;
2020 (3) ADJ 622 to argue that the
question of jurisdiction was not raised and
thus he would be estopped from raising
question at the appellate stage.

21. In the light of the arguments, the
Court is to decide the effect of two
notifications which are to be interpreted by
this Court conferring jurisdiction on the
Deputy Registrar and District Assistant
Registrar or the District Assistant Registrar
only for exercise of powers under Section
68 of the1965 Act in respect of Primary
Co-operative Societies.

22. Section 3(2) of the Act confers the
powers upon the State Government to
appoint other persons to assist the Registrar
by special or general order. Thus, in terms
of the mandate of Section 3(2), it is upon
for the State Government to delegate the
functions and powers to be performed by
the Registrar upon any of the officers as
specified in the notification.

23. Relevant extracts of Notification
No.3328-C/ XII-CA-25(1)-67, dated June
24, 1969 and Notification No.5539/ C-1-7
(16) 75, Lucknow dated 27.12.1975 are
quoted herein:

"Notification No.3328-C/ XII-CA25(1)-67, dated June 24, 1969

In exercise of the powers under subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Uttar
Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1965
(U.P. Act XI of 1966), the Governor is
pleased to confer, subject to the provisions
of the said Act and the rules made
thereunder, the powers of the Registrar
under that Act and the rules, to be
exercised as follows:

(1) An officer for the time being
holding the post of Additional Registrar,
Co-operative Societies, at the headquarters
of the Registrar Co-operative Societies,
U.P. or the Deputy Registrar of the Cooperative Societies at the said headquarters
shall exercise the powers of the Registrar
under the Act and the rules in respect of
such class or classes or type or types of Cooperative Societies which, by the order of
the Registrar, are placed under the charge
of such officer:

Provided that the power under Section
14, 125 and 126 and under Rules, 30, 31,
32 and 33 shall not be exercised by the said
Deputy Registrar in respect of an apex Cooperative Society or a Central Cooperative Society and the powers under
Rules, 124, 125 and 126 shall not be
exercised by him in respect of an apex Cooperative Society;

2. An officer for the time being holding
the post of Deputy Registrar/ Assistant
Registrar, Incharge of a Division, shall
exercise the powers of the Registrar under
the Act and the rules within the area of his
jurisdiction:

Provided that the powers under
Sections 14, 125, and 126 and under Rules
30, 31, 32 and 33 shall not be exercised by
the said Deputy Registrar/ Assistant
Registrar in respect of an apex Cooperative Society or a Central Cooperative Society and the powers under
Rules 124, 125 and 126 shall not be
850 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
exercised by such officer in respect of an
apex Co-operative Society;

(3) ...

(4) An office for the time being holding
the post of District Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies, U.P. shall exercise the
powers of the Registrar -

(a) under Section 32, 33, 37, 66, 67,
69 and 103 of the Act and Rules 104, 134
and 287 in respect of all the Co-operative
Societies, other than apex Co-operative
Societies, having headquarters within the
area of his jurisdiction;

(b) under Sections 70, 71, 98, 109 and
115 of the Act and Rules 312(c) 331, 332,
336, 365, 366, 369, 370, 371, 372, 374, 377
and 378 in respect of all the Co-operative
Societies, having headquarters within the
area of his jurisdiction; and

(c) under Sections 27, 29, 31, 65, 68,
74, 91, 92 and 127 of the Act and Rules 42,
43, 60, 61, 62, 90, 97, 110, 111, 124, 125,
151, 178, 180, 213, 214, 215 and 224 in
respect only the primary Co-operative
Societies, having headquarters within the
area of his jurisdiction;"

¿lgdkfjrk1⁄411⁄2
vuqHkkx]
la[;k
5539@lh&1&71⁄4161⁄2 75] y[kuÅ fnukad 27 fnlEcj]
1975À

mRrj izns'k lk/kkj.k [kaM vf/kfu;e] 1904
1⁄4mRrj izns'k vf/kfu;e la[;k 1] 19041⁄2 dh /kkjk 21 ds
lkFk ifBr mRrj izns'k lgdkjh lfefr vf/kfu;e]
1965 1⁄4mRrj izns'k vf/kfu;e la[;k 11] 19661⁄2 dh
/kkjk 3 dh mi/kkjk 1⁄421⁄2 ds v/khu 'kfDr dk iz;ksx
djds rFkk ljdkjh vf/klwpuk la[;k 3328@lh@12
lh ,&25 1⁄411⁄2@67] fnukad 24 twu 1969 ds dze esa
jkT;iky fuEufyf[kr O;fDr;ksa dks rRdkyhu izHkko ls
mRrj izns'k lgkdjh lfefr 1⁄4la'kks/ku1⁄2 v/;kns'k] 1975
1⁄4mRrj izns'k v/;kns'k la[;k 26] 19751⁄2 }kjk
;Fkkla'kksf/kr mDr vfkfu;e la[;k 11] 1966 ds v/khu
fucU/kd ds vf/kdkjh iznku djrs gS%&

1⁄411⁄2 lgdkjh lfefr;ksa ds fucU/kd] mRrj izns'k
ds eq[;ky; vij ij fucU/kd] ;k mDr eq[;ky; ij
lgdkjh lfefr;ksa ds mi fucU/kd dk in /kkj.k djus
okyk dksbZ O;fDr ,sls oxZ ;k oxksZ vFkok ,sls izdkj ;k
izdkjks dh lgdkjh lfefr;kas ds tks fucU/kd ds vkns'k
}kjk ,sls vij fucU/kd ;k mi fucU/kd ds izHkkj esa
j[kh xbZ gks] lEcU/k esa mDr v/;kns'k }kjk ;Fkk
la'kksf/kr mDr vf/kfu;e la[;k 11] 1966 ds v/khu
fucU/kd dh 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djsxkA

1⁄421⁄2 fMohtu eas rRle;] lgdkjh lfefr;ksa ds
mi fucU/kd dk in /kkj.k djus okyk dksbZ O;fDr
vius vf/kdkfjrk ds {ks= esa mDr v/;kns'k }kjk
;Fkkla'kksf/kr mDr vf/kfu;e l[a;k 11] 1966 ds
v/khu fucU/kd dh 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djsxkA

1⁄431⁄2 rRle; ftyk lgk;d fucU/kd] lgdkjh
lfefr;ksa dk in /kkj.k djus okyk dksbZ O;fDr dsoy
,slh izkjfEHkd lgdkjh lfefr;ksa ds ftuds eq[;ky;
mudh vf/kdkfjrk ds {ks= ds Hkhrj gks] lEcU/k esa mDr
v/;kns'k }kjk ;Fkkla'kksf/kr mDr vf/kfu;e la[;k 11]
1966 dh /kkjk 29] 35&d rFkk 95&d ds v/khu
fucU/kd dh 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djsxkA"

24. From the notification dated
05.07.1969, it is clear that the powers of the
Registrar have been delegated extensively
upon the Deputy Registrar/ Assistant
Registrar, (in-charge of the Division) in
terms of Clause (2) relating to all the
powers
of
the
Registrar
except
as
prohibited under the proviso to Clause (2)
of the notification dated 05.07.1969. If
Clause (2) is read with Clause (4), it makes
clear that simultaneous and concurrent
powers have been delegated to the Deputy
Registrar
and
the
District
Assistant
Registrar, the only difference being that the
powers of the Deputy Registrar/ Assistant
Registrar in that division go the extent of
all the powers to be performed by the
Registrar except as prohibited under the
proviso to Clause (2) whereas the District
Assistant Registrar under Clause (4)not can
perform and exercise the powers of a
Registrar in respect of the powers conferred
and specifies under Clause (a) to (c) of
Clause (4) of the notification dated
05.07.1969. The notification of 1975
delegated all powers to be exercised by the
Registrar upon the Additional Registrar or
Deputy Registrar in respect of societies
placed by the Registrar under the said
4 All. U.P. Civil Secretariat Primary Co-Operative Bank Ltd. Lko Vs. U.P. Co-Operative
 Tribunal Lko & Ors.
851
Additional Registrar or Deputy Registrar.
Interestingly there is no corresponding
provisions akin to Clause (4) as was
contained in the notification dated 1969.

25. It is also relevant to mention here
that the word "Deputy Registrar" used in
the earlier notifications of 1969 and 1975
were amended to include the word "Joint/
Deputy Registrar" by virtue of another
notification dated 26.07.2006.

