# Union of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi & Ors v. Rakesh Chandra Verma & Anr

- **Citation:** (2023) 12 ILRA 66
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-11-23
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Review Application No. 334 of 2023
- **Bench:** Saumitra Dayal Singh, Shiv Shanker Prasad
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/union-of-india-ministry-of-finance-department-of-revenue-new-delhi-ors-v-rakesh-49501
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

(A) Civil Law - Review application based
on court's order - which dismissed writ
petition and confirmed order of CAT -
12 All. Union of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi & Ors.
67
passed in Original Application - Recovery
of excess amount paid - Merely because
the
employer
chose
to
introduce
a
qualifying
Clause
while
making
due
payments to an employee, it may not
become entitled to claim reversal of the
same, on his own sweet will/volition - a
point or ground though raised in the
proceedings but not pressed at the stage
of oral hearing has to be presumed to
have been given up or not pressed - Per
se, it may not give rise to a ground for
review
-
Review
is
not
a
routine
procedure.(Para - 3, 11, 13)

Respondent worked as an Income Tax Inspector
with Union of India from 2005 to 2016 - reached
superannuation on 30.06.2016 - monetary
benefit of MACP granted to private respondent -
Employer
introduced
a
qualifying/recovery
clause stating that - In future, if an official(s)
does not qualify for grant of MACPS, the
financial
up
gradation
granted
shall
be
withdrawn - amounts received by way of arrears
or otherwise by the officer(s) shall be recovered
- qualifying clause in the order is a unilateral act
by employer - Respondent neither required nor
provided undertaking for recovery - Errors in
order can be corrected/rectified - Union of India
not filed a correction application to correct
proceedings record. (Para -3, 4, 10, 11, 14,
20)

HELD:- If law does not allow for recovery from
Class-III employee after retirement, Union
cannot draw benefits on the strength of
qualifying clause. No recovery from a retired
employee can be made within one year of
retirement, so there is no possibility of recovery
within five years of the amount's disbursement.
No occasion to review. Any amount or
consequential benefit withheld to be released
within two months, if not; they will attract 8%
interest from the due date until actual payment.
(Para - 21, 26, 31)

Review application dismissed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

66 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(26) This Court finds that the review
applicant
has
basically
raised
the
contention that since the award passed by
the MSME Council was tainted with
procedural irregularity, the same would not
be covered under the Arbitration Act and
hence the remedy as to challenge to the
award under Section 34 of the Act was not
available to the writ petitioner/review
applicant. This Court also finds that the
said contention cannot be accepted as the
proceedings
so
far
as
the
writpetitioner/review applicant is concerned,
has attained finality by passing of the
impugned order dated 07.10.2023 by the
MSME Council in arbitration proceedings
after the termination of the conciliation
proceedings.
The
proceedings
having
attained finality, the only recourse available
to the review applicant is to challenge the
order impugned in the writ petition by
availing statutory remedy provided under
the provisions of the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act. The contention of the
review applicant that non-interference by
this Court under Article 226/227 of the
Consttution would render the review
applicant remedy-less is not acceptable in
view of the fact that this Court in the
impugned
judgment/order
has
already
relegated
the
writ-petitioner
to
avail
statutory remedy as provided under the Act
and it is open for the writ-petitioner to
challenge the same before the appropriate
forum.

(27) Apparently, the review applicant
is trying to seek a re-hearing of the writ
petition, which is not within the scope of
the review. The learned Counsel could not
point out any error apparent on the face of
the record and the submissions made by the
learned Counsel do not fall within the
parameters of Section 114 read with Order
XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C.

(28) For all the aforesaid reasons and
having considered the matter at great
length, there is no doubt left in the mind of
this Court that no grounds of review has
been made out in the present review
application.

(29) As a sequel to the above, the
present review application is dismissed.
The review applicant may avail the remedy
as provided under law as has already been
granted by this Court in the impugned order
dated 10.10.2023, if so desires.

(30) There shall be no orders as to
cost.
----------
(2023) 12 ILRA 66
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.11.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH, J.
THE HON'BLE SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, J.

