# U.P. State Road Transport Corp., Lucknow & Ors v. Jagdamba Singh &Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 10 ILRA 1013
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-07-07
- **Case number:** First Appeal From Order No. 574 of 1997
- **Bench:** Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/u-p-state-road-transport-corp-lucknow-ors-v-jagdamba-singh-ors-49252
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

1014 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Civil Law - Motor Vehicle Act,1988Compensation-Compensation for the death in
a road accident-appeal and the cross objection
raised
only
one
issue
of
quantum
of
compensation-age of the deceased not in
dispute-
income
tax
returns
have
been
produced- 20 years of age at the time of
accident-multiplier applicable would be 18-the
rate of interest would be 9% from the date of
filing of the claim petition till award and 6%
thereafter till deposit of amount.

Appeal partly allowed. (E-9)

Cases cited:

## Text

10 All. U.P. State Road Transport Corp., Lucknow & Ors. Jagdamba Singh & Ors.
1013
while deciding the Crl. Misc. Application
u/s 482 Cr.P.C., has observed in paragraph
no. 13 as under:-

"13. But the instant matter arises
out of a case which is based on a police
report as a first information report had
been lodged before the police at Deesa
Police Station under Section 154 CrPC
and, therefore, the investigation was
conducted by the police authorities in terms
of procedure prescribed under Chapter XII
CrPC and thereafter charge-sheet was
submitted. At this stage, the Chief Judicial
Magistrate after submission of the chargesheet appears to have entertained an
application of the complainant for addition
of three other sections into the chargesheet, completely missing that if it were a
complaint case lodged by the complainant
before the Magistrate under Section
190(1)(a) CrPC, obviously the Magistrate
had full authority and jurisdiction to
conduct enquiry into the matter and if at
any stage of the enquiry, the Magistrate
thought it appropriate that other additional
sections also were fit to be included, the
Magistrate
obviously
would
not
be
precluded from adding them after which
the process of cognizance would be taken
by the Magistrate and then the matter
would be committed for trial before the
appropriate court."

13. This Court in Vibhuti Narayan
Chaubey Alias....v. State of U.P, 2003
CriLJ 196, while dismissing a petition
against order passed on application under
Section 216 Cr.P.C., by the accused
persons to alter the charge under Section
307/34 IPC to Section 324/34 IPC observed
that once the charge is framed the case will
result, either in acquittal or in conviction in
accordance with the provisions of trials
prescribed under Chapter 18, 19 and 20 of
the Cr.P.C. The charge can be withdrawn
under Section 224 of Cr.P.C., only after
judgment and it cannot be deleted. The
word "alter" has not been used in Section
216 Cr.P.C. and therefore, charge once
framed cannot be deleted. Section 216
Cr.P.C. does not provide for deletion of
charge. The word "delete" has intentionally
been not used by the legislature.

14. In the light of foregoing
discussion and judicial authorities cited
above, I find no legal justification to
interfere in the impugned order passed by
learned court below, whereby application
under Section 216 Cr.P.C. moved by
revisionist for deletion of charge under
Section 302/34 and 201 IPC has been
dismissed.

15. Revision stands dismissed with
above observations.

----------
(2023) 10 ILRA 1013
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.07.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. KAUSHAL JAYENDRA
THAKER, J.

First Appeal From Order No. 574 of 1997

U.P. State Road Transport Corp., Lucknow
& Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Jagdamba Singh &Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Avanish Mishra, Sri Lal Dhari Rajbhar,Sri
Mritunjay Sahai

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Prabodh Gaur, Sri S.D. Ojha
1014 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Civil Law - Motor Vehicle Act,1988Compensation-Compensation for the death in
a road accident-appeal and the cross objection
raised
only
one
issue
of
quantum
of
compensation-age of the deceased not in
dispute-
income
tax
returns
have
been
produced- 20 years of age at the time of
accident-multiplier applicable would be 18-the
rate of interest would be 9% from the date of
filing of the claim petition till award and 6%
thereafter till deposit of amount.

Appeal partly allowed. (E-9)

Cases cited:

1. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs Pranay Sethi &
ors., 2017 LawSuit (SC) 1093

2. First Appeal From Order No. 1818 of 2012 (
Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co.Ltd. Vs Smt.
Renu Singh & ors.) decided on 19.7.2016

3. Khenyei Vs New India Assurance Company
Limited & ors., 2015 LawSuit (SC) 469

Sarla Verma Vs Delhi Transport Corporation,
(2009) 6 SCC 121

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Kaushal
Jayendra Thaker, J.)

1. By way of this appeal, the appellants
has challenged the judgment and order dated
11.4.1997 passed by Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal / VIIth Additional District Judge,
Azamgarh (hereinafter referred to as 'Tribunal')
in M.A.C.P. No. 13 of 1995 (Jagdamba Singh
and another Vs. Shobhnath and others)
awarding
a
sum
of
Rs.11,22,000/-
as
compensation to the claimants/respondents with
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the
date of filing the claim petition.

2. Heard earned counsel for the appellants
and learned counsel for the respondents.
Perused the record and judgment.

3. The brief facts of the case are that
claimants-appellants filed a Motor Accident
Claim Petition before the Tribunal for claiming
the compensation under Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 for the death of Kamlesh Kumar Singh in
a road accident with the averments that on
13.10.1994 at about 8:25 AM, Kamlesh Kumar
Singh-deceased was going on motorcycle
bearing no. U.P. 50 6160 from Azamgarh to
Sarfadeenpur Industrial Estate, when he reached
Narauli Taxi Stand, a bus bearing no. U.P. 65 C
5015 came from behind the motorcycle of the
deceased, which was being driven very rashly
and negligently by its driver. The bus driver lost
the control of the bus and hit the motorcycle. In
this accident, deceased sustained very serious
injuries and died on the spot.

4. The appeal and the cross objection
raised only one issue of quantum. The twin
issues raised by the Insurance Company are that
driver of the bus was not negligent and in
alternative even if this Court holds he was
negligent. The deceased was a contributor to the
incident having been taken place and the
deceased was either solely negligent or he was
driving his motorcycle on the wrong side and
the evidence of the driver has not been believed
by the learned Tribunal rather it has been
brushed aside, therefore, the judgment is bad.

5. It is further submitted that income of
the deceased has been wrongly considered to be
Rs.9,000/- per month, the deduction of 1/3rd is
bad as deceased was a bachelor and only father
and mother were dependent on him.

6. As against this, Mr. S.D. Ojha, learned
counsel for the claimants submits that while
going through the site plan, evidence on record
and the judgment of the learned Tribunal, the
issue of negligence has been rightly decided in
favour of the claimants. .

7. It is next submitted that income of
Rs.9,000/- per month is considered on the basis
that deceased was the partner in the firm and,
therefore, the same was based on income tax
returns. Rather the learned Tribunal did not add
any amount under the head of future loss of
income. Further granting multiplier on the basis
10 All. U.P. State Road Transport Corp., Lucknow & Ors. Jagdamba Singh & Ors.
1015
of the age of the parents and not on the basis of
the age of the deceased. The Tribunal had
granted only Rs.20,000/- under the head of non
pecuniary damages.

8. As far as the rate of interest is
concerned, it is submitted by learned counsel
for the appellant has raised cross objection and
has contended that the interest at the rate of
12% awarded by the Tribunal is on the higher
side and is bad in the eye of law. It is submitted
that the interest should be as per the repo rate. It
is further submitted by learned counsel for the
appellant that there can be no addition of
amount as the accident is of the year 1994 when
the Rule was not in vogue and the judgment of
National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay
Sethi and others, 2017 LawSuit (SC) 1093
was not available.

9. The accident is not in dispute. The
issue of negligence has attained finality as
neither the Insurance Company nor the owner
of the vehicle has disputed the same even in
oral submissions. The driver of the said vehicle
was having valid and effective driving licence
on the date of accident is also a decided fact. The
vehicle being insured and there being no breach of
policy condition is a finding, which has attained
finality. The only issue to be decided is the
quantum of compensation awarded by the
Tribunal.

10. The term negligence means failure to
exercise care towards others which a reasonable
and prudent person would in a circumstance or
taking action which such a reasonable person
would not. Negligence can be both intentional or
accidental which is normally accidental. More
particularly, it connotes reckless driving and the
injured must always prove that the either side is
negligent. If the injury rather death is caused by
something owned or controlled by the negligent
party then he is directly liable otherwise the
principle of "res ipsa loquitur" meaning thereby
"the things speak for itself" would apply.

11. The principle of contributory negligence
has been discussed time and again. A person who
either contributes or is co author of the accident
would be liable for his contribution to the accident
having taken place and that amount will be
deducted from the compensation payable to him if
he is injured and to legal representatives if he dies
in the accident.

12. The Division Bench of this Court in
First Appeal From Order No. 1818 of 2012 (
Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co.Ltd. Vs.
Smt. Renu Singh And Others) decided on
19.7.2016 has held as under :

"16. Negligence means failure to
exercise required degree of care and caution
expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the
omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided upon the considerations, which
ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs,
would do, or doing something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is
not always a question of direct evidence. It is an
inference to be drawn from proved facts.
Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a
relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What
may be negligence in one case may not be so in
another. Where there is no duty to exercise care,
negligence in the popular sense has no legal
consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise
care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid
acts or omissions which would be reasonably
foreseen likely to caused physical injury to
person. The degree of care required, of
course, depends upon facts in each case. On
these broad principles, the negligence of
drivers is required to be assessed.

17. It would be seen that burden of
proof for contributory negligence on the part
of deceased has to be discharged by the
opponents. It is the duty of driver of the
offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is
well settled law that at intersection where two
roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast
moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did
not slow down at intersection, but continued
to proceed at a high speed without caring to
notice that another vehicle was crossing, then
the conduct of driver necessarily leads to
1016 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him
rashly as well as negligently.

18. 10th Schedule appended to
Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations
for driving of motor vehicles which also form
part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such
Regulation clearly directs that the driver of
every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at
every intersection or junction of roads or at a
turning of the road. It is also provided that
driver of the vehicle should not enter
intersection or junction of roads unless he
makes sure that he would not thereby endanger
any other person. Merely, because driver of the
Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of
road would not absolve him from his
responsibility to slow down vehicle as he
approaches intersection of roads, particularly
when he could have easily seen, that the car
over
which
deceased
was
riding,
was
approaching intersection.

19. In view of the fast and constantly
increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles
upon roads may be regarded to some extent as
coming within the principle of liability defined
in Rylands V/s. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330.
From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads
of this country have been rendered by the use of
motor vehicles, highly dangerous. 'Hit and run'
cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have
caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such
cases are increasing in number. Where a
pedestrian without negligence on his part is
injured or killed by a motorist, whether
negligently
or
not,
he
or
his
legal
representatives, as the case may be, should be
entitled to recover damages if principle of
social justice should have any meaning at all.

20. These provisions (sec.110A and
sec.110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely
procedural provisions. They substantively affect
the rights of the parties. The right of action
created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was 'new
in its species, new in its quality, new in its
principles. In every way it was new. The right
given to legal representatives under Act, 1988
to file an application for compensation for
death due to a motor vehicle accident is an
enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by
limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents
Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers
require new strategies and new remedies.

21. In the light of the above
discussion, we are of the view that even if
courts may not by interpretation displace the
principles of law which are considered to be
well settled and, therefore, court cannot
dispense with proof of negligence altogether in
all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is
possible to develop the law further on the
following lines; when a motor vehicle is being
driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily
not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of
res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be
invoked in motor accident cases with greater
frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per
three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew V/s.
State of Punjab, 2005 0 ACJ(SC) 1840).

22. By the above process, the burden
of proof may ordinarily be cast on the
defendants in a motor accident claim petition to
prove that motor vehicle was being driven with
reasonable care or that there is equal
negligence on the part the other side."

emphasis added

13. The Apex Court in Khenyei Vs. New
India
Assurance
Company
Limited
&
Others, 2015 LawSuit (SC) 469 has held as
under:

"4. It is a case of composite
negligence where injuries have been caused to
the claimants by combined wrongful act of joint
tort feasors. In a case of accident caused by
negligence of joint tort feasors, all the persons
who aid or counsel or direct or join in
committal of a wrongful act, are liable. In such
case, the liability is always joint and several.
The extent of negligence of joint tort feasors in
such a case is immaterial for satisfaction of the
claim of the plaintiff/claimant and need not be
10 All. U.P. State Road Transport Corp., Lucknow & Ors. Jagdamba Singh & Ors.
1017
determined by the by the court. However, in
case all the joint tort feasors are before the
court, it may determine the extent of their
liability for the purpose of adjusting inter-se
equities between them at appropriate stage. The
liability of each and every joint tort feasor vis a
vis to plaintiff/claimant cannot be bifurcated as
it is joint and several liability. In the case of
composite
negligence,
apportionment
of
compensation between tort feasors for making
payment to the plaintiff is not permissible as the
plaintiff/claimant has the right to recover the
entire amount from the easiest targets/solvent
defendant.

14. There is a difference between
contributory and composite negligence. In the
case of contributory negligence, a person who
has himself contributed to the extent cannot
claim compensation for the injuries sustained
by him in the accident to the extent of his own
negligence;whereas in the case of composite
negligence, a person who has suffered has not
contributed to the accident but the outcome of
combination of negligence of two or more other
persons. This Court in T.O. Anthony v.
Karvarnan & Ors. [2008 (3) SCC 748] has
held that in case of contributory negligence,
injured need not establish the extent of
responsibility of each wrong doer separately,
nor is it necessary for the court to determine the
extent of liability of each wrong doer
separately. It is only in the case of contributory
negligence that the injured himself has
contributed by his negligence in the accident.
Extent of his negligence is required to be
determined as damages recoverable by him in
respect of the injuries have to be reduced in
proportion to his contributory negligence. The
relevant portion is extracted hereunder :

"6. 'Composite negligence' refers to
the negligence on the part of two or more
persons. Where a person is injured as a result
of negligence on the part of two or more wrong
doers, it is said that the person was injured on
account of the composite negligence of those
wrong-doers. In such a case, each wrong doer,
is jointly and severally liable to the injured for
payment of the entire damages and the injured
person has the choice of proceeding against all
or any of them. In such a case, the injured need
not establish the extent of responsibility of each
wrong-doer separately, nor is it necessary for
the court to determine the extent of liability of
each wrong-doer separately. On the other hand
where a person suffers injury, partly due to the
negligence on the part of another person or
persons, and partly as a result of his own
negligence, then the negligence of the part of
the injured which contributed to the accident is
referred to as his contributory negligence.
Where the injured is guilty of some negligence,
his claim for damages is not defeated merely by
reason of the negligence on his part but the
damages recoverable by him in respect of the
injuries stands reduced in proportion to his
contributory negligence.

7. Therefore, when two vehicles are
involved in an accident, and one of the drivers
claims compensation from the other driver
alleging negligence, and the other driver denies
negligence or claims that the injured claimant
himself was negligent, then it becomes
necessary to consider whether the injured
claimant was negligent and if so, whether he
was solely or partly responsible for the accident
and the extent of his responsibility, that is his
contributory negligence. Therefore where the
injured is himself partly liable, the principle of
'composite negligence' will not apply nor can
there be an automatic inference that the
negligence was 50:50 as has been assumed in
this case. The Tribunal ought to have examined
the extent of contributory negligence of the
appellant and thereby avoided confusion
between composite negligence and contributory
negligence. The High Court has failed to
correct the said error."

This Court in Challa Bharathamma
&Nanjappan (supra) has dealt with the breach
of policy conditions by the owner when the
insurer was asked to pay the compensation
fixed by the tribunal and the right to recover the
same was given to the insurer in the executing
court concerned if the dispute between the
1018 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
insurer and the owner was the subject-matter of
determination for the tribunal and the issue has
been decided in favour of the insured. The same
analogy can be applied to the instant cases as
the liability of the joint tort feasor is joint and
several.
In
the
instant
case,
there
is
determination of inter se liability of composite
negligence to the extent of negligence of 2/3rd
and 1/3rd of respective drivers. Thus, the
vehicle - trailor-truck which was not insured
with the insurer, was negligent to the extent of
2/3rd. It would be open to the insurer being
insurer of the bus after making payment to
claimant to recover from the owner of the
trailor-truck the amount to the aforesaid extent
in the execution proceedings. Had there been
no determination of the inter se liability for
want of evidence or other joint tort feasor had
not been impleaded, it was not open to settle
such a dispute and to recover the amount in
execution proceedings but the remedy would be
to file another suit or appropriate proceedings
in accordance with law.

What emerges from the aforesaid
discussion is as follows :

(i)
In
the
case
of
composite
negligence, plaintiff/claimant is entitled to sue
both or any one of the joint tort feasors and to
recover the entire compensation as liability of
joint tort feasors is joint and several.

(ii) In the case of composite
negligence, apportionment of compensation
between two tort feasors vis a vis the
plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. He can
recover at his option whole damages from any
of them.

(iii) In case all the joint tort feasors
have been impleaded and evidence is sufficient,
it is open to the court/tribunal to determine
inter se extent of composite negligence of the
drivers. However, determination of the extent of
negligence between the joint tort feasors is only
for the purpose of their inter se liability so that
one may recover the sum from the other after
making
whole
of
payment
to
the
plaintiff/claimant to the extent it has satisfied
the liability of the other. In case both of them
have been impleaded and the apportionment/
extent of their negligence has been determined
by the court/tribunal, in main case one joint tort
feasor can recover the amount from the other in
the execution proceedings.

(iv) It would not be appropriate for
the court/tribunal to determine the extent of
composite negligence of the drivers of two
vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other
joint tort feasors. In such a case, impleaded
joint tort feasor should be left, in case he so
desires, to sue the other joint tort feasor in
independent proceedings after passing of the
decree or award."

emphasis added

14. The latest decision of the Apex Court
in Khenyei (Supra) has laid down one further
aspect about considering the negligence more
particularly composite/contributory negligence.
The deceased or the person concerned should be
shown to have contributed either to the accident
and the impact of accident upon the victim
could have been minimised if he had taken care.

15. While going through the record,
findings of facts as well as place of incident and
the time of accident, it cannot be said that the
driver of the motorcycle, who died on the spot,
who had received several multiple injuries can
be said to have contributed to the accident
having been taken place. The accident took
place at 6:30 AM, therefore, it cannot be said
that driver of the motorcycle, which is a smaller
vehicle in that compare to the bus can be said to
be bad.

16. This takes this Court now to the issue
of compensation. The age of the deceased is not
in dispute and he was the partner in the business
and his income tax returns have been produced.
It has come on record that after him the firm
had losses may that as it may be, the figures
which is admissible of Rs.9,000/- per month
income, 40% of the income will have to be
10 All. U.P. State Road Transport Corp., Lucknow & Ors. Jagdamba Singh & Ors.
1019
added in view of the decision of the Apex Court
in Pranay Sethi (Supra), deducted 1/2.

17. It is further stated that the deceased
was 20 years of age at the time of accident,
hence, the multiplier applicable would be 18.
He has relied on the decision in National
Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi and
others, 2017 LawSuit (SC) 1093 & Sarla
Verma Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation,
(2009) 6 SCC 121 in support of above
arguments.

18. As far as the amount under the head
of non-pecuniary damages is concerned, it
should be Rs.70,000/- + 10% increase every
three years as per the decision of the Apex
Court in Pranay Sethi (Supra) hence, the
lump sum amount under this head would be
Rs.1,00,000/-.

19.

Hence,
the
total
amount
of
compensation, in view of the above discussions,
payable to the appellants-claimants is being
computed herein below:

(i) Annual Income : Rs.1,08,000/-
Per annum (Rs.9,000 X 12)

(ii)
Percentage
towards
future
prospects 40% : Rs. 43,200/-

(iii) Total income : Rs. 1,08,000/- +
Rs.43,200/- = Rs. 1,51,200/-

(iv) Income after deduction 1/2 :
Rs.1,51,200/- - Rs.75,600/- = Rs.75,600/-

(v) Multiplier applicable : 18

(vi) Loss of Dependency : Rs.
75,600/- X 18 = Rs.13,60,800/-

(vii)
Amount
under
loss
of
consortium : Rs. 1,00,000/-

(viii)
Total
compensation
:
Rs.13,60,800/-
+
Rs.1,00,000/-
=
Rs.14,60,800/-

20. As far as issue of rate of interest is
concerned, the rate of interest would be 9%
from the date of filing of the claim petition till
award and 6% thereafter till deposit of amount.

21. In view of the above, the appeal is
partly allowed. Judgment and decree passed by
the Tribunal shall stand modified to the
aforesaid extent. The appellant-U.P.S.R.T.C.
shall deposit the amount within a period of 12
weeks from today with interest as directed
above. The amount already deposited be
deducted from the amount to be deposited.

