# U.P. State Sugar And Cane Devp. Corp. Ltd v. Surendra Prasad Mishra & Anr

- **Citation:** (2024) 2 ILRA 995
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-01-30
- **Case number:** Writ - A No. 2000147 of 2011
- **Bench:** Attau Rahman Masoodi, Om Prakash Shukla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/u-p-state-sugar-and-cane-devp-corp-ltd-v-surendra-prasad-mishra-anr-51517
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Service Law - General Clauses Act,
1897 - S. 27 - Disciplinary proceeding -
Punishment - Lost money was directed to
be recovered from the retiral dues -
Charge
of
not
performing
duty
as
Storekeeper as 160 bags were found short
during physical verification - Show cause
notice sent after the charged-employee
was found guilty in departmental enquiry
-
IInd
notice
returned
back
with
endorsement that he has refused to take
the letter - Effect of refusal - Tribunal
allowed the claim of charged-employee
holding the service of notice insufficient -
Validity challenged - Held, refusal of the
show cause notice is deemed service and
has to be construed as acceptance of the
show cause notice - Claimant/respondent
himself has refused to accept the said
second
show
cause
notice.
In
this
backdrop, the competent authority i.e.
General Manager had proceeded with the
matter and after considering the gravity of
charges as well as the inquiry report, has
passed the impugned order - There is no
illegality in conducting the departmental
inquiry against the claimant/respondent.
(Para 16, 17 and 18)

Writ petition allowed. (E-1)

List of cases cited :-

## Text

2 All. U.P. State Sugar And Cane Devp. Corp. Ltd. Vs. Surendra Prasad Mishra & Anr.
995
recruitment year, in the existing Uttar
Pradesh Higher Judicial Services Rules,
1975 on the harmonious construction of the
provisions of Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the said
Rules. However, there is also no bar under
the rules for the High Court to conduct a
special drive for recruitment to the unfilled
reserved category direct recruitment seats
against the existing vacancies of that
particular recruitment year, provided the
same is prior to the corresponding increase
to the number of recruits to be taken by
promotion from the Nyayik Sewa by the
operation of Rule 8(2) of the UPHJS Rules,
1975 for that particular recruitment year.

(iii) The High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad on its administrative side has
only adopted Section 3 (1) of the
Reservation Act, 1994 by virtue of
interpretation of "order" as could be found
in Rule 7 of the UPHJS Rules, 1975.

(iv) Under the existing UPHJS
Rules, 1975 and the Resolution of the Full
court dated 23.05.2015 and the resolution
of the Rule Revision Committee dated
13.01.2016, section 3(2) of the Reservation
Act, 1994 cannot be construed to be
adopted by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad on its administrative side.

(v) Unforeseen Vacancies are not
anticipated Vacancies or likely vacancies
and as such these unforeseen vacancies
cannot be assessed at the start of
Recruitment year within the meaning of
Rule 8(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Higher
Judicial Services Rules, 1975.

(vi) This Court finds no error in
the
determination
of
vacancies
for
recruitment year 2012 and 2014 and
accordingly the Seniority report and list
dated 31.01.2019 is upheld.

(v) Adhoc posting/appointment of
any officer against the Fast Track Courts is
of no relevance for the purpose of fixation
of seniority as provided under Proviso to
Rule 22 (3) and Rule 26 of the UPHJS
Rules, 1975.

(vi) Seniority has to be given as
per the appointment made on a substantive
post and seniority is to be determined in
accordance with rotation of vacancies
between direct recruits and promotees
based on quota of vacancies reserved for
both the categories as per Rule 22(2) of the
UPHJS Rules, 1975.

(126) For all the aforesaid reasons and
a sequel to above, all the writ petitions
being
Writ-A
No.2000845
of
2014
(Sanjeev Kumar Singh and others Vs State
of U.P. and others), (ii) Writ-A No. 30173
of 2019 (Harendra Bahadur Singh and
others Vs State of U.P. and others), (iii)
Writ-A
No.
11453
of
2020
(Smt.
Manorama and others Vs Hon'ble High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad and
others) and (iv) Writ-A No. 28511 of 2021
(Randheer Singh and others Vs Hon'ble
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and
others) are hereby dismissed.

(127) There shall be no order as to
cost.
----------
(2024) 2 ILRA 995
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 30.01.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ATTAU RAHMAN MASOODI,
J.
THE HON'BLE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.

