# Union Of India & Ors v. Raj Bahadur Singh

- **Citation:** (2020) 6 ILRA 825
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-04-22
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 1178 of 2019
- **Bench:** Biswanath Somadder, Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/union-of-india-ors-v-raj-bahadur-singh-45802
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

826 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
A. Civil Law - Central Civil Services
(Extraordinary Pension) Rules, 1939 -
Rule 3-A(1)(a) - Disability Compensation -
Accident 'in the Course of Employment' -
Meaning
-
Accident
having
admittedly
occurred while the petitioner was already
availing leave and was neither in the process
of undertaking a journey home from duty or
going back to duty the issue with regard to
notional extension of the employers' premises
would not arise in the present case - Since it
was not the case of the petitioner that the
accident occurred while he was undertaking a
journey back home from his place of work and
for the said reason the accident could not be
said to have occurred 'in the course of
employment' - Howsoever liberally we may
attempt to construe the provisions under the
CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939, the petitioner would
not by any stretch be held to be 'on duty'
leading to a causal connection between
disablement and government service. (Para
27, 28 and 36)
B. Doctrine of Precedents - Meaning - A
judgment is only an authority for what it
actually decides and not what logically follows
from the various observations made in the
judgment - In order to fully understand and
appreciate the binding force of a decision, it is
always necessary to see what were the facts
of the case in which the decision was given
and what was the point decided. (Para 29)
Special Appeal allowed; Writ Petition
dismissed (E-1)
Cases relied on :-

## Text

6 All. Union of India & Ors. Vs. Raj Bahadur Singh 825

13. The sensitivity in matters
relating to a juvenile or child or juvenile
in conflict with law was deep embedded
in the legislation as is apparent from
Chapter II of the Juvenile Justice (Care &
Protection of Children) Rules, 2007. Rule
3 therein gives in detail the fundamental
principles
to
be
followed
in
administration of the Rules.

14. The said Act is a beneficial
legislation.
The
principles
of
such
beneficial legislation are to be applied
only for the purpose of interpretation of
this statute. The concealment of the
pendency of criminal case against the
appellant-petitioner
was
of
no
consequence. As per the requirement of
law a conviction in an offence will not be
treated as a disqualification for a juvenile.
The records of the case pertaining to his
involvement in a criminal matter are to be
obliterated after a specified period of
time. The intention of the legislature is
clear that in so far as juveniles are
concerned their criminal records is not to
stand in their way in their lives. The
cancellation of the candidature of the
appellant-petitioner was thus bad. The
authority concerned failed to appreciate
the fact that the appellant-petitioner was
entitled to benefit of the provisions of Act
of
2000.
The
cancellation
of
the
candidature
of
the
petitioner
goes
contrary to the object sought to be
achieved by the Act of 2000. Section 19
of the Act of 2000 protects a juvenile and
any stigma attached to his conviction is
also removed. The Act of 2000 does not
envisage incarceration of a juvenile which
clearly shows that the intention and object
was not to shut the doors of a disciplined
and decent civilised life. It provides him
an opportunity to mend his life for the
future.

15. We thus hold that the authority
concerned fell in complete error in not
extending the benefit of Act of 2000 to
the appellant-petitioner particularly when
there are specific provisions provided
therein to take care of a juvenile being
implicated, tried and / or convicted in a
criminal matter. We thus extend the
benefit provided under Section 19 of the
Act of 2000 to the appellant-petitioner.

16. The judgment and order of the
learned Single Judge is set aside. The
Writ A No. 21337 of 2018 is allowed and
the order dated 04.09.2018 passed by the
District
Nodal
Officer,
Recruitment
Centre, Azamgarh is set aside. The
respondent no. 6 is directed to reinstate
the petitioner within a period of 30 days
from the date of production of a certified
copy of this order with all consequential
benefits except for back wages following
the principle of no work and no pay.
----------
(2020)06ILR A825
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.04.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE BISWANATH SOMADDER, J.
THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Special Appeal No. 1178 of 2019

Union Of India & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Raj Bahadur Singh ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Ashok Singh

