# U.P.P.C.L. & Anr v. U.P. State Public Service Tribunal & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 3 ILRA 164
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-02-13
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 19501 of 2018
- **Bench:** Ramesh Sinha, Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/u-p-p-c-l-anr-v-u-p-state-public-service-tribunal-ors-49941
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Punishment - Limitation
- U.P. St. Public (Tribunals) Act, 1976 -
Section 5(1)(b) - The point of limitation
goes to the root of the matter. It involves
a jurisdictional issue. The Limitation Act
has been made applicable to the Tribunal,
as it was applicable to a suit, thus, Section
5 thereof has no application to a reference
filed under Section 4 of the Act. If a claim
petition is barred by limitation, then
irrespective of its merits, the Tribunal has
no other option but to decline to entertain
it. It does not have the power to condone
the delay. (Para 13)

As S. 5(1)(b) provides that the provisions of the
Uttar Pradesh Act 1963 shall mutatis mutandis
apply to reference u/s 4, as the reference were
a suit filed in the civil court, S. 3 of the
Limitation Act would apply to it, which provides
that a suit instituted after the prescribed period
of limitation, shall be dismissed, although
limitation has not been set up as a defence. The
Tribunal has no power to condone the delay in
filing the claim petition. Therefore, the claim
petition filed after the expiry of the limitation
period has to be dismissed and it cannot be
entertained and adjudicated on its merits merely
because it had been admitted. (Para 24, 25)

B. A decision as is well known, is an
authority for which it decides, and not
what can logically be deduced therefrom.
A little difference in facts or additional
facts may make a lot of difference in the
precedential value of a decision. (Para 19)

C. When a belated representation in
regard to a stale or dead issue/dispute is
3 All. U.P.P.C.L. & Anr. Vs. U.P. State Public Service Tribunal & Ors.
165
considered and decided, in compliance
with a direction of the Court or Tribunal to
do so. The date of the said decision cannot
be considered as furnishing a cause-ofaction for reviving the dead issue or timebarred dispute. The issue of limitation or
delay and latches should be considered
with reference to the original cause-ofaction, and not with reference to the date
on which an order is passed in compliance
with a Court's direction. (Para 21, 22)

In the present case, punishment order was
passed on 5.5.2006. The respondent no. 2
submitted
a
representation
against
the
aforesaid order on 12.6.2006 to the U.P.
Power Corporation Ltd. The representation
was treated as an appeal and was rejected by
means
of
an
order
dated
22.5.2008.
Thereafter, the respondent no. 2 again
submitted representations dated 17.11.2008
and 30.3.2016 to the same authority, without
making mention of the provision under which
the same were filed. The representations
were disposed of by stating that as the appeal
filed by the respondent no. 2 had already
been rejected, no action was warranted on his
representations. The representations were not
filed under any Rule governing the service
conditions of the respondent no. 2. In such
circumstances,
filing
of
successive
representations would not extend the period
of limitation. The Tribunal has erred in law in
not deciding the plea of limitation merely on
the ground that the claim petition had been
admitted. (Para 23)

Writ petition allowed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

## Text

164 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
punishment of dismissal or removal from
the service. As such, the submission of the
counsel for the respondents based upon
interpretation of Rule 4(vi) of the said Rule
cannot be accepted. Even otherwise, the
second submission of counsel for the
petitioner
merits
acceptance
that
continuation of passing of suspension order
can be justified only when the charges
leveled can lead to award of a major
penalty whereas in the present case the
respondents themselves on the conclusion
of the inquiry imposed a 'minor penalty', as
such, even if for the sake of arguments, the
contention of counsel for the respondents is
accepted, the suspension order would be hit
by the proviso to Rule 4(i).

