# Umesh Kumar Sirohi v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2024) 5 ILRA 1717
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-05-02
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 10665 of 2021
- **Bench:** Saumitra Dayal Singh, Donadi Ramesh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/umesh-kumar-sirohi-v-state-of-u-p-anr-52016
- **Pages:** 36

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Judicial officer assailed
the penalty order passed by the St.
Government removing him from service-
Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India-
Rule 9(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Government
Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,
1999- Rule 34 of the Uttar Pradesh Higher
Judicial Service Rules, 1975- allegation of
abusing his position as a Judge- tried to
influence judicial officer junior to him for
personal benefits.

B. No requirement of recording reasons
under
Rule
9(4)-
Where
Disciplinary
Authority intends to agree with the inquiry
report
-
concluding
the
guilt
of
a
delinquent- Disciplinary Authority may
proceed with procedure prescribed under
Article 311 of the Constitution of India-
Disciplinary Authority/Full Court was not
obligated to record its express reasons-to
reject the representation made by the
delinquent or to accept the Inquiry Report
or to award particular penalty. (Paras 44,
45 and 64)

Held:
Therefore, there is no basis to the submission
being advanced by learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner that the requirement of recording
reasons under Rule 9(4) of the Rules exists and
may be enforced, independent of Rule 9(2) of the
Rules. The submission is misconceived. It is
rejected. (Para 44)

Having taken that view, we are further not
inclined to accept the submission of Sri Khare
that unless Rule 9(4) is read as suggested (by
him), there would exist no requirement to furnish
a copy of the Inquiry Report to the delinquent
and/or to grant him opportunity to represent
thereagainst. Though attractive in first blush, the
submission must fail. Those requirements arise,
sustain and are enforced in law, on the pure
strength of Article 311 of the Constitution of
India, as interpreted in Mohd. Ramzan Khan
(supra). In view of that higher law existing, lack
of statutory law (either by principal legislature or
its delegate) would
make no difference.
Consequently, where the Disciplinary Authority
intends to agree with the Inquiry Report -
concluding the guilt of a delinquent, the
Disciplinary Authority may proceed in accordance
with procedure prescribed under Article 311 as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Mohd.
Ramzan Khan (supra). That circumstance not
provided by Rule 9 of the Rules would remain
governed by the Constitutional provision (Article
311), as interpreted by the Supreme Court. (Para
45)

Thus, both in the context of the Rules and the
binding law, we are of the view that the
Disciplinary Authority / Full Court was not
obligated to record its express reasons-to reject
the representation made by the delinquent or to
accept the Inquiry Report or to award particular
penalty. (Para 64)

C.
Domestic
Inquiry-
reasonable
opportunity given to the delinquent- fair
and proper- conclusions drawn by Judge 'A'
based on relevant material- conduct of the
delinquent
officer
incorrigible
and
unbecoming of the judicial office- Petition
dismissed. (Paras 105 and 110)
1718 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
HELD:
Thus, we find, no good ground is made out to
offer any interference. The scope of judicial
review has to remain limited. The disciplinary
inquiry in Departmental Inquiry No. 21 of 2015 is
found to be fair and proper and conclusions
drawn by the Inquiry Judge 'A', based on material
and evidence collected during that Inquiry, with
which the petitioner had been confronted. Also,
that material cannot be described as extraneous
or irrelevant. (Para 105)

Once the petitioner admitted having called the
learned ACJM (who was seized with the case
proceeding involving his close family members),
that too, using the mobile phone of his wife's
lawyer - ostensibly to check the ACJM regarding
his working, every other detail referred to by
learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner - to
point certain deficiencies in the conduct of that
Inquiry, pales into insignificance. For the guilt of
the petitioner -a a judicial officer to be
established, the above quoted passage was
enough. Clearly, the p

## Text

_Characters 0–39,910 of 125,846. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39910 for what follows._

5 All. Umesh Kumar Sirohi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1717
by this Court, the petitioners shall have 45
days from today to file appropriate appeals.

139. The writ petitions are thus
dismissed. No order as to costs.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 1717
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH, J.
THE HON'BLE DONADI RAMESH, J.

Writ-A No. 10665 of 2021

Umesh Kumar Sirohi ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Siddharth Khare, Sr. Adv.

Counsel for the Respondent:
Ashish Mishra, C.S.C.

A. Service Law - Judicial officer assailed
the penalty order passed by the St.
Government removing him from service-
Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India-
Rule 9(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Government
Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,
1999- Rule 34 of the Uttar Pradesh Higher
Judicial Service Rules, 1975- allegation of
abusing his position as a Judge- tried to
influence judicial officer junior to him for
personal benefits.

B. No requirement of recording reasons
under
Rule
9(4)-
Where
Disciplinary
Authority intends to agree with the inquiry
report
-
concluding
the
guilt
of
a
delinquent- Disciplinary Authority may
proceed with procedure prescribed under
Article 311 of the Constitution of India-
Disciplinary Authority/Full Court was not
obligated to record its express reasons-to
reject the representation made by the
delinquent or to accept the Inquiry Report
or to award particular penalty. (Paras 44,
45 and 64)

Held:
Therefore, there is no basis to the submission
being advanced by learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner that the requirement of recording
reasons under Rule 9(4) of the Rules exists and
may be enforced, independent of Rule 9(2) of the
Rules. The submission is misconceived. It is
rejected. (Para 44)

Having taken that view, we are further not
inclined to accept the submission of Sri Khare
that unless Rule 9(4) is read as suggested (by
him), there would exist no requirement to furnish
a copy of the Inquiry Report to the delinquent
and/or to grant him opportunity to represent
thereagainst. Though attractive in first blush, the
submission must fail. Those requirements arise,
sustain and are enforced in law, on the pure
strength of Article 311 of the Constitution of
India, as interpreted in Mohd. Ramzan Khan
(supra). In view of that higher law existing, lack
of statutory law (either by principal legislature or
its delegate) would
make no difference.
Consequently, where the Disciplinary Authority
intends to agree with the Inquiry Report -
concluding the guilt of a delinquent, the
Disciplinary Authority may proceed in accordance
with procedure prescribed under Article 311 as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Mohd.
Ramzan Khan (supra). That circumstance not
provided by Rule 9 of the Rules would remain
governed by the Constitutional provision (Article
311), as interpreted by the Supreme Court. (Para
45)

Thus, both in the context of the Rules and the
binding law, we are of the view that the
Disciplinary Authority / Full Court was not
obligated to record its express reasons-to reject
the representation made by the delinquent or to
accept the Inquiry Report or to award particular
penalty. (Para 64)

C.
Domestic
Inquiry-
reasonable
opportunity given to the delinquent- fair
and proper- conclusions drawn by Judge 'A'
based on relevant material- conduct of the
delinquent
officer
incorrigible
and
unbecoming of the judicial office- Petition
dismissed. (Paras 105 and 110)
1718 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
HELD:
Thus, we find, no good ground is made out to
offer any interference. The scope of judicial
review has to remain limited. The disciplinary
inquiry in Departmental Inquiry No. 21 of 2015 is
found to be fair and proper and conclusions
drawn by the Inquiry Judge 'A', based on material
and evidence collected during that Inquiry, with
which the petitioner had been confronted. Also,
that material cannot be described as extraneous
or irrelevant. (Para 105)

Once the petitioner admitted having called the
learned ACJM (who was seized with the case
proceeding involving his close family members),
that too, using the mobile phone of his wife's
lawyer - ostensibly to check the ACJM regarding
his working, every other detail referred to by
learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner - to
point certain deficiencies in the conduct of that
Inquiry, pales into insignificance. For the guilt of
the petitioner -a a judicial officer to be
established, the above quoted passage was
enough. Clearly, the petitioner had not called the
ACJM in his capacity as a senior officer. (Para 110)

Petition dismissed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:

1. U.O.I. & ors. Vs Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991)
1 SCC 588

2. Punjab National Bank & ors. Vs K.K. Verma,
(2010) 13 SCC 494

3. Hari Om Gupta Vs St. of Bihar, 2015 SCC
OnLine Patna 4511

4. Umesh Chandra Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 2005 SCC
OnLine All 2370

5. Madhav Prasad Vs Deputy Managing Director,
(2004) (4) LLN 857

6. Ram Kumar Versus St. of Hary., 1987 Supp SCC
582

7. Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay v.
U.O.I. & ors., 1991 Supp 2 SCC 12

8. Boloram Bordoloi Vs Lakhimi Gaolia Bank &
ors., (2021) 3 SCC 806
9. Sanjeev Kumar Vs St. of U.P. & ors., (2008)
SCC OnLine All 1089

10. Nishith Ranjan Tiwari Vs St. of U.P. & ors.,
(2013) SCC OnLine 11768

11. St. of U.P. & ors. Vs Neeraj Verma, 2021 SCC
OnLine All 422

12. Shailendra Kumar Srivastava Vs St. Public
Services Court, Lucknow & ors., 2023 SCC OnLine
All 1896

13. St. of Har. & anr. Vs Rattan Singh, (1977) 2
SCC 491

14. U.O.I. & ors. Vs P. Gunasekara, (2015) 2 SCC
610

15. St. of Karn. & anr. Vs Umesh, (2022) 6 SCC
563

16. R.R. Parekh VsHigh Court of Gujarat & anr.,
(2016) 14 SCC 1

17. Registrar General High Court of Patna Vs
Pandey Gajendra Prasad & ors., (2012) 6 SCC 357

18. Desh Bhushan Jain Vs St. of U.P. & anr., 2007
SCC OnLine All 1568

19. Satya Pal Narang Vs St. of U.P. & and Another
ors., 2015 SCC OnLine All 8365

20. Punjab National Bank & ors. Vs K.K. Verma,
(2010) 13 SCC 494

21. Hari Niwas Gupta Vs St. of Bihar (2015) SCC
OnLine Pat 4511

22. Hari Niwas Gupta Vs St. of Bihar (2020) 3 SCC
153

23. D.K. Agrawal Vs Council of the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India, 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 903

24. Dr. Anurika Vaish Vs U.O.I., 2015 SCC OnLine
All 9599

25. Chairman Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi
Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs Jagdish Sharan
Varshney & ors., (2009) 4 SCC 240
5 All. Umesh Kumar Sirohi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1719
26. Institute of Chartered Accountant of India Vs
L.K. Ratna & ors., 1986(4) SCC 537

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal
Singh, J. & Hon'ble Donadi Ramesh, J.)

1. Heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned
Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Aditendra
Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner; Sri
Ashish Mishra, learned counsel for the High
Court and Sri Nimai Das, learned Additional
Chief Standing Counsel for the Staterespondents.

2. The present writ petition has been
filed to assail the penalty order passed by the
State
Government
dated
16.04.2021,
communicated to the petitioner by the
Registrar(J)(Confidential),
High
Court
Allahabad vide letter dated 28.05.2021.
Thereby, the petitioner - then serving as
Additional District & Sessions Judge,
Lalitpur has been removed from service,
with immediate effect. The petitioner was
appointed to the U.P. Civil Service (Judicial)
in the year 2001. In 2013, he was promoted
and thus appointed to the U.P. Higher
Judicial
Service.
While
serving
as
Additional District & Sessions Judge,
Meerut, first Charge Sheet dated 08.08.2016
was issued to the petitioner. Again, on
20.03.2017 a second Charge Sheet was
issued to the petitioner.

3. The first Charge Sheet dated
08.08.2016
led
to
institution
of
Departmental Inquiry No. 21 of 2015, on the
following four charges :

"1. That you with the help of your
younger brother Sri Raj Kumar Sirohi, the
then Civil Judge (Junior Division)/Judicial
Magistrate, Meerut and other family
members demanded dowry as a condition
for your brother's marriage with Dr. Muskan
Sirohi D/o Ummed Singh (W/o Sri Raj
Kumar Sirohi). Part of the demand for
dowry was also fulfilled. You and your
brother continued to press the demand of
dowry even after marriage so much so that
Sri Raj Kumar Sirohi deserted his wife for
non-fulfillment of dowry demand. The
demand and receipt of dowry for marriage
of your brother with Dr. Muskan Sirohi is a
misconduct within the meaning of Rule 11-A
of the U.P. Government Servant Rules, 1956.

Thus,
you
have
committed
misconduct within the meaning of Rule 11-A
read with Rule 3 of the U.P. Government
Servants Conduct Rules, 1956.

2.That on 26.06.2014, during the
course of reconciliation meeting between
the family members of Dr. Muskan Sirohi
with you and your younger brother Sri Raj
Kumar Sirohi, you self inflicted an injury on
your left hand, as a conspiracy to involve Dr.
Muskan Sirohi and her family members in a
criminal case. In furtherance thereof your
wife Smt. Meghana Sirohi lodged an FIR
against Dr. Muskan Sirohi and her family
members being Case Crime No. 472 of 2014,
U/s 395, 397 IPC at P.S. Medical College,
Meerut.

Thus, you have acted in a manner
which is unbecoming of a Judicial Officer.
Further, you have misused your authority as
a Judicial Officer and failed to maintain
absolute
integrity.
Thus,
you
have
committed misconduct within the meaning
of Rule 3 of the U.P. Government Servants
Conduct Rules, 1956.

3. That you and your younger
brother Sri Raj Kumar Sirohi, the then Civil
Judge
(Junior
Division)/Judicial
Magistrate, Meerut have tried to influence
the Investigating Officer by misusing your
official position during the course of
investigation of the aforesaid Case Crime
No. 472 of 2014.
1720 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Thus, you have acted in a manner
which is unbecoming of a Judicial Officer.
Further, you have misused your authority as
a Judicial Officer and failed to maintain
absolute
integrity.
Thus,
you
have
committed misconduct within the meaning
of Rule 3 of the U.P. Government Servants
Conduct Rules, 1956.

4. That you and your younger
brother Sri Raj Kumar Sirohi, the then Civil
Judge
(Junior
Division)/Judicial
Magistrate, Meerut have tried to influence
the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Court No. 5, Meerut and thus interfered in
the judicial proceeding arising our of Case
Crime No. 472 of 2014.

Thus,
you
have
committed
misconduct within the meaning of Rule 3 of
the U.P. Government Servants Conduct
Rules, 1956."

4. The second Charge Sheet dated
20.03.2017
led
to
institution
of
Departmental Inquiry No. 24 of 2016, on the
following three charges. They read as
below :

"(1)
That
while
posted
as
Additional District Judge, Meerut you
misused your position and tried to influence
Sri XXXXX, Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate-V, Meerut in your personal case
No. 93650 of 2015 (Crime No. 472 of 2014)
State Vs. Rama Singh and Others U/s 452,
324 IPC, P.S. Medical, Meerut in which your
wife Smt. Meghna Sirohi is complainant.
Firstly, in November 2015 you asked Sri
XXXXX, ACJM-V to summon the Circle
Officer in connection with filing of chargesheet and thereafter in December 2015 you
asked Sri XXXXX to take cognizance under
Section 307 IPC in the said case.

(2)
That
while
posted
as
Additional District Judge, Meerut you made
false allegation against Sri ******, the then
District Judge, Meerut that his behaviour
towards
you
was
prejudicial,
which
allegation was found to be false in the
Vigilance Enquiry Report dated 26.10.2016.
(3) That your another allegation against the
then District Judge, Meerut that he
submitted a false report dated 02.03.2016 to
the High Court in respect of your effort to
influence the concerned Magistrate, was
again found to be false in the Vigilance
Enquiry Report dated 26.10.2016."

5. Both inquiries were conducted
simultaneously. Inquiry No. 21 of 2015
was conducted at Prayagraj, by Judge 'A'
while Inquiry No. 24 of 2016 was
conducted at Lucknow, by Judge 'B'. The
Inquiry Judge 'A' submitted the report in
Inquiry No. 21 of 2015, dated 26.04.2019
whereas Inquiry Judge 'B' submitted their
report in Inquiry No. 24 of 2016, dated
03.07.2019. Upon such Inquiry Reports
submitted, the matter went (to the Full
Court)
through
the
Administrative
Committee. Upon submission of the two
Inquiry Reports and appraisal by the
Administrative Committee, both Inquiry
Reports (in Inquiry Nos. 21 of 2015 and 24
of 2016) were made available to the
petitioner vide further communications
dated 26.04.2019 and 03.07.2019, to
obtain his comments.

6. The petitioner submitted his
comments/representation to the two Inquiry
Reports
on
6.8.2019
and
19.8.2019,
respectively. Thereafter, the matter was
considered by the Full Court on 11.12.2020.
Therein, the Full Court resolved to accept
the two Inquiry Reports and inflict major
penalty of removal from service, with
immediate effect. That decision has been
approved by the State Government and has
been communicated to the petitioner. Hence
this challenge.
5 All. Umesh Kumar Sirohi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1721

7. Submissions advanced by learned
Senior Counsel for the petitioner are:

(i) Petitioner being a Government
Servant, he is fully protected under the
umbrella of Article 311 of the Constitution
of India. Relying on Rule 9 (4) of the Uttar
Pradesh Government Servant (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1999 (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Rules') read with Rule 34
of the U.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules,
1975, it has been submitted, even after
substitution of Article 311(2) of the
Constitution of India, the petitioner is
entitled to a reasonable opportunity of being
heard and to a reasoned order dealing with
his representation/comments - offered to the
two Inquiry Reports, referred to above.

8. Insofar as the Full Court made no
mention of such comments/representation
and further insofar as it has offered no
reason whatsoever to deal with the
representations made against the two
Inquiry Reports, the penalty order is wholly
contrary to the law. Reliance has been
placed on Union of India and others Vs.
Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 588
as followed in Punjab National Bank and
others Vs. K.K. Verma, (2010) 13 SCC
494. In Hari Om Gupta Vs. State of Bihar,
2015 SCC OnLine Patna 4511. Thus, it has
been
submitted,
notwithstanding
the
substitution of Article 311(2) of the
Constitution
of
India,
the
obligation
remained
on
the
Appointing
Authority/Disciplinary Authority, to act
with reason. That has been violated.

9. Specific to the Rules, it has been
submitted, Rule 9(4) of the Rules clearly
mandates that the Disciplinary Authority
must not only give opportunity to the
delinquent - to represent against the Inquiry
Report, but it must also record its reasons to
award the penalty. In that regard, it has been
urged, the decision of a coordinate bench of
this Court, in Umesh Chandra Vs. State of
U.P. and others, 2005 SCC OnLine All
2370, insofar as it does not notice or deal
with the mandatory statutory requirement of
Rule 9(4) of the Rules, is not good law. At
the same time, responding to the counter
submission advanced by learned counsel for
the High Court on the strength of the another
decision of the coordinate bench of this
Court in Madhav Prasad Vs. Deputy
Managing Director, (2004) (4) LLN 857, it
has been urged that that decision supports
the submission of the petitioner - that the
Appointing
Authority/Disciplinary
Authority or even the Appellate Authority,
must record its reasons to reject the
objections raised by the delinquent, to the
Inquiry Reports, and it must give reasons to
support its order.

10. Second, it has been submitted, at
the Full Court meeting dated 11.12.2020, the
Inquiry Judge 'A', and the District Judge (at
whose instance the complaint was lodged
against the petitioner and who in the
meantime had been elevated to the bench of
this Court), participated. By their mere
participation, the decision of the Full Court
became tainted and untenable in law. Here,
as has already been recorded in the earlier
order dated 15.4.2023, the relevant record
was produced on 16.4.2024. The same was
allowed to be examined by the learned
counsel for the petitioner. We had perused
the same and retained its photocopy on the
record. It so transpires that Inquiry Judge 'A'
had not attended the Full Court meeting
dated 11.12.2020. As to the participation of
the learned District Judge who had by then
been elevated to the bench of this Court, his
specific abstention is recorded in the
original record. Though it is handwritten, in
absence of any further challenge or doubt
1722 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
raised to the authenticity or genuineness of
the original record produced during these
proceedings, that issue must rest here.

11. Third, it has been submitted,
Charge no. 4 of Inquiry No. 21 of 2015 and
Charge No. 1 of Inquiry No. 24 of 2016,
overlapped. Thus, the the same alleged
misconduct was twice inquired into. That
itself is cited as a ground to vitiate the
inquiries.

12. Fourth, it has been submitted,
Domestic Inquiry No. 21 of 2015 was
wholly vitiated as (i) the Inquiry Report is
conjectural; (ii) it has been prepared in
complete violation of principles of natural
justice; (iii) it has been prepared upon denial
of any opportunity to the petitioner to crossexamine the Employers' Witnesses; (iv) the
Inquiry Judge 'A' had, for no reason, denied
to recall of Employers' Witnesses for crossexamination; (v) the forced absence of the
petitioner in the Inquiry proceedings,
occasioned by his prolonged illness was
completely ignored, for no good reason
given and (vi) the material relied by the
petitioner was not considered in the Inquiry
Report.

13. Similarly, the Inquiry Report in
the Domestic Inquiry 24 of 2016 was
vitiated for reason of non-consideration of
essential
facts.
Here,
it
has
been
submitted, the first date in the proceeding
in Case No. 93650 of 2015 arising from
Case Crime No. 472 of 2014, was
16.1.2016. This fact was proven by the
petitioner through oral evidence of D.W.4,
the
then
System
Officer,
District
Judgeship, Meerut. That witness was not
cross-examined by the Presenting Officer.
Yet, the Inquiry Judge 'B' inferred
(contrary to the record), that the above
described case was heard by Sri XXXXX,
the then ACJM on 18.12.2015, when the
alleged occurrence took place.

14. Also, the documents relied upon
in the Charge Sheet leading to institution
of Departmental Inquiry 24 of 2016 were
never proven. Neither the letter of Sri
XXXXX
learned
ACJM,
dated
18.12.2015, nor the Report/complaint of
the then learned District Judge dated
2.3.2016, nor the Vigilance Report dated
26.10.2016,
were
proven
in
those
proceedings. Yet, those documents have
been referred to and relied upon by the
Inquiry Judge 'B'. In that regard, it has
been further submitted that the Charge
Sheet that led to that inquiry had referred
to only two documents namely, the report
submitted by the District Judge dated
2.3.2016 and the letter written by the
learned ACJM, Sri XXXXX to the learned
District Judge, dated 12.1.2016.

15. Next, it has been submitted, the
specific
application
moved
by
the
petitioner before the Inquiry Judge 'B' - to
be permitted to confront the employer
witness D.W.4 with certain documents
was denied by adopting wholly erroneous
procedure. The cross-examination of the
said witness was closed on 3.7.2018
whereas the documents were summoned
on 16.4.2019. Further, it has been
submitted, no evidence was led to prove
charge nos. 2 and 3.

16. Responding to the above, Sri
Ashish Mishra learned counsel for the High
Court would submit, the penalty order has
been passed wholly in accordance with law.
After substitution of Article 311(2) of the
Constitution of India, the only mandatory
requirement in law remains - to conduct the
departmental inquiry with respect to charges
that may lead to award of major penalty.
5 All. Umesh Kumar Sirohi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1723
That compliance has been made. Further, in
view of the existing provision of Article 311
(2) of the Constitution of India, read with
Rule 9 of the Rules, the High Court was
obligated to serve on the petitioner the two
Inquiry Reports and to call for his
comments. That requirement was also
fulfilled, on an admitted case basis. Upon
due consideration of the same, the Full
Court has accepted the two Inquiry Reports
and has awarded due penalty.

17. As to the requirement to furnish
reasons, the position in law (being claimed
by the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner), has been hotly contested. Sri
Mishra
would
submit,
after
the
Constitutional
Amendment
(42nd
amendment), the constitutional requirement
stood fulfilled upon due Inquiries made and
upon opportunity granted to the delinquent
to furnish his representations against both
Inquiry Reports. Those were considered by
the Full Court - the Disciplinary Authority.
Since the Full Court accepted the Inquiry
Reports and concurred with the findings
recorded therein, after appraisal of the
objections raised thereto, neither any further
consideration was required to be made by
the Full Court in its capacity as the
Disciplinary Authority nor it was required to
record its own/separate reasons, either to
accept the Inquiry Reports or to award the
penalty of removal from service. In that
regard, first, he has referred to and heavily
relied on the coordinate bench decision in
Umesh Chandra (supra).