26. Considering the submissions of
the Counsel for the respondents, the law in
respect of delegation of powers/ functions
is reasonably and fairly well settled that the
powers can be exercised only by the person
upon whom the powers are delegated
specifically and in terms of the mandate of
the Act and by no one else. However, there
is no bar that the powers cannot be
conferred on multiple officers giving them
concurrent jurisdiction to exercise the
powers which also appears from the
mandate of Section 3(2) of the 1965 Act
which used the word 'persons' and not
'person'.

27. The judgment cited by the
Counsel for the respondent in the case of
Sultana Begum (supra) lays down the law
while interpreting two provisions which are
inconsistent. Similarly the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Maya Methew (supra)
interprets and lays down law to interpret
rules which are overlapping, whereas, in
the present case the two provisions in the
notification of 1969 are not inconsistent but
confer jurisdiction on two set of officers
one at the divisional level and other at the
district level in respect of Primary Cooperative Societies.

28.

Conforming
concurrent
jurisdiction on two or more offices is
neither barred under the Act nor is
unknown in adjudicatory functions, in fact
the Section 3(2) envisages and provides for
delegations in favour of 'persons'.

29. It is well established that the court
cannot read a statutory provisions contrary
to its language unless the same is
prohibited under the Act or has the
potential to lead to absurd results.

30. This Court can also not loose site
of the fact that the vires of the notifications
or the provisions of the Act are not under
challenge in the present proceedings and
thus the same are to be read only on the
terms as contained in the notification.

31. As regards the judgment of this
Court in the case of Ravi Pratap Srivastava
(supra) which is the foundation for passing
the impugned order, the same ex-facie does
not consider the scope of notifications of
1969 or 1975, thus cannot be read to be
laying any law on question of jurisdiction
of officers under the Act.

32. Thus on the basis of the reasoning
recorded above, it has to be held that
concurrent jurisdiction has been conferred
upon the officers in respect of Primary Cooperative Societies and the order passed by
the Joint Registrar/ Joint Commissioner
(Co-operative), Lucknow, respondent no.3
dated 23.01.2017 and impugned before the
Tribunal was well within jurisdiction and
thus the order of the Tribunal dated
21.03.2018 is clearly not sustainable and is
set aside in all the petitions, the matters are
remanded before the Tribunal to decide the
matter afresh on merits and in accordance
with law with all expedition.

33. The writ petitions stand allowed.
----------
852 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2022)04ILR A852
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.02.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. KAUSHAL JAYENDRA
THAKER, J.
THE HON'BLE AJAI TYAGI, J.

Writ-C No. 22624 of 2021

Prathama U.P. Gramin Bank, Moradabad
 ...Petitioner
Versus
U.O.I. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Dharmendra Vaish

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Sri Deepak Singh, Ms. Punita Pandey,
Mrs. Shweta Pandey

Civil
Law
-
Consumer
Protection
Act,1986 - Complaint was filed in the year
1999
by
the
Consumer
-
sum
of
Rs.1,01,145/- with interest @ 15% was
ordered to be paid by the bank vide order
01.04.022 - State Consumer Redressal
Dispute Commission, U.P. Lucknow rejected
the appeal of the petitioner bank - No
appeal was filed by the bank before the
National
Consumer
Dispute
Redressal
Commission - Held - Petitioner bank has
chosen after three years to come before
this Court challenging the order date
24.05.2021 in spite of contesting the
execution proceedings
- order of the
Consumer Commission cannot be brought to
challenge by way of seeking a writ of
certiorari
-
writ
petition
against
the
issuance
of
notice
by
the
Consumer
Commission cannot be entertained and they
should appear before the Commission and
raise all objections - writ petition dismissed
as not maintainable with costs quantified at
Rs.20,000/- (Para 6, 7)

Dismissed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited :-

1. N.N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. Vs Indo
Unique Flame Ltd. (2021) 2 SCC (Civ.) 555

2. Radha Krishan Industries Vs St. of H.P.
(2021) 6 SCC 771

3. M. Chinnamuthu (Dead) Vs Kamaleshan @
Shanmugam (Dead) Through LRS reported in
2022 LiveLaw (SC) 209

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Kaushal
Jayendra Thaker, J. &
Hon'ble Ajai Tyagi, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mrs. Shweta Pandey, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of respondents
and counsel for the State.

2. This petition has been filed by the
petitioners seeking following relief: