# U.P.S.R.T.C. & Anr v. Chandra Bhan Sahu & Anr

- **Citation:** (2023) 8 ILRA 765
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-07-06
- **Case number:** First Appeal from Order (Defective) No. 430 of 2008
- **Bench:** Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/u-p-s-r-t-c-anr-v-chandra-bhan-sahu-anr-50576
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Law-Motor
Vehicle
Act,
1988Sections 173 -Limitation Act, 1963 -
Section
5
-Challenge
to-award
of
compensation-challenged the sum of Rs.
50,000/- awarded as compensation after
delay of 333 days-such delay is not
explained properly-The matter has once
dismissed under Chapter 12 Rule 4 in not
taking steps to serve the other side, this
dismissal was in year 2023 after about 14
years of not taking steps- The issue of
contributory
negligence
cannot
be
interfered as the accident took place in
the morning at the by-pass and the
injured was not at all liable for the
accident it was the driver of the bus who
has been considered to be negligent by
tribunal- it is solemn duty of the owner of
the vehicle to produce the licence of its
driver to show that the driver was a
qualified driver, no doubt the vehicle was
insured and the accident occurred during
this period that will not shift the burden-
It is the prima facie duty of owner to
discharge the burden by holding valid
licence of driver which is not done in this
case- this appeal both on question of
delay and on question of merits is
dismissed.(Para 1 to 17)
There is no presumption that delay in
approaching
the
court
is
always
deliberate.
No
person
gains
from
deliberate delaying a matter by not
resorting to take appropriate legal remedy
within time but then the words "sufficient
cause" show that delay, if any, occurred,
should not be deliberate, negligent and
due to casual approach of concerned
litigant, but, it should be bona fide, and,
for the reasons beyond his control, and, in
any case should not lack bona fide. If the
explanation does not smack of lack of
bona fide, the Court should show due
consideration to the suiter, but, when
there is apparent casual approach on the
part of suiter, the approach of Court is
also bound to change. Lapse on the part of
litigant in approaching Court within time
766 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
is understandable but a total inaction for
long
period
of
delay
without
any
explanation whatsoever and that too in
absence of showing any sincere attempt
on the part of suiter, would add to his
negligence, and would be relevant factor
going against him.(Para 6)
The appeal is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

8 All. U.P.S.R.T.C. & Anr. Vs. Chandra Bhan Sahu & Anr.
765

12. Fresh Award be drawn accordingly
in the above petition by the tribunal as per the
modification made herein. The Tribunals in
the State shall follow the direction of this
Court as herein aforementioned as far as
disbursement is concerned, it should look into
the condition of the litigant and the pendency
of the matter and judgment of A.V. Padma
(supra). The same is to be applied looking to
the facts of each case.

13. The Tribunal shall follow the
guidelines issued by the Apex Court in Bajaj
Allianz
General
Insurance
Company
Private Ltd. v. Union of India and others
vide order dated 27.1.2022, as the purpose of
keeping compensation is to safeguard the
interest of the claimants. No amount shall be
kept in fixed deposit as the accident is of the
year 1991.

14. Record be sent back to the
tribunal.

15.This Court is thankful to both the
learned counsels for getting this old appeal
disposed of.
----------
(2023) 8 ILRA 765
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.07.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. KAUSHAL JAYENDRA
THAKER, J.

First Appeal from Order (Defective) No. 430 of
2008

U.P.S.R.T.C. & Anr. ...Appellants
Versus
Chandra Bhan Sahu & Anr.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Nripendra Mishra, Sri Deo Dayal

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Kamal Mehrotra

Civil
Law-Motor
Vehicle
Act,
1988Sections 173 -Limitation Act, 1963 -
Section
5
-Challenge
to-award
of
compensation-challenged the sum of Rs.
50,000/- awarded as compensation after
delay of 333 days-such delay is not
explained properly-The matter has once
dismissed under Chapter 12 Rule 4 in not
taking steps to serve the other side, this
dismissal was in year 2023 after about 14
years of not taking steps- The issue of
contributory
negligence
cannot
be
interfered as the accident took place in
the morning at the by-pass and the
injured was not at all liable for the
accident it was the driver of the bus who
has been considered to be negligent by
tribunal- it is solemn duty of the owner of
the vehicle to produce the licence of its
driver to show that the driver was a
qualified driver, no doubt the vehicle was
insured and the accident occurred during
this period that will not shift the burden-
It is the prima facie duty of owner to
discharge the burden by holding valid
licence of driver which is not done in this
case- this appeal both on question of
delay and on question of merits is
dismissed.(Para 1 to 17)
There is no presumption that delay in
approaching
the
court
is
always
deliberate.
No
person
gains
from
deliberate delaying a matter by not
resorting to take appropriate legal remedy
within time but then the words "sufficient
cause" show that delay, if any, occurred,
should not be deliberate, negligent and
due to casual approach of concerned
litigant, but, it should be bona fide, and,
for the reasons beyond his control, and, in
any case should not lack bona fide. If the
explanation does not smack of lack of
bona fide, the Court should show due
consideration to the suiter, but, when
there is apparent casual approach on the
part of suiter, the approach of Court is
also bound to change. Lapse on the part of
litigant in approaching Court within time
766 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
is understandable but a total inaction for
long
period
of
delay
without
any
explanation whatsoever and that too in
absence of showing any sincere attempt
on the part of suiter, would add to his
negligence, and would be relevant factor
going against him.(Para 6)
The appeal is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

1. Collector, Land Acqn. Vs Katiji (1987) 2 SCC
107

2. P.K. Ramachandran Vs St. of Ker. (1998) AIR
SC 2276

3. Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs Kuntal Kumari (1969)
AIR SC 575

4. Brij Indar Singh Vs Kanshi Ram (1918) ILR
45 Cal 94

5. St. of Nagaland Vs Lipok AO & ors. (2005)
AIR SC 2191

6. Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Vs
Shantaram Baburao Patil & ors., JT (2001) 5 SC
608

7. Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRS. Vs Ex.
Eng. Jalgaon Medium Project & anr. (2008) 17
SCC 448

8. Maniben Devraj Shah Vs Municipal Corp. of
Brihan Mumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157

9. Pappu & ors. Vs Vinod Kumar Lamba & ors.
(2018) SC 592

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Kaushal
Jayendra Thaker, J.)

1. Heard Sri Deo Dayal, learned
counsel for the appellants and Sri Komal
Mehrotra,
learned
counsel
for
the
respondents.

2. This is a defective appeal of the
year 2008 preferred by U.P. State Road
Transport Corpaoration challenging the
sum
of
Rs.
50,000/-
awarded
as
compensation under M.V.Act, 1988. The
delay is of 333 days which occurred is not
explained properly, the judgment is dated
10.01.2007 granting a sum of Rs. 50,000/-
and granted right to recovery from the
appellant herein. The delay which is sought
to be condoned is a huge delay of one year,
therefore, no reason to condone the delay.
The matter has once dismissed under
Chapter 12 Rule 4 in not taking steps to
serve the other side, this dismissal was in
year 2023 after about 14 years of not taking
steps.

3. The expression "sufficient cause"
in Section 5 of Act, 1963 has been held to
receive a liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice and generally a
delay
in
preferring
appeal
may
be
condoned in interest of justice where no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or
lack of bona fide is imputable to parties,
seeking
condonation
of
delay.
In
Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. Katiji,
1987(2) SCC 107, the Court said, that,
when substantial justice and technical
considerations are taken against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred, for, the other side cannot claim
to have vested right in injustice being done
because of a non deliberate delay. The
Court
further
said
that
judiciary
is
respected not on account of its power to
legalise injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing injustice
and is expected to do so.

4. In P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State
of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276 the Court
said:

"Law of limitation may harshly affect
a particular party but it has to be applied
8 All. U.P.S.R.T.C. & Anr. Vs. Chandra Bhan Sahu & Anr.
767
with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribe and the Courts have no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds."

5. The Rules of limitation are not
meant to destroy rights of parties. They
virtually take away the remedy. They are
meant with the objective that parties should
not resort to dilatory tactics and sleep over
their rights. They must seek remedy
promptly. The object of providing a legal
remedy is to repair the damage caused by
reason of legal injury. The statute relating
to limitation determines a life span for such
legal remedy for redress of the legal injury,
one has suffered. Time is precious and the
wasted time would never revisit. During
efflux of time, newer causes would come
up, necessitating newer persons to seek
legal remedy by approaching the courts. So
a life span must be fixed for each remedy.
Unending period for launching the remedy
may lead to unending uncertainty and
consequential
anarchy.
The
statute
providing limitation is founded on public
policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest
reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the
general welfare that a period be put to
litigation). It is for this reason that when an
action becomes barred by time, the Court
should be slow to ignore delay for the
reason that once limitation expires, other
party matures his rights on the subject with
attainment of finality. Though it cannot be
doubted that refusal to condone delay
would result in foreclosing the suiter from
putting forth his cause but simultaneously
the party on the other hand is also entitled
to sit and feel carefree after a particular
length of time, getting relieved from
persistent and continued litigation.

6. There is no presumption that delay
in approaching the court is always
deliberate. No person gains from deliberate
delaying a matter by not resorting to take
appropriate legal remedy within time but
then the words "sufficient cause" show that
delay, if any, occurred, should not be
deliberate, negligent and due to casual
approach of concerned litigant, but, it
should be bona fide, and, for the reasons
beyond his control, and, in any case should
not lack bona fide. If the explanation does
not smack of lack of bona fide, the Court
should show due consideration to the suiter,
but, when there is apparent casual approach
on the part of suiter, the approach of Court
is also bound to change. Lapse on the part
of litigant in approaching Court within time
is understandable but a total inaction for
long
period
of
delay
without
any
explanation whatsoever and that too in
absence of showing any sincere attempt on
the part of suiter, would add to his
negligence, and would be relevant factor
going against him.

7. I need not to burden this judgment
with a catena of decisions explaining and
laying down as to what should be the
approach of Court on construing "sufficient
cause" under Section 5 of Act, 1963 and it
would be suffice to refer a very few of
them besides those already referred.

8. In Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs.
Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 a three
Judge Bench of the Court said, that, unless
want of bona fide of such inaction or
negligence as would deprive a party of the
protection of Section 5 is proved, the
application must not be thrown out or any
delay cannot be refused to be condoned.

9. The Privy Council in Brij Indar
Singh Vs. Kanshi Ram ILR (1918) 45
Cal 94 observed that true guide for a court
to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is
768 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
whether the appellant acted with reasonable
diligence in prosecuting the appeal. This
principle still holds good inasmuch as the
aforesaid decision of Privy Council as
repeatedly been referred to, and, recently in
State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and
others, AIR 2005 SC 2191.

10. In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai
Baburao Vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil
and others, JT 2001(5) SC 608 the Court
said that under Section 5 of Act, 1963 it
should adopt a pragmatic approach. A
distinction must be made between a case
where the delay is inordinate and a case
where the delay is of a few days. In the
former case consideration of prejudice to
the other side will be a relevant factor so
the case calls for a more cautious
approach but in the latter case no such
consideration may arise and such a case
deserves a liberal approach. No hard and
fast rule can be laid down in this regard
and
the
basic
guiding
factor
is
advancement of substantial justice.

11. In Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by
LRS. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon
Medium Project and Anr. (2008) 17 SCC
448, in para 17 of the judgment, the Court
said :

"...The evidence on record suggests
neglect of its own right for long time in
preferring appeals. The court cannot
enquire into belated and state claims on
the ground of equity. Delay defeats
equity. The court helps those who are
vigilant and "do not slumber over their
rights."

12. In Maniben Devraj Shah Vs.
Municipal
Corporation
of
Brihan
Mumbai, 2012 (5) SCC 157, in para 18 of
the judgment, the Court said as under:

"What needs to be emphasised is that
even though a liberal and justice oriented
approach is required to be adopted in the
exercise of power under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act and other similar statutes,
the Courts can neither become oblivious of
the fact that the successful litigant has
acquired certain rights on the basis of the
judgment under challenge and a lot of time
is consumed at various stages of litigation
apart from the cost. What colour the
expression 'sufficient cause' would get in
the factual matrix of a given case would
largely depend on bona fide nature of the
explanation. If the Court finds that there
has been no negligence on the part of the
applicant and the cause shown for the
delay does not lack bona fides, then it may
condone the delay. If, on the other hand,
the explanation given by the applicant is
found to be concocted or he is thoroughly
negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it
would be a legitimate exercise of discretion
not to condone the delay. In cases involving
the State and its agencies/instrumentalities,
the Court can take note of the fact that
sufficient time is taken in the decision
making process but no premium can be
given for total lethargy or utter negligence
on the part of the officers of the State and /
or its agencies/instrumentalities and the
applications filed by them for condonation
of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of
course by accepting the plea that dismissal
of the matter on the ground of bar of
limitation will cause injury to the public
interest."

13. In view of this Court, the kind of
explanation rendered herein does not
satisfy the observations of Apex Court that
if delay has occurred for reasons which
does not smack of mala fide, the Court
should be reluctant to refuse condonation.
On the contrary, I find that here is a case
8 All. Smt. Pushpa Singh & Ors. Vs. Manoj Kumar Singh & Ors.
769
which shows a complete careless and
reckless long delay on the part of applicant
which has remained virtually unexplained
at all and the matter was also dismissed.
Therefore, I do not find any reason to
exercise judicial discretion so as to justify
condonation of delay in the present case.

14. Even on merits it is solemn duty
of the owner of the vehicle to produce the
licence of its driver to show that the driver
was a qualified driver, no doubt the vehicle
was insured and the accident occurred
during this period that will not shift the
burden. This Court is fortified in its view
by decision of Apex Court in Pappu and
others Vs. Vinod Kumar Lamba and
others, reported in AIR 2018 SC 592 ,
where it is held that it is prima facie duty of
owner to discharge the burden by holding
valid licence of driver which is not done in
this case.

15. Even in issue no. 2, the tribunal
has held that insurance company has
examined D.W.-1 who is an officer of
R.T.O, that the licence issued in name of
Sri Kailashi Chandra son of Sri Nahar
Singh was for light motor vehicle and
heavy goods vehicle which was operative
from 06.01.2004 to 05.01.2007. There is no
dispute that it was Kailashi Chandra who
was driving the vehicle. Kailashi Chandra
was not examined. And therefore, it was
found that the licence which was produced
was not of the driver of the bus. This fact
will not permit this Court to interfere in the
well penned judgment of the tribunal.

16. The issue of contributory
negligence cannot be interfered as the
accident took place on 22.06.2005 in the
morning at the by-pass and the injured was
not at all liable for the accident it was the
driver of the bus who has been considered
to be negligent by tribunal.

17. Hence, this appeal both on
question of delay and on question of merits
is dismissed. Amounts if not deposited be
deposited as expeditiously as possible.
----------
(2023) 8 ILRA 769
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 02.08.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.

First Appeal From Order No. 488 of 2014
with
First Appeal From Order Nos. 439 of 2014
 & 442 of 2014

Smt. Pushpa Singh & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Manoj Kumar Singh & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Mohd. Saeed

Counsel for the Respondents:
Anil Kumar Srivastava

A. Civil Law - Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 -
Section
173--Challenge
to-award
of
compensation-
enhancement
of
compensation for personal injury-Tribunal
has not considered the issue of pain and
suffering and non-pecuniary damages
in the correct perspective and not
noticing that a young child had suffered
an injury who had to undergo surgical
procedures, though simple on his foot,
and remained hospitalized and also
certain injuries which were received by
Smt. Pushpa Singh- the appellants
namely Master Ahan and Smt. Pushpa
Singh are entitled to an additional sum
of Rs.25,000/- each for suffering and
pain and other ancillary non-pecuniary
heads.