18. On Mohd. Ramzan Khan
(supra), it has been submitted, the said
decision no where lays down the law that the
Disciplinary Authority must record its
independent reasons either to accept the
Inquiry Report or to award the punishment.
The only requirement in law enforced by
Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra), is the
furnishing of Inquiry Report to the
delinquent and calling for his comments
thereto. As to the requirement of reasons to
be given by the Disciplinary Authority, he
would submit, the law in that regard has
remained consistent that the Disciplinary
Authority need not record its separate reason
where it proposes to accept the Inquiry
Report and the findings of the Inquiry
Officer (here Judge). Thus, reliance has been
first placed on Ram Kumar Versus State of
Haryana, 1987 Supp SCC 582 and Indian
Institute of Technology, Bombay v. Union
of India and others, 1991 Supp 2 SCC 12.
Also, reliance has been placed on a
coordinate bench decision of the Court in
Madhav Prasad Vs. Deputy Director
(supra). Doubt, if any, is stated to have been
removed upon the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Boloram Bordoloi Vs.
Lakhimi Gaolia Bank and others, (2021)
3 SCC 806.

19. Dealing with Rule 9(4) of the
Rules, it has been submitted, the said Rule
has no application to the facts of the present
case. In any case, it does not postulate an
independent
requirement
on
the
Disciplinary Authority, to record its reason -
to either accept an Inquiry Report or to
award punishment. In his submission Rule
9(4) of the Rules would come to life only
where Rule 9(2) of the Rules first applies.
Thus, only where the Disciplinary Authority
disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry
Officer (here Judge), it would be first
obligated
to
offer
his
own/ex-parte
consideration and record its own finding and
reasons therefor. That reasoning of the
Disciplinary Authority would arise, first at
the stage of disagreement being expressed to
the findings of the Inquiry Officer and
second, at the stage of award of penalty
under Rule 9(4) of the Rules. In the facts of
1724 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the present case, the Disciplinary Authority
i.e. Full Court did not disagree with either of
the two Inquiry Reports submitted by the
two Inquiry Judges. On the contrary, the Full
Court accepted both the Inquiry Reports.
Therefore, the trigger to activate Rule 9(4)
of the Rules (that exists by way of of Rule
9(2) of the Rules), was not activated.
Consequently, the Full Court was not
obligated in law, to give any further reasons.
He has relied on coordinate bench decisions
of the Court in Sanjeev Kumar Vs. State of
U.P. and others, (2008) SCC OnLine All
1089, Nishith Ranjan Tiwari Vs. State of
U.P. and others, (2013) SCC OnLine
11768, State of U.P. and others Vs. Neeraj
Verma, 2021 SCC OnLine All 422 and
Shailendra Kumar Srivastava Vs. State
Public Services Court, Lucknow and
others, 2023 SCC OnLine All 1896.

20. Merely because certain other High
Courts, may have opted for another
procedure and merely because on a
subjective opinion that approach may appear
to be better, may never be a ground either to
apply the Rules contrary to the legislative
intent or to vitiate the penalty order, for
reason of that approach not taken.

21. Responding to the submission of
duplication
of
charge,
it
has
been
vehemently urged, there is none. While
Charge no. 4 in Domestic Inquiry No. 21 of
2015 was of the delinquent (petitioner)
having tried to influence the learned ACJM
in a judicial proceeding arising out of Case
Crime No. 472 of 2014, the charge no. 1 in
the Domestic Inquiry 24 of 2016 was of
misuse of position to try influence the
learned ACJM in Case No. 93650 of 2015,
arising out of Case Crime No. 472 of 2015 -
to summon the Circle Officer, to submit a
Charge Sheet and to take cognizance under
Section 307 IPC.

22. The challenge raised to the two
Inquiry Reports - being in violation of rules
of natural justice and being otherwise
vitiated in law, has been rebutted with
vehemence, by relying on various order
sheet entries of the two Inquiry proceedings;
applications received, entertained and dealt
with by the two Inquiry Judges; the evidence
received in the two inquiries as also the
conduct offered by the petitioner in the
course of the two inquiries. Reference has
also been made to the fact that the other
delinquent whose conduct was jointly
inquired into in the course of the Domestic
Inquiry No. 21 of 2015, was none other than
the real younger brother of the petitioner. He
too being a judicial officer, his conduct was
similarly inquired into. He had crossexamined the Employers' Witnesses, on
many dates. As to the ex parte nature of
Inquiry No. 21 of 2015, relying on the
Inquiry record, it has been assertively urged
that the petitioner left the Inquiry Judge 'A'
with no option but to proceed ex parte in
terms of Rule 7(10) of the Rules. More than
enough opportunity was granted to the
petitioner to participate in those proceeding
and allow them to conclude, in a time bound
manner. However, repeated adjournments
were sought and the conduct of nonappearance (without seeking adjournment),
was also continued, despite long pendency
of the Inquiry proceeding. It has been stated,
all documents and evidence led at the
Inquiry proceedings were made available to
the delinquent petitioner. His rights were not
prejudiced.

23. While both Inquiries commenced
in the year 2017, they continued over a long
period of almost two years. Even if the
petitioner may contend and try to justify that
he could not appear on certain dates for
reasons, however, the continuous unabated
conduct of absence offered - over a long
5 All. Umesh Kumar Sirohi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1725
period of time in the course of two Inquiry
proceedings, may not be overlooked. Both,
in the Disciplinary Inquiry No. 21 of 2015
and 24 of 2016, the petitioner habitually
absented himself and participated on certain
dates of his choice, without making any
bona fide effort to let those proceedings
conclude. Thus, in a nutshell, it has been
submitted, the rules of natural justice may
not be read as iron cast rules. Insofar as
sufficient and reasonable opportunity of
hearing was given to the petitioner during
the course of both Inquiry proceedings, no
breach of that fundamental requirement of
law, was committed.

24. As to the proof of the charges and
the objections thereto, it has been urged,
here strict rule of evidence would not apply.
Insofar as balance of evidence rule would
allow for conclusions to arise (in the
disciplinary proceedings), and be sustained
on a preponderance of possibilities, such
conclusions may not be interfered with even
by appeal authorities, less so by a Writ
Court. Thus, reliance has first been placed
on the decision of the Supreme Court in
State of Haryana and Another Vs. Rattan
Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491, Union Of India
and others vs. P. Gunasekara, (2015) 2
SCC 610 and State of Karnataka and
Another Vs. Umesh, (2022) 6 SCC 563.

25. Then, specific to the case of
disciplinary proceedings against a judicial
officer, reliance has been placed on R.R.
Parekh Vs.High Court of Gujarat and
Another, (2016) 14 SCC 1, Registrar
General High Court of Patna Vs.
Pandey Gajendra Prasad and Others,
(2012) 6 SCC 357, Desh Bhushan Jain
Vs. State of U.P. and Another, 2007 SCC
OnLine All 1568 and Satya Pal Narang
Vs. State of U.P. and 2 Others, 2015 SCC
OnLine All 8365. Thus, it has been
submitted, in the case of judicial officers,
the concept of misconduct acquires a
different shade. Misconduct of having
tried to influence another judicial officer,
had to be dealt with most seriously,with an
iron hand.

26. Having heard learned
counsel for parties and having perused the
record, in the first place, we may deal with
the ground of challenge raised on the
strength of Article 311 of the Constitution
of India read with Rule 9(4) of the Rules.
Article 311 of the Constitution of India, as
it stands, reads as below:

"311. Dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank of persons employed in
civil capacities under the Union or a
State-(1) No person who is a member of a
civil service of the Union or an all-India
service or a civil service of a State or holds
a civil post under the Union or a State
shall be dismissed or removed by an
authority subordinate to that by which he
was appointed.

(2) No such person as aforesaid
shall be dismissed or removed or reduced
in rank except after an inquiry in which he
has been informed of the charges against
him and given a reasonable opportunity of
being heard in respect of those charges:

[Provided
that
where
it
is
proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon
him any such penalty, such penalty may be
imposed on the basis of the evidence
adduced during such inquiry and it shall not
be necessary to give such person any
opportunity of making representation on the
penalty proposed:

Provided further that this clause
shall not apply-]

(a) where a person is dismissed or
removed or reduced in rank on the ground of
1726 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
conduct which has led to his conviction on a
criminal charge; or

(b)
where
the
authority
empowered to dismiss or remove a person or
to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for
some reason, to be recorded by that
authority in writing, it is not reasonably
practicable to hold such inquiry; or

(c) where the President or the
Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied
that in the interest of the security of the State
it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.

(3) If, in respect of any such
person as aforesaid, a question arises
whether it is reasonably practicable to hold
such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2),
the decision thereon of the authority
empowered to dismiss or remove such
person or to reduce him in rank shall be
final."

27. Also, Rule 9 of the Rules reads as
below:

"9. Action on Inquiry Report- (1)
The Disciplinary Authority may, for reasons
to be recorded in writing, remit the case for
re-inquiry to the same or any other Inquiry
Officer under intimation to the charged
Government servant. The Inquiry Officer
shall thereupon proceed to hold the inquiry
from such stage as directed by the
Disciplinary Authority, according to the
provisions of Rule 7.

(2) The Disciplinary Authority
shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the
Inquiry Officer on any charge, record its
own finding thereon for reasons to be
recorded.

(3) In case the charges are not
proved, the charged Government servant
shall be exonerated the Disciplinary
Authority of the charges and informed him
accordingly.

(4) If the Disciplinary Authority,
having regard to its findings on all or any of
charges is of the opinion that any penalty
specified in Rule 3 should be imposed on the
charged Government servant, he shall give
a copy of the inquiry report and his findings
recorded under sub-rule (2) to the charged
Government servant and require him to
submit his representation if he so desires,
within a reasonable specified time. The
Disciplinary Authority shall, having regard
to all the relevant records relating to the
inquiry and representation of the charged
Government servant, if any, and subject to
the provisions of Rule 16 of these rules, pass
a reasoned order imposing one more
penalties mentioned in Rule 3 of these rules
and communicate the same to the charged
Government servant."

28. In Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra),
the
following
issue
had
arisen
for
consideration by the Supreme Court:

"2. The short point that falls for
determination in this bunch of appeals is as
to whether with the alteration of the
provisions of Article 311(2) under the Fortysecond Amendment of the Constitution
doing away with the opportunity of showing
cause against the proposed punishment, the
delinquent has lost his right to be entitled to
a copy of the report of enquiry in the
disciplinary proceedings."

29. Taking note of the Constitutional
Amendment whereby clause 2 of Article 311
was
substituted,
the
Supreme
Court
observed as below:

"11.The question which has now to
be answered is whether the Forty-second
Amendment has brought about any change
in the position in the matter of supply of a
5 All. Umesh Kumar Sirohi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1727
copy of the report and the effect of nonsupply thereof on the punishment imposed.

12.We have already noticed the
position that the Forty-second Amendment
has deleted the second stage of the inquiry
which would commence with the service of a
notice
proposing
one
of
the
three
punishments mentioned in Article 311(1)
and the delinquent officer would represent
against the same and on the basis of such
representation and/or oral hearing granted
the disciplinary authority decides about the
punishment. Deletion of this part from the
concept of reasonable opportunity in Article
311(2), in our opinion, does not bring about
any material change in regard to requiring
the copy of the report to be provided to the
delinquent.

13.Several pronouncements of this
Court dealing with Article 311(2) of the
Constitution have laid down the test of
natural justice in the matter of meeting the
charges. This Court on one occasion has
stated that two phases of the inquiry
contemplated under Article 311(2) prior to
the Forty-second Amendment were judicial.
That perhaps was a little stretching the
position. Even if it does not become a
judicial proceeding, there can be no dispute
that it is a quasi-judicial one. There is a
charge and a denial followed by an inquiry
at which evidence is led and assessment of
the material before conclusion is reached.
These facets do make the matter quasijudicial and attract the principles of natural
justice. As this Court rightly pointed out in
theGujarat case[(1969) 2 SCC 128 : (1970)
1 SCR 251] , the disciplinary authority is
very often influenced by the conclusions of
the Inquiry Officer and even by the
recommendations relating to the nature of
punishment to be inflicted. With the Fortysecond Amendment, the delinquent officer is
not associated with the disciplinary inquiry
beyond the recording of evidence and the
submissions made on the basis of the
material to assist the Inquiry Officer to come
to his conclusions. In case his conclusions
are kept away from the delinquent officer
and the Inquiry Officer submits his
conclusions
with
or
without
recommendation as to punishment, the
delinquent is precluded from knowing the
contents thereof although such material is
used against him by the disciplinary
authority. The report is an adverse material
if the Inquiry Officer records a finding of
guilt and proposes a punishment so far as
the delinquent is concerned. In a quasijudicial matter, if the delinquent is being
deprived of knowledge of the material
against him though the same is made
available to the punishing authority in the
matter of reaching his conclusion, rules of
natural justice would be affected. Prof.
Wade has pointed out: [ Administrative Law,
6th edn., p. 10]

"The concept of natural justice
has existed for many centuries and it has
crystallised into two rules: that no man
should be judge in his own cause; and that
no man should suffer without first being
given a fair hearing.... They (the courts)
have been developing and extending the
principles of natural justice so as to build up
a kind of code of fair administrative
procedure, to be obeyed by authorities of all
kinds. They have done this once again, by
assuming that Parliament always intends
powers to be exercised fairly."

...

15.Deletion
of
the
second
opportunity from the scheme of Article
311(2) of the Constitution has nothing to do
with providing of a copy of the report to the
delinquent in the matter of making his
representation. Even though the second
stage of the inquiry in Article 311(2) has
been
abolished
by
amendment,
the
delinquent is still entitled to represent
1728 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
against the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer
holding that the charges or some of the
charges are established and holding the
delinquent guilty of such charges. For doing
away with the effect of the enquiry report or
to meet the recommendations of the Inquiry
Officer in the matter of imposition of
punishment, furnishing a copy of the report
becomes necessary and to have the
proceeding completed by using some
material behind the back of the delinquent is
a position not countenanced by fair
procedure. While by law application of
natural justice could be totally ruled out or
truncated, nothing has been done here
which could be taken as keeping natural
justice out of the proceedings and the series
of pronouncements of this Court making
rules of natural justice applicable to such an
inquiry are not affected by the Forty-second
Amendment. We, therefore, come to the
conclusion that supply of a copy of the
inquiry report along with recommendation,
if any, in the matter of proposed punishment
to be inflicted would be within the rules of
natural justice and the delinquent would,
therefore, be entitled to the supply of a copy
thereof. The Forty-second Amendment has
not brought about any change in this
position.

...

18.We make it clear that wherever
there has been an Inquiry Officer and he has
furnished a report to the disciplinary
authority at the conclusion of the inquiry
holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of
the charges with proposal for any particular
punishment or not, the delinquent is entitled
to a copy of such report and will also be
entitled to make a representation against it,
if he so desires, and non-furnishing of the
report would amount to violation of rules of
natural justice and make the final order
liable
to
challenge
hereafter."

30. Thus, the Supreme Court
enunciated the law in Mohd. Ramzan
Khan (supra) - despite substitution of
Article 311(2), wherever the Inquiry Officer
may have submitted a report to the
Disciplinary Authority recording finding/s
of guilt of the delinquent, the latter would
remain entitled to a copy of that Inquiry
Report and would be further entitled to
represent thereagainst.