# U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Jhansi v. Devendra Kumar Verma & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 9 ILRA 524
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-06-19
- **Case number:** WRIT - C No. 17599 of 2006
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/u-p-state-road-transport-corporation-jhansi-v-devendra-kumar-verma-ors-45993
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

(A) Labour Law - U.P. Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 - Section 6-E - Conditions of
service, etc. to remain unchanged in certain
circumstances during the pendency of
proceedings - Section 6-F - Special
provision for adjudication as to whether the
conditions of services, etc. changed during
the pendency of proceedings .

Court proceeded to hear the matter as it is
pending since 2006 - Respondent no.1 engaged as
conductor - chargesheeted and a preliminary
inquiry held for the alleged misconduct - caught
red handed carrying 13 passengers in bus No.
UGO-9890 without tickets - found guilty of
misconduct - departmental appeal filed by
respondent no. 1 - partly allowed - modifying the
order of punishment of removal to stoppage of
two years' increments without affecting his future
services - respondent no. 1 raised Industrial
Dispute before the Labour Court. (Para-3)

HELD:- No rider can be put to the proviso of
Section 6-E(2) so far as the conditions
mentioned therein are concerned for the
employer to comply with. The proviso which
imposes conditions for performance of certain
act, those conditions are to be fulfilled by the
employer, before he can take action as
contemplated under Sub-section (2) of Section
6-E of the Act, 1947. (Para - 24)

Petition dismissed. (E-7)

List of cases cited: -

## Text

524 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

34. The person seeking equity
must do equity. It is not just the clean
hands, but also clean mind, clean heart and
clean
objective
that
are
the
equifundamentals of judicious litigation. The
legal maxim jure naturae aequum est
neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria
fieri locupletiorem, which means that it is a
law of nature that one should not be
enriched by the loss or injury to another, is
the percept for Courts. Wide jurisdiction of
the court should not become a source of
abuse of the process of law by the
disgruntled litigant. Careful exercise is
also necessary to ensure that the litigation
is genuine, not motivated by extraneous
considerations and imposes an obligation
upon the litigant to disclose the true facts
and approach the court with clean hands.

35. No litigant can play hide and
seek with the courts or adopt pick and
choose. True facts ought to be disclosed as
the Court knows law, but not facts. One,
who does not come with candid facts and
clean breast cannot hold a writ of the court
with
soiled
hands.
Suppression
or
concealment
of
material
facts
is
impermissible to a litigant or even as a
technique of advocacy. In such cases, the
Court is duty bound to discharge rule nisi
and such applicant is required to be dealt
with for contempt of court for abusing the
process of the court. {K.D. Sharma v. Steel
Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. [(2008) 12
SCC 481]."

33. From perusal of the facts as
narrated in the writ petition specially in
paragraph 24 of the writ petition in which
the petitioner has stated that he has already
made
a
representation
before
the
respondents authorities but from perusal of
the supplementary affidavit filed by him it
is clear that no representation was made by
the petitioner till the time of the filing of
the writ petition. Statutory representation
was submitted by him for the first time on
27.4.2017, copy of which is appended as
annexure no.2 to the personal affidavit,
which was submitted by him within the
statutory period of 30 days but since wrong
facts have been stated by the petitioner in
the writ petition he is not entitled for any
relief specially under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.

34. The High Court is exercising
discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution. Over
and above, a Court of Law is also a Court of
Equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity
that when a party approaches a High Court,
he must place all the facts before the Court
without
any
reservation.
If
there
is
suppression of material facts on the part of
the petitioner or twisted facts have been
placed before the Court, the Writ Court may
refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it
without entering into merits of the matter.

35. Accordingly, we are of the
opinion that the present writ petition is
devoid of merit and the same is liable to be
dismissed.

36. In view of the same, present writ
petition is dismissed with cost.
----------
(2020)09ILR A524
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.06.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAVI NATH TILHARI, J.

WRIT - C No. 17599 of 2006

U.P. State Road Transport Corporation,
Jhansi ...Petitioner
9 All. U.P.State Road Transport Corportion, Jhansi Vs. Devendra Kumar Verma & Ors.
525
Versus
Devendra Kumar Verma & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Rahul Anand Gaur, Sri J.N. Singh, Sri
Nishant Mehrotra, Sri Sheo Ram Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri G.K. Srivastava, Sri Ranjeet
Kumar Misra, Sri Ajai Kumar Tiwari(S.C.)

(A) Labour Law - U.P. Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 - Section 6-E - Conditions of
service, etc. to remain unchanged in certain
circumstances during the pendency of
proceedings - Section 6-F - Special
provision for adjudication as to whether the
conditions of services, etc. changed during
the pendency of proceedings .

Court proceeded to hear the matter as it is
pending since 2006 - Respondent no.1 engaged as
conductor - chargesheeted and a preliminary
inquiry held for the alleged misconduct - caught
red handed carrying 13 passengers in bus No.
UGO-9890 without tickets - found guilty of
misconduct - departmental appeal filed by
respondent no. 1 - partly allowed - modifying the
order of punishment of removal to stoppage of
two years' increments without affecting his future
services - respondent no. 1 raised Industrial
Dispute before the Labour Court. (Para-3)

HELD:- No rider can be put to the proviso of
Section 6-E(2) so far as the conditions
mentioned therein are concerned for the
employer to comply with. The proviso which
imposes conditions for performance of certain
act, those conditions are to be fulfilled by the
employer, before he can take action as
contemplated under Sub-section (2) of Section
6-E of the Act, 1947. (Para - 24)

Petition dismissed. (E-7)

List of cases cited: -

1. J.K. Industries Ltd. & ors. Vs Chief Inspector
of Factories and Boilers & ors. (1996) 6 SCC 665
2. Casio India Company Pvt. Ltd. Vs St. of Har.
(2016) 6 SCC 209

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ravi Nath Tilhari, J.)

1. Heard Sri Sheo Ram Singh, learned
counsel for petitioner and Sri Ajai Kumar
Tiwari, learned Standing Counsel. No one
appeared for private respondents to argue
the matter even in the revised list. The
Court proceeded to hear the matter as it is
pending since 2006. After hearing the
learned Counsel for the petitioner and the
learned Standing counsel, judgment was
reserved.

2. The petitioner has challenged the
Award dated 23.9.2005 passed by Presiding
Officer,
Labour
Court-II
U.P.
Kanpur/Respondent No. 2 in Misc. Dispute No.
40 of 2001, under Section 6-F of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act 1947'). By the said award,
the order bearing no. 8025 dated 26.12.2000
passed
by
U.P. State
Road
Transport
Corporation, Jhansi area office Tehsil Road,
Jhansi through Regional Manager/ Respondent
No. 3 and the appellate order dated 23.4.2001
removing the respondent no. 1 from services,
have been declared illegal and the petitionercorporation was directed to restore the services
of respondent no. 1 (now deceased and
substituted by his heirs and legal representatives
as respondent nos. 1/1 to 1/4), giving continuity
in service with all consequential benefits,
including payment of full salary and other
allowances. The rest part of the order dated
26.12.2000,
whereby
salary/wages
of
suspension period was denied and recovery of
the amount of loss of tickets to the tune of Rs.
30734.70/-, was directed, was maintained by
the Labour Court.

3. Briefly stated facts of the case are
that the respondent no. 1, Devendra Kumar
526 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Verma was engaged as conductor and was
posted at Rath Depot in Jhansi Region,
Jhansi. He was chargesheeted and a
preliminary inquiry was held for the
alleged misconduct dated 23.9.1995, i.e. he
was caught red handed carrying 13
passengers in bus No. UGO-9890 without
tickets. Vide order dated 25.9.1998 he was
found
guilty
of
misconduct.
The
departmental appeal filed by respondent no.
1 was partly allowed vide order dated
26.3.1999
modifying
the
order
of
punishment of removal to stoppage of two
years' increments without affecting his
future services. The respondent no. 1 raised
Industrial Dispute before the Labour Court,
Kanpur being Adjudication Case No.
47/2001.