11. Thus, on both the grounds, writ
petition deserves to be allowed. The
suspension order dated 06.08.2022 is
declared to have come to an end on
19.10.2022 when an order was passed
against the petitioner as conclusion of
inquiry. The liberty granted by this Court to
respondents to conclude the inquiry in
terms of the judgment dated 21.11.2022
shall continue and the respondents shall be
at liberty to pass such order as may be in
accordance with law. The respondent no.2
is directed to pass fresh orders with regard
to the claim of the petitioner for payment of
salary and all consequential service benefits
within a period of six weeks.
----------
(2023) 3 ILRA 164
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 13.02.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAMESH SINHA, J.
THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Writ A No. 19501 of 2018
U.P.P.C.L. & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
U.P. State Public Service Tribunal & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Vikrant Raghuvanshi, Neerav Chitravanshi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Deo Raj Singh, P.K. Srivastava,
Renu Mishra

A. Service Law - Punishment - Limitation
- U.P. St. Public (Tribunals) Act, 1976 -
Section 5(1)(b) - The point of limitation
goes to the root of the matter. It involves
a jurisdictional issue. The Limitation Act
has been made applicable to the Tribunal,
as it was applicable to a suit, thus, Section
5 thereof has no application to a reference
filed under Section 4 of the Act. If a claim
petition is barred by limitation, then
irrespective of its merits, the Tribunal has
no other option but to decline to entertain
it. It does not have the power to condone
the delay. (Para 13)

As S. 5(1)(b) provides that the provisions of the
Uttar Pradesh Act 1963 shall mutatis mutandis
apply to reference u/s 4, as the reference were
a suit filed in the civil court, S. 3 of the
Limitation Act would apply to it, which provides
that a suit instituted after the prescribed period
of limitation, shall be dismissed, although
limitation has not been set up as a defence. The
Tribunal has no power to condone the delay in
filing the claim petition. Therefore, the claim
petition filed after the expiry of the limitation
period has to be dismissed and it cannot be
entertained and adjudicated on its merits merely
because it had been admitted. (Para 24, 25)

B. A decision as is well known, is an
authority for which it decides, and not
what can logically be deduced therefrom.
A little difference in facts or additional
facts may make a lot of difference in the
precedential value of a decision. (Para 19)

C. When a belated representation in
regard to a stale or dead issue/dispute is
3 All. U.P.P.C.L. & Anr. Vs. U.P. State Public Service Tribunal & Ors.
165
considered and decided, in compliance
with a direction of the Court or Tribunal to
do so. The date of the said decision cannot
be considered as furnishing a cause-ofaction for reviving the dead issue or timebarred dispute. The issue of limitation or
delay and latches should be considered
with reference to the original cause-ofaction, and not with reference to the date
on which an order is passed in compliance
with a Court's direction. (Para 21, 22)

In the present case, punishment order was
passed on 5.5.2006. The respondent no. 2
submitted
a
representation
against
the
aforesaid order on 12.6.2006 to the U.P.
Power Corporation Ltd. The representation
was treated as an appeal and was rejected by
means
of
an
order
dated
22.5.2008.
Thereafter, the respondent no. 2 again
submitted representations dated 17.11.2008
and 30.3.2016 to the same authority, without
making mention of the provision under which
the same were filed. The representations
were disposed of by stating that as the appeal
filed by the respondent no. 2 had already
been rejected, no action was warranted on his
representations. The representations were not
filed under any Rule governing the service
conditions of the respondent no. 2. In such
circumstances,
filing
of
successive
representations would not extend the period
of limitation. The Tribunal has erred in law in
not deciding the plea of limitation merely on
the ground that the claim petition had been
admitted. (Para 23)

Writ petition allowed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. St. of U.P. Vs Vivekanand Singh & anr.,
MANU/UP/1557/2015 (Para 13)

2. Regional Manager Vs Pawan Kumar Dubey,
(1976) 3 SCC 334 (Para 16)

3. Commissioner of Income Tax Vs Son
Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd., (1992) 4 SCC 363
(Para 17)

4. Ambica Quarry Works Vs St. of Guj., (1987) 1
SCC 203 (Para 18)
5. Bhav Nagar University Vs Palitana Sugar Mills
Pvt. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 211 (Para 19)