Writ - A No. 2000147 of 2011

U.P. State Sugar And Cane Devp. Corp.
Ltd. ...Petitioner
Versus
Surendra Prasad Mishra & Anr.
 ...Respondents
996 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Petitioner:
P.K. Sinha

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., V.S. Trivedi

A. Service Law - General Clauses Act,
1897 - S. 27 - Disciplinary proceeding -
Punishment - Lost money was directed to
be recovered from the retiral dues -
Charge
of
not
performing
duty
as
Storekeeper as 160 bags were found short
during physical verification - Show cause
notice sent after the charged-employee
was found guilty in departmental enquiry
-
IInd
notice
returned
back
with
endorsement that he has refused to take
the letter - Effect of refusal - Tribunal
allowed the claim of charged-employee
holding the service of notice insufficient -
Validity challenged - Held, refusal of the
show cause notice is deemed service and
has to be construed as acceptance of the
show cause notice - Claimant/respondent
himself has refused to accept the said
second
show
cause
notice.
In
this
backdrop, the competent authority i.e.
General Manager had proceeded with the
matter and after considering the gravity of
charges as well as the inquiry report, has
passed the impugned order - There is no
illegality in conducting the departmental
inquiry against the claimant/respondent.
(Para 16, 17 and 18)

Writ petition allowed. (E-1)

List of cases cited :-

1. C.C. Alavi Haji Vs Palapetty Muhammed &
anr. AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 1705

(Delivered by Hon'ble Om Prkash Shukla,
J.)

(1) This writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India has been
instituted by the petitioners, assailing the
correctness of the judgment/order dated
11.11.2010 passed by the State Public
Services Tribunal, Lucknow (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Tribunal'), whereby (i)
Claim Petition No. 810 of 2008 filed by the
claimant/respondent no.1 (Surendra Prasad
Misra) has been allowed; (ii) the order of
punishment
dated
23.05.2007
and
consequential
order
dated
02.01.2008
passed
on
appeal
preferred
by
the
respondent
no.1-claimant
have
been
quashed;
and
(iii)
the
respondents/petitioners herein have been
directed to pay full retiral dues and full
salary for suspension period except what
has already been paid, as per rules.

(2) Apparently, by means of the
punishment order dated 23.05.2007, an
amount of Rs.1,05,42.50 was ordered to be
recovered from the retiral dues of the
respondent no.1-claimant and his pay for
suspension
period,
except
subsistence
allowance was also ordered to be withheld.

(3) The facts, in nutshell, are that in
the year 1972, the claimant/respondent
no.1,
Surendra
Prasad
Mishra,
was
appointed on the post of Storekeeper in
U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd and while
continuing on the said post, the Managing
Director, U.P. State Sugar Corporation
Ltd., vide order dated 24.06.2002, had
transferred the claimant/respondent no.1 in
Sale Department as Incharge Godown and
since 25.06.2002, claimant/respondent was
deputed for the said work in the Godown at
Budhwai Unit.

(4) On 05.10.2003, when the
claimant/respondent was posted in the
Godown
at
Budhwai
Unit,
physical
verification of the Godowns was made,
wherein it was found that although all the
locks of Godowns were in tact and even
there were no breaches in the walls of
Godowns at any other place, but even then
2 All. U.P. State Sugar And Cane Devp. Corp. Ltd. Vs. Surendra Prasad Mishra & Anr.
997
160 bags were found short. In this
backdrop, the claimant/respondent was
placed under suspension vide order dated
18.11.2003 and an inquiry was instituted
against the claimant/respondent. However,
since the inquiry took some time to
finalize,
the
claimant/respondent
was
reinstated in service vide order dated
03.11.2004, pending finalization of the
inquiry.

(5) The record of the instant writ
petition reveals that initially, Shri Y.K.
Agarwal, Deputy Chief Engineer was
appointed as Inquiry Officer to conduct the
inquiry and on his transfer, one Shri R.C.
Saxena, Assistant Engineer was appointed
as Inquiry Officer. Subsequently, it was
found that Shri R.C. Saxena, without
serving
the
charge-sheet
on
the
claimant/respondent and even without
conducting the inquiry as per law,
submitted its report and apparently gave a
report that no case is made out against the
claimant/respondent and others. As no
action was taken on the aforesaid report by
the
petitioners/department,
hence
the
claimant/respondent filed Writ Petition No.
8065 (S/S) of 2005 before this Court,
wherein a direction was issued by this
Court to take decision on the aforesaid
report of the Inquiry Officer. In compliance
of the aforesaid direction of this Court, the
department/petitioners
proceeded
to
consider the said inquiry report and after
due consideration, it was found that the
inquiry conducted by the Inquiry Officer
Shri R.C. Saxena was not in accordance
with the provisions of law and as such, the
said inquiry report was not accepted and
another inquiry officer Shri P.K. Saxena
was appointed to conduct the inquiry. The
Inquiry Officer, after his appointment as
aforesaid, served a charge-sheet on the
claimant/respondent
vide
letter
dated
11.03.2006,
to
which
the
claimant/respondent submitted his reply
vide letter dated 24.03.2006. However,
records reveal that before Shri P.K. Saxena,
the Inquiry Officer, could submit his report,
he was transferred to some other unit and
as such, Shri L.P. Singh, Accountant and
thereafter Shri R.K. Jain were appointed as
Inquiry Officer, but they too did not
conclude the inquiry. Lastly Shri Sanjay
Sinha, Assistant Engineer (Civil) was
appointed as Inquiry Officer, who after
concluding the inquiry, submitted his report
dated
04.11.2006,
holding
the
claimant/respondent guilty for the charges
so levelled against him. Thereafter, a show
cause notice along with a copy of the
inquiry
report
was
served
on
the
claimant/respondent
vide
letter
dated
07.02.2007 by registered post, but it
returned undelivered with the remarks that
the recipient is not available at home.
Thereafter, another letter dated 04.04.2007
was sent to the claimant/respondent by
registered post directing him to put up his
case before the punishing authority and
also allowing him personal hearing on
11.04.2007, however, this letter too was
returned undelivered with the remark that
the claimant/respondent refused to accept
it. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority,
after taking into consideration of all the
relevant material, passed the punishment
order
dated
23.05.2007
against
the
claimant/ respondent, whereby an amount
of Rs.1,05,42.50 was ordered to be
recovered from the retiral dues of the
respondent no.1-claimant and his pay for
suspension
period,
except
subsistence
allowance was also ordered to be withheld.

(6) Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid
order of punishment dated 23.05.2007, the
claimant/respondent preferred an appeal on
10.08.2007, which was rejected vide order
998 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
dated
02.01.2008
by
the
Appellate
Authority.
Thereafter,
the
claimant/respondent challenged the order
of punishment dated 23.04.2007 and
appellate
order
dated 02.01.2008
by
instituting Claim Petition No. 810 of 2008
before the learned Tribunal. The learned
Tribunal, after hearing the parties and
going through the record, allowed the claim
petition with the direction as stated in
paragraph-1
hereinabove
vide
judgment/order dated 11.11.2010. It is this
judgment/order dated 11.11.2010, which
has been assailed in the instant writ
petition.

(7) Heard Shri P.K. Sinha, learned
Counsel representing the petitioners and
respondent no.3 and Shri V.S. Trivedi,
learned
Counsel
representing
the
respondent no.1.

(8) Submission of the learned Counsel
representing the petitioners and respondent
no.3 is that the learned Tribunal has not
correctly
appreciated
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case and has, in fact,
recorded a vague finding that the chargesheet has not been approved by the
competent authority i.e. General Manager
and show case notice was not served upon
the respondent no.1-claimant and as such
the
enquiry
conducted
against
the
respondent
no.1-claimant
was flawed.
According to the learned Counsel, the
General
Manager
is
the
appointing
authority of the respondent no.1/claimant
and charge-sheet was approved by the
General Manager, however, after filing the
instant writ petition, it transpired that in the
impugned
judgment/order
dated
11.11.2010, words 'Managing Director'
have inadvertently been mentioned in
paras-7
and
9
of
the
impugned
judgment/order in place of words 'General
Manager' and as such, the petitioners
preferred an application for correction in
the impugned judgment/order
to
the
aforesaid extent, bearing Misc. Application
No. 109 of 2017. The learned Tribunal,
vide judgment/order dated 16.08.2017,
after hearing the parties and going through
the record, allowed the aforesaid correction
application
and
corrected
the
words
'Managing Director' mentioned in paras-7
and 9 of the impugned judgment/order as
'General Manager'. The said order dated
16.08.2017 (supra) has been brought on
records by the petitioners by means of an
affidavit
dated
04.09.2017
and
the
respondent
no.1/claimant
has
not
controverted the aforesaid finding by filing
any affidavit. Learned Counsel, thus,
submitted that since the charge-sheet has
been approved by the competent authority
i.e. General Manager, hence the finding
recorded by the learned Tribunal in this
regard
is
patently
illegal
and
not
sustainable.

