# Udai Singh Bhanuvanshi v. Sri Kunj Behari Tewari

- **Citation:** (2002) 1 ILRA 207
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2001-01-08
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 226 of 2002
- **Bench:** A.K. Yog
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/udai-singh-bhanuvanshi-v-sri-kunj-behari-tewari-39795
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Lettings Rent and Eviction) Act 1972-
Section 21 (i) (b) Release application-
can only be made by the land lord-
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2002
208
application made by Mr. 'A' on the basis
of will deed to release rent as land lord-
held- perfectly right.

Held- Para 17

Court has consistently held that the
accommodation required by the land lord
for his family members, like month-inlaw, daughter-in-law etc. (not strictly
covered by the definition of family in the
Act, the requirement or need in lieu of
land lords' guest, attendant, servant,
etc.) shall be the need of land lord.
Reference may be made to the following
decisions of this Court:
Case law discussed:
1978 ARC-394
1983 (2) 143
1996 (2) ARC-14
AIR 1981 SC 1113
1998 (1) ARC 449
1999 (1) AWC 795
1988 (2) ARC 430

## Text

1All] Udai Singh Bhanuvanshi V. Sri Kunj Behari Tewari
207
arrears of land revenue, he issues a
citation to him for his appearance and can
take steps to arrest and detain the person
in civil prison and also to attach and sell
other properties of the defaulter. It is
common knowledge that if the defaulter is
able to secure even a temporary or time
bound stay order against the recovery
proceedings, he is able to delay the
process of recovery for a long period as
the Tehsil authorities lay off their hands.
The Collector and the Tehsildar are busy
persons and have to perform many
government functions. They are overburdened with work and unless the
creditor is keenly pursuing the matter they
normally do not revive the recovery
proceedings immediately after expiry of
the time bound stay order. It is common
experience that some clever defaulters
who manage to get even a time bound
stay order by making a small deposit or
giving an undertaking to deposit the
amount are thus able to forestall the
recovery proceedings for a long time.
Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that
such borrowers who have undertaken or
have been directed to deposit some
amount as a condition for staying the
recovery proceedings must be held strictly
bound by the said conditions and in the
event of non-compliance of the conditions
imposed, this Court will be fully justified
in declining to grant the relief under
Article 226 of the Constitution as the
proceedings under the said provisions are
discretionary in nature and can not be
claimed as a matter of right.

7. In the present case, the admitted
position is that the conditions on which
the recovery proceedings were stayed by
this Court have not been complied with
by the petitioners. In fact, the petitioners
did not deposit any amount at all. It
appears that the petitioners made a false
statement on 8.1.2001 with the sole aim
of getting a stay order. Not only the
petitioners did not deposit the amount
within the time fixed by this Court but
they have not done so even later on or till
the time when the writ petition was taken
up for hearing. There is no explanation at
all why the petitioners did not comply
with the statements made by them. We
are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that
the conduct of the petitioners has been
very unfair and the statement regarding
making of deposit was made with the sole
aim of getting a stay order. Therefore, in
the facts and circumstances of the case,
this Court would be fully justified in not
granting any relief under Article 226 of
the
Constitution
in
favour
of
the
petitioners.

For the reasons mentioned above, the
writ petition is dismissed with costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD: 7.1.2002

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE A.K. YOG, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 226 of 2002

Udai Singh Bhanuvanshi
...Petitioner
Versus
Sri Kunj Behari Tewari. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Raj Kumar Jain
Sri Rahul Jain

Counsel for the Respondent:

U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Lettings Rent and Eviction) Act 1972-
Section 21 (i) (b) Release application-
can only be made by the land lord-
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2002
208
application made by Mr. 'A' on the basis
of will deed to release rent as land lord-
held- perfectly right.

Held- Para 17

Court has consistently held that the
accommodation required by the land lord
for his family members, like month-inlaw, daughter-in-law etc. (not strictly
covered by the definition of family in the
Act, the requirement or need in lieu of
land lords' guest, attendant, servant,
etc.) shall be the need of land lord.
Reference may be made to the following
decisions of this Court:
Case law discussed:
1978 ARC-394
1983 (2) 143
1996 (2) ARC-14
AIR 1981 SC 1113
1998 (1) ARC 449
1999 (1) AWC 795
1988 (2) ARC 430

(Delivered by Hon'ble A.K. Yog, J.)

1.

Udai
Singh
Bhanuvanshi,
petitioner, who is the tenant of residential
accommodation on the first floor of house
no. 118408 Kaushalpuri, Kanpur Nagar
(for short called 'the Accommodation')
comprising of two Rooms. One Store,
Dochatti, Verandah, Aagan and Bath
room at the rate of Rs. 60/- per month has
approached this Court by filing present
writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India and seeks to
challenge the judgement and order dated
August 25, 2001 (Annexure-7 to the writ
petition) allowing land lord's Rent Appeal
No. 243 of 1995 (Kunj Behari Tewari
Versus Udai Singh Bhanuwanshi) under
Section
22
U.P.
Urban
Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972, U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (for
short called 'the Act') arising out of the
judgment and order dated November 8,
1995 passed by Prescribed Authority
under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act in Rent
Control Case No. 157 of 1993. (Kunj
Behari Versus Udai Singh) dismissing the
release application filed by the land lord
Kunj Bheari, son of Brahm Dutt Tewari,
under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act
(Annexure- 6 to the writ petition).

2. Admittedly, the petitioner shows
that the 'Accommodation' is in the
tenancy of the petitioner, Father of the
petitioner was tenant and Smt. Sukh Devi
and Ram Dayal Awasthi were the land
lords.
Aforementioned
Ram
Dayal
Awasthi executed a 'will' with respect to
the
premises
including
'the
accommodation' in favour of Vinod
Behari and Shyam Behari sons of Bhram
Dutt, Ram Dayal Awasthi having died,
said Vinod Behari and Shyam Behari
inherited the property through the will.
Kunj Behari Tewari respondent another
son of said Braham Dutt Tewari (real
brother of Vinod Behari and Shyam
Behari) claimed to be the owner/landlord
of
certain
property
including
'the
accommodation' by virtue of court decree
dated 14.1.1991 in Suit No. 1310 of 1989
(Kunj Behari Versus Shyam Behari)
passed by Ist Additional Civil Judge,
Kanpur Nagar. The said Kunj Behari filed
release application dated 2.4.1994 before
the Prescribed Authority under Section 21
of the Act claiming to be the land lord.

3. It is categorically mentioned in
the release application that registered
notice dated September3, 1993 was sent
through Advocate to the petitioner-tenant
and same was served upon the petitioner
on September 9, 1993 (Para 2 of the
release application Annexure -2 to the
writ petition- PP 31 of the writ paper
book). Release claimed for personal use
1All] Udai Singh Bhanuvanshi V. Sri Kunj Behari Tewari
209
of the land lord vide release application
under section 21 of the Act. The
contesting respondent petitioner-tenant
filed
written
statement.
Parties
led
evidence in support of their respective
cases.

4. The Prescribed Authority rejected
the release application primarily on the
ground that Kunj Behari Tewari failed to
establish his status as owner /landlord.

Feeling
aggrieved,
Kunj
Behari
Tewari filed Rent Appeal No. 243 of 1995
and the said rent appeal has been allowed
by Additional District Judge, Court No. 8
Kanpur Nagar, vide judgment and order
dated 25.8.2001.

5. After discussing the affect of the
partition decree between Kunj Behari
Tewari and aforementioned Vinod Behari
and Shyam Behari as well as the
registered notice dated September 3, 1993
sent to the tenant-petitioner by registered
post, keeping in view the fact that Kunj
Behari Tewari was authorized assigned
the rights to realize rent as 'landlord' of
the accommodation from the tenant with
respect to the accommodation in question
and the tenant was further required to pay
rent to said Kunj Behari Tewari.

6. In lower appellate court's
judgment (at Particular page 66 of the
writ petition) shows that Kunj Behari
Tewari was authorized not only to realize
the 'rent' but also authorized to realize the
same in his capacity as land lord of the
accommodation
vis-a-vis
the
tenantpetitioner.

7. The learned counsel for the
petitioner submitted that under Section 21
(1) (a) of the Act the land lord alone, who
is the owner of the accommodation, can
maintain application for release under
section 21 (1) (a) of the Act against his
tenant. The learned counsel for the
petitioner has laid emphasis on the
expression 'occupation by himself' used in
Section (1) (a) of the Act and argued that
it is the owner as land lord who can claim
release
of
an
accommodation
in
possession of some one as tenant. And not
a person who is authorized merely to
realize rent or accept rent on behalf of
owner/landlord.

8. I am not in agreement with the
submissions made on behalf of the
petitioner
in
this
respect
being
misconceived.

Relevant extract of Section 21 (1)(a)
of the Act read as:

9. "The Prescribed Authority may on
an application of the land lord in that
behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from
the building under tenancy or any
specified part thereof if it is satisfied that
any of the following grounds exists
namely ....."

10. Section 3 (j) of the Act defines
the term 'land lord' and reads:

"3(j) 'land lord ' in relation to a
building means a person to whom its rent
is or if the building were let, would be,
payable and includes, except in clause (g),
the agent or attorney, or such person."

11. If the expression 'except in
clause (g)' is extracted from the aforesaid
definition of the term 'land lord' will read'
a person to whom its rent is payable and
includes the agent or attorney or such
person.
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2002
210
12. No where under the Act, term
'owner' has been used. Thus the concept
of 'ownership' has no nexus nor relevant
while
dealing
with
the
expression
'landlord', tenant or their inter se rights
and obligations. There is no ambiguity in
the relevant provisions of the Act. Hence
this Court has no occasion to interpret the
said Act by adding or extracting or
otherwise to ascertain intention of the
legislature
while
interpreting
aforementioned provisions in 'The Act'.

13. The learned counsel for the
petitioner emphasized that in the instant
case Kunj Behari Tewari was given
limited/restricted right only to realize
'rent' on behalf of the land lord and,
therefore, he cannot claim to be treated as
land lord for the purposes of maintaining
'Release Application' under section 21 of
the Act.

14. The aforesaid submission of the
learned counsel for the petitioner is in
ignorance of the appellate court finding in
its judgment to the effect that Kunj Behari
Tewari was authorized to realize rent as
land lord. The observation of the said
court on the basis of the registered notice
dated September 3, 1993 has not been
assailed before me. There is no pleading
or ground to assail this finding in the writ
petition. Petitioner has not filed copy of
the said notice alongwith the writ petition
to enable the court to peruse the contents
of the said notice of its own and find out
for itself whether said finding is against
record. Petitioner has made no grievance
against the observation of the appellate
court on the above point.

15. Learned counsel for the
petitioner seeks to place reliance on the
following decisions:
1. 1978 ARC-394 Prem Chandra Pachit
versus
IInd.
Additional
District
Judge, Saharanpur and others.
2. 1983 (2) ARC 143- Smt. Sughra
Begum versus Sri Ram and others.
3. 1996 (2) ARC 14- Smt. Ved Rani
Diwan and another versus VIIIth
Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad
and others.
4. AIR 1981 SC 1113 M.M. Quasin
versus Manohar Lal Sharma and
others.

16. The decision in the case of Prem
Chandra Pachit (supra) lays down that the
need of 'Manager' required for running a
'Lodge' by the land lord cannot be equated
with the need of the land lord.

17. I am not in agreement with the
ratio of the aforesaid decision since in my
opinion need of the land lord for
accommodating 'Manager' would be the
need of the land lord himself. This Court
has
consistently
held
that
the
accommodation required by the land lord
for his family members, like mother-inlaw, daughter-in-law etc. (not strictly
covered by the definition of family in the
Act, the requirement or need in lieu of
land lord's guest, attendant, servant, etc.)
shall be the need of land lord. Reference
may be made to the following decisions
of this Court:

1998(1) ARC 449(Para 10)(S.R. Singh,J.)
1999 (1) AWC 795 (Sudhir Narain, J.)
1999 (1) AWC 424 (J.C. Gupta, J.)
1988 (2) ARC 430 (R.K. Gulati, J.)

18. Since the aforesaid question is
not arising it is not necessary for me to
decide this question in this case and or
refer the matter for hearing by larger
Bench.
The
question
regarding
1All] Sanjay Pratap Singh V. The Consolidation Commissioner, Lucknow and others
211
correctness of the ratio laid down in the
case of Prem Chand Pachit may be
decided in some other appropriate case
and occasion.

19. In the cases of Smt. Sughra
Begum, Smt. Ved Rani Diwan and M.M.
Quasim (supra) this Court held that an
agent or such other person cannot
maintain release application under section
21 (1)(a) of the Act. The facts of the
above cases are clearly distinguishable
from the facts of the case in hand. In the
present case in hand. Kunj Behari Tewari,
who
filed
release
application
was
authorized to realize rent as land lord and
thus his status as the owner/landlord of
the accommodation, as already discussed
above, cannot be questioned or assailed in
the present proceedings.

No other point has been raised or
pressed.

The writ petition fails and dismissed
in limine.

No order as to costs.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.2.2002

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE S.K. SEN, C.J.
THE HON'BLE R.K. AGARWAL, J.

Special Appeal No. 170 of 1997

Sanjay Pratap Singh

...Appellant
Versus
The
Consolidation
Commissioner,
Lucknow and others
...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Mr. Ravindra Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Mr. Ran Vijay Singh

Constitution
of
India,
Article
14-
Discrimination- claim for compassionate
appointment on the Post of Consolidatorauthorities offered appointment on the
post of clerk while those claimants with
lesser qualification appointed on the
post of consolidator-held action on the
part
of
State
Government
amounts
discrimination- direction issued to give
appointment on the post of Consolidator.

Held- Para 4

However, the appellant- writ petitioner
has produced necessary record and
relevant documents by way of filing a
supplementary affidavit wherein he has
mentioned that the post of Consolidator
was filled up, subsequently under the
provisions of Dying in Harness Rules
from amongst the candidates who had
lesser qualification than the appellant.
We are of the view that such act on the
port of the State Government amounts of
discrimination,
arbitrariness
and
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. In our view, the learned Single
Judge did not correctly assess the
position and dismissed the writ petition.
We are of the view that the appellant-
writ
petitioner
should
be
given
appointment on the post of Consolidator
in event such post is available. The order
dated 24.2.1997 passed by the learned
Single Judge is set aside. The Special
Appeal and writ petition are allowed
with
the
aforesaid
directions
and
observations.

(Delivered by Hon'ble S.K. Sen, C.J.)

1. Heard Sri Ravindra Singh learned
counsel for the appellant and Sri Ran
Vijay Singh, learned Standing Counsel for
the respondents.