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri Divikar Rai Sharma, Sri Manphool
Singh, Sri Anil Kumar Bind, Sri Akhilesh
Singh
826 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
A. Civil Law - Central Civil Services
(Extraordinary Pension) Rules, 1939 -
Rule 3-A(1)(a) - Disability Compensation -
Accident 'in the Course of Employment' -
Meaning
-
Accident
having
admittedly
occurred while the petitioner was already
availing leave and was neither in the process
of undertaking a journey home from duty or
going back to duty the issue with regard to
notional extension of the employers' premises
would not arise in the present case - Since it
was not the case of the petitioner that the
accident occurred while he was undertaking a
journey back home from his place of work and
for the said reason the accident could not be
said to have occurred 'in the course of
employment' - Howsoever liberally we may
attempt to construe the provisions under the
CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939, the petitioner would
not by any stretch be held to be 'on duty'
leading to a causal connection between
disablement and government service. (Para
27, 28 and 36)
B. Doctrine of Precedents - Meaning - A
judgment is only an authority for what it
actually decides and not what logically follows
from the various observations made in the
judgment - In order to fully understand and
appreciate the binding force of a decision, it is
always necessary to see what were the facts
of the case in which the decision was given
and what was the point decided. (Para 29)
Special Appeal allowed; Writ Petition
dismissed (E-1)
Cases relied on :-
1. St. of Orissa Vs Sudhansu Sekhar Misra &
ors. AIR (1968) SC 647
2. Earl of Halsbury LC in Quinn Vs Leathem
(1901) AC 495
3. U.O.I. Vs Amrit Lal Manchandra & ors.
(2004) 3 SCC 75
4. London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. Vs Horton
(1951) AC 737
5. Home Office Vs Dorcet Yacht Co. (1970) 2
ALL ER 294
6. Herrington Vs British Railways Board (1972)
2 WLR 537
(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra
Kumar Srivastava, J.)

1. The present special appeal seeks
to challenge the judgment and order dated
27.05.2019 passed in Writ-A No.53145 of
2004 (Raj Bahadur Singh Vs. Union of
India and others) whereby the writ
petition has been allowed and the orders
passed by the respondent authorities in
terms of which the claim of the petitioner
for disability compensation under the
Central Civil Services (Extraordinary
Pension) Rules, 19391 stood rejected,
have been set aside, and a direction has
been issued to the respondents to compute
the benefits payable to the petitioner
under the CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939 and to
pay the same within a stipulated time
period as per terms of the order.

2. The Union of India through
Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of India, New Delhi, and the
authorities of the Central Reserve Police
Force, who were the respondents in the
writ petition, are the appellants before us.

3. The principal grounds canvassed
before us on behalf of the appellants is
that the respondent-petitioner was not
entitled to the benefit of disability
compensation inasmuch as he was not
'homebound' when he met with the
accident, as he had already reached home
and the accident occurred when he was
engaged in his personal work and as such
there
was
no
causal
connection/attributability
between
the
disablement and government service, and
the interpretation given by the learned
Single Judge to Rule 3-A(1)(a) of the
6 All. Union of India & Ors. Vs. Raj Bahadur Singh 827
CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939, is erroneous and
the judgment and order is legally
unsustainable.

4. It has been pointed out that the
respondent was sanctioned leave for 14th,
15th, and 16th December, 1998 with
permission to avail 13th December, 1998,
the same being a Sunday, and he had left
the Unit, where he was posted, on 13th
December, 1998 itself to reach his home
town on the same day which is only at
distance of 110 kilometers from the Unit
he was posted, having a travelling time of
about three hours, and in view of the
same the accident having occurred on
14th December, 1998, the respondent
petitioner could not in any manner be said
to be 'homebound' at the relevant point of
time.

5. Per contra, learned counsel
appearing
for
the
respondent-writ
petitioner has supported the order passed
by the learned Single Judge by submitting
that the petitioner having met with an
accident on 14th December, 1998 while
he was on leave for a short period, the
same would be considered to be on duty,
and he would be entitled to get the
disability benefit.

6. The facts of the case, which are
reflected from the records before us,
indicate that as per the case set up in the
writ petition, the petitioner was on leave
from 14th December, 1998 to 16th
December, 1998, when he met with an
accident,
which
occurred
on
14th
December, 1998 while he was going to
his house by a scooter which was hit from
the opposite side by a three-wheeler. The
claim raised by him for disability pension
under the CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939 was
based on a contention that the leave being
for very short period, he would be
considered to be on duty and would be
entitled for the disability pension.

7. The claim raised by the petitioner
for disability pension under the CCS
(EOP) Rules, 1939, was rejected by the
Commandant of the Battalion by means
of an order dated 6th April, 1999, the
operative portion of which reads as
follows :-

^^1- pWwfd cy la[;k&911182766
flikgh jkt cgknqj flag dk ,DlhMsaV fnukad
14@12@98 dks yxHkx 17%00 cts fnukad
14@12@98 ls 16@12@98 rd 3 fnu ds
vodk'k fnukad 13@12@98 dh vuqefr lfgr]
ds nkSjku viuk futh dk;Z laiUu djrs le;
vius iSr`d xkWo esa gqvk gS] vr% mDr nq?kZVuk
ds ifj.kke Lo:i gq, uqdlku vFkok Hkfo"; esa
gksus okyh fdlh Hkh vlDrrk ds fy, mDr
dkfeZd dsfjiqcy foHkkx ls fdlh izdkj ds
nkos@izfriwfrZ dk gdnkj ugha gksxk rFkk mDr
nq?kZVuk ljdkjh M~;wVh ij u ekuh tk dj
dkfeZd ds }kjk futh dk;Z laiUu djrs le;
futh dk;Z gsrq ekuh tk;sA

2- dkfeZd ds bZykt dh vof/k dk
le; le; ij dkfeZd ds vodk'k dh gdnkjh
ds vuqlkj fu;fer dj fn;k tk;sA**

8. Thereafter, the respondentpetitioner submitted a representation
before the Deputy Inspector General,
CRPF, Rampur raising a plea that the
accident having occurred during the
period of casual leave the same would be
considered to be as a period on duty as
per the relevant rules and accordingly the
accident would be deemed to be while on
government duty and accordingly he was
entitled to disability pension. The claim
sought to be raised by the respondentpetitioner was rejected by the Deputy
Inspector General, CRPF by means of an
828 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
order dated 5th April, 2004 stating therein
that there was no provision under the
relevant rules that the period spent on
casual leave would be treated to be as that
on duty and therefore the accident having
occurred when the respondent-petitioner
was on casual leave the same could not
have been treated to be an accident while
on duty.

9. Aggrieved against the aforesaid
two orders, the respondent-petitioner
preferred another representation before
the Director General of Police, CRPF,
Lucknow, reiterating his contention that
the accident having occurred during a
period when he was on casual leave the
same would be treated to be as a period
spent on duty. The representation of the
petitioner was turned down by the
Director General, CRPF, by assigning the
reason that there was no provision under
the rules to treat the period of casual leave
as that on duty and therefore the
respondent petitioner could not claim
entitlement to disability pension.

10. The stand taken by the
respondents
(appellants
herein)
with
regard to the claim set up by the
petitioner, as reflected from the averments
made in the counter affidavit filed in the
writ petition, is being extracted below :-

"3(a). That while the petitioner
was working as Constable/General Duty
at 62 Bn. C.R.P.F. C/o. 56 APO. He has
sanctioned three days Casual Leave i.e.
for 14th, 15th and 16th December, 1998
with the permission to avail 13th
December, 1998, being Sunday.

3(b). That on 14th December,
1998 when he was on leave, he met under
an accident with three wheeler at his
home town at Hardoi while he was doing
his own work and he sustained the
fracture injury in his right leg due to said
accident.

x x x x x

5. That in reply to the contents
of paragraph no. 3 of the writ petition, it
is submitted that on 14th December, 1998
at his home town while the petitioner was
on sanctioned leave the accident took
place in which he receive the injury in his
right leg. However, on 6.4.1999 an order
has been passed that as per Rule
petitioner is not entitled for disability
benefits."

11. In order to appreciate the rival
contentions, the provisions with regard to
disability pension under the CCS (EOP)
Rules, 1939, may be adverted to.

12. The relevant extracts from the
CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939, are as follows :-

"3. For the purpose of these
rules unless there is anything repugnant in
the subject or context,

(1) 'accident' means,

(i) a sudden and unavoidable
mishap; or

(ii) a mishap due to an act of
devotion to duty in an emergency arising
otherwise than by violence out of and in
the course of service;

(2) 'date of injury' means,

(i) in the case of accident or
violence, the actual date on which the
injury is suffered or such date, not being
6 All. Union of India & Ors. Vs. Raj Bahadur Singh 829
later than the date of the report of the
Medical Board, as the President may fix;
and

(ii) in the case of disease, the
date on which the Medical Board reports
or such earlier date as may be fixed by the
President with due regard to the opinion
of the Medical Board;

3-A.
Disablement/Death.--
(1)(a) Disablement shall be accepted as
due to Government service, provided that
it is certified that it is due to wound,
injury or disease which,

(i) is attributable to Government
service, or

(ii)existed
before
or
arose
during Government service and has been
and remains aggravated thereby.

(b) Death shall be accepted as
due to Government service provided it is
certified that it was due to or hastened by,

(i) a wound, injury or disease
which was attributable to Government
service, or

(ii)
the
aggravation
by
Government service of a wound, injury or
disease which existed before or arose
during Government service.

(2) There shall be a causal
connection between,

(a)
disablement
and
Government service; and

(b)death
and
Government
service, for attributability or aggravation
to be conceded. Guidelines in this regard
are given in the Appendix which shall be
treated as part and parcel of these Rules."

13. We may also refer to the
'Guidelines for conceding attributability
of disablement or death to government
service',
referable
to
Rule
3-A(2),
appended to the CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939.

14. In particular, we may refer to
clause 4(b) and 4(c) of the aforesaid
guidelines, which are as follows :-

"4(b) A person subject to the
disciplinary code of the Central Armed
Police Battalions, is 'on duty',

(i) When performing an official
task or a task, failure to do which would
constitute an offence, triable under the
disciplinary code, applicable to him.

(ii) When moving from one
place of duty to another place of duty
irrespective of the method of movement.

(iii) During the period of
participation in recreation, organized or
permitted by service authorities, and
during the period of travelling in a body
or singly under organized arrangements.

(iv) When proceeding from his
duty station to his leave station on
returning to duty from his leave station at
public expenses, that is, on Railway
warrant, on cash TA (irrespective of
whether Railway warrant/cash TA is
admitted for the whole journey or for a
portion only), in Government transport or
when road mileage is paid for the journey.

(v) When journeying by a
reasonable route from one's official
residence to and back from the appointed
830 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
place of duty irrespective of the mode of
conveyance, whether private or provided
by the Government.

(c) An accident which occurs
when a man is not strictly 'on duty' as
defined above, may also be attributable to
service, provided that it involved risk
which was definitely enhanced in kind or
degree
by
the
nature,
conditions,
obligations or incidents of his service and
that the same was not a risk common to
human existence in modern conditions in
India. Thus, for example,where a person
is killed or injured by someone by reason
of his belonging to an Armed Police
Battalion (and in the course of his duty in
such service, he had incurred wrath of
such person) he shall be deemed to be 'on
duty' at the relevant time.

This benefit will be given more
liberally
to
the
claimant
in
cases
occurring on 'active service' as defined in
the relevant Acts/Rules (e.g., those
applicable
to
BSF/CRPF,
etc.,
Personnel)."

15. I t may be noted that the CCS
(EOP) Rules, 1939, are applicable to all
Central Government servants paid from
Civil Estimates other than those to whom
the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923,
applied, whether their appointments are
permanent or temporary on a scale of pay
or fixed pay or piece-work rate.

16. The CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939,
provide for the grant of award in the form
of monthly pension or lump sum
compensation in certain circumstances,
including a case, where a government
servant is boarded out of government
service on account of his disablement due
to wound, injury or disease and the
disablement is accepted as due to
government service, the government
servant would be granted disability
pension. This disability pension would be
in addition to invalid pension/gratuity, if
admissible under CCS (Pension) Rules,
1972.

17. As we have already noticed the
appellants/respondent
have
taken
a
specific
stand
that
the
respondentpetitioner had been sanctioned three days'
casual leave for 14th, 15th, and 16th
December, 1998 with a permission to
avail 13th December, 1998 being a
Sunday, and during the period when he
was on leave on 14th December, 1998, he
met with an accident at his home town
while on his own work and there would
be no entitlement to disability benefit to a
person in a case where disability had
occurred other than on government duty
and accordingly orders were passed by
the authorities rejecting his claim. It was
also stated that there was no provision in
terms of which a period of casual leave is
to be treated as a period on duty, as
claimed by the petitioner.

18. The stand taken by the
respondents/appellants in their counter
affidavit has been taken note of by the
learned Single Judge in the judgment
under appeal in the following manner :-

"A Counter Affidavit has been filed
by respondents admitting that petitioner was
working as Constable (General Duty) at 62
Battalion, CRPF, C/o 56 APO. He was
sanctioned three days casual leave, i.e., 14th,
15th and 16th December, 1998 with the
permission to avail 13th December 1998
being Sunday. On 14.12.1998 while riding a
Scooter and going to his hometown at Hardoi,
petitioner met an accident with a threewheeler causing fracture in his right leg."
6 All. Union of India & Ors. Vs. Raj Bahadur Singh 831

19. Similarly, the order dated 6th
April, 1999 passed by the Commandant,
CRPF,
rejecting
the
claim
of
the
respondent
petitioner
for
disability
pension has been taken note of in the
judgment under appeal, as follows :-

"Whenever a person is granted
leave, it cannot be said that as soon as he
is relieved at the place of posting or
moves towards his hometown, process of
journey would not be attributable to
Government
service
inasmuch
this
journey is also being undertaken by the
employee concerned which is directly
attributable to his service inasmuch as a
part of service conditions, he was posted
at a place other than his hometown.
Therefore, till the incumbent reaches his
hometown on official leave, in my view,
the entire process of journey will be part
of official duty being attributable to
Government service and has casual
connection to such service."

20. The judgment under appeal
proceeds on the premise that the claim of
the petitioner had been rejected for the
reason that the petitioner had met with an
accident while proceeding on leave and
that the accident occurred on 14th
December, 1998 while the petitioner was
on his way to his home town. It is on the
basis of this presumption that the learned
Single Judge proceeded to formulate the
issue in dispute and also to record his
view in the following manner :-

"7.
In
the
present
case,
petitioner met an accident when he was
granted leave and going to his Hometown
from the place of his posting. "Whether
an employee when returns to Home from
his Office or place of posting, if meets
and accident, can it be said to have
occurred
during
the
course
of
employment and in the present case can it
be said that it has connection with
Government duty" is the moot question to
be answered."

8. In my view, it cannot be said
that returning to Hometown from place of
posting has no direct connection with the
Government duty inasmuch, leave when
granted to a Government servant is part of
service condition and when Government
servant is returning to his house from the
place of posting, it is an incident of
service having direct connection with the
Government duty otherwise there would
not have been any occasion for the
Government Servant to undertake journey
to return to his Hometown.

9.
When
an
Government
Servant
is
granted
leave
and
he
proceeds from his place of Posting to
his residence, can it be said that as soon
as he leaves the place of postings, he
ceased to be a Government Servant and
there is no connection with Government
duty at all is also an issue which has to
be examined in the light of spirit of
Rules with which Rules, 1939 have
been framed.

10. The aforesaid Rules are for
the welfare of employees who sustain
injuries, disease etc. during course of
duty or when they are doing something
which has any connection with the
Government Duty."

21. On a plain reading of the
pleadings in the writ petition, as are
evident from the records, it is seen that
the issue which was formulated by the
writ court did not at all arise in the facts
of the case.
832 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

22. In the counter affidavit filed in
the
writ
petition,
the
appellants/respondents nowhere took a
stand that the accident occurred on 14th
December, 1998 while the petitioner was
going to his home town and that his claim
for disability pension was turned down
for that reason. The order dated 6th April,
1999 passed by the Commandant, CRPF,
rejecting the claim of the petitioner for
disability pension, is also not for the
reason that the accident occurred when
the petitioner was proceeding on leave as
has been noted in the judgment under
appeal.

23. It is also not the stand of the writ
petitioner in the writ petition, or at any
stage when he raised his claim for
disability pension before the authorities,
that the accident occurred on 14th
December, 1998 while he was proceeding
on leave or was on way to his home town.
On the contrary, the admitted case of the
petitioner was that the accident occurred
while he was on leave and the basis of the
claim set up by him was that the leave
being for a very short period he would be
considered to be on duty and would be
entitled for disability pension on the basis
thereof.

24. It thus emerges from the admitted
stand of the parties that the petitioner had
been sanctioned three days' casual leave for
14th, 15th and 16th December, 1998 with
permission to avail 13th December, 1998,
being a Sunday, and it was on 14th
December, 1998 during the period when the
petitioner was on leave that the accident
occurred. The claim set up by the petitioner
was based on the ground that the leave
being for a short period, the petitioner ought
to have been considered to be on duty when
the accident occurred.

25. The precedents which have been
referred to in the judgment under appeal,
are mostly in respect of matters relating to
the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923, and
the interpretation of the expression 'in the
course of employment' which term as per
the settled legal position has been held to
connote not only actual work but also any
other engagement, natural and incidental
thereto.

26. There can be no quarrel with the
aforesaid proposition of law and in
particular that the expression 'in the course
of employment' would stand reasonably
extended both as regards work-hours and
work-place by applying the doctrine of
notional extension as to time and place. The
narrow interpretation that an accident would
be said to have arisen 'out of and in the
course of employment' only if the workman
sustained injuries at the place of his
employment, would be totally out of sync
with the present times where modern
management methods and developments
have made it wholly unnecessary to
consider a workman on duty only when he
reaches his place of work or starts working
and the principle of notional extension of
the employers' premises has been adopted
in the context of claims relating to workmen
compensation. It is in this context of
notional extension of the employers'
premises that in a case where an employee
dies while going to join his duty or while
coming back from duty, would be deemed
to be 'in the course of his employment'.

27. As we have already noticed, in
the facts of the present case, the accident
having admittedly occurred while the
petitioner was already availing leave and
was neither in the process of undertaking
a journey home from duty or going back
to duty the issue with regard to notional
6 All. Union of India & Ors. Vs. Raj Bahadur Singh 833
extension of the employers' premises
would not arise in the present case.

28. The question which was therefore
posed by the learned Single Judge while
deciding the writ petition does not arise in
the facts of the case at hand since it was not
the case of the petitioner that the accident
occurred while he was undertaking a
journey back home from his place of work
and for the said reason the accident could
not be said to have occurred 'in the course
of employment'.

29. The law with regard to
applicability of the doctrine of precedents is
well settled. It has been consistently held
that a judgment is only an authority for
what it actually decides and not what
logically
follows
from
the
various
observations made in the judgment. In order
to fully understand and appreciate the
binding force of a decision, it is always
necessary to see what were the facts of the
case in which the decision was given and
what was the point decided.

30. In the case of The State of Orissa
Vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors.2
referring to the observations made by Earl
of Halsbury LC in Quinn Vs. Leathem3,
it was stated thus :-

"12. ...A decision is only an
authority for what it actually decides. What
is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and
not every observation found therein nor
what logically follows from the various
observations made in it. On this topic this is
what Earl of Halsbury L.C. said in Quinn v.
Leathem, 1901 AC 495.

"Now before discussing the case
of Allen v. Flood, (1898) AC 1 and what
was decided therein, there are two
observations of a general character which I
wish to make, and one is to repeat what I
have very often said before, that every
judgment must be read as applicable to the
particular facts proved, or assumed to be
proved, since the generality of the
expressions which may be found there are
not intended to be expositions of the whole
law, but governed and qualified by the
particular facts of the case in which such
expressions are to be found. The other is
that a case is only an authority for what it
actually decides. I entirely deny that it can
be quoted for a proposition that may seem
to follow logically from it. Such a mode of
reasoning
assumes
that
the
law
is
necessarily a logical Code, whereas every
lawyer must acknowledge that the law is
not always logical at all."

