# Union Bank of India v. A.D.M., Meerut & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 7 ILRA 1271
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-05-30
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Review Application No. 293 of 2021
- **Bench:** Vivek Kumar Birla, Prakash Padia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/union-bank-of-india-v-a-d-m-meerut-ors-50368
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

1272 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Civil
Law
-
The
Securitisation
and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act,
2002 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -
Order XLVII Rule 1 - review application, error
apparent on the face of the record, alternative
remedy, Debt Recovery Tribunal, successive
review applications, exemplary costs
The Union Bank of India filed a review
application seeking to review the judgment
dated April 19, 2021, which dismissed its writ
petition (No. 9803 of 2021) challenging the
Additional District Magistrate's (ADM) order
dated October 30, 2019, rejecting the Bank's
application under Section 14 of the SARFAESI
Act, 2002, for physical possession of property.
The writ petition was dismissed on the ground
of an available statutory alternative remedy
under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before
the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), relying on
United Bank of India Vs Satyawati Tandon
(2010) 8 SCC 110. The Bank argued that
Section 17 remedy is available only to
borrowers, guarantors, lessees, or tenants, not
secured creditors, and that the dismissal was
based on an error apparent on the face of the
record. A prior review application (No. 168 of
2021) on similar grounds was dismissed on
September 9, 2021, without liberty to file a
fresh review The review application was
dismissed on merits and for being a second
review application on the same grounds, with
exemplary costs of Rs. 50,000 to be deposited
with the Registrar General within one month, to
be transmitted to the High Court Legal Services
Committee, Allahabad. The delay condonation
application was allowed. No error apparent on
the face of the record existed in the judgment
dated April 19, 2021. The dismissal was based
on the settled law in Satyawati Tandon, which
mandates exhausting statutory remedies under
Section 17 before invoking Article 226. The
Bank's contention that Section 17 applies only
to borrowers or guarantors required reasoning
and was not a patent error. The second review
application was not maintainable, as successive
review applications on the same grounds are
impermissible under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.
The earlier review application (No. 168 of
2021) was dismissed without granting liberty
to file afresh, and no new evidence or
sufficient reason analogous to Order XLVII was
presented.
The review application is dismissed.

List of Cases referred:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,995 of 56,648. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39995 for what follows._

7 All. Union Bank of India Vs. A.D.M., Meerut & Ors.
1271
namely, High Court Judges (Travelling
Allowances) Rules, 1956.

23. The reason given in the impugned
order further is that since the said Rules
1956 do not make any provision for
pensionary
benefits/domestic
help
allowance, as such the petitioner is not
entitled to his claim. Another reason
assigned by the State Government while
passing the impugned order is that on the
basis of parity any pensioner can lay any
claim only under statutory rules and not
otherwise. The aforesaid reasons indicated
by the State Government while passing the
impugned order dated 26.12.2019 are
absolutely untenable and fallacious for the
reason that the statutory provision where
the petitioner can trace his claim for
payment of domestic help allowance is
available in Rule 15-A of Rules 1985 which
clearly mandates that conditions of service
and other perquisites shall be made
available to the Chairman and ViceChairman of the Central Administrative
Tribunal as are admissible to a Judge of a
High Court in terms of the provisions
contained in Act, 1954. We have already
noticed the definition of the expression
'pension' as occurring in Section 2(gg) of
Act, 1954 which includes not only
pecuniary pension but also other retirement
benefits. Accordingly, if any retirement
benefits such as benefit of Domestic Help
Allowance has been made available to a
retired High Court Judge in terms of the
provisions contained in Act, 1954, the same
shall be made available to a retired
Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the
Central Administrative Tribunal as well.

24. For the discussion made and
reasons given above, we are unable to find
ourselves in agreement with the reasons
assigned by the State Government while
rejecting the claim of the petitioner by
means of the order dated 26.12.2019.

25. Resultantly, the writ petition is
allowed and the impugned order dated
26.12.2019,
passed
by
the
State
Government, as is contained in annexure
no.15 to the writ petition, is hereby
quashed. A direction is issued to the
concerned respondent to make available the
benefit of Domestic Help Allowance to the
petitioner with effect from 01.03.2008
along with periodical revision, if any,
within a month from today. He shall also be
paid arrears of the said allowance within
next two months. However, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, he shall not be
entitled to payment of interest.

26. This order shall be communicated
by learned Chief Standing Counsel to all
concerned forthwith.

27. There shall be no order as to costs.
----------
(2023) 7 ILRA 1271
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.05.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.
THE HON'BLE PRAKASH PADIA, J.

Civil Misc. Review Application No. 293 of 2021
IN
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9803 of 2021

Union Bank of India ...Petitioner
Versus
A.D.M., Meerut & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Suresh Chandra Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Anjani Kumar Chaurasiya
1272 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Civil
Law
-
The
Securitisation
and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act,
2002 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -
Order XLVII Rule 1 - review application, error
apparent on the face of the record, alternative
remedy, Debt Recovery Tribunal, successive
review applications, exemplary costs
The Union Bank of India filed a review
application seeking to review the judgment
dated April 19, 2021, which dismissed its writ
petition (No. 9803 of 2021) challenging the
Additional District Magistrate's (ADM) order
dated October 30, 2019, rejecting the Bank's
application under Section 14 of the SARFAESI
Act, 2002, for physical possession of property.
The writ petition was dismissed on the ground
of an available statutory alternative remedy
under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before
the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), relying on
United Bank of India Vs Satyawati Tandon
(2010) 8 SCC 110. The Bank argued that
Section 17 remedy is available only to
borrowers, guarantors, lessees, or tenants, not
secured creditors, and that the dismissal was
based on an error apparent on the face of the
record. A prior review application (No. 168 of
2021) on similar grounds was dismissed on
September 9, 2021, without liberty to file a
fresh review The review application was
dismissed on merits and for being a second
review application on the same grounds, with
exemplary costs of Rs. 50,000 to be deposited
with the Registrar General within one month, to
be transmitted to the High Court Legal Services
Committee, Allahabad. The delay condonation
application was allowed. No error apparent on
the face of the record existed in the judgment
dated April 19, 2021. The dismissal was based
on the settled law in Satyawati Tandon, which
mandates exhausting statutory remedies under
Section 17 before invoking Article 226. The
Bank's contention that Section 17 applies only
to borrowers or guarantors required reasoning
and was not a patent error. The second review
application was not maintainable, as successive
review applications on the same grounds are
impermissible under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.
The earlier review application (No. 168 of
2021) was dismissed without granting liberty
to file afresh, and no new evidence or
sufficient reason analogous to Order XLVII was
presented.
The review application is dismissed.

List of Cases referred:

1. Chajju Ram Vs Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112: No
review for incorrect exposition of law.

2. T.C. Basappa Vs T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC
440

3. Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs Ahmad Ishaque, AIR
1955 SC 233

4. Patel Narshi Thakershi Vs Pradyuman Singhji,
(1971) 3 SCC 844

5. Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma Vs Aribam Pishak
Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389

6. Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon Vs U.O.I., 1980
Supp SCC 562

7. S. Nagaraj Vs St. of Karn., 1993 Supp (4) SCC
595

8. Meera Bhanja Vs Nirmala Kumari Choudhury,
(1995) 1 SCC 170

9. Parsion Devi Vs Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC
715

10. Lily Thomas Vs U.O.I., (2000) 6 SCC 224

11. Common Cause Vs U.O.I., (2003) 10 SCC
264

12. Kerala St. Electricity Board Vs Hitech
Electrothermics, (2005) 6 SCC 651

13. Jain Studios Ltd. Vs Shin Satellite Public Co.
Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 501

14. St. of West Bengal Vs Kamal Sengupta,
(2008) 8 SCC 612

15. Kamlesh Verma Vs Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC
320

16. Ram Sahu Vs Vinod Kumar Rawat, 2020 SCC
Online SC 896

17. S. Madhusudhan Reddy Vs VS Narayana
Reddy, 2022 SCC Online SC 1034
7 All. Union Bank of India Vs. A.D.M., Meerut & Ors.
1273
18. Govt. of NCT of Delhi Vs K.L. Rathi Steels
Ltd., 2023 SCC Online SC 288

19. Irtaza Ali Vs District Judge Moradabad,
(1982) 2 ARC 514

20. Vinod Kumar Vs St. of U.P., 2022 (11) ADJ
25 (DB

21. Y.P. Chawla Vs M.P. Tiwari, AIR 1992 SC
1360

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Birla,
J. & Hon'ble Prakash Padia, J.)

Order
on
Civil
Misc.
Delay
Condonation Application:-

1. Heard.

2. Cause shown for the delay in filing
the restoration application is sufficient. The
delay is condoned.

3. The application is allowed.

Order
on
Civil
Misc.
Review
Application:-

1. Heard Shri Saurabh Pandey,
Advocate holding brief of Shri Suresh
Chandra Pandey, learned counsel for the
review-applicant and Shri Anjani Kumar
Chaurasiya,
learned
counsel
for
the
opposite party.

2. The present review application has
been filed seeking review of the judgment
and order dated 19.04.2021 passed in Civil
Misc. Writ Petition No. 9803 of 2021
(Union Bank of India vs. Additional
District Magistrate, Meerut and 2 others).

3. Facts in brief in the present case are
that the writ petition in question was filed
by the petitioner challenging the decision
taken by the Additional District Magistrate
(Finance
&
Revenue),
Meerut
dated
30.10.2019 by which the application filed
by the Bank under sub-section 1 of Section
14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 seeking
physical possession of the property was
rejected.

4. After hearing counsel for the
parties, the writ petition filed by the
petitioner was dismissed by this Court vide
its judgment and order dated 19.04.2021 on
the ground of availability of statutory
alternative remedy to the petitioner as
provided under Section 17 of SARFAESI
Act, 2002 before the Debt Recovery
Tribunal. The order passed by the Writ
Court dated 19.04.2021 is reads as
follows:-

"The matter is taken up through Video
Conferencing.

Sri Suresh Chandra Pandey, learned
counsel appears on behalf of petitioner.

Learned Standing Counsel appears on
behalf of respondent no.1.

Challenge in this petition is to order
dated 30.11.2019 passed by Additional
District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue)
under Section 14 of The Securitisation and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Securities Interest Act,
2002.

In the case of United Bank of India v.
Satyawati Tandon and Others, (2010) 8
SCC 110 wherein in paragraph 42 and 43 it
is held:

"42. There is another reason why the
impugned order should be set aside. If
respondent
No.1
had
any
tangible
grievance against the notice issued under
Section 13(4) or action taken under Section
14, then she could have availed remedy by
filing an application under Section 17(1).
The expression `any person' used in Section
17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its
fold, not only the borrower but also
1274 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
guarantor or any other person who may be
affected by the action taken under Section
13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and
the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to
pass interim orders under Sections 17 and
18 and are required to decide the matters
within a fixed time schedule. It is thus
evident that the remedies available to an
aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act
are both expeditious and effective.

43.Unfortunately, the High Court
overlooked the settled law that the High
Court will ordinarily not entertain a
petition
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution if an effective remedy is
available to the aggrieved person and that
this rule applies with greater rigour in
matters involving recovery of taxes, cess,
fees, other types of public money and the
dues
of
banks
and
other
financial
institutions. In our view, while dealing with
the petitions involving challenge to the
action taken for recovery of the public
dues, etc., the High Court must keep in
mind that the legislations enacted by
Parliament and State Legislatures for
recovery of such dues are code unto
themselves inasmuch as they not only
contain
comprehensive
procedure
for
recovery of the dues but also envisage
constitution of quasi judicial bodies for
redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved
person. Therefore, in all such cases, High
Court must insist that before availing
remedy
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution, a person must exhaust the
remedies available under the relevant
statute."

In view of the law laid down by the
Supreme Court the petitioner has a remedy
against the said order under Section 17 of
the SARFAESI Act before the Debt
Recovery Tribunal, therefore, we are not
inclined to cause any indulgence.

Consequently, petition is dismissed
with the liberty to petitioner to seek
redressal of his grievance before Debt
Recovery Tribunal. "

5. In order to review the aforesaid
final judgment dated 19.04.2021 as quoted
above, various grounds are taken in the
present review application. The basic
ground which is taken and argued before us
is that the alternative remedy under Section
17 of the Act, 2002 is available only for the
borrower, guarantor, lessee, tenant but not
to the secured creditor. It is further argued
that the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Satyamati
Tandon
(Supra),
relied
upon
while
dismissing the writ petition would have no
bearing on the preset case as the same deals
and operate on a very distinct field, i.e., to
safeguard the interest of the financial
institution. It is further argued that the order
dated 19.04.2021 rejecting the writ petition
suffers from a mistake which is patent,
manifest and self-evident. It is further
argued that alternative remedy is not a
complete bar to the jurisdiction of this
Court, if the proceedings challenged are
wholly without jurisdiction.

6. Before proceeding further it would
be appropriate to take note of Order XLVII
Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (hereinafter referred as the CPC) as
well as scope of the review as per the
settled law.

7. The grounds available for filing a
review application against a judgment have
been set out in Order XLVII of the Code of
Civil Procedure in the following words:

1. Application for review of judgment
- (1) Any person considering himself
aggrieved-
7 All. Union Bank of India Vs. A.D.M., Meerut & Ors.
1275

(a) by a decree or order from which an
appeal is allowed, but from which no
appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no
appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a
Court of Small Causes,

and who, from the discovery of new
and important matter or evidence which,
after the exercise of due diligence was not
within his knowledge or could not be
produced by him at the time when the
decree was passed or order made, or on
account of some mistake or error apparent
on the face of the record, or for any other
sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review
of the decree passed or order made against
him, may apply for a review of judgment to
the Court which passed the decree or made
the order.

(2) A party who is not appealing from
a decree or Order may apply for a review of
judgment notwithstanding the pendency of
an appeal by some other party except where
the ground of such appeal is common to the
applicant and the Appellant, or when, being
Respondent, he can present to the Appellate
Court the case on which he applies for the
review.

[Explanation-The fact that the decision
on a question of law on which the judgment
of the Court is based has been reversed or
modified by the subsequent decision of a
superior Court in any other case, shall not
be a ground for the review of such
judgment.]

8. A glance at the aforesaid provisions
makes it clear that a review application
would be maintainable on

(i) discovery of new and important
matters or evidence which, after exercise of
due
diligence,
were
not within
the
knowledge of the applicant or could not be
produced by him when the decree was
passed or the order made;

(ii) on account of some mistake or
error apparent on the face of the record; or

(iii) for any other sufficient reason.

9. Privy Council in the case of
Chajju Ram vs. Neki AIR 1922 P.C. 112;
Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi vs. Parath Nath
AIR 1934 P.C. 213; held that there cannot
be a review on the ground that the
judgment
proceeded
on
an
incorrect
exposition of law. Further, the Court has no
jurisdiction to review because it was of the
opinion that a different conclusion of law
should have been arrived at. It was also
observed that if a decision is erroneous in
law that is not a ground for ordering
review. If a court has decided a point
erroneously, the error could not be one
apparent on the face of the record or even
analogous to it. Therefore, subsequent
events or the fact that the Court took a
different view in a subsequent case is not a
sufficient reason for granting review (vide
Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC).
"

10. What can be said to be an error
apparent on the face of the proceedings has
been dealt with and considered by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of T.C.
Basappa vs. T.Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC
440. It is held that such an error is an error
which is a patent error and not a mere
wrong decision.

11. In the case of Hari Vishnu
Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955
SC 233, it is observed as under:

"It is essential that it should be
something more than a mere error; it must
be one which must be manifest on the face
of the record. The real difficulty with
1276 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
reference to this matter, however, is not so
much in the statement of the principle as in
its application to the facts of a particular
case. When does an error cease to be mere
error, and become an error apparent on the
face of the record? Learned counsel on
either side were unable to suggest any
clear-cut rule by which the boundary
between the two classes of errors could be
demarcated."

12. In Patel Narshi Thakershi and
Ors.
v.
Shri
Pradyuman
Singhji
Arjunsinghji (1971) 3 SCC 844, the
Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:

4..... It is well settled that the power
to review is not an inherent power. It
must
be
conferred
by
law
either
specifically or by necessary implication.
No provision in the Act was brought to
notice from which it could be gathered
that the Government had power to review
its own order. If the Government had no
power to review its own order, it is
obvious that its delegate could not have
reviewed its order.......

13. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma
v. Aribam Pishak Sharma (1979) 4 SCC
389, the Hon'ble Apex Court was
examining an order passed by the Judicial
Commissioner who was reviewing an
earlier judgment that went in favour of
the Appellant, while deciding a review
application filed by the Respondents
therein who took a ground that the
predecessor Court had overlooked two
important documents that showed that the
Respondents were in possession of the
sites through which the Appellant had
sought easementary rights to access his
home- stead. The said appeal was allowed
by the Hon'ble Apex Court with the
following observations:

3...It is true as observed by this Court
in Shivdeo Singh and Ors. v. State of
Punjab (1979) 4 SCC 389 there is nothing
in Article 226 of the Constitution to
preclude a High Court from exercising the
power of review which inheres in every
court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent
miscarriage of justice or to correct grave
and pulpable errors committed by it. But,
there are definitive limits to the exercise of
the power of review. The power of review
may be exercised on the discovery of new
and important matter or evidence which,
after the exercise of due diligence was not
within the knowledge of the person seeking
the review or could not be produced by him
at the time when the order was made; it
may be exercised where some mistake or
error apparent on the face of the record is
found; it may also be exercised on any
analogous ground. But, it may not be
exercised on the ground that the decision
was erroneous on merits. That would be the
province of a court of appeal. A power of
review is not to be confused with appellate
power which may enable an appellate court
to correct all manner of errors committed
by the subordinate court.

(emphasis added)

14. In Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon v.
Union of India and Ors. 1980 Supp SCC
562, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that
a review of an earlier order cannot be done
unless the court is satisfied that the material
error which is manifest on the face of the
order, would result in miscarriage of justice
or
undermine
its
soundness.
The
observations made are as under:

12. A review is not a routine
procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri
Kapil at length to remove any feeling that
the party has been hurt without being
heard. But we cannot review our earlier
7 All. Union Bank of India Vs. A.D.M., Meerut & Ors.
1277
order unless satisfied that material error,
manifest on the face of the order,
undermines its soundness or results in
miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra
Kante and Anr. v. Sheikh Habib (1975) 1
SCC
674
the Hon'ble Apex Court
observed:

A review of a judgment is a
serious step and reluctant resort to it is
proper only where a glaring omission or
patent mistake or like grave error has
crept in earlier by judicial fallibility....
The present stage is not a virgin ground
but review of an earlier order which has
the normal feature of finality.

(emphasis added)

15. In S. Nagaraj and Ors. v. State
of Karnataka and Anr. 1993 Supp (4)
SCC 595, the Hon'ble Apex Court
explained as to when a review jurisdiction
could be treated as statutory or inherent and
held thus:

18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all
barriers. Neither the Rules of procedure nor
technicalities of law can stand in its way.
The order of the court should not be
prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis
is adhered for consistency but it is not as
inflexible in Administrative Law as in
Public Law. Even the law bends before
justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction
exercised by the higher courts is founded
on equity and fairness. If the court finds
that the order was passed under a mistake
and it would not have exercised the
jurisdiction
but
for
the
erroneous
assumption which in fact did not exist and
its perpetration shall result in miscarriage
of justice then it cannot on any principle be
precluded
from
rectifying
the
error.
Mistake is accepted as valid reason to recall
an order. Difference lies in the nature of
mistake
and
scope
of
rectification,
depending on if it is of fact or law. But the
root from which the power flows is the
anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either
statutory or inherent. The latter is available
where the mistake is of the Court.

16. Again, in Meera Bhanja v.
Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (1995) 1
SCC 170 while quoting with approval a
passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma
v. Aribam Pishak Sharma (1979) 4 SCC
389 the Honb'le Apex Court once again
held that review proceedings are not by
way of an appeal and have to be strictly
confined to the scope and ambit of Order
47 Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure.

9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 Code of
Civil Procedure a judgment may be open to
review inter alia if there is a mistake or an
error apparent on the face of the record. An
error which is not self-evident and has to be
detected by a process of reasoning, can
hardly be said to be an error apparent on
the face of the record justifying the court to
exercise its power of review Under Order
47 Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure. In
exercise of this jurisdiction Under Order 47
Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure it is not
permissible for an erroneous decision to be
'reheard and corrected'. A review petition, it
must be remembered has a limited purpose
and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in
disguise'.

[emphasis added]

17. In Parsion Devi and Ors. v.
Sumitri Devi and Ors.:(1997) 8 SCC 715,
stating that an error that is not self-evident
and the one that has to be detected by the
process of reasoning, cannot be described
as an error apparent on the face of the
record for the Court to exercise the powers
of review, the Honb'le Apex Court held as
under:
1278 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"7. It is well settled that review
proceedings have to be strictly confined to
the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1
Code
of
Civil
Procedure.
In
Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt.
of A.P., 1964 SCR (5) 174 the Honb'le
Apex Court opined:

11. What, however, we are now
concerned with is whether the statement in
the order of September 1959 that the case
did not involve any substantial question of
law is an 'error apparent on the face of the
record'. The fact that on the earlier occasion
the Court held on an identical state of facts
that a substantial question of law arose
would not per se be conclusive, for the
earlier order itself might be erroneous.
Similarly, even if the statement was wrong,
it would not follow that it was an 'error
apparent on the face of the record', for there
is a distinction which is real, though it
might not always be capable of exposition,
between a mere erroneous decision and a
decision which could be characterized as
vitiated by 'error apparent'. A review is by
no means an appeal in disguise whereby an
erroneous
decision
is
reheard
and
corrected, but lies only for patent error."

18. The error referred to under the
Rule, must be apparent on the face of the
record and not one which has to be
searched out. While discussing the scope
and ambit of Article 137 that empowers the
Hon'ble Supreme Court to review its
judgments and in the course of discussing
the contours of review jurisdiction Under
Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure in Lily Thomas vs. Union of
India reported in (2000) 6 SC 224, the
Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:

54. Article 137 empowers this Court
to review its judgments subject to the
provisions of any law made by Parliament
or any Rules made Under Article 145 of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court Rules
made in exercise of the powers Under
Article 145 of the Constitution prescribe
that in civil cases, review lies on any of the
grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure which provides:

56. It follows, therefore, that the
power of review can be exercised for
correction of a mistake but not to substitute
a view. Such powers can be exercised
within the limits of the statute dealing with
the exercise of power. The review cannot
be treated like an appeal in disguise. The
mere possibility of two views on the
subject is not a ground for review. Once a
review petition is dismissed no further
petition of review can be entertained. The
Rule of law of following the practice of the
binding nature of the larger Benches and
not taking different views by the Benches
of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength
has to be followed and practised. However,
this Court in exercise of its powers Under
Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution
and upon satisfaction that the earlier
judgments have resulted in deprivation of
fundamental rights of a citizen or rights
created under any other statute, can take a
different view notwithstanding the earlier
judgment.

58. Otherwise also no ground as
envisaged Under Order XL of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of
the Code of Civil Procedure has been
pleaded in the review petition or canvassed
before us during the arguments for the
purposes of reviewing the judgment in
Sarla Mudgal case. It is not the case of the
Petitioners that they have discovered any
new and important matter which after the
exercise of due diligence was not within
their knowledge or could not be brought to
7 All. Union Bank of India Vs. A.D.M., Meerut & Ors.
1279
the notice of the Court at the time of
passing of the judgment. All pleas raised
before us were in fact addressed for and on
behalf of the Petitioners before the Bench
which, after considering those pleas, passed
the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case. We
have also not found any mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record requiring
a review. Error contemplated under the
Rule must be such which is apparent on
the face of the record and not an error
which has to be fished out and searched.
It must be an error of inadvertence. No
such error has been pointed out by the
learned Counsel appearing for the parties
seeking review of the judgment. The only
arguments
advanced
were
that
the
judgment
interpreting
Section
494
amounted to violation of some of the
fundamental rights. No other sufficient
cause has been shown for reviewing the
judgment.
The
words
"any-other
sufficient reason appearing in Order 47
Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure" must
mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at
least analogous to those specified in the
rule" as was held in Chajju Ram v. Neki
Ram : AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved
by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios
Catholicos. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose
Athanasius : 1955 SCR 520. Error
apparent on the face of the proceedings
is an error which is based on clear
ignorance or disregard of the provisions
of law. in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa :
1955 SCR 250 the Hon'ble Apex Court
held that such error is an error which is
a patent error and not a mere wrong
decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad
: AIR 1955 SC 233, it was held:

It is essential that it should be
something more than a mere error; it
must be one which must be manifest on
the face of the record. The real difficulty
with reference to this matter, however, is
not so much in the statement of the
principle as in its application to the facts of
a particular case. When does an error, cease
to be mere error and become an error
apparent on the face of the record? Learned
Counsel on either side were unable to
suggest any clear-cut Rule by which the
boundary between the two classes of errors
could be demarcated.

Mr. Pathak for the first Respondent
contended on the strength of certain
observations of Chagla, CJ in - 'Batuk K.
Vyas v. Surat Boroug Municipality: ILR
1953 Bom 191, that no error could be said
to be apparent on the face of the record if it
was not self-evident and if it required an
examination or argument to establish it.
This test might afford a satisfactory basis
for decision in the majority of cases. But
there must be cases in which even this test
might
break
down,
because
judicial
opinions also differ, and an error that might
be considered by one Judge as self-evident
might not be so considered by another. The
fact is that what is an error apparent on
the face of the record cannot be defined
precisely or exhaustively, there being an
element of indefiniteness inherent in its
very nature, and it must be left to be
determined judicially on the facts of each
case.

Therefore, it can safely be held that
the Petitioners have not made out any case
within the meaning of Article 137 read with
Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules and
Order 47 Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure
for reviewing the judgment in Sarla
Mudgal case6. The petition is misconceived
and bereft of any substance.

emphasis added)

19. It is also settled law that in
exercise of review jurisdiction, the Court
cannot reappreciate the evidence to arrive
1280 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
at a different conclusion even if two views
are possible in a matter. In Kerala State
Electricity
Board
v.
Hitech
Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. and
Ors. (2005) 6 SCC 651, the Hon'ble Apex
Court observed as follows:

10.....In a review petition it is not open
to this Court to reappreciate the evidence
and reach a different conclusion, even if
that is possible. Learned Counsel for the
Board at best sought to impress us that the
correspondence exchanged between the
parties did not support the conclusion
reached by this Court. We are afraid such a
submission cannot be permitted to be
advanced in a review petition. The
appreciation of evidence on record is fully
within the domain of the appellate court. If
on appreciation of the evidence produced,
the court records a finding of fact and
reaches a conclusion, that conclusion
cannot be assailed in a review petition
unless it is shown that there is an error
apparent on the face of the record or for
some reason akin thereto. It has not been
contended before us that there is any error
apparent on the face of the record. To
permit the review Petitioner to argue on a
question of appreciation of evidence would
amount to converting a review petition into
an appeal in disguise.

20. Under the garb of filing a review
application, a party cannot be permitted
to repeat old and overruled arguments for
reopening the conclusions arrived at in a
judgment. The power of review is not to
be confused with the appellate power
which enables the Hon'ble Supreme
Court to correct errors committed by a
subordinate Court. This point has been
elucidated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite
Public Co. Ltd. : (2006) 5 SCC 501
where it was held thus:

11. So far as the grievance of the
applicant on merits is concerned, the
learned Counsel for the opponent is right
in submitting that virtually the applicant
seeks the same relief which had been
sought at the time of arguing the main
matter and had been negatived. Once
such a prayer had been refused, no review
petition would lie which would convert
rehearing of the original matter. It is
settled law that the power of review
cannot be confused with appellate power
which enables a superior court to correct
all errors committed by a subordinate
court. It is not rehearing of an original
matter. A repetition of old and overruled
argument is not enough to reopen
concluded adjudications. The power of
review can be exercised with extreme
care, caution and circumspection and
only in exceptional cases.

12. When a prayer to appoint an
arbitrator by the applicant herein had
been made at the time when the
arbitration petition was heard and was
rejected, the same relief cannot be sought
by an indirect method by filing a review
petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is
in the nature of 'second innings' which is
impermissible
and
unwarranted
and
cannot be granted.

21. In State of West Bengal and Ors.
v. Kamal Sengupta and Anr. (2008) 8
SCC 612, the Hon'ble Apex Court
emphasized the requirement of the review
Petitioner who approaches a Court on the
ground of discovery of a new matter or
evidence, to demonstrate that the same
was not within his knowledge and held
thus:
7 All. Union Bank of India Vs. A.D.M., Meerut & Ors.
1281

"At this stage it is apposite to observe
that where a review is sought on the ground
of discovery of new matter or evidence,
such matter or evidence must be relevant
and must be of such a character that if the
same had been produced, it might have
altered the judgment. In other words, mere
discovery of new or important matter or
evidence is not sufficient ground for review
ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party
seeking review has also to show that such
additional matter or evidence was not
within its knowledge and even after the
exercise of due diligence, the same could
not be produced before the court earlier.

In the captioned judgment, the term
'mistake or error apparent' has been
discussed in the following words:

22. The term 'mistake or error
apparent' by its very connotation signifies
an error which is evident per se from the
record of the case and does not require
detailed
examination,
scrutiny
and
elucidation either of the facts or the legal
position. If an error is not self-evident and
detection thereof requires long debate and
process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as
an error apparent on the face of the record
for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 Code of
Civil Procedure or Section 22(3)(f) of the
Act. To put it differently an order or
decision or judgment cannot be corrected
merely because it is erroneous in law or on
the ground that a different view could have
been taken by the court/tribunal on a point
of fact or law. In any case, while exercising
the power of review, the court/tribunal
concerned cannot sit in appeal over its
judgment/decision."

22. After discussing a series of
decisions
on
review
jurisdiction
in
Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and Ors.
(2013) 8 SCC 320, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court observed that review proceedings
have to be strictly confined to the scope
and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, Code of
Civil Procedure. As long as the point
sought to be raised in the review
application has already been dealt with and
answered, parties are not entitled to
challenge the impugned judgment only
because an alternative view is possible. The
principles for exercising review jurisdiction
were
succinctly
summarized
in
the
captioned case as below:

20. Thus, in view of the above, the
following
grounds
of
review
are
maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

20.1. When the review will be
maintainable:

(I) Discovery of new and important
matter or evidence which, after the exercise
of due diligence, was not within knowledge
of the Petitioner or could not be produced
by him;

(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the
face of the record;

(iii) Any other sufficient reason.

The words "any other sufficient
reason" have been interpreted in Chhajju
Ram v. Neki and approved by this Court in
Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most
Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius to mean "a
reason sufficient on grounds at least
analogous to those specified in the rule".
The same principles have been reiterated in
Union of India v. Sundur Manganese &
Iron Ores Ltd.
20.2. When the review will not be
maintainable:

(i) A repetition of old and overruled
argument
is
not
enough
to
reopen
concluded adjudications.

(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential
import.

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be
equated with the original hearing of the
case.
1282 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(iv) Review is not maintainable unless
the material error, manifest on the face of
the order, undermines its soundness or
results in miscarriage of justice.

(v) A review is by no means an appeal
in disguise whereby an erroneous decision
is re-heard and corrected but lies only for
patent error.

(vi) The mere possibility of two views
on the subject cannot be a ground for
review.

(vii) The error apparent on the face of
the record should not be an error which has
to be fished out and searched.

(viii) The appreciation of evidence on
record is fully within the domain of the
appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be
advanced in the review petition.

(ix) Review is not maintainable when
the same relief sought at the time of
arguing
the
main
matter
had
been
negatived.

23. In Ram Sahu (Dead) Through
LRs and Ors. v. Vinod Kumar Rawat
and Ors., 2020 SCC Online SC 896,
citing previous decisions and expounding
on the scope and ambit of Section 114 read
with Order XLVII Rule 1, the Hon'ble
Apex Court has observed that Section 114
Code of Civil Procedure does not lay any
conditions precedent for exercising the
power of review; and nor does the Section
prohibit the Court from exercising its
power to review a decision. However, an
order can be reviewed by the Court only on
the grounds prescribed in Order XLVII
Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure. The said
power cannot be exercised as an inherent
power and nor can appellate power be
exercised in the guise of exercising the
power of review.

24. Very recently in the case of S.
Madhusudhan Reddy vs. V. Narayana
Reddy and others repored in 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 1034, it was again held by the
Hon'ble Apex Court that the courts
jurisdiction of review is not the same as
that of an appeal. A judgment can be open
to review, if there is a mistake or error
apparent on the face on record but an error
that to be detected by process of reasoning
cannot be prescribed on the face of the
record. Paragraph-31 of the aforesaid
judgment is reproduced below:-

"As can be seen from the above
exposition of law, it has been consistently
held by this Court in several judicial
pronouncements
that
the
Court's
jurisdiction of review, is not the same as
that of an appeal. A judgment can be open
to review if there is a mistake or an error
apparent on the face of the record, but an
error that has to be detected by a process of
reasoning, cannot be described as an
error apparent on the face of the record
for the Court to exercise its powers of
review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.
In the guise of exercising powers of
review, the Court can correct a mistake
but not substitute the view taken earlier
merely because there is a possibility of
taking two views in a matter. A judgment
may also be open to review when any new
or important matter of evidence has
emerged after passing of the judgment,
subject to the condition that such evidence
was not within the knowledge of the party
seeking review or could not be produced by
it when the order was made despite
undertaking an exercise of due diligence.
There is a clear distinction between an
erroneous decision as against an error
apparent on the face of the record. An
erroneous decision can be corrected by
the Superior Court, however an error
apparent on the face of the record can only
be
corrected
by
exercising
review
7 All. Union Bank of India Vs. A.D.M., Meerut & Ors.
1283
jurisdiction.