4. The respondent no. 1 is alleged to
have committed serious misconduct on
dated 13.6.1999, 17.6.1999 and 18.6.1999.
He was chargesheeted for various charges
vide
order
dated
23.8.1999.
In
the
Departmental Inquiry, the Inquiry Officer
submitted the inquiry report and returned
the finding that all charges were proved.
The punishing authority after affording
opportunity of hearing passed the order of
punishment of removal from services on
26.12.2000. The departmental appeal was
dismissed vide order dated 23.4.2001.

5. The respondent no. 1 raised Industrial
Dispute before the Labour Court, being Misc.
Adjudication Case No. 40/2001 under Section
6-F of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
challenging the order dated 26.12.2000 and the
appellate order dated 23.4.2001, inter-alia, on
the ground that with respect to the order dated
26.12.2000, the petitioner-corporation did not
seek permission from the Labour Court
although the first dispute being adjudication
case No. 47 of 2001 was pending before the
Labour Court.

6. The petitioner-corporation filed
reply stating that the pending dispute in
Misc. Dispute No. 47 of 2001 was not
connected with the new dispute and as such
the provisions of Section 6-E of the Act
1947 were not applicable nor attracted. The
charges against the respondent no. 1, were
grievous in nature and he was guilty of
cheating and embezzlement.

7. The Labour Court passed an Award
dated 22.9.2005 in favour of respondent no.
1 holding the order dated 26.12.2000 and
appellate order dated 23.4.2001 as illegal
and
directed
the
reinstatement
of
respondent no. 1 in service with continuity
of service and directed the payment of
entire salary, allowances and other benefits
with effect from 20.12.2000. However,
Labour Court maintained the part of order
by which the salary for suspension period
was forfeited and the recovery of loss of
tickets from the respondent no. 1 was
directed, was maintained.

8. Sri Sheo Ram Singh, learned counsel
for the petitioner-corporation has submitted
that Section 6-E (2) of U.P. Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 was not attracted and the Labour
Court
acted
illegally
in
granting
protection/benefit of Section 6-E (2) of the
Act,1947 to the respondent no. 1 as well as in
awarding the claim, in favour of respondent
no. 1. He has submitted that the dispute
pending in Adjudication Case No. 47 of 2001
was different than the dispute in the present
Adjudication Case No. 40 of 2001 and as such
Section 6-E (2) of the Act was not attracted.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has next submitted that the respondent no.
1 did not raise this plea of Section 6-E (2)
of the Act, 1947, in the Departmental
Appeal and as such it was not open for him
to raise this plea before the Labour Court
9 All. U.P.State Road Transport Corportion, Jhansi Vs. Devendra Kumar Verma & Ors.
527
for the first time. The impugned Award, as
such, deserves to be quashed, in his
submission.

10. Learned Standing Counsel has
supported the Award of the Labour Court
on the ground the order has been passed.
He has submitted that Section 6-E (2) of
the Act, 1947 was attracted and as the
petitioner did not comply with the same,
there is no illegality in the Award passed
by the Labour Court, which Award does
not call for any interference by this Court
in the exercise of writ jurisdiction.

11. I have considered the submissions
of the learned counsel for the petitioner and
the learned standing counsel and have
perused the material on record.

12. The short point involved in this
case is whether Section 6-E (2) of the Act,
1947, is attracted to the present case or not.

13. It is appropriate to reproduce
Section 6-E of the U.P. Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 as under:

[6E. Conditions of service, etc. to
remain
unchanged
in
certain
circumstances during the pendency of
proceedings. - (1) During the pendency of
any conciliation proceeding before a
Conciliation Officer or a Board or of any
proceeding before a Labour Court or
Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute,
no employer shall, -

(a) in regard to any matter
connected with the dispute, alter, to the
prejudice of the workmen concerned in
such dispute, the conditions of service
applicable to them immediately before the
commencement of such proceeding, or

(b) for any misconduct connected
with the dispute, discharge or punish,
whether by dismissal or otherwise any
workman concerned in such dispute save
with the express permission in writing of
the authority before which the proceeding
is pending.

(2) During the pendency of any
such proceeding in respect of an industrial
dispute, the employer may, in accordance
with the standing orders applicable to a
workman concerned in such dispute, -

(a) alter, in regard to any matter
not connected with the dispute, the
conditions of service applicable to that
workman
immediately
before
the
commencement of such proceeding, or

(b) for any misconduct not
connected with the dispute, discharge or
punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise :

Provided that no such workman
shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he
has been paid wages for one month and an
application has been made by the employer
to
the
authority
before
which
the
proceeding is pending for approval of the
action taken by the employer.

(3)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in sub-section (2) no employer
shall during the pendency of any such
proceeding in respect of an industrial
dispute, take any action against any
protected workman concerned in such
dispute, -

(a) by altering, to the prejudice of
such protected workman, the conditions of
service applicable to him immediately
before
the
commencement
of
such
proceeding, or

(b) by discharging or punishing,
whether by dismissal or otherwise, such
protected workman,

such with the express permission
in writing of the authority before which the
proceeding is pending.

Explanation. - For the purposes
of this sub-section, a 'protected workman'
528 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in relation to an establishment, means a
workman who, being an officer of a
registered trade union connected with the
establishment, is recognized as such in
accordance with rules made in this behalf.

(4) In every establishment, the
number of workmen to be recognized as
protected workmen for the purposes of subsection (3) shall not exceed one per cent of
the total number of workmen employed
therein subject to a minimum number of
five protected workmen and a maximum
number of one hundred protected workmen
and for the aforesaid purpose, the State
Government may make rules providing for
the distribution of such protected workmen
among various trade unions, if any,
connected with the establishment and the
manner in which they may be chosen and
recognized as protected workmen.

(5) Where an employer makes an
application to a Board, Labour Court or
Tribunal under the proviso to sub-section
(2) for approval of the action taken by him,
the authority concerned shall, without
delay, hear such application and pass, as
expeditiously as possible, such order in
relation thereto as it deems fit.]

14. A bare perusal of Section 6-E(1)
of the Act, 1947 shows that during
pendency of any conciliation proceeding
before a Conciliation Officer or a Board or
of any proceeding before a Labour Court or
Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute,
no employer shall, (a) in regard to any
matter connected with the dispute, alter, to
the prejudice of the workmen concerned in
such dispute, the conditions of service
applicable to them immediately before the
commencement of such proceeding, or (b)
for any misconduct connected with the
dispute, discharge or punish, whether by
dismissal or otherwise any workman
concerned in such dispute save with the
express permission in writing of the
authority before which the proceeding is
pending. This sub-section (1) relates to the
matter or dispute which is pending before
Conciliation Officer or Board or Labour
Court or Tribunal i.e. the same dispute and
no such action as under Clauses (a), (b) can
be taken without the express permission in
writing of the authority before whom the
proceeding is pending.

15. Perusal of Section 6-E(2) shows
that
during
pendency
of
any
'such
proceeding' in respect of an industrial
dispute, the employer may, in accordance
with the standing orders applicable to a
workman concerned in such dispute, (a)
alter, in regard to any matter not connected
with the dispute, the conditions of service
applicable to that workman immediately
before
the
commencement
of
such
proceeding, or (b) for any misconduct not
connected with the dispute, discharge or
punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise.
This is subject to the proviso, which
provides that no such workman shall be
discharged or dismissed, unless he has been
paid wages for one month and an
application has been made by the employer
to
the
authority
before
which
the
proceeding is pending, for approval of the
action taken by the employer.

16. 'Such proceedings' in Section 6E(2) refers to pendency of any conciliation
proceeding, before a conciliation officer or
a Board or any proceeding before Labour
Court or Tribunal in respect of industrial
dispute as has been mentioned in subsection 1 of Section 6-E.