31. A similar view was taken in
Union
of
India
Vs.
Amrit
Lal
Manchandra and others4, and after
referring to the decisions in London
Graving Dock Co. Ltd. Vs. Horton5,
Home Office Vs. Dorcet Yacht Co.6
and Herrington Vs. British Railways
Board7, it was stated that observations of
Court must be read in the context in
which
they
appear
and
that
one
additional or different fact may make a
world of difference :-

"15. ...Courts should not place
reliance on decisions without discussing
as to how the factual situation fits in with
the fact situation of the decision on which
reliance is placed.

Observations of Courts are
neither to be read as Euclid's theorems
nor as provisions of the statute and that
too taken out of their context. These
observations must be read in the context
in which they appear to have been stated.
834 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Judgments of Courts are not to be
construed as statutes. To interpret words,
phrases and provisions of a statute, it may
become necessary for Judges to embark
into
lengthy
discussions
but
the
discussion is meant to explain and not to
define. Judges interpret statutes, they do
not interpret judgments. They interpret
words of statutes; their words are not to
be interpreted as statutes. In London
Graving Pock Co. Ltd. v. Horton (1951
AC 737 at p. 761), Lord Mac Dermot
observed:

"The matter cannot, of course,
be settled merely by treating the ipsissima
verba of Willes, J. as though they were
part of an Act of Parliament and applying
the rules of interpretation appropriate
thereto. This is not to detract from the
great weight to be given to the language
actually used by that most distinguished
Judges."

16. In Home Office v. Dorset
Yacht Co.(1970 (2) All ER 294), Lord
Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech....is not to
be treated as if it was a statute definition.
It will require qualification in new
circumstances." Megarry, J. in (1971) 1
WLR 1062 observed:

"One
must not,
of
course,
construe even a reserved judgment of even
Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of
Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British
Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord
Morris said:

"There is always peril in treating
the words of a speech or judgment as
though they are words in a legislative
enactment, and it is to be remembered that
judicial utterances made in the setting of the
facts of a particular case."

17. Circumstantial flexibility, one
additional or different fact may make a
world of difference between conclusions in
two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly
placing reliance on a decision is not proper.

18. The following words of Lord
Denning in the matter of applying
precedents have become locus classicus:

"Each case depends on its own
facts and a close similarity between one
case and another is not enough because
even a single significant detail may alter the
entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one
should avid the temptation to decide cases
(as said by Cordozo) by matching the
colour of one case against the colour of
another. To decide therefore, on which side
of the line a case falls, the broad
resemblance to another case is not at all
decisive."

x x x

"Precedent
should
be
followed only so far as it marks the
path of justice, but you must cut the
dead wood and trim off the side
branches else you will find yourself
lost in thickets and branches. My plea
is to keep the path to justice clear of
obstructions which could impede it."

32. The precedents which have
been referred to in the judgment under
appeal being on a point of law which
does not arise in the facts and
situation of the present case reliance
placed on the said decisions to arrive
at a conclusion on a question which
was not at issue is therefore misplaced
and the judgment of the writ court
cannot be sustained for the said
reason.
6 All. Union of India & Ors. Vs. Raj Bahadur Singh 835

33. We may now refer to the
provisions of the CCS (EOP) Rules,
1939 to advert to the question as to
whether the petitioner would be entitled
to the benefit of disability pension in
terms of the provisions contained
therein.

34. The grant of disability
pension under the CCS (EOP) Rules,
1939 is admissible in a case where
government servant is boarded out of
government service on account of his
disablement due to wound, injury or
disease. In terms of Rule 3-A(1)(a),
disablement shall be accepted as due
to government service, provided it is
certified that it was due to wound,
injury or disease which is attributable
to government service, or existed
before or arose during government
service and has been and remains
aggravated thereby. Further, sub-rule
(2) of Rule 3-A provides that there has
to be a causal connection between
disablement and Government service
for attributability to be conceded.

35. The guidelines for conceding
attributability
of
disablement
of
government service, in the context of
persons subject to the disciplinary
code of the Central Armed Police
Battalions (CAPB), have included the
case of an accident which occurs
while proceeding from duty station to
leave station and on returning to duty
from leave station at public expense.
An accident which occurs when a
person is not strictly 'on duty' as
defined under clause 4(b), may also be
attributable to service, provided it
involved risk which was definitely
enhanced in kind or degree by the
nature,
conditions,
obligations
or
incidents of his service and that the
same was not a risk common to human
existence in modern conditions.

36. In the case at hand, the
accident having occurred on a day
when the petitioner was availing
leave, howsoever liberally we may
attempt to construe the provisions
under the CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939, the
petitioner would not by any stretch be
held to be 'on duty' leading to a causal
connection between disablement and
government service for attributability
to be conceded in any manner.

37. As per the petitioner's case
also there is no assertion that the
accident occurred while he was on his
journey back home from his duty
station, and the sole basis of the claim
being founded on the stand that the
leave being for a short period the
petitioner may be considered 'on duty',
the accident can in no manner be held
to be attributable to Government
service as per the provisions of the
CCS (EOP) Rules, 1939, so as to
sustain a claim for disability pension
in terms thereof.

38. The judgment under appeal
whereby directions have been issued
to compute benefits payable to the
petitioner in terms of the CCS (EOP)
Rules, 1939, and to make payment of
the
same,
therefore,
cannot
be
sustained. The judgment of the learned
Single Judge is liable to be set aside
and is accordingly set aside.

39. The special appeal is allowed.

40. The writ petition stands
dismissed.
----------
836 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2020)06ILR A836
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.02.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SURYA PRAKASH
KESARWANI, J.

WRIT A No. 1846 of 2020

Ramesh Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus

State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Paras Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Jay Ram Pandey

A. Service Law - Pension - Compassionate
Appointment - Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of
Dependents of Government Servants Dying
in Harness Rules, 1974: Rule 5 - The mere
fact that an application was made when the
old scheme was in force will not by itself
create a right in favour of the applicant to be
considered under the old scheme. (Para 14)

Petitioner prayed for enforcement of provisions of
Old Pension Scheme on him instead of New
Pension Scheme dated 28.3.2005, which was
enforced from 1.4.2005, on the ground that at the
time of application for compassionate appointment,
the old scheme was operative and therefore, he
deserves to be considered under the old scheme.
(Para 2, 14)

Court held that under the Rules, 1974, there cannot
be immediate or automatic appointment merely on
an application. Several circumstances having a
bearing on eligibility, and financial condition, upto
the date of consideration may have to be taken into
account. (Para 12)

A compassionate appointee enters in a Government
service and becomes part of the cadre only when
he is appointed under the Rules, 1974. Therefore,
the service conditions and other benefits as
applicable as on the date of his appointment shall
alone be available to him and shall govern his
service conditions. The Old Pension Scheme which
was abolished, prior to the appointment of the
petitioner shall not be applicable to the petitioner.
At
the
time
of
his
appointment,
i.e.,15.4.2005/joining on 21.4.2005, the New
Pension Scheme which came into force on
1.4.2005, was in operation. Therefore, the
petitioner can get the benefit of only the New
Pension Scheme and not the Old Pension Scheme,
which was operative prior to 01.4.2005. (Para 13)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. Pitta Naveen Kumar & ors. Vs Raja Narasaiah
Zangiti & ors., (2006) 10 SCC 261 (Para 7)

2. S.B.I. & anr. Vs Raj Kumar, (2010) 11 SCC 661
(Para 11, 12, 14)

Precedent distinguished:

1. Mahesh Narayan & ors. Vs St. of U.P. &
ors., 2020 (4) ADJ 172; 2020 (2) ALJ 518
(Para 6)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Surya Prakash
Kesarwani, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner, the learned standing counsel
for the State-respondent Nos.1 and 3, and
learned counsel for the respondent Nos.2
and 4.

2. This writ petition has been filed
praying for a direction in the nature of
mandamus to the respondent-authorities
to enforce the provisions of Old Pension
Scheme on the petitioner and not the New
Pension Scheme dated 28.03.2005, which
was enforced from 01.04.2005.

3. Briefly stated, undisputed facts of
the present case are that father of the
petitioner Sri Bhagwan Prasad was an
assistant teacher in Junior High School,