# U.P.State Electricity Board, Lucknow & Ors v. Raghuraj Singh

- **Citation:** (2020) 6 ILRA 767
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-04-21
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 75 of 2020
- **Bench:** Biswanath Somadder, Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/u-p-state-electricity-board-lucknow-ors-v-raghuraj-singh-45794
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

A. Civil Law -U.P. State Electricity Board
(Employees' Retirement) Regulations,
1975 - Regulation 2(c) - Compulsory
Retirement - Opportunity to show cause -
Principle of Natural Justice - An order of
compulsory
retirement
involves
no
civil
consequences and that the government
servant does not lose any of the rights
acquired by him before retirement - The
appropriate authority has an absolute right to
retire a government servant if it is of the
opinion that it is in the public interest to do so
- Accordingly if the authority bona fide forms
that opinion, the correctness of the same
cannot be challenged. (Para 13)
B. Compulsory Retirement - Purpose -
While passing of an order of compulsory
retirement, public interest, is the primary
consideration, the purpose being to retain only
efficient persons in service and to dispense
with the services of the 'dead wood'. (Para 14)
C. Compulsory Retirement - Scope of
Interference - In a matter of compulsory
retirement, the subjective satisfaction of the
reviewing authority was not open to court's
interference
in
absence
of
mala
fides,
perversity, arbitrariness or unreasonableness
- The object being public interest the
formation of bona fide opinion by the
appropriate authority in this regard could be
challenged only on the grounds of being based
on no evidence or being based on collateral
grounds or being arbitrary but could not be
challenged on merits. (Para 17 and 18)
Special Appeal allowed; Writ Petition
dismissed (E-1)
Cases relied on :-

## Text

6 All. U.P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow & Ors. Vs. Raghuraj Singh 767
defaulter at the time the suit was filed.
The trial Court has rightly decreed the
suit and the Revisional Court has rightly
upheld the decree.

22. In view of the discussion made
above there is no infirmity or illegality in
the orders passed by the Courts below.

23. The petition is devoid of merit
and is accordingly dismissed.
----------

(2020)06ILR A767
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.04.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE BISWANATH SOMADDER, J.
THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Special Appeal No. 75 of 2020

U.P.State Electricity Board, Lucknow &
Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Raghuraj Singh ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Amit Saxena, Sri Abhishek Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri Ajit Kumar, Sri Punit Khare, Sri Satish
Tandon

A. Civil Law -U.P. State Electricity Board
(Employees' Retirement) Regulations,
1975 - Regulation 2(c) - Compulsory
Retirement - Opportunity to show cause -
Principle of Natural Justice - An order of
compulsory
retirement
involves
no
civil
consequences and that the government
servant does not lose any of the rights
acquired by him before retirement - The
appropriate authority has an absolute right to
retire a government servant if it is of the
opinion that it is in the public interest to do so
- Accordingly if the authority bona fide forms
that opinion, the correctness of the same
cannot be challenged. (Para 13)
B. Compulsory Retirement - Purpose -
While passing of an order of compulsory
retirement, public interest, is the primary
consideration, the purpose being to retain only
efficient persons in service and to dispense
with the services of the 'dead wood'. (Para 14)
C. Compulsory Retirement - Scope of
Interference - In a matter of compulsory
retirement, the subjective satisfaction of the
reviewing authority was not open to court's
interference
in
absence
of
mala
fides,
perversity, arbitrariness or unreasonableness
- The object being public interest the
formation of bona fide opinion by the
appropriate authority in this regard could be
challenged only on the grounds of being based
on no evidence or being based on collateral
grounds or being arbitrary but could not be
challenged on merits. (Para 17 and 18)
Special Appeal allowed; Writ Petition
dismissed (E-1)
Cases relied on :-
1. U.O.I. Vs Col. J.N. Sinha & ors. (1970) 2
SCC 458
2. St. of Guj. & anr. Vs Suryakant Chunilal
Shah (1999) 1 SCC 529
3. U.O.I. Vs M.E. Reddy & anr. (1980) 2 SCC
15
4. Baikuntha Nath Das & anr. Vs Chief Dist.
Medical Officer, Baripada & anr. (1992) 2 SCC
299
5. Posts and Telegraphs Board & ors. Vs
C.S.N. Murthy (1992) 2 SCC 317
6. K. Kandaswamy Vs U.O.I. & anr. (1995) 6
SCC 162
7. Pyare Mohan Lal Vs St.of Jhar. & ors.
(2010) 10 SCC 693
(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra
Kumar Srivastava, J.)
768 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

1. The present special appeal seeks
to challenge the judgment and order dated
17.04.2019 passed in Writ-A No. 17360
of 1995 (Raghuraj Singh Vs. U.P.S.E.B.
Lucknow and others) whereby the writ
petition, which was directed against an
order of compulsory retirement dated
23.12.1994 passed in exercise of powers
under Regulation 2 (c) of the U.P. State
Electricity
Board
(Employees'
Retirement) Regulations, 19751 against
the respondent-writ petitioner, has been
allowed and the order of compulsory
retirement has been set aside.

2.

The
Uttar
Pradesh
State
Electricity Board, Lucknow2 and its
authorities, who were respondents in the
writ petition, are the appellants before us.

3. It is sought to be contended on
behalf of the appellants that the learned
Single Judge has proceeded to allow the
writ petition principally on the basis of a
finding that there existed no material on
record which could support the opinion
that the continuance of the petitioner in
service was not in public interest and
nothing to this effect had been detailed in
the counter affidavit.

4.

Learned
Senior
Counsel
appearing for the appellants submits that
the aforementioned finding recorded by
the learned Single Judge is contrary to the
facts on record, inasmuch as the order of
compulsory retirement dated 23.12.1994
was in terms of the Board's order dated
22.2.1991 and as per the recommendation
made by the Screening Committee on
07.10.1994, and on the basis of adverse
reports, gross negligence in performance
of duties and indiscipline on the part of
the respondent-petitioner. It has been
pointed out that the aforementioned fact
was brought on record by a counter
affidavit
filed
on
behalf
of
the
appellants/respondents, and the learned
Single Judge having proceeded to allow
the writ petition without taking into
consideration the facts on record, the
judgment cannot be legally sustained.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-petitioner, on the other hand,
has supported the judgment of the writ
court by submitting that there was no
material whatsoever which could have
justified
passing
of
the
order
of
compulsory
retirement
which
was
founded on no material and was a result
of non-application of mind and has rightly
been set aside by the learned Single
Judge.

6. Rival contentions now fall for
consideration.

7. The order of compulsory
retirement dated 23.12.1994, in the
present case, has been passed in exercise
of powers under Regulation 2 (b) of the
Regulations 1975, as amended in terms of
the UPSEB (Employees' Retirement)
(Second Amendment) Regulations, 1993.
For ease of reference, Regulation 2 (b)
and Regulation 2 (c) are being extracted
below :-

"2. (a) x x x x x

 Board's
employee
(whether
permanent
or
temporary),
without
assigning any reason, require him to
retire, in public interest, provided that
such employee has completed 20 years of
qualifying service and has attained the
age of 50 years. Any employee of the
Board, also, may, by giving three months'
notice to the appointing authority, seek
6 All. U.P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow & Ors. Vs. Raghuraj Singh 769
voluntary retirement at any time, after
attaining the age of 45 years, provided
that
he
has
completed
minimum
qualifying service of 20 years.

(c) The period of such notice
shall be three months :

Provided that--

(i) any such Board's employee
may, by order of the appointing authority
or any authority to which the appointing
authority is subordinate, without such
notice or by a shorter notice be retired
forthwith and on such retirement the
Board's employee shall be entitled to
claim a sum equivalent to the amount of
his pay plus allowances, if any, for the
period of the notice or, as the case may
be, for the period by which such notice
falls short of three months, at the same
rates
at
which
he
was
drawing
immediately before his retirement.

(ii) It shall be open to the
appointing authority or any authority to
which
the
appointing
authority
is
subordinate to allow a Board's employee to
retire without any notice or by a shorter
notice without requiring the Board's
employee to pay any penalty in lieu of
notice :

Provided further that such notice
given by the Board's employee against
whom disciplinary proceedings are pending
or contemplated, shall be effective only if it
is accepted by the appointing authority or
any authority to which the appointing
authority is subordinate, provided that in the
case
of
contemplated
disciplinary
proceedings the Board's employee shall be
informed before the expiry of his notice that
it has not been accepted :

Provided also that the notice once
given by a Board's employee under clause
(b) seeks voluntary retirement shall not be
withdrawn by him except with the
permission of the appointing authority or
any authority to which the appointing
authority is subordinate;"

8. The provisions with regard to
compulsory
retirement
under
the
aforementioned
Regulations
1975
are
somewhat
similar
in
terms
to
the
Fundamental
Rule
56
(j)
of
the
Fundamental Rules and also Fundamental
Rule 56 (c) of the U.P. Fundamental Rules.

9. The principal ground canvassed
by the petitioner to assail the order of
compulsory retirement before the writ
court was by submitting that there was no
material whatsoever to justify that the
petitioner had become a "dead wood", and
that the order was founded on no material
and was a result of non-application of
mind. This was controverted by the
appellants/respondent by filing a counter
affidavit wherein it was specifically
averred that the order of compulsory
retirement dated 23.12.1994 was passed
in terms of Board Order dated 22.02.1991
and as per the Screening Committee
recommendation dated 7.10.1994 on the
basis of adverse reports, gross negligence
of duties and indiscipline on part of the
respondent-petitioner. It was stated in
paragraph 20 of the counter affidavit as
follows:-

"20. That the contents of
paragraph No.23 of the affidavit is not
admitted and it is submitted that petitioner
was retired vide Order No. 1729-E-8,
dated 23.12.1994 in terms of B.O.No.100Kavini-RVP/29/12-Kavini,
dated
22.2.1991- as per screening committees
770 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
recommendations O.M.No.2891-E-V/VKarya Chamta, dated 07.10.1994 only on
the basis of adverse reports, gross
negligence
of
duties
and
sufficient
indiscipline on the part of the petitioner."

10. Attention of this Court has also
been drawn to the proceedings of the
Screening
Committee
and
its
recommendations
dated
07.10.1994,
which are on record as part of an affidavit
filed on behalf of the appellants in the
instant appeal, wherein the service
records of the respondent-petitioner have
been referred to.

11. The recommendation made
by the screening committee which
forms the basis of the order of
compulsory retirement clearly shows
that the petitioner was given adverse
entries in his character roll for the
period 03.12.1993 to 31.03.1984 and
thereafter for the period 01.04.1985 to
31.03.1986
again
he
was
given
adverse entry in his character roll and
his
integrity
was
also
withheld.
Subsequently, for the period 5/1982 to
01.12.1983,
on
the
basis
of
a
departmental inquiry, an order of
punishment of reduction of his pay
scale by two stages was given and also
a censure entry was awarded. The
Screening Committee also has taken
notice of the fact that a domestic
enquiry was pending against the
petitioner for the reason that the
petitioner had not complied with an
order of transfer dated 19.07.1988 and
had not joined the place of his transfer
within the stipulated time period.

12. In order to appreciate the
rival
contentions,
the
principles,
evolved
in
terms
of
judicial
precedents,
governing
compulsory
retirement, may be adverted to.

13. The question as to whether
before
passing
of
an
order
of
compulsory retirement there is any
requirement of providing opportunity
to show cause and whether application
of
rules
of
natural
justice
are
necessary were considered in the
decision in Union of India Vs. Col.
J.N. Sinha and others3, and it was
held that an order of compulsory
retirement
involves
no
civil
consequences and that the government
servant does not lose any of the rights
acquired by him before retirement.
Referring to Fundamental Rule 56 (j),
it was held that the appropriate
authority has an absolute right to
retire a government servant if it is of
the opinion that it is in the public
interest to do so. The power could be
exercised subject to the conditions
mentioned in the rule, one of which
was that the concerned authority must
be of the opinion that it is in public
interest to do so, and accordingly if
the authority bona fide forms that
opinion, the correctness of the same
cannot
be
challenged.
The
observations made in the judgment, in
this regard, are as follows :-

"9. Now coming to the express
words of Fundamental Rule 56(j) it says
that the appropriate authority has the
absolute right to retire a Government
servant if it is of the opinion that it is in
the public interest to do so. The right
conferred on the appropriate authority is
an absolute one. That power can be
exercised
subject
to
the
conditions
mentioned in the rule, one of which is that
the concerned authority must be of the
6 All. U.P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow & Ors. Vs. Raghuraj Singh 771
opinion that it is in public interest to do
so. If that authority bona fide forms that
opinion, the correctness of that opinion
cannot be challenged before courts. It is
open to an aggrieved party to contend that
the requisite opinion has not been formed
or the decision is based on collateral
grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision.

The 1st respondent challenged
the opinion formed by the Government on
the ground of mala fide. But that ground
has failed. The High Court did not accept
that plea. The same was not pressed
before us. The impugned order was not
attacked on the ground that the required
opinion was not formed or that the
opinion formed was an arbitrary one. One
of the conditions of the 1st respondent's
service is that the Government can choose
to retire him any time after he completes
fifty years if it thinks that it is in public
interest to do so. Because of his
compulsory retirement he does not lose
any of the rights acquired by him before
retirement.
Compulsory
retirement
involves no civil consequences. The
aforementioned Rule 56(j) is not intended
for taking any penal action against the
Government servants. That rule merely
embodies one of the facets of the pleasure
doctrine embodied in Article 310 of the
Constitution. Various considerations may
weigh with the appropriate authority
while exercising the power conferred
under the rule. In some cases, the
Government may feel that a particular
post may be more usefully held in public
interest by an officer more competent
than the one who is holding. It may be
that the officer who is holding the post is
not
inefficient
but
the
appropriate
authority may prefer to have a more
efficient officer. It may further be that in
certain key posts public interest may
require that a person of undoubted ability
and integrity should be there. There is no
denying the fact that in all organizations
and
more
so
in
Government
organizations, there is good deal of dead
wood, it is in public interest to chop off
the same. Fundamental Rule 56(j) holds
the balance between the rights of the
individual Government servant and the
interests of the public. While a minimum
service is guaranteed to the Government
servant, the Government is given power
to energise its machinery and make it
more efficient by compulsorily retiring
those who in its opinion should not be
there in public interest.

x x x

11. In our opinion the High
Court
erred
in
thinking
that
the
compulsory retirement involves civil
consequences. Such a retirement does not
take away any of the rights that have
accrued to the Government servant
because of his past service. It cannot be
said that if the retiring age of all or a
section of the government servants is
fixed at 50 years, the same would involve
civil consequences. Under the existing
system there is no uniform retirement age
for
all
Government
servants.
The
retirement age is fixed not merely on the
basis of the interest of the Government
servant but also depending on the
requirements of the society. "

14. In The State of Gujarat and
another Vs. Suryakant Chunilal Shah4,
it was held that while passing of an order
of compulsory retirement, public interest,
is the primary consideration, the purpose
being to retain only efficient persons in
service and to dispense with the services
of the "dead wood". The assessment of
772 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
efficiency is required to be made on the
basis of material on record, of which
confidential reports are an important input
and an employee with doubtful integrity
could not be considered to be efficient. It
was stated thus :-

"23. In order, therefore, to find
out whether any government servant has
outlived his
utility
and
is
to be
compulsorily retired in public interest for
maintaining an efficient administration,
an objective view of overall performance
of that government servant has to be
taken before deciding, after he has
attained the age of 50 years, either to
retain him further in service or to
dispense with his services in public
interest, by giving him three months'
notice or pay in lieu thereof.

24. The performance of a
government servant is reflected in the
annual
character
roll
entries
and,
therefore,
one
of
the
methods
of
discerning the efficiency, honesty or
integrity of a government servant is to
look at his character roll entries for the
whole tenure from the inception to the
date
on
which
decision
for
his
compulsory retirement is taken. It is
obvious that if the character roll is
studded with adverse entries or the overall
categorisation of the employee is poor
and there is material also to cast doubts
upon his integrity, such a government
servant cannot be said to be efficient.
Efficiency is a bundle of sticks of
personal assets, thickest of which is the
stick of "integrity". If this is missing, the
whole
bundle
would
disperse.
A
government servant has, therefore, to
keep his belt tight.

25. Purpose of adverse entries is
primarily to forewarn the government
servant to mend his ways and to improve
his performance. That is why, it is
required to communicate the adverse
entries so that the government servant to
whom the adverse entry is given, may
have either opportunity to explain his
conduct so as to show that the adverse
entry was wholly uncalled for, or to
silently brood over the matter and on
being convinced that his previous conduct
justified such an entry, to improve his
performance."

15. Taking a similar view in
Union of India Vs. M.E. Reddy and
another5, it was reiterated that the
object of compulsory retirement is to
weed out the "dead wood" in order to
maintain a high standard of efficiency
and initiative in service. The object
being public interest, the order of
compulsory retirement can neither be
held to be punitive nor stigmatory and
hence the principles of natural justice
are not attracted. The observations
made in the judgment are as follows :-

"8. An analysis of this rule
clearly shows that
the following
essential ingredients of the rule must
be
satisfied
before
an
order
compulsorily retiring a government
servant is passed:

(1) That the member of the
Service must have completed 30 years of
qualifying service or the age of 50 years
(as modified by notification dated July
16, 1969);

(2) That the government has an
absolute right to retire the government
servant concerned because the word
"require" clearly confers an unqualified
right on the Central Government;

(3) That the order must be
passed
in
public
interest;
6 All. U.P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow & Ors. Vs. Raghuraj Singh 773

(4) That three months' previous
notice in writing shall be given to the
government servant concerned before the
order is passed.

It may be noted here that the
provision gives an absolute right to the
government and not merely a discretion,
and, therefore, impliedly it excludes the
rules of natural justice. It is also not
disputed in the present case that all the
conditions mentioned in rule referred to
above have been complied with. It is a
different matter that the argument of
Reddy is based on the ground that the
order is arbitrary and mala fide with
which we shall deal later.

9. On a perusal of the impugned
order passed by the Government of India
it would appear that the order fully
conforms to all the conditions mentioned
in Rule 16(3). It is now well-settled by a
long catena of authorities of this Court
that compulsory retirement after the
employee has put in a sufficient number
of years of service having qualified for
full pension is neither a punishment nor a
stigma so as to attract the provisions of
Article 311(2) of the Constitution. In fact,
after an employee has served for 25 to 30
years and is retired on full pensionary
benefits, it cannot be said that he suffers
any real prejudice. The object of the rule
is to weed out the dead wood in order to
maintain a high standard of efficiency and
initiative in the State Services. It is not
necessary that a good officer may
continue to be efficient for all times to
come. It may be that there may be some
officers who may possess a better
initiative
and
higher
standard
of
efficiency and if given chance the work of
the government might show marked
improvement. In such a case compulsory
retirement of an officer who fulfills the
conditions of Rule 16(3) is undoubtedly
in public interest and is not passed by way
of punishment. Similarly, there may be
cases of officers who are corrupt or of
doubtful integrity and who may be
considered fit for being compulsorily
retired in public interest, since they have
almost reached the fag end of their career
and their retirement would not cast any
aspersion nor does it entail any civil
consequences. Of course, it may be said
that if such officers were allowed to
continue they would have drawn their
salary until the usual date of retirement.
But this is not an absolute right which can
be claimed by an officer who has put in
30 years of service or has attained the age
of 50 years. Thus, the general impression
which is carried by most of the employees
that compulsory retirement under the
conditions involves some sort of stigma
must be completely removed because
Rule 16(3) does nothing of the sort.

10. Apart from the aforesaid
considerations we would like to illustrate
the jurisprudential philosophy of Rule
16(3)
and
other
similarly
worded
provisions like Rule 56(j) and other rules
relating to the government servants. It
cannot be doubted that Rule 16(3) as it
stands is but one of the facets of the
doctrine of pleasure incorporated in
Article 310 of the Constitution and is
controlled only by those contingencies
which are expressly mentioned in Article
311. If the order of retirement under Rule
16(3) does not attract Article 311(2) it is
manifest that no stigma or punishment is
involved. The order is passed by the
highest authority, namely, the Central
Government in the name of the President
and expressly excludes the application of
rules of natural justice as indicated above.
774 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The safety valve of public interest is the
most
powerful
and
the
strongest
safeguard against any abuse or colourable
exercise of power under this rule.
Moreover, when the Court is satisfied that
the exercise of power under the rule
amounts to a colourable exercise of
jurisdiction or is arbitrary or mala fide it
can always be struck down. While
examining this aspect of the matter the
Court would have to act only on the
affidavits,
documents,
annexures,
notifications and other papers produced
before it by the parties. It cannot delve
deep into the confidential or secret
records of the government to fish out
materials to prove that the order is
arbitrary or mala fide. The Court has,
however, the undoubted power subject to
any privilege or claim that may be made
by the State, to send for the relevant
confidential
personal
file
of
the
government servant and peruse it for its
own satisfaction without using it as
evidence.

11. It seems to us that the main
object of this rule is to instil a spirit of
dedication and dynamism in the working
of the State Services so as to ensure purity
and cleanliness in the administration
which is the paramount need of the hour
as the Services are one of the pillars of
our great democracy. Any element or
constituent of the Service which is found
to be lax or corrupt, inefficient or not up
to the mark or has outlived his utility has
to be weeded out. Rule 16(3) provides the
methodology for achieving this object.
We must, however, hasten to add that
before the Central Government invokes
the power under Rule 16(3), it must take
particular care that the rule is not used as
a ruse for victimisation by getting rid of
honest and unobliging officers in order to
make way for incompetent favourites of
the government which is bound to lead to
serious demoralisation in the service and
defeat the laudable object which the rule
seeks to subserve. If any such case comes
to the notice of the government the officer
responsible for advising the government
must be strictly dealt with. Compulsory
retirement contemplated by the aforesaid
rule
is
designed
to
infuse
the
administration with initiative and activism
so that it is made poignant and piquant,
specious and subtle so as to meet the
expanding needs of the nation which
require exploration of "fields and pastures
new". Such a retirement involves no stain
or stigma nor does it entail any penalty or
civil consequences. In fact, the rule
merely seeks to strike a just balance
between the termination of the completed
career
of
a
tired
employee
and
maintenance of top efficiency in the
diverse activities of the administration.

12. An order of compulsory
retirement on one hand causes no
prejudice to the government servant who
is made to lead a restful life enjoying full
pensionary and other benefits and on the
other
gives
a
new
animation
and
equanimity
to
the
Services.
The
employees should try to understand the
true spirit behind the rule which is not to
penalise them but amounts just to a
fruitful incident of the Service made in
the larger interest of the country. Even if
the employee feels that he has suffered,
he should derive sufficient solace and
consolation from the fact that this is his
small contribution to his country, for
every good cause claims its martyr."

16. The scope of judicial review in a
matter relating to compulsory retirement
came to be considered in Baikuntha
6 All. U.P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow & Ors. Vs. Raghuraj Singh 775
Nath Das and another Vs. Chief
District Medical Officer, Baripada and
another6, and it was held that opinion of
the
authority
regarding
compulsory
retirement is his subjective satisfaction
which is to be formed on the basis of
entire record of service and since the
order of compulsory retirement does not
amount to punishment hence principles of
natural justice are not required to be
observed in passing of such an order. The
principles, in this regard, were laid down
as follows :-

(i) An order of compulsory
retirement is not a punishment. It implies
no
stigma
nor
any
suggestion
of
misbehaviour.

(ii) The order has to be passed
by the government on forming the
opinion that it is in the public interest to
retire a government servant compulsorily.
The order is passed on the subjective
satisfaction of the government.

(iii) Principles of natural justice
have no place in the context of an order of
compulsory retirement. This does not
mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded
altogether. While the High Court or this
Court would not examine the matter as an
appellate court, they may interfere if they
are satisfied that the order is passed (a)
mala fide or (b) that it is based on no
evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary -- in the
sense that no reasonable person would
form the requisite opinion on the given
material; in short, if it is found to be a
perverse order.

(iv) The government (or the
Review Committee, as the case may be)
shall have to consider the entire record of
service before taking a decision in the
matter -- of course attaching more
importance to record of and performance
during the later years. The record to be so
considered would naturally include the
entries
in
the
confidential
records/character rolls, both favourable
and adverse. If a government servant is
promoted
to
a
higher
post
notwithstanding the adverse remarks,
such remarks lose their sting, more so, if
the promotion is based upon merit
(selection) and not upon seniority.

(v) An order of compulsory
retirement is not liable to be quashed by a
Court merely on the showing that while
passing
it
uncommunicated
adverse
remarks
were
also
taken
into
consideration. That circumstance by itself
cannot be a basis for interference.

Interference is permissible only
on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above.
This aspect has been discussed in paras
30 to 32 above.

35. Before parting with the case,
we must refer to an argument urged by Sri
R.K. Garg. He stressed what is called, the
new concept of Article 14 as adumbrated
in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India,
(1978) 1 SCC 248 and submitted on that
basis that any and every arbitrary action is
open to judicial scrutiny. The general
principle evolved in the said decision is
not in issue here. We are concerned
mainly with the question whether a facet
of principle of natural justice -- audi
alteram partem -- is attracted in the case
of compulsory retirement. In other words,
the question is whether acting upon
undisclosed material is a ground for
quashing
the
order
of
compulsory
retirement. Since we have held that the
nature of the function is not quasi-judicial
776 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in nature and because the action has to be
taken on the subjective satisfaction of the
government, there is no room for
importing the said facet of natural justice
in such a case, more particularly when an
order of compulsory retirement is not a
punishment nor does it involve any
stigma."

17. The aforementioned view was
reiterated in Posts and Telegraphs
Board and others Vs. C.S.N. Murthy7,
and it was held that in a matter of
compulsory retirement, the subjective
satisfaction of the reviewing authority
was not open to court's interference in
absence
of
mala
fides,
perversity,
arbitrariness or unreasonableness. It was
stated as follows:-

"5. ...F.R. 56(j) authorises the
Government to review the working of its
employees at the end of their period of
service referred to therein and to require
the servant to retire from service if, in its
opinion, public interest calls for such an
order. Whether the conduct of the
employee is such as to justify such a
conclusion
is
primarily
for
the
departmental authorities to decide. The
nature of the delinquency and whether it
is of such a degree as to require the
compulsory retirement of the employee
are primarily for the Government to
decide upon. The courts will not interfere
with the exercise of this power, if arrived
at bona fide and on the basis of material
available on the record. No mala fides
have been urged in the present case. The
only suggestion of the High Court is that
the record discloses no material which
would justify the action taken against the
respondent. We are unable to agree. In
our opinion, there was material which
showed that the efficiency of the
petitioner was slackening in the last two
years of the period under review and it is,
therefore, not possible for us to fault the
conclusion of the department as being
mala
fide,
perverse,
arbitrary
or
unreasonable. The Division Bench seems
to have thought that, since the adverse
remarks mentioned in the earlier letter of
April 29, 1971 were not repeated in the
subsequent letter, it should be taken that
they had been given up subsequently or
that the respondent had improved in the
subsequent year. We do not think that this
is a legitimate inference, for the report for
1971-72 only shows that the respondents'
propensity to delay matters persisted
despite the warning of the previous year.
But, even if one assumes that the High
Court was correct on this, the adverse
remarks made against the respondent in
relation to the period 1971-72, standing
by themselves, can constitute sufficient
material for the department to come to a
conclusion in the matter. It is true that the
earlier record of the respondent was good
but if the record showed that the standard
of work of the respondent had declined
and was not satisfactory, that was
certainly material enabling the department
to come to a conclusion under F.R. 56(j).
We are of opinion that the High Court
erred in setting aside the order of
compulsory retirement on the basis that
there was no material at all on record
justifying
the
action
against
the
respondent."

18. Considering the nature of
compulsory retirement, it was held in the
case of K. Kandaswamy Vs. Union of
India and another8, that an order of
compulsory retirement does not amount
to punishment nor does it entail loss of
retiral benefits nor is it stigmatic. On the
scope of judicial review it was held that
6 All. U.P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow & Ors. Vs. Raghuraj Singh 777
the object being public interest the
formation of bona fide opinion by the
appropriate authority in this regard could
be challenged only on the grounds of
being based on no evidence or being
based on collateral grounds or being
arbitrary but could not be challenged on
merits. The observations made in the
judgment in this regard are being
extracted below :-

"8. As seen in the light of
documents and in the light of the specific
permission sought by the appellant himself
on the basis of the special report submitted
by the State Government, the Government
of India through its appropriate committee
reached the conclusion that in view of the
doubtful integrity it would not be desirable
in the public interest to retain the appellant
in
service.
Accordingly,
they
have
compulsorily retired the appellant from
service. Compulsory retirement does not
amount to dismissal or removal from
service within the meaning of Article 311 of
the Constitution. It is neither punishment
nor visits with loss of retiral benefits; nor
does it cast stigma. The officer would be
entitled to the pension that he has actually
earned and there is no diminution of the
accrued benefits. The object of compulsory
retirement of the government employee is
public interest. If the appropriate authority
bona
fide
forms
that
opinion,
the
correctness thereof on merits cannot be
challenged before courts, though it may be
open to the aggrieved employee to impugn
it. But the same may be challenged on the
ground that requisite opinion is based on no
evidence or has not been formed or the
decision is based for collateral grounds or
that it is an arbitrary decision.

9. While exercising the power
under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules,
the appropriate authority has to weigh
several circumstances in arriving at the
conclusion that the employee requires to be
compulsorily retired in public interest. The
Government is given power to energise its
machinery by weeding out dead wood,
inefficient, corrupt and people of doubtful
integrity by compulsorily retiring them
from
service.
When
the
appropriate
authority forms bona fide opinion that
compulsory retirement of the government
employee is in the public interest, court
would not interfere with the order."

19. The scope of judicial review in a
matter relating to compulsory retirement
again came up for consideration in Pyare
Mohan Lal Vs. State of Jharkhand and
others9, and reiterating the very limited
scope of judicial review in case of
compulsory
retirement
which
is
permissible only on grounds of nonapplication of mind, mala fides or want of
material particulars, it was held that
power
to
retire
compulsorily
a
government servant in terms of service
rules is absolute, provided the authority
concerned forms a bona fide opinion that
compulsory
retirement
is
in
public
interest.
Referring
to
the
earlier
precedents on the point, the law was
summarized as follows :-

"18. Thus, the law on the point
can be summarised to the effect that an
order of compulsory retirement is not a
punishment and it does not imply stigma
unless such order is passed to impose a
punishment for a proved misconduct, as
prescribed in the statutory rules (See
Surender Kumar v. Union of India (2010)
1 SCC 158). The Authority must consider
and examine the overall effect of the
entries of the officer concerned and not an
isolated entry, as it may well be in some
778 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
cases
that
in
spite
of
satisfactory
performance, the authority may desire to
compulsorily retire an employee in public
interest, as in the opinion of the said
Authority, the post has to be manned by a
more efficient and dynamic person and if
there is sufficient material on record to
show that the employee "rendered himself
a liability to the institution", there is no
occasion for the court to interfere in the
exercise of its limited power of judicial
review."

20. The provisions contained under
Regulation 2 (b) and Regulation 2 (c) of
the Regulations 1975 being in similar
terms as Fundamental Rule 56 (j) of the
Fundamental
Rules
as
also
the
Fundamental Rule 56 (c) of the U.P.
Fundamental Rules, the legal principles,
which have evolved in terms of judicial
precedents on the point of compulsory
retirement under the Fundamental Rules,
would squarely apply.

21. In the facts of the present case, the
records of the case clearly reflect that the
order of compulsory retirement has been
passed as per the provisions contained under
the Regulations, 1975, in terms of the Board
Order dated 22.02.1991 and as per the
Screening Committee recommendation dated
07.10.1994 on the basis of adverse reports in
the character rolls, gross negligence of duties
and indiscipline. The subjective satisfaction,
having thus been recorded by the appropriate
authority under the statutory regulations, the
order cannot be said to be without basis or
having been passed on extraneous reasons or
without there being any material to support
the same so as to render it arbitrary.

22. The judgment of the learned Single
Judge whereunder the order of compulsory
retirement has been set aside by stating the
reason that the same has been passed without
any material to support it and nothing in that
regard had been referred to in the counter
affidavit, thus cannot be supported from the
facts which are evident from the records.

23. The judgment of the learned Single
Judge is thus legally unsustainable and is
therefore set aside.

24. The Special Appeal is accordingly
allowed.

25. The writ petition stands dismissed.
----------
(2020)06ILR A778
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.03.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE BISWANATH SOMADDER, J.
THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Special Appeal Defective No. 179 of 2020

Cane Commissioner, U.P. & Ors.
 ...Appellants
Versus
Adalat Singh ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Ravindra Singh

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri Hari Nath Tripathi

A. Constitution of India - Article 226 -
Writ - Delay - Jurisdiction of Court -
Inordinate delay in approaching the writ Court
for reasons of want of bona fides or inaction
or negligence would deprive a party from his
rights
of
invoking
the
extraordinary
discretionary jurisdiction of the Court - The
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 is
essentially discretionary in nature and in a
case of negligence or deliberate gross inaction
or lack of bona fides on part of the party