22. Record and proceedings be sent back
to the Tribunal forthwith. The amount be paid
to the claimants and no amount be kept in fixed
deposit.

23. On depositing the amount in the
Registry of Tribunal, Registry is directed to first
deduct the amount of deficit court fees, if any.
Considering the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of A.V. Padma V/s.
Venugopal, Reported in 2012 (1) GLH (SC),
442, the order of investment is not passed
because applicants /claimants are neither
illiterate or rustic villagers.

24. In view of the ratio laid down by
Hon'ble Gujarat High Court, in the case of Smt.
Hansaguri P. Ladhani v/s The Oriental
Insurance Company Ltd., reported in 2007(2)
GLH 291, total amount of interest, accrued on
the principal amount of compensation is to be
apportioned on financial year to financial year
basis and if the interest payable to claimant for
any
financial
year
exceeds
Rs.50,000/-,
insurance company/owner is/are entitled to
deduct appropriate amount under the head of
'Tax Deducted at Source' as provided u/s 194A
(3) (ix) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and if the
amount of interest does not exceeds Rs.50,000/-
in any financial year, registry of this Tribunal is
directed to allow the claimant to withdraw the
amount without producing the certificate from
the concerned Income- Tax Authority. The
aforesaid view has been reiterated by this High
Court in Review Application No.1 of 2020 in
1020 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
First Appeal From Order No.23 of 2001 (Smt.
Sudesna and others Vs. Hari Singh and another)
while disbursing the amount. The said decision
has also been reiterated by High Court Gujarat
in R/Special Civil Application No.4800 of 2021
(The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chief
Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS) decided
on 5.4.2022.

25. Fresh Award be drawn accordingly in
the above petition by the tribunal as per the
modification made herein. The Tribunals in the
State shall follow the direction of this Court as
herein aforementioned as far as disbursement is
concerned, it should look into the condition of
the litigant and the pendency of the matter and
judgment of A.V. Padma (supra). The same is
to be applied looking to the facts of each case.

26. The Tribunal shall follow the
guidelines issued by the Apex Court in Bajaj
Allianz General Insurance Company Private
Ltd. v. Union of India and others vide order
dated 27.1.2022, as the purpose of keeping
compensation is to safeguard the interest of the
claimants. As long period has elapsed, the
amount be deposited in the Saving Account of
claimants in Nationalized Bank without F.D.R.

----------
(2023) 10 ILRA 1020
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.09.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SURYA PRAKASH
KESARWANI, J.
THE HON'BLE MS. NAND PRABHA SHUKLA,
J.

Government Appeal No. 2903 of 1986

The State of U.P. ...Appellant
Versus
Ram Prakash & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
A.G.A., Sri S.K. Yadav
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Digvijay Singh

A. Criminal Law-Criminal Procedure Code,
1973-Section 378 - Indian Penal Code,
1860-Sections
302/34-Challenge
toacquittal-deceased was shot dead by fire
arms-an
application
regarding
irregularities of distribution of dalia and
milk was signed by the villagers including
PW-1 against the PW-2 and his father-The
incident took place after four years-the
representation was made collectively on a
minor issue of irregularity but the Trial
court disbelieved the evidence of PW-1
and PW-2-The statement of PW-5 is
totally consistent with the evidence of
PW-1 and PW-2 and the medical evidenceThe scope of appeal against the acquittal
under section 378 CrPC is not limited to
scrutinize but High court has to appreciate
the
evidence
in
an
appeal
against
acquittal in the same manner as it would
do in an appeal against conviction-Hence,
the findings recorded by the learned Trial
court while acquitting the accused are
perverse
and
even
contrary
to
the
evidence on record-The accused are held
to be guilty of the offence committed
under section 302/34 IPC.(Para 1 to 28)

The appeal is disposed of. (E-6)
.
List of Cases Cited:

1. Manu Sharma Vs St. (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6
SCC 1

2. Khekh Ram Vs St. of H.P. (2018) 1 SCC 202

3. Achhar Singh Vs St. of H.P. (2021) 5 SCC 543

(Delivered by Hon'ble Surya Prakash
Kesarwani, J.
&
 Hon'ble Ms. Nand Prabha Shukla, J.)

1. Heard Smt. Manju Thakur, learned
AGA for the appellant and Shri Digvijay