# U.P. Rajya Karmchari Kalyan Nigam v. District Judge, Kanpur Nagar and others

- **Citation:** (2013) 1 ILRA 135
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2013-01-03
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 68144 of 2012
- **Bench:** Pankaj Mithal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/u-p-rajya-karmchari-kalyan-nigam-v-district-judge-kanpur-nagar-and-others-42465
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996,
Section 34 readwith Micro, Small and
Medium Enterprises Development Act,
2006,
Section
19-award
made
by
industry
facilitation
council-appeal
without deposit 75 % of award-heldappeal can not be entertained-petition
dismissed.

Held: Para-9 and 10

A
conjoint
reading
of
the
above
provisions makes it clear that an appeal
or an application for setting aside the
award made by the Industry Facilitation
Council can only be entertained if the
applicant deposits 75% of the amount
awarded. This condition of deposit is in
addition to the conditions or procedure
136 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
laid down under Section 34 of the 1996
Act.

Accordingly,
the
application
of
the
petitioner for setting aside the award
cannot be entertained unless 75% of the
amount awarded is deposited. The court
below is, therefore, not justified in
permitting any lesser amount to be
deposited.

## Text

1 All] U.P. Rajya Karmchari Kalyan Nigam V. District Judge, Kanpur Nagar and others
135

"In view of the above definition and
Rule 111, I think that the contentions raised
on behalf of the petitiner have force. The
said Rule of the Act emphasises the officers
of the Director as competent authorities to
entertain the revision petition. Therefore, in
the facts and circumstances of the present
case, I think that the revision petitioner
against the order of the appellate authority
of the Kanpur should have been preferred in
the district of Kanpur. The reason of the
revisional court for entertaining the revision
petition on the ground that only appeal has
been transferred to Kanpur for decision and
no other proceedings for ever does not
appear to me as correct. It is well known
that the order of the original officer merges
in the order of the appellate authoirty,
therefore, it was incumbent upon the
revisional court to have addressed itself to
the
question
wherther
the
appellate
authority was usbordinate to the revisional
court in the facts and circumstances of the
present. To my mind the appellate authority
was of District Kanpur, therefore the
revisional court of Jalaun cannot have
jurisdictiodn to look into the illegality,
irregularity or impropriety committed by the
appellate authority of Kanpur....."
(emphasis supplied)

11. Following the judgment in
Darbari Lal (supra) another learned single
Judge of this Court has also taken the same
view
in
Prashuram
(supra).
In
Prashuram(supra)
all
other
contrary
decisions
have
been
considered
and
distinguished and to my knowledge this
judgment still holds the field. So far as
judgment in Haider Ali (Supra) is
concerned, as has been noticed the learned
single Judge himself has stayed the further
proceedings pursuant to the judgment
rendered in that case.

12. In view of the foregoing
discussions and law laid down by this court
in the aforesaid cases, no infirmity can be
attached with the order impugned, passed
by the Deputy Director of Consolidation,
Bulandshahr, Camp Gautam Budh Nagar.

13. The writ petition lacks merit and is
hereby dismissed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.01.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 68144 of 2012

U.P. Rajya Karmchari Kalyan Nigam

 ...Petitioner
Versus
District Judge, Kanpur Nagar And Others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Nripendra Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
............................

Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996,
Section 34 readwith Micro, Small and
Medium Enterprises Development Act,
2006,
Section
19-award
made
by
industry
facilitation
council-appeal
without deposit 75 % of award-heldappeal can not be entertained-petition
dismissed.

Held: Para-9 and 10

A
conjoint
reading
of
the
above
provisions makes it clear that an appeal
or an application for setting aside the
award made by the Industry Facilitation
Council can only be entertained if the
applicant deposits 75% of the amount
awarded. This condition of deposit is in
addition to the conditions or procedure
136 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
laid down under Section 34 of the 1996
Act.

Accordingly,
the
application
of
the
petitioner for setting aside the award
cannot be entertained unless 75% of the
amount awarded is deposited. The court
below is, therefore, not justified in
permitting any lesser amount to be
deposited.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Mithal, J.)

1. The petitioner has preferred this writ
petition against the order of the District
Judge dated 30.7.2012 by which he has been
directed to deposit the admitted amount of
award i.e. Rs.7,49,598/- for the purposes of
hearing of application for setting aside the
award.

2. Heard Sri Nripendra Mishra, learned
counsel for the petitioner.

3. It appears that the respondent No.2
made a claim against the petitioner which
was referred under Section 6(2) of the
Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale
and Ancillary Industrial Undertaking Act,
1993 (in short "1993 Act") to the Industry
Facilitation Council for the purposes of
arbitration. Pursuant to the reference an
award was made on 19.10.2010 awarding
Rs.7,49,598/- and interest for the period
1.1.1997 to 30.10.2000 amounting to
Rs.10,50,564/- to respondent No.2. Petitioner
applied for setting aside the said award
before the District Judge. It is on the above
application, on the objection by the
respondent No.2 that the application can not
be entertained unless the petitioner deposits
75% of the amount awarded, that the District
Judge has passed the impugned order
directing the petitioner to at least deposit the
admitted amount as awarded.

4. The submission of Sri Nripendra
Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner is
that no condition to deposit any amount can
be imposed as the application for setting
aside the award is under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
which does not provide for deposit of any
part of the awarded amount as a condition for
maintaining an application.

5. The arbitration proceedings were
drawn pursuant to the reference made under
Section 6(2) of the 1993 Act. Section 6(2) of
the said Act apart from providing for
referring the dispute to an arbitrator provides
that the provisions of Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short "1996 Act")
shall apply as if it is an arbitration pursuant to
an arbitration agreement under the 1996 Act.

6. Section 7 of the 1993 Act provides
for the mandatory deposit of 75% of amount
awarded as a condition precedent for
appealing against the award.

7. The 1993 Act has been repealed by
Section 32 of the Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprises Development Act, 2006. The
said Act vide Section 19 provides that an
application for setting aside a decree, award
or any order made under the Act by the
Council shall not be entertained unless the
applicant/appellant deposits 75% of the
amount in terms of the decree/award.

8. The provisions of Section 34 of the
1996 Act are to be read along with the
provisions of the aforesaid both the Acts
which in addition to the procedure prescribed
under Section 34 of the 1996 Act provides
for deposit of 75% of the amount of the
award as a
condition precedent for
entertaining the application for setting aside
the award.
1 All] U.P. Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd.V. Bhagwati Prasad Gupta and another
137

9. A conjoint reading of the above
provisions makes it clear that an appeal or an
application for setting aside the award made
by the Industry Facilitation Council can only
be entertained if the applicant deposits 75%
of the amount awarded. This condition of
deposit is in addition to the conditions or
procedure laid down under Section 34 of the
1996 Act.

10. Accordingly, the application of the
petitioner for setting aside the award cannot
be entertained unless 75% of the amount
awarded is deposited. The court below is,
therefore, not justified in permitting any
lesser amount to be deposited.

11. The writ petition is dismissed with
the direction to the court below to proceed
with the decision of the application only on
deposit of 75% of the decreed amount by the
petitioner.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.01.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SIBGHAT ULLAH KHAN, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 68340 of 2006

U.P. Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd.

 ...Petitioner
Versus
Bhagwati Prasad Gupta And Another

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Arvind Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
Sri Mahendra Kumar Mishra

Constitution of India, Article 226-Labour
Court Award-direction of reinstatement
and to treat the long gap of absence
from duty as medical leave-reliance
placed upon some receipts of UPC
without application-even the medical
certificate obtained from private doctorheld-the receipts of UPC as well as such
medical
certificate
can
be
easily
procured by interested person-obsoletely
no explanation for long term period of
absence for 18 years-held-award not
sustainable-quashed.

Held: Para-7

U.P.C. is not believable at all in view of
above Supreme Court authorities. It is
quite clear that respondent No.1 was
working somewhere else. He could not
show that he was prevented by sufficient
cause from attending his duties for 18
years.
Case Law discussed:
1994 (4) SCC 445 (para-6); AIR 2000 SC 433

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sibghat Ullah
Khan, J.)

1. Heard Sri Arvind Kumar, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri
Mahendra Kumar Mishra, learned counsel
for legal representatives of workman
respondent No.1.

2. This writ petition is directed
against award dated 20.09.2006 given by
Presiding Officer, Labour Court (III),
U.P. Kanpur in Adjudication Case No.102
of 1996. The matter which was referred to
the labour court was as to whether the
action of petitioner employer terminating
the services of its workman respondent
No.1 w.e.f. 24.09.1993 was just and valid
or not.

3. The workman himself admitted
that he was appointed in the year 1968,
however
since
03.02.1975,
he
was
suffering from mental disease hence he
could not appear to work for 18 years and