6. C. Jaqab Vs Director of Geology and Mining
Indus. Est. & anr., (2008) 10 SCC 115 (Para 21)

7. U.O.I. & ors. Vs M.S. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59
(Para 22)

Precedent distinguished:

U.O.I. Vs Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 (Para
14)

Present petition challenges the judgment
and order dated 06.02.2018, passed by
the St. Public Service Tribunal, whereby
the claim petition No. 1624 of 2016, which
was filed by the opposite party no. 2, was
allowed and punishment order was set
aside.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ramesh Sinha, J.
&
Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Sri Neerav Chitravanshi
Advocate, the learned Counsel for the
petitioner - Power Corporation, Ms. Renu
Mishra Advocate, the learned Counsel for
the opposite party, and Sri Anand Kumar
Singh, the learned Standing Counsel for the
State and and perused the records.

2. By means of the instant writ
petition
the
petitioner-
U.P.
Power
Corporation Ltd. has approached this court
challenging the judgment and order dated
6.2.2018 passed by the State Public Service
Tribunal (hereinafter referred as 'the
Tribunal') whereby the claim petition No.
1624 of 2016, which was filed by the
opposite party no. 2, was allowed.

3. The aforesaid claim petition had
been filed by the opposite party no. 2
challenging an order dated 5.5.2006 passed
by the Chairman, U.P. Power Corporation
166 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Ltd./opp.
party
no.
2,
whereby
the
punishment of Censure entry and stoppage
of two annual increments with cumulative
effect was imposed upon the respondent no.
2.

4. On 12.6.2006 the respondent no.2
had submitted a representation to the U.P.
Power
Corporation
Ltd.
against
the
punishment order dated 5.5.2006 and the
said representation was treated as an appeal
and the same was also rejected by means of
an order dated 22.5.2008. Thereafter, the
respondent
no.
2
submitted
two
representations
dated
17.11.2008
and
30.3.2016 against the aforesaid orders,
which were disposed of by means of an
order dated 6.6.2016 stating that the appeal
filed by the respondent no. 2 had already
been rejected by means of an order dated
22.5.2008 and, therefore, no action was
warranted on his representation dated
17.11.2008 or 30.3.2016.

5. The respondent no.2 had filed the
claim petition challenging all the aforesaid
orders dated 5.5.2006 imposing punishment
of Censure entry and stoppage of annual
increments, order dated 22.5.2008 rejecting
his appeal and the order dated 6.6.2016 on
his representation, by filing Claim Petition
No. 1624 of 2016 before the Tribunal.

6. The petitioner- U.P. Power
Corporation Ltd., which was an opposite
party in the claim-petition, opposed the
claim-petition on the preliminary ground
that the punishment order was passed on
5.5.2006 and the claim-petition was barred
by the period of limitation provided in
section 5 of the U.P. State Public
(Tribunals) Act.

7. The Tribunal held that the
respondent no. 2 had challenged the latest
order dated 6.6.2016 and the claim-petition
had been filed on 16.8.2016, which was
admitted on 27.10.2016 and in such
circumstances there was hardly any need to
re-open the question. Thus, apparently the
plea of limitation was not gone into by the
Tribunal for the mere reason that the claim
petition had been admitted.