(9) Learned counsel representing the
respondent no.1-claimant, on the other
hand, has argued that in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the impugned
judgment passed by the learned Tribunal
does not warrant any interference by this
Court in this case for the reason that a clear
finding has been recorded by the learned
Tribunal to the effect that issuance of
charge-sheet, show cause notice and
passing of the punishment order are
exclusive jurisdiction of the appointing
authority and since there is no evidence
brought on record to draw the inference
that the charge-sheet was approved by the
competent
authority
i.e.
appointing
authority,
the
impugned
order
of
punishment based on such charge-sheet
dated 11.03.2006 is vitiated in the eyes of
law. He has further argued strenuously that
2 All. U.P. State Sugar And Cane Devp. Corp. Ltd. Vs. Surendra Prasad Mishra & Anr.
999
after the impugned judgment/order, the
petitioners had made manipulation in the
record of inquiry and with the mala fide
intention, the word 'approved' has been
mentioned in the charge-sheet and on that
basis, the petitioners are now trying to setup a case before this Court, as if the
charge-sheet has been approved by the
competent authority, so that it can be
argued by them that the learned Tribunal
has recorded erroneous finding that the
charge-sheet has not been approved by the
competent authority. According to the
learned Counsel, if for the sake of
argument, if manipulation has not been
done after the impugned judgment/order,
there is no reason to record a finding by the
learned Tribunal in its order to the effect
that there is no evidence brought on to
draw the inference that the charge-sheet
was approved by the competent authority
i.e. appointing authority. According to the
learned Counsel, the charge-sheet against
the respondent no.1-claimant were not
proved by the competent authority and the
inquiry officer has submitted his report
only on the basis of the charge-sheet and
reply submitted by the respondent no.1claimant. In this view, submission on
behalf of the respondent no.1-claimant is
that at this juncture no interference in the
judgment and order passed by the learned
Tribunal is warranted.

(10) We have given our thoughtful
consideration to the rival submissions made
by the learned counsel appearing for the
respective parties and have also perused the
records available before us on this writ
petition.

(11) Apparently, it is an admitted fact
that while the petitioner was working on
the post of Incharge Godown in Budhwal
Unit of the U.P. State Sugar Corporation
Limited, a physical verification was made
on 05.10.2003, wherein irregularities in
stock
were found,
upon
which the
claimant/respondent was placed under
suspension vide order dated 18.11.2003 and
an inquiry was instituted. During pendency
of the inquiry, the claimant/respondent was
reinstated vide order dated 03.11.2004,
however, inquiry was ordered to be
continued against the claimant/respondent.
Initially, Shri Y.K. Agarwal, Deputy Chief
Engineer was appointed as inquiry officer
to conduct the inquiry, however, on his
transfer, one Shri R.C. Saxena, Assistant
Engineer was appointed as Inquiry Officer,
who, without serving charge-sheet to the
claimant/respondent
and
without
conducting the inquiry in accordance with
law, gave a report, stating that no case is
made out against the claimant/respondent
and others. This inquiry report was not
accepted
by
the
Disciplinary
Authority/General Manager and another
inquiry officer Shri P.K. Saxena, Incharge
Chief Engineer, was appointed to conduct
the inquiry.

(12) Thereafter, a charge-sheet was
issued to the respondent no.1-claimant on
11.03.2005, which contained two charges.
The
first
charge
stated
against
the
respondent no.1-claimant was related to
having not performed his duties as assigned
by the Sugar Corporation Board on the post
of Sugar Godown Keeper as on physical
verification, 160 bags were found short and
he had not informed to the competent
authority regarding deficiency in the
same. The second charge against the
claimant/respondent
relates
to
nonverification of stock with the record nor
any mention has made in F.D.O. report
dated 15.10.2003 and 31.10.2003 and
knowingly
causing
loss
to
the
Corporation.
1000 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(13) The respondent no.1-claimant
submitted reply to the said charge-sheet on
24.03.2006, denying the allegations made
against him in the charge-sheet. However,
before submitting his inquiry report, Shri
P.K. Saxena was transferred to some other
unit and as such, Shri L.P. Singh,
Accountant and thereafter, Shri R.K. Jain
were appointed as inquiry officer, but they
too could not conclude the inquiry. Lastly
Shri Sanjay Sinha, Assistant Engineer
(Civil) was appointed as Inquiry Officer,
who, after due inquiry, submitted its report
dated 04.11.2006, holding both the charges
levelled against the claimant/respondent to
have
been
proved.
The
Disciplinary
Authority/General
Manager,
after
considering the said inquiry report, issued a
show
cause
notice
to
the
claimant/respondent
vide
letter
dated
07.02.2007 by registered post, but it
returned undelivered with the remark that
recipient
is
not
available
at
home.
Thereafter, another letter dated 04.04.2007
was sent to the claimant/respondent by
registered post, however, this letter dated
04.04.2007 was also returned undelivered
with
the
remark
that
the
claimant/respondent refused to accept it.
Thereafter,
the
Disciplinary
Authority/General Manager, after taking
into consideration all the relevant material,
passed
the
punishment
order
dated
23.05.2007, which was challenged by the
claimant/respondent
by
instituting
an
appeal
before
the
Managing
Director/Appellate Authority, who, vide
order dated 02.01.2008, rejected the appeal.

(14)

Feeling
aggrieved,
the
claimant/respondent had instituted Claim
Petition No. 810 of 2008 before the learned
Tribunal, who, vide judgment/order dated
11.11.2010 allowed the claim petition
mainly on two grounds viz. (I) charge-sheet
has not been approved by the competent
authority; and (II) show cause notice was
not served upon the claimant/respondent.

(15) So far as first ground of allowing
the claim petition i.e. charge-sheet has not
been proved by the disciplinary authority is
concerned, the record reveals that the
disciplinary authority in the case of the
claimant/respondent
is
the
General
Manager of the Corporation. From perusal
of the impugned judgment/order dated
11.11.2010, what we find is that the learned
Tribunal, in para-9 of the impugned
judgment, has inadvertently mentioned that
the Managing Director is the competent
authority, however, this inadvertent error
was corrected by the learned Tribunal itself
vide order dated 16.08.2017 on an
application moved by the petitioners and it
was directed that the words 'General
Manager' be substituted in place of words
'Managing Director' in paras-7 and 9 of the
impugned judgment. The record available
before this Court also reveals that the
charge-sheet has been approved by the
General Manager of the Corporation. In
this regard, the petitioners had also arrayed
Sri S.K. Verma, Retired General Manager,
who, vide affidavit dated 04.09.2017,
stating on oath that there is no manipulation
in the approval of the charge-sheet as
alleged by the claimant/respondent. Thus,
the
plea
of
the
claimant/respondent
regarding the manipulation in the chargesheet, in this regard, has no substance as
the
learned
Counsel
for
the
claimant/respondent has not submitted
any documentary proof to show that
there is manipulation in the record and
on the other hand, learned Counsel for
the petitioners have filed an affidavit of
Incharge General Manager to prove the
authenticity of the approved chargesheet.
2 All. U.P. State Sugar And Cane Devp. Corp. Ltd. Vs. Surendra Prasad Mishra & Anr.
1001

(16) So far as the second ground for
allowing the claim petition by the learned
Tribunal i.e. show cause notice was not
served upon the claimant/ respondent, it is
an admitted fact that first show cause notice
was returned back to the department with
the endorsement that recipient is not
available at home. Thereafter, second letter
containing show cause notice was issued to
the claimant/respondent, however, the
record reveals that the second letter
containing show cause notice was returned
back
to
the
department
with
the
endorsement that claimant/respondent has
refused to take the letter. Thus, the finding
recorded by the learned Tribunal in this
regard that show cause notice was not
served upon the claimant/respondent, is
contrary to the record and the law
propounded by this court as well as the
Hon'ble Apex Court that refusal of the
show cause notice is deemed service and
has to be construed as acceptance of the
show cause notice. In a slightly different
context, while considering the effect of
Section 27 of the General Clauses Act,
1897, a Bench of three Judges of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in C.C. Alavi Haji vs.
Palapetty Muhammed and Anr, AIR
2007 SC (Supp) 1705 made following
observations: -

"14. Section 27 gives rise to a
presumption that service of notice has been
effected when it is sent to the correct
address by registered post. In view of the
said presumption, when stating that a
notice has been sent by registered post to
the address of the drawer, it is unnecessary
to further aver in the complaint that in spite
of the return of the notice unserved, it is
deemed to have been served or that the
addressee is deemed to have knowledge of
the notice. Unless and until the contrary is
proved by the addressee, service of notice
is deemed to have been effected at the time
at which the letter would have been
delivered in the ordinary course of
business. This Court has already held that
when a notice is sent by registered post and
is returned with a postal endorsement
"refused" or "not available in the house"
or "house locked" or "shop closed" or
"addressee not in station", due service has
to be presumed. [Vide Jagdish Singh v.
Natthu Singh AIR 1992 SC 1604 : State of
M.P. vs. Hiralal & Ors. (1996) 7 SCC 523
and V. Raja Kumari vs. P. Subbarama
Naidu & Anr. (2004) 8 SCC 774]"

(17) From the aforesaid, it is apparent
that the reasoning given by the learned
Tribunal while allowing the claim petition
is contrary to record as the charge-sheet has
already been approved by the competent
authority i.e. General Manager and after
returning the first show cause notice
unserved upon the claimant/respondent,
second show cause notice was issued to the
claimant/respondent, however, the postal
endorsement on the second show cause
notice reveals that the claimant/respondent
himself has refused to accept the said
second show cause notice. In this backdrop,
the competent
authority
i.e.
General
Manager had proceeded with the matter
and after considering the gravity of charges
as well as the inquiry report, has passed the
impugned order. The learned Tribunal has
lost sight of not considering the aforesaid
fact while allowing the claim petition.

(18) In view of the aforesaid, we find
that there is no illegality in conducting the
departmental
inquiry
against
the
claimant/respondent and the punishment
awarded against the claimant/respondent is
commensurate to the charges proved
against him, which was after following the
due procedure of law. Learned Counsel for
1002 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the claimant/respondent has failed to point
out any illegality or irregularity in
conducting the departmental inquiry against
him. Thus, the impugned judgment/order
passed by the learned Tribunal is liable to be
set-aside.

(19) Accordingly, the instant writ petition
is allowed. The impugned judgment/order
dated 11.11.2010 passed by the learned
Tribunal
is
hereby
set-aside
with
the
consequential
effect
that
the
order
of
punishment/recovery passed by the disciplinary
authority is restored.

(20) There will be no order as to
costs.
----------
(2024) 2 ILRA 1002
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 23.02.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J.
THE HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.

Writ - C No. 7195 of 2022

Smt. Kamala Devi ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Rajnish Ojha, Amrendra Nath Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Manish Vaish, Pankaj Gupta, Pravin
Kumar Singh

Civil Law - U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 -
Section 95(1)(g) - U.P. Panchayat Raj
(Removal of Pradhans, Up-Pradhans and
Members) Enquiry Rules, 1997 - Rule 3,
Rule 5, Rule 6 - Locus Standi of Complainant
- Necessary and Proper Party - Writ Petition
Challenging Seizure of Gram Pradhan's Powers -
Article 226 of the Constitution of India,1950 -
The petitioner, a Gram Pradhan, challenged an
order under the proviso to Section 95(1)(g) of
the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, seizing her
administrative and financial powers during a
preliminary enquiry into alleged irregularities,
initiated based on a complaint by a Gram Sabha
member. The complainant sought impleadment
in the writ petition, prompting a reference by a
Single Judge to a Division Bench to determine:
(1) whether the complainant has locus standi to
be impleaded in such a writ petition, and (2)
whether the Division Bench judgment in Amin
Khan Vs St. of U.P. (2008 SCC OnLine All 269)
requires reconsideration. Held: A complainant under
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules is not a necessary party in a
writ petition challenging the interim seizure of a Gram
Pradhan's powers, as no relief is typically sought
against the complainant, and their absence does not
preclude an effective order, per the principles of
Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC, applied analogously to writ
proceedings. However, the complainant may be a
proper party in specific cases where their presence
aids the court in fully adjudicating the dispute, such
as when facts or documents are withheld by St.
authorities, subject to the court's discretion under
Article 226 and Rule 5A of the Allahabad High Court
Rules, 1952. The discretion must be exercised with
reasoned fairness, not arbitrarily, as per Uday Narain
Singh Malpaharia Vs Addl. Member, Board of
Revenue, Bihar (AIR 1963 SC 786). The judgment in
Amin Khan was distinguished, as it addressed the
complainant's locus standi to file an appeal, not
impleadment in a writ petition, and involved a
complainant who was also a member of the
committee exercising the Pradhan's powers, unlike
the present case. The court found no conflict with
Amin Khan and declined to refer it for reconsideration
by a larger bench. The questions were answered,
and the writ petition was directed to be listed
before the Single Judge for further proceedings.

Case Law Cited:

1. Amin Khan Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 2008 SCC
OnLine All 269

2. Dharam Raj Vs St. of U.P. & ors., (2009) 108
RD 689

3. Vivekanand Yadav Vs St. of U.P. & Anr.,
(2010) 111 RD 699