Civil Misc. Review Application No. 334 of
2023
In
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4179 of 2023

Union of India, Ministry of Finance,
Department of Revenue, New Delhi & Ors.
 ...Petitioners
Versus
Rakesh Chandra Verma & Anr.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Saumitra Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Nikhil Pandey

(A) Civil Law - Review application based
on court's order - which dismissed writ
petition and confirmed order of CAT -
12 All. Union of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi & Ors.
67
passed in Original Application - Recovery
of excess amount paid - Merely because
the
employer
chose
to
introduce
a
qualifying
Clause
while
making
due
payments to an employee, it may not
become entitled to claim reversal of the
same, on his own sweet will/volition - a
point or ground though raised in the
proceedings but not pressed at the stage
of oral hearing has to be presumed to
have been given up or not pressed - Per
se, it may not give rise to a ground for
review
-
Review
is
not
a
routine
procedure.(Para - 3, 11, 13)

Respondent worked as an Income Tax Inspector
with Union of India from 2005 to 2016 - reached
superannuation on 30.06.2016 - monetary
benefit of MACP granted to private respondent -
Employer
introduced
a
qualifying/recovery
clause stating that - In future, if an official(s)
does not qualify for grant of MACPS, the
financial
up
gradation
granted
shall
be
withdrawn - amounts received by way of arrears
or otherwise by the officer(s) shall be recovered
- qualifying clause in the order is a unilateral act
by employer - Respondent neither required nor
provided undertaking for recovery - Errors in
order can be corrected/rectified - Union of India
not filed a correction application to correct
proceedings record. (Para -3, 4, 10, 11, 14,
20)

HELD:- If law does not allow for recovery from
Class-III employee after retirement, Union
cannot draw benefits on the strength of
qualifying clause. No recovery from a retired
employee can be made within one year of
retirement, so there is no possibility of recovery
within five years of the amount's disbursement.
No occasion to review. Any amount or
consequential benefit withheld to be released
within two months, if not; they will attract 8%
interest from the due date until actual payment.
(Para - 21, 26, 31)

Review application dismissed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

1. St. of Punj. & ors. Vs Rafiq Masih (White
Washer) & anr. , (2015) 4 SCC 334

2. High Court of Punj. & Har. & ors. Vs Jagdev
Singh, (2016) 14 SCC 267

3. Daman Singh & ors. Vs St. of Punj. & ors.,
(1985) 2 SCC 670

4. St. of Maha. Vs Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak,
(1982) 2 SCC 463

5. Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon Vs U.O.I. & ors.,
1980 (Supp) SCC 562

6. Sow Chandra Kante Vs Sheikh Habib, (1975)
1 SCC 674

7. U.O.I. & anr. Vs Mohd. Yunush, Writ-A No.
33686 of 2017

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal
Singh, J.
&
Hon'ble Shiv Shanker Prasad, J.)

1. Heard Shri Saumitra Singh, learned
counsel for the applicants and Shri Nikhil
Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent.

2. Present review application has been
filed arising from the order of the coordinate bench of this Court in Writ-A No.
4179 of 2023 (Union of India and 5 others
Vs. Rakesh Chandra Verma and another).
By that order, the co-ordinate bench
dismissed the writ petition and thus
confirmed the order passed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench,
Allahabad, dated 20.05.2022 passed in
Original Application No. 330/01316/2017
(Rakesh Kumar Verma Vs. Union of India
and 5 others).

3. The respondent worked as Income
Tax Inspector with the Union of India,
from 24.02.2005. He attained the age of
superannuation on 30.06.2016. During his
years in service, amongst other by virtue of
Order No. 20 of 2023, dated 03.09.2013
68 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
issued by the Chief Commissioner of
Income Tax (CCA), Lucknow, benefit of
Modified
Assured
Career
Progression
Scheme (MACPS) was conferred, amongst
others on the private-respondent. In that
regard, his previous service rendered at
another
establishment
was
included
(without break). Perusal of that order
reveals the ground of MACP was qualified
in the following terms :

"In future, if it is found that any
official(s) does not qualify for grant of
MACPS, the financial up gradation granted
hereunder shall be withdrawn and the
amounts received by way of arrears or
otherwise by the officer(s) shall be
recovered."

4. Neither any rule or administrative
instruction is shown to us as may have
required any undertaking to be given by the
private-respondent to give effect to the
above clause qualified, noted above nor any
undertaking was furnished by the privaterespondent.

5. In such circumstances, relying
heavily on the contents of paragraph-4(b) of
the Supplementary Affidavit filed in the writ
petition, it has been submitted that the above
noted recital in the order dated 3.9.2023
draws a clear distinction of fact as may not
allow the ratio of State of Punjab and
others v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and
another, (2015) 4 SCC 334 to be applied to
the facts of the present case. That essential
contention has been ignored or has remained
from being considered in the decision of the
co-ordinate bench, which is the subject matter
of the present review proceedings. For ready
reference, the contents of paragraph 4(b) of
the Supplementary Affidavit filed in the writ /
main proceedings are quoted below :

"The pay fixation order dated
27.05.2015
has
been
passed
in
compliance to the order No. 20 of 2013
dated 03.09.2013 passed by CCIT (CAA)
Lucknow, wherein it has been specifically
mentioned that "In future, if it is found
that any official(s) does not qualify for
grant
of
MACPS,
the
financial
upgradation granted hereunder shall be
withdrawn and the amounts received by
way of arrears or otherwise by the
officer(s)
shall
be
recovered."
A
photocopy of the order dated 03.09.2013
granting MACP benefits to Shri Rakesh
Chandra
Verma
is
being
enclosed
herewith and marked as ANNEXURE
SA-2 to this affidavit."

6. Then referring to the decision in the
case of Rafiq Masih (supra), Shri Singh
has referred to paragraph-18 of the report
and submitted that the case of the privaterespondent would fall under Clause (iii)
thereof
and
therefore
recovery
was
permissible. Also, for reason of the
qualifying Clause, noted above, contained
in the Office Order No. 20 of 2013, dated
03.09.2013 (quoted above), the case of the
private-respondents would not fall under
Clause (ii) of Rafiq Masih (supra). For
ready reference paragraph 18 of the said
report reads as below :

"18. It is not possible to postulate
all situations of hardship, which would
govern employees on the issue of recovery,
where payments have mistakenly been
made by the employer, in excess of their
entitlement. Be that as it may, based on the
decisions referred to herein above, we may,
as a ready reference, summarise the
following
few
situations,
wherein
recoveries by the employers, would be
impermissible in law :
12 All. Union of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi & Ors.
69

(i) Recovery from employees
belonging to Class-III and Class-IV service
(or Group 'C' and Group 'D' service).

(ii)
Recovery
from
retired
employees, or employees who are due to
retire within one year, of the order of
recovery.

(iii) Recovery from employees,
when the excess payment has been made
for a period in excess of five years, before
the order of recovery is issued.

(iv) Recovery in cases where an
employee has wrongfully been required to
discharge duties of a higher post, and has
been paid accordingly, even though he
should have rightfully been required to
work against an inferior post.

(v) In any other case, where the
Court arrives at the conclusion, that
recovery if made from the employee, would
be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such
an extent, as would far outweigh the
equitable balance of the employer's right to
recover."

7. Here, further reliance has been
placed on another decision of the Supreme
Court in High Court of Punjab and
Haryana and others v. Jagdev Singh,
(2016) 14 SCC 267. Relevant to the
present discussion, heavy reliance has been
placed on the ratio of that decision
contained in paragraph-11. For ready
reference, same is quoted below :

"11 The principle enunciated in
proposition (ii) above cannot apply to a
situation such as in the present case. In the
present case, the officer to whom the payment
was made in the first instance was clearly
placed on notice that any payment found to
have been made in excess would be required
to be refunded. The officer furnished an
undertaking while opting for the revised pay
scale. He is bound by the undertaking."

8. Thus, it has been submitted, as in the
case of Jagdev Singh (supra) so in the
present case, the recovery of excess amount
paid to the private-respondent would remain
recoverable as there exists a recovery clause
in the order dated 03.09.2013-whereunder the
amount came to be paid to the respondent.
Since that recovery has been made within a
period of five years from the date of payment
made, the recovery would stand protected
under Clause (iii) of Rafiq Masih (supra).