17. Thus as per Section 6-E (2),
notwithstanding the pendency of any
proceeding in respect of an industrial
dispute before the Labour Court or the
9 All. U.P.State Road Transport Corportion, Jhansi Vs. Devendra Kumar Verma & Ors.
529
Tribunal etc., for any act of misconduct,
which is not connected with the pending
dispute,
the
workman
can
still
be
discharged or dismissed or punishment may
be imposed by the employer but two
conditions are to be complied with as
provided under the proviso. First, that the
workman has to be paid one month's wages
and second, the employer has to file an
application before the authority concerned
before whom the proceedings with respect
to first dispute are pending for approval of
the action of the employer.

18. Admittedly, in the present case
any such application as referred to in the
proviso was not made by the employer
seeking approval of its action/order with
respect to respondent no. 1. The submission
of learned counsel for the petitioner that if
the dispute is not connected with the
previous dispute, Section 6-E (2) of the
Act, 1947 is not attracted, on the face of the
statutory provision, is misconceived and
cannot sustained.

19. The next submission of learned
counsel for the petitioner that as respondent
no. 1 did not raise the plea of the employer
not filing the application as provided in the
proviso of Section 6-E (2), in the
departmental appeal, filed against the order
of punishment dated 26.12.2000, he could
not take this plea before the Labour Court,
also deserves rejection being misconceived.

20. There is no prohibition or
restriction in Section 6-E (2), proviso, of
the Act, 1947 that plea of non-compliance
of the proviso cannot be raised before the
Labour Court, if such plea had not been
taken in the departmental appeal. No such
restriction can be imposed or placed, when
the provision is very specific and clear and
is
for
the
welfare
of
the
employee/workman. If the contention of
the petitioner's counsel is accepted then this
Court would be re-writing the proviso or
placing another proviso to Section 6-E (2),
which is not the function of the Court.

21. In the case of J.K. Industries
Ltd. And others vs. Chief Inspector of
Factories and Boilers and others (1996) 6
SCC 665, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
held that a proviso to a provision in a
statute has several functions and while
interpreting a provision of the statute, the
Court is required to carefully scrutinize and
find out the real subject of the proviso
appended to that provision. A proviso is
normally used to remove special cases from
the general enactment and provide for them
specifically.
A
proviso
qualifies
the
generality of the main enactment by
providing an exception and taking out from
the main proviso, portion, which, but for
the proviso would be a part of the main
provision. A proviso should not be read as
if providing something by way of addition
to the main provision which is foreign to
the main provision itself.

22. It is relevant to reproduce
Paragraph Nos. 33 to 36 of the case of J.K.
Industries Ltd. And others (supra) as under:

33. A proviso to a provision in a
statute has several functions and while
interpreting a provision of the statute, the
Court is required to carefully scrutinise
and find out the real object of the proviso
appended to that provision. It is not a
proper rule of interpretation of a proviso
that the enacting part or the main part of
the Section be construed first without
reference to the proviso and if the same if
found to be ambiguous only then recourse
may be had to examine the proviso as has
been canvassed before us. On the other
530 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
hand an accepted rule of interpretation is
that a Section and the proviso thereto must
be construed as a whole each portion
throwing light, if need be, on the rest. A
proviso is normally used to remove special
cases from the general enactment and
provide for them specially.

34. A proviso qualifies the
generality of the main enactment by
providing an exception and taking out from
the main provision, a portion, which, but
for them proviso would be a part of the
main provision. A proviso must, therefore,
be considered in relation to the principal
matter to which it stands as a proviso. A
proviso should not be read as if providing
something by way of addition to the main
provision which is foreign to the main
provision itself.

35. Indeed, in some cases, a
proviso, may be an exception to the main
provision though it cannot be inconsistent
with what is expressed in the main
provision and if it is so, it would be ultravires of the main provision and struck
down. As a general rule in construing an
enactment containing a proviso, it is proper
to construe the provisions together without
making either of them redundant or otiose.
Even where the enacting part is clear, it is
desirable to make an effort to give meaning
to the proviso with a view to justify its
necessary.

36. While dealing with proper
function of a proviso, this Court in The
Commissioner of Income-Tax, Mysore &
Ors. vs. The Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd. &
Ors.
MANU/SC/0070/1959
:
[1959]36ITR1(SC) opined:

The proper function of a proviso
is that it qualifies the generality of the main
10 enactment by providing an exception
and taking out as it were, from the main
enactment, a portion which, but for the
proviso would fall within the main
enactment. Ordinarily it is foreign to the
proper function of a proviso to read it as
providing
something by
way
of
an
addendum or dealing with a subject which
is foreign to the main enactment.

23. In case of Casio India Company
Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana 2016(6)
SCC 209, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
that: proviso can serve various purposes.
Generally, it is in the nature of an
exception. The proviso should not be
normally construed as nullifying the
enactment or as taking away completely a
right conferred. It is relevant to reproduce
Paragraph Nos. 22 & 23 as under:

"22.It needs no special emphasis
to mention that provisos can serve various
purposes. The normal function is to qualify
something enacted therein but for the said
proviso would fall within the purview of the
enactment. It is in the nature of exception.
[See : Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co.
Ltd v. Commercial Tax Officer[12]].
Hidayatullah, J. (as his Lordship then was)
in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and
Ginning Factory v. Subhsh Chandra Yograj
Sinha[13] had observed that a proviso is
generally added to an enactment to qualify
or create an exception to what is in the
enactment,
and
the
proviso
is
not
interpreted as stating a general rule.
Further, except for instances dealt with in
the proviso, the same should not be used
for
interpreting
the
main
provision/enactment, so as to exclude
something by implication. It is by nature of
an addendum or dealing with a subject
matter which is foreign to the main
enactment. (See : CIT, Mysore etc. v Indo
Mercantile Bank Ltd[14]). Proviso should
not be normally construed as nullifying the
enactment or as taking away completely a
right
conferred.
9 All. Sita Ram & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
531

23. Read in this manner, we do not
think the proviso should be given a greater or
more significant role in interpretation of the
main part of the notification, except as
carving out an exception. It means and
implies that the requirement of the proviso
should be satisfied i.e. manufacturing dealer
should not have charged the tax. The proviso
would not scuttle or negate the main
provision by holding that the first transaction
by the eligible manufacturing dealer in the
course by way of inter-state sale would be
exempt but if the inter-state sale is made by
trader/purchaser, the same would not be
exempt. That will not be the correct
understanding of the proviso. Giving over
due and extended implied interpretation to
the proviso in the notification will nullify and
unreasonably restrict the general and plain
words of the main notification. Such
construction is not warranted."

24. In view of the aforesaid
judgments, this Court is of the considered
view that no rider can be put to the proviso
of Section 6-E(2) so far as the conditions
mentioned therein are concerned for the
employer to comply with. The proviso
which imposes conditions for performance
of certain act, those conditions are to be
fulfilled by the employer, before he can
take action as contemplated under Subsection (2) of Section 6-E of the Act, 1947.

25. No other point has been pressed
by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

26. Thus considered, the writ petition
deserves to be dismissed.

27. The respondent no. 1, in whose
favour the award was passed has died and
has
been
substituted
by
his
legal
representatives as respondent nos. 1/1 to
1/4. As such the monetary benefits under
the Award deserves to be given to the
respondent nos. 1/1 to 1/4, if not already
paid to the deceased respondent. It is
ordered accordingly.

28. The writ petition lacks merits and
is hereby dismissed. No orders as to costs.
----------
(2020)09ILR A531
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.02.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE BALA KRISHNA NARAYANA, J.
THE HON'BLE RAVI NATH TILHARI, J.

WRIT - C No. 22248 of 2019
connected with
WRIT - C No. 19215 of 2019
connected with
WRIT - C No. 25323 of 2019
connected with
WRIT - C No. 23046 of 2019

Sita Ram & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Shashi Nandan, Sri Balendra Deo Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Neeraj Dube

Civil Law - National Highways Act, 1956 -
Section 3G (1) - Awards - Review of award -
Permissibility - No provision under National
Highways Act, for review of Award once
passed & attained finality - Only limited
provision
for
correction
of
clerical
/arithmetical mistakes or errors arising
therein
u/s
33
of
Right
to
Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013

Award granted compensation to the petitioners
@ of Rs. 5500/- sq. metre - subsequently