8. Section 5 (1) (b) of the State Public
Service Tribunal Act provides as follows: -

"(b)
The
provisions
of
the
Limitation Act, 1963 shall mutatis mutandis
apply to reference under section 4 as if a
reference were a suit filed in civil court so,
however, that:-

(i) Notwithstanding the period of
limitation prescribed in the Schedule to the
said Act, the period of limitation for such
reference shall be one year;

(ii) In computing the period of
limitation the period beginning with the
date on which the public servant makes a
representation
or prefers
an
appeal,
revision or any other petition (not being a
memorial to the Governor), in accordance
with the rules or orders regulating his
conditions of service, and ending with the
date on which such public servant has
knowledge of the final order passed on such
representation, appeal, revision or petition,
as the case may be, shall be excluded"

9. From a bare perusal of the
aforesaid statutory mandate it is apparent
that the period of limitation for filing a
claim-petition is one year and in computing
the period of limitation, the period on
which the employee makes a representation
or prefers an appeal, revision or any other
petition in accordance with the Rules or
orders regulating his conditions of service
and ending with the date on which such
Public Servant has knowledge of the final
3 All. U.P.P.C.L. & Anr. Vs. U.P. State Public Service Tribunal & Ors.
167
order passed on such representation,
appeal, or revision or petition, shall be
excluded.

10.
In
the
present
case,
the
punishment order was passed on 5.5.2006
and the period of limitation starts running
from the immediate following day.

11. The petitioner had submitted a
representation against the aforesaid order
on 12.6.2006 and the same was rejected by
means of an order dated 22.5.2008.
Thereafter, the petitioner claims to have
submitted repetitive representations on
17.11.2008 and on 30.3.2016. No Rule or
any other provision of law has been
mentioned in the representation dated
17.11.2008 under which the same was filed.
After sleeping over the matter for about
eight years the respondent no. 2 submitted
another representation on 30.3.2016 for reconsideration of the order dated 22.5.2008.
The said representations were rejected by
means of the order dated 6.6.2016 stating
that the representation dated 17.11.2008
had been consigned, as his appeal had
already been rejected by means of an order
dated 22.5.2008 and no action was
warranted on the representation. The order
dated 6.6.2016 further stated that no action
was warranted on the request made by him
through his letter dated 30.3.2016 for
setting aside the punishment order.

12. Section 5 of the U.P. Public
Service (Tribunals) Act provides for
exclusion of time spent in decision of
disposal of representation, appeal, revision
or any other petition submitted "in
accordance with the Rules or orders
regulating his conditions of service" as
the repetitive representations submitted by
the respondent no. 2 did not refer to any
Rules or orders regulating his conditions of
services,
the
filing
of
repetitive
representations against the punishment
order dated 5.5.2006 will not extend the
period of limitation prescribed under
section 5(1) of the U.P. State Public Service
(Tribunals) Act.

13. In this regard, Sri Neerav
Chitravanshi, the petitioner's counsel, has
placed before this Court the judgment dated
29.5.2015 rendered by a Coordinate Bench
of this Court in the State of U.P. v.
Vivekanand
Singh
&
anr.,
MANU/
UP/1557/2015 wherein this court held that
the original order having been passed on
28.12.2012 and no statutory remedy having
been preferred against it the period of
limitation for filing a claim-petition was
one year from the date of passing of the
original order. This Court further held that
"The point of limitation goes to the root of
the matter. It involves a jurisdictional issue.
The Limitation Act has been made
applicable to the Tribunal, as it was
applicable to a suit, thus, Section 5 thereof
has no application to a reference filed
under Section 4 of the Act. If a claim
petition is barred by limitation, then
irrespective of its merits, the Tribunal has
no other option but to decline to entertain
it. It does not have the power to condone
the delay."

14. Per contra, Ms. Renu Mishra,
learned counsel for the respondent no. 2,
has opposed the writ petition and she has
placed reliance on a decision of Hon'ble the
Supreme Court in the case of Union of
India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648,
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that:-

"4. The principles underlying
continuing
wrongs
and
recurring/successive wrongs have been
168 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
applied
to
service
law
disputes.
A
"continuing wrong" refers to a single
wrongful act which causes a continuing
injury. "Recurring/successive wrongs" are
those which occur periodically, each wrong
giving rise to a distinct and separate cause
of action. This Court Balakrishna Savalram
Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar
Maharaj Sansthan explained the concept of
continuing wrong (in the context of Section
23
of
the
Limitation
Act,
1908
corresponding to Section 22 of the
Limitation Act, 1963): (AIR p. 807, para
31)

''31.... It is the very essence of a
continuing wrong that it is an act which
creates a continuing source of injury and
renders the doer of the act responsible and
liable for the continuance of the said injury. If
the wrongful act causes an injury which is
complete, there is no continuing wrong even
though the damage resulting from the act may
continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of
such a character that the injury caused by it
itself continues, then the act constitutes a
continuing wrong. In this connection, it is
necessary to draw a distinction between the
injury caused by the wrongful act and what
may be described as the effect of the said
injury.'
* * *

8. In this case, the delay of sixteen
years would affect the consequential claim
for arrears. The High Court was not justified
in directing payment of arrears relating to
sixteen years, and that too with interest. It
ought to have restricted the relief relating to
arrears to only three years before the date of
writ petition, or from the date of demand to
date of writ petition, whichever was lesser. It
ought not to have granted interest on arrears
in such circumstances."

15. The aforesaid case initiated from
the denial of Disability Pension to a person,
who was invalidated out of Army Service
in Medical category and the aforesaid
observations were made by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court with reference to denial of
Disability Pension to an Ex Serviceman,
which was treated to be a "continuing
wrong", however, the challenge in the
present case was against a punishment
order of awarding a censure entry and
stoppage of two annual increments with
cumulative effectives, which is not the
same as denial of Disability Pension.

16. In Regional Manager v. Pawan
Kumar Dubey, (1976) 3 SCC 334, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -

"7.... It is the rule deducible from
application of law to the facts and
circumstances of a case, which constitutes
its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion
based upon facts, which may appear to be
similar. One additional or different fact
can make a world of difference between
conclusions in two cases even when
principles are applied in each to similar
facts."

 (Emphasis by the Court)

17. In Commissioner of Income Tax
v. Son Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd.,
(1992) 4 SCC 363, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that: -

"39... It is neither desirable nor
permissible to pick out a word or a
sentence from the judgment of this court
divulged from the context of the question
under consideration and treat it to be the
complete "Law declared by this court." The
judgment must be read as a whole and the
observations of the judgment have to be
considered in the light of the questions
which were before this court. A decision of
this Court takes its colour from the
3 All. U.P.P.C.L. & Anr. Vs. U.P. State Public Service Tribunal & Ors.
169
questions involved in the case in which it is
rendered and while applying the decision to
a later case, the Court must carefully try to
ascertain the true principle laid down by a
decision of this Court, and not to pick out
words or sentences from the judgment,
divulged from the context of the questions
under consideration by this court, to
support their reasonings...".

 (Emphasis by the Court)

18. Again in Ambica Quarry Works
v. State of Gujrat, (1987) 1 SCC 203, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "The ratio
of any decision must be understood in the
background of the facts of that case. It has
been said long time ago that a case is only
an authority for what it actually decides,
and not what logically follows from it."

19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
reiterated the aforesaid principles in Bhav
Nagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills
Pvt. Ltd. , (2003) 2 SCC 211, by stating
that - "59... A decision as is well known, is
an authority for which it decides, and not
what can logically be deduced therefrom."
It is also well settled that "a little difference
in facts or additional facts may make a lot
of difference in the precedential value of a
decision."

20. Therefore, the aforesaid decision
rendered in a case arising out of denial of
Disability Pension to an Ex Serviceman
would have no application to the instant
case, which arises out of imposition of
punishment of censure entry and stopage of
two annual increments.

21. In C. Jaqab v. Director of
Geology and Mining Indus. Est. & anr.,
(2008) 10 SCC 115, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that "When an order is passed
considering and rejecting the claim or
representation in compliance with direction
of the Court or Tribunal, such an order does
not revive the stale claim, nor amount to
some amount of ''acknowledgement of a
jural relationship' to give rise to a fresh
cause of action."

22. In Union of India & ors. V. M.S.
Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that "when a belated
representation in regard to a stale or dead
issue/dispute is considered and decided, in
compliance with a direction of the Court or
Tribunal to do so. The date of the said
decision cannot be considered as furnishing
a cause-of-action for reviving the dead
issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of
limitation or delay and latches should be
considered with reference to the original
cause-of-action, and not with reference to
the date on which an order is passed in
compliance with a Court's direction."

23. Examining the facts of the present
case in the light of the law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court and mentioned
above, it is apparent that the punishment
order was passed on 5.5.2006. The
respondent no. 2 submitted a representation
against the aforesaid order on 12.6.2006 to
the U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. The
representation was treated as an appeal and
was rejected by means of an order dated
22.5.2008. Thereafter, the respondent no. 2
again
submitted
representations
dated
17.11.2008 and 30.3.2016 to the same
authority, without making mention of the
provision under which the same were filed.
The representations were disposed of by
stating that as the appeal filed by the
respondent no. 2 had already been rejected,
no
action
was
warranted
on
his
representations. The representations were
not filed under any Rule governing the
service conditions of the respondent no. 2.
170 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
In such circumstances, filing of successive
representations would not extend the period
of limitation. The Tribunal has erred in law
in not deciding the plea of limitation
merely on the ground that the claim petition
had been admitted.

24. As section 5 (1) (b) of the U.P.
Public
Service
(Tribunals) Act
1976
provides that the provisions of the Uttar
Pradesh Act 1963 shall mutatis mutandis
apply to reference under section 4, as the
reference were a suit filed in the civil court,
Section 3 of the Limitation Act would
apply to it, which provides that a suit
instituted after the prescribed period of
limitation, shall be dismissed, although
limitation has not been set up as a defence.
The Tribunal has no power to condone the
delay in filing the claim petition. Therefore,
the claim petition filed after the expiry of
the limitation period has to be dismissed
and
it
cannot
be
entertained
and
adjudicated on its merits merely because it
had been admitted.

25. In view of the aforesaid
discussions, we are of the view that the
claim petition which was filed by the
respondent no. 2 before the Tribunal on
13.08.2016 challenging the punishment
order dated 05.05.2006 and the appellate
order dated 22.05.2008 was barred by the
period of limitation prescribed under
section 5 of the U.P. Public Service
(Tribunals) Act 1976 and the Tribunal erred
in entertaining the claim-petition and
allowing the same, without deciding the
plea of limitation on the ground that the
claim petition had been admitted. The
claim petition being barred by limitation
was liable to be dismissed as such.

26. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, the writ petition is allowed. The
judgment and order dated 06.02.2018
passed by Tribunal allowing the Claim
Petition No. 1624 of 2016 is hereby set
aside and the claim petition is dismissed.
----------
(2023) 3 ILRA 170
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 17.03.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE KARUNESH SINGH PAWAR, J.

Writ A No. 21190 of 2016

Devi Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Prabhat Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A.
Service
Law
-
Complying
with
directions/Execution of order - Promotion
- Arrears of salary - Whenever the
authorities are directed to extend all the
benefits which the petitioner would have
obtained,
had
he
not
been
illegally
deprived of them, it is not open for the
authorities to urge that he has not worked
and therefore he should not be paid salary
or be granted benefits. The proper course
for the authorities is to challenge that
order in the appeal. They cannot take this
plea in execution of that order. (Para 8)

In case the authorities are aggrieved by any
order passed by the Court of law, it is always
open for the authorities to challenge the same
in appropriate Court. However, in the facts of
the present case, the order dated 23.02.2012
has not been assailed, admittedly, by the
opposite parties, hence it has become final.
Without challenging the said order dated
23.02.2012, it is not open for the authorities, at
the time of execution, to assert that since the