9. On the other hand, learned counsel
for the respondent would contend, arguments
as were raised by the petitioner at the stage of
hearing of the writ petition have been noted
in the judgement dated 23.03.2023. No other
submission was advanced at that stage. The
ground if any arising from the pleadings
made in paragraph-4(b) of the Supplementary
Affidavit filed in the writ-proceedings must
be deemed to have been given up at the stage
of hearing.

10. Alternatively, it has been submitted,
neither any undertaking was required to be
furnished by the respondent nor such
undertaking was furnished by the respondentto allow for recovery of the amount paid
under MACP paid to the applicant.

11. Merely because the employer
chose to introduce a qualifying Clause
while
making
due
payments
to
an
employee, it may not become entitled to
claim reversal of the same, on his own
sweet will/volition.

12. Last, it has been submitted,
undisputedly, the respondent was a ClassIII employee having retired from service on
30.06.2016 whereas the payment was made
in the year 2015. The case of the
respondent falls under Clause (ii) of Rafiq
Masih (supra). Owing to the date of
70 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
retirement preceding the date of recovery,
no recovery is permissible, in law.

13. Having heard learned counsel for
the parties and having perused the record,
in the first place, it is wholly accepted and
acknowledged
principle
in
our
jurisprudence that a point or ground though
raised in the proceedings but not pressed at
the stage of oral hearing has to be
presumed to have been given up or not
pressed. Per se, it may not give rise to a
ground for review. In Daman Singh and
others Vs. State of Punjab and others
(1985) 2 SCC 670, speaking for a five
judge Constitution bench of the Supreme
Court, Chinnappa Reddy, J. succinctly
observed :

"We attach no significance to this
submission. It is not unusual for parties
and counsel to raise innumerable grounds
in the petitions and memoranda of appeal
etc., but, later, confine themselves, in the
course of argument to a few only of those
grounds, obviously because the rest of the
grounds are considered even by them to be
untenable. No party or counsel is thereafter
entitled to make a grievance that the
grounds not argued were not considered. If
indeed any ground which was argued was
not considered it should be open to the
party aggrieved to draw the attention of the
court making the order to it by filing a
proper
application
for
review
or
clarification. The time of the superior
courts is not to be wasted in inquiring into
the question whether a certain ground to
which no reference is found in the judgment
of the subordinate court was argued before
that court or not ?"

14. Thus, such a ground may become
available only if the litigant asserts, at the
stage of filing of a Review Application that
he had not only raised such ground but had
pressed it at the stage of oral hearing.
There, the other settled principle in our
jurisprudence remains-an order passed by
the Court is the only true record of the
proceedings. If any error is claimed in the
same,
it
may
be
applied
for
correction/rectification, in accordance with
law. In the present case, neither any
correction application came to be filed by
the Union of India to correct the record of
the proceedings as narrated in the order
dated 23.3.2023 nor the Union has made
any averment in the Review Application
that the ground of challenge arising from
the pleadings made in paragraph 4 (b) of its
Supplementary Affidavit filed in the writ
proceedings, had been pressed at the stage
of
the
oral
hearing.
In
State
of
Maharashtra
v.
Ramdas
Shrinivas
Nayak, (1982) 2 SCC 463, a submission
was advanced before the Supreme Court
that concession recorded by the High Court
had not been made by the parties. That
question was refused to be gone into in face
of the record of the High Court. There, it
was observed as under:

??..We are afraid that we cannot
launch into an enquiry as to what
transpired in the High Court. It is simply
not done. Public policy bars us. Judicial
decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial
record are unquestionable. They are not
open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged
into the arena. ?Judgments cannot be
treated as mere counters in the game of
litigation.? [ Per Lord Atkinson in
Somasundaram Chetty v. Subramanian
Chetty, AIR 1926 PC 136 : 99 IC 742] We
are bound to accept the statement of the
Judges recorded in their judgment, as to
what transpired in court. We cannot allow
the statement of the Judges to be
contradicted by statements at the Bar or by
12 All. Union of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi & Ors.
71
affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges
say in their judgment that something was
done, said or admitted before them, that
has to be the last word on the subject. The
principle is well-settled that statements of
fact as to what transpired at the hearing,
recorded in the judgment of the court, are
conclusive of the facts so stated and no one
can contradict such statements by affidavit
or other evidence. If a party thinks that the
happenings in court have been wrongly
recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent
upon the party, while the matter is still
fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the
attention of the very Judges who have made
the record to the fact that the statement
made with regard to his conduct was a
statement that had been made in error...?

15. In view of the above, it is not
possible to accept the submission advanced
by Shri Singh that the challenge arising
from the pleadings made in paragraph 4(b)
of the Supplementary Affidavit filed in the
writ proceedings, had been pressed. The
fact that such affidavit may have been
taken on record, does not raise any
presumption that all that was pleaded in
that affidavit had actually been pressed at
the stage of hearing.

16. Then, review is not a routine
procedure. As observed in Col. Avtar Singh
Sekhon Vs. Union of India and others 1980
(Supp) SCC 562, it may not be resorted to
unless the Court is "satisfied that material
error, manifest on the face of the order,
undermines its soundness or results in
miscarriage of justice". The Supreme Court
further took note of its earlier decision in Sow
Chandra Kante Vs. Sheikh Habib (1975) 1
SCC 674, wherein it was observed :

"A review of a judgment is a
serious steps and reluctant resort to it is
proper only where a glaring omission or
patent mistake or like grave error has crept
in earlier by judicial fallibility..... The
present stage is not a virgin ground but
review of an earlier order which has the
normal feature of finality."

17. Applying the above principle, for
below noted reasons, we find no occasion
has arisen to grant the review prayed for.

18. In any case, the second
submission advanced by learned counsel
for Union of India also does not merit
acceptance. As noted above, the equitable
principle laid down by the Supreme Court
in Rafiq Masih (supra) applies not only to
retired employees but it also applies to the
case of the serving employees as well,
subject to stipulations contained in that
decision. Second, the equitable principle
referred to above applies not only to Class
III and Class IV employees but it also
applies to other employees, to the extent
indicated in that decision. Thus, Clause-I is
specific to Class III & IV employees
whereas the other clauses may apply to
other class of employees as well, subject to
the stipulations contained in that decision.

19. Here, there is no dispute that the
private
respondent
was
a
Class-III
employee. Therefore, at first, he is entitled
to benefit of Clause (i) of Rafiq Masih
(supra).

20. The case of the private respondent
is squarely covered by Clause (ii) of Rafiq
Masih (White Washer) (supra) inasmuch
as it is not disputed to the applicant/Union
of India that the monetary benefit of MACP
granted to the private respondent vide order
dated 03.09.2013 was conferred on the
private
respondent, vide
order dated
27.05.2015 whereas he retired from service
72 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
on
30.06.2016.
The
recovery
order
withholding the MACP qua prior period of
service rendered to another employer, was
first issued on 01.07.2016 and thereafter,
again on 16.08.2016. Both orders were
issued after the date of retirement of the
private respondent. Those could not have
been issued in terms of Clause (ii) of Rafiq
Masih (supra).

21. As to the submission advanced by
learned counsel for the Union that the case
of the private-respondent would fall under
Clause (iii) of Rafiq Masih (supra), we
cannot accept that submission. Primarily,
the
same
would
apply
to
serving
employees. If that clause were to be read to
the detriment of a retired employee, a clear
conflict would arise in the application of
Clause (ii) of Rafiq Masih (supra). Since
no recovery is permitted from a retired
employee within one year of his retirement,
there may never arise any situation where
such recovery may be permitted within five
years of the disbursement of the amount,
after his retirement.

22. The reliance placed by learned
counsel for Union of India on the decision
of the Jagdev Singh (supra) cannot be
accepted. In the first place, it does not lay
down any law contrary to Rafiq Masih
(supra). It only explains and carves out an
exception to the general principle laid
down in Rafiq Masih (supra). That
exception has not been laid down by way
of a general principle of law but arising
from peculiar facts of that case. In
paragraph-2 of Jagdev Singh (supra), it
has been clearly noted, under Haryana Civil
Service (Judicial Branch) and Haryana
Superior Judicial Service Revised Pay
Rules, 2001, an undertaking was required
to be submitted by an eligible employee
that any excess payment would be refunded
to the State Government. Thus, the
Supreme Court noted as below:

"Under the rules, each officer
was required to submit an undertaking that
any excess which may be found to have
been paid will be refunded to the
Government either by adjustment against
future payments due or otherwise."

23. Then, by way of reasoning, in
paragraph 9 of that report, it is observed as
below:

"9.
The
submission
of
the
Respondent, which found favour with the
High Court, was that a payment which has
been made in excess cannot be recovered
from an employee who has retired from the
service of the state. This, in our view, will
have no application to a situation such as
the present where an undertaking was
specifically furnished by the officer at the
time when his pay was initially revised
accepting that any payment found to have
been made in excess would be liable to be
adjusted. While opting for the benefit of the
revised pay scale, the Respondent was
clearly on notice of the fact that a future refixation or revision may warrant an
adjustment of the excess payment, if any,
made."

24. It is upon that reasoning that the
conclusion came to be recorded in
paragraph 11 of the report, as has been
noticed above.

25. Thus, according to Jagdev Singh
(supra), the exception to Clause (ii) of the
Rafiq Masih (supra) would arise only in
cases where an undertaking may have been
furnished by the beneficiary/employee.
That would allow for refund/ recovery/
reversal of any monetary benefit that may
12 All. C.E.O., U.P. Sunni Central Waqf Board Lucknow Vs. Mohammad Nihal & Ors.
73
have been wrongly paid out to him during
his years in service. Thus, furnishing of an
undertaking is a sine qua non to invoke an
exception to Clause (ii) of Rafiq Masih
(supra).

26.

The
qualifying
Clause
incorporated in the order dated 03.09.2013
is an unilateral act of the employer. It is not
an
undertaking
given
by
the
employee/recipient nor it can ever be
equated with the same. Though the
employer had unilaterally qualified the
benefit of MACP, that restriction created
could be enforced only in accordance with
law. Once the Supreme Court has laid
down the law in Rafiq Masih (supra) and
provided that the recovery of any amount
(that may have been wrongly paid to an
employee), may be made subject to
conditions laid down in that decision, the
qualifying Clause relied by learned counsel
for the Union of India would remain
subservient to the law declared by the
Supreme Court in Rafiq Masih (supra).
Being contrary to that, it is therefore
unenforceable. To the extent, that law
would not allow for recovery to be made
from the Class-III employee after his
retirement, no benefit may be drawn by the
Union on the strength of the said qualifying
Clause.

27. As noted above, in the present
case, it has not been shown to us, either that
the respondent was obligated under the
Rules to furnish such undertaking or that he
had,
as
a
fact,
furnished
such
an
undertaking. Consequently, the exception
being claimed by the Union is wholly
misconceived
and
unfounded.
Consequently, the decision in the case of
Jagdev Singh (supra) is distinguished on
facts. The exception to Clause (ii) of Rafiq
Masih (supra) being claimed by the Union
of India, is unfounded and misconceived.

28. Earlier, this Court had the
occasion to consider the decision of Jagdev
Singh (supra), in Writ-A No. 33686 of
2017 (Union of India and another Vs.
Mohd. Yunush) Neutral Citation No.
2023:AHC:170688-DB, (in which one of
us Saumitra Dayal Singh was a member).
Therein, a similar view was expressed.

29. In view of the above, we find no
merit in the present review application.

30.

Accordingly,
the
review
application is dismissed.

31. Any amount or consequential
benefit that may have been withheld till
now may be released within a period of two
months from today, failing which, the same
shall attract interest @ 8% from the date it
became due till the date of its actual
payment.
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(2023) 12 ILRA 73
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 11.12.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Civil Revision No. 35 of 2022

C.E.O. U.P. Sunni Central Waqf Board
Lucknow ...Revisionist
Versus
Mohammad Nihal & Ors. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Syed Aftab Ahmad

Counsel for the Opp. Parties: