# Union of India & Ors v. Ravindra Kumar Singh & Anr

- **Citation:** (2019) 2 ILRA 2120
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2017-07-12
- **Case number:** Service Bench No. 268 of 2019
- **Bench:** Anil Kumar, Saurabh Lavania
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/union-of-india-ors-v-ravindra-kumar-singh-anr-44706
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

A. Service Law - disciplinary proceeding -
disciplinary enquiry in contravention of
sub-rule 2 & 3 of Rule 15 of Central Civil
Services
(Classification,
Control
and
Appeal) Rules, 1965 as also principles of
natural
justice
-
the
applicant-
respondent failed to disclose the letter
dated 12.10.2017 and the fact that he
retired from the service on attaining
superannuation - he who seeks equity
must come with clean hands
When a person approaches a Court of Equity
in exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, he should not only approach the Court
with clean hands but with clean mind, heart
and objective as well (Para 18)

 Writ Petition disposed of (E-10)

Cases Cited:-

## Text

_Characters 0–39,730 of 54,889. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39730 for what follows._

2120 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Judges, however, also noted that it was
urged on behalf of the appellant Bank that
the family of the respondent was in
receipt of family pension. This, the Court
held,
was
of
no
consequence
in
considering
the
application
for
compassionate
appointment.

32. The learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellants has
sought
to
distinguish
the
above
observations, in the judgment in Canara
Bank [Canara Bank v. M. Mahesh
Kumar, (2015) 7 SCC 412 : (2015) 2
SCC (L&S) 539] , by submitting that it is
not the case of the State of Himachal
Pradesh that mere receipt of family
pension would disable an applicant from
submitting
an
application
for
compassionate appointment or preclude
consideration of the claim. On the
contrary, the submission which is urged is
that the scheme requires consideration of
all relevant sources of income and hence,
receipt of family pension would be one of
the criteria which would be taken into
consideration
in
determining
as
to
whether the family of the deceased
employee is in indigent circumstances.
We find merit in this submission for the
simple reason that it is in accord with the
express terms of the scheme of 18-1-1990
as modified by the State. The scheme
contemplates that payments which have
been received on account of welfare
measures provided by the State including
family pension are to be taken into
account. Plainly, the terms of the scheme
must be implemented.

33. For these reasons, we have come
to the conclusion that the High Court was
not justified, based on the decision in
Govind
Prakash
Verma
[Govind
Prakash Verma v. LIC, (2005) 10 SCC
289 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 590] in issuing a
direction to the State to act in a manner
contrary to the express terms of the
scheme which require that the family
pension received by the dependents of the
deceased
employee
be
taken
into
account."

13- Learned Counsel for the petitioner
could not point out any other good reason or
ground to establish that the reasoning given
by the Tribunal and respondent no. 4, while
rejecting the claim of the petitioner, is
unjustified and illegal.

14- Keeping in view the provision of
the scheme of 1998 and the observations
made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
judgment passed in the case of State of
Himachal Pradesh(Supra), we hold that
there is no illegality in the order dated
12.07.2017 passed by the Tribunal and
order
dated
23.07.2015
passed
by
respondent no. 4. For the aforesaid
reason, we do not find a fit case for
interference.

15- The petition is misconceived and
hence dismissed accordingly.
----------

(2019)10ILR A 2120

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 18.09.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ANIL KUMAR, J.
THE HON'BLE SAURABH LAVANIA, J.

Service Bench No. 268 of 2019

Union of India & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Ravindra Kumar Singh & Anr.
 ...Respondents
2 All. Union of India & Ors. Vs Ravindra Kumar Singh & Anr.
2121
Counsel for the Petitioners:
Kuldeepak Nag (K.D. Nag)

Counsel for the Respondents:
R.C. Saxena

A. Service Law - disciplinary proceeding -
disciplinary enquiry in contravention of
sub-rule 2 & 3 of Rule 15 of Central Civil
Services
(Classification,
Control
and
Appeal) Rules, 1965 as also principles of
natural
justice
-
the
applicant-
respondent failed to disclose the letter
dated 12.10.2017 and the fact that he
retired from the service on attaining
superannuation - he who seeks equity
must come with clean hands
When a person approaches a Court of Equity
in exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, he should not only approach the Court
with clean hands but with clean mind, heart
and objective as well (Para 18)

 Writ Petition disposed of (E-10)

Cases Cited:-

1. Smt. Sudama Devi Vs Commissioner & ors
(1983) (2) SCC 1
2. State of Rajasthan & ors Vs Bal Kishan
Mathur (dead) through legal representatives &
ors (2014) (1) SCC 592
3. The Ramjas Foundation & Ors Vs U.O.I. &
ors AIR (1993) SC 852
4. K.P. Srinivas Vs R.M. Premchand & ors.
(1994) 6 SCC 620
5. Nooruddin Vs (Dr.) K.L. Anand (1995) 1 SCC
242
6. Ramniklal N. Bhutta & anr. Vs State of Mah
& ors. AIR (1997) SC 1236
7. M/s Tilok Chand Motichand & ors*. Vs H.B.
Munshi & anr. AIR (1970) SC 898
8. St of Haryana Vs Karnal Distillery AIR
(1977) SC 781
9. Sabia Khan & ors. Vs St of U.P. & ors. AIR
(1999) SC 2284
10. Agriculture & Process Food Products Vs
Oswal Agro Furane & Ors. AIR (1996) SC
1947

11. Abdul Rahman Vs Prasony Bai & anr AIR
(2003) SC 718

12. S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vs St
of Bihar & ors. (2004) 7 SCC 166

13. S.P. Chengalvaraya naidu Vs Jagannath
(1994) AIR 853

(Delivered by Hon'ble Anil Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Sri K.D. Nag, learned
counsel for petitioner, Sri R.C. Saxena,
learned counsel for applicant-respondent
No. 1 and perused the record.

2. Facts in brief of the present case
are
that
applicant-respondent
No.
1/Ravindra Kumar Singh has filed an
O.A. No. 75 of 2010 (Ravindra Kumar
Singh Vs. Union of India and others),
challenging the entire disciplinary, i.e.
memorandum of charge, inquiry report,
second stage advice of the CVC and the
penalty order compulsorily retiring him
from service and also challenged the
penalty order dated 30.07.2010 by means
of amendment in the said O.A. before the
Central
Administrative
Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as the ''Tribunal')
In addition to abvoesaid O.A., applicantrespondent has also filed O.A. No.
316/2007.

3. Both the O.As were clubbed
together and decided by the common
judgment by the Tribunal.
2122 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

4. So far as the O.A. No. 316/2007
is concerned, the Tribunal in its judgment
and order dated 01.09.2017 held as
under:-

"23. The only relief claimed in OA
No. 316/2007 is challenged to the chargesheet on the ground that the same has
been issued by an incompetent authority.
In view of the above, there is no merit in
this OA, Which is liable to be dismissed.
Ordered accordingly."

5. So far as the O.A. No. 75 of 2010
is concerned, the Tribunal in its judgment
dated 01.09.2017 held as under:-

"24. As far as OA No. 75/2010 is
concerned, we have already recorded our
opinion that the procedure adopted by the
disciplinary authority is in contravention
to sub-rules (2)and (3) (a) of rule 15 of
the CCS(CCA)Rules, 1965, as also
violative of principles of natural justice.
The impugned penalty order is thus liable
to be set aside on this count. We order
accordingly. notwithstanding the setting
aside of the impugned penalty order, the
matter is remitted back to the disciplinary
authority to pass a fresh order after
taking into consideration the reply of the
applicant to the inquiry report, without
taking into consideration the second stage
advice of CVC."

6. The findings on which the
abvoesaid judgment has been passed by
Tribunal is quoted hereinbelow:-

"16. It is admitted case of the parties
that on receipt of the inquiry report the
disciplinary authority failed to forward
the same to the Government servant. To
the contrary without seeking response of
the Government servant, CVC's advice
was sought by recording its own tentative
opinion of imposing the penalty, whereas
ex facie the requirement of the rule is that
the disciplinary authority is under a
bounden duty to forward the report of the
inquiry firstly to the charged officer for
his representation and it is only after the
comments/representation of the charged
officer that the disciplinary authority, if
after examining the representation of the
Government servant to the inquiry report,
is of the opinion that the penalty as
prescribed under rules is required to be
imposed, may seek second stage advice of
the Commission. The object of this
provision is based upon sound principles
of natural justice. The disciplinary
authority is not required to formulate its
opinion merely on the basis of the inquiry
report, except where he disagrees on the
findings of the inquiring authority on any
article of charge without considering the
reply/representation of the Government
servant to the findings of the inquiring
authority. The very object is that the
disciplinary authority on consideration of
the representation/reply of the charged
officer to the findings of the inquiring
authority may change its opinion. In the
present case, the disciplinary authority in
gross contravention of the provisions of
sub-rule (2) and sub-rule (3)(a) of rule
15, chose to seek second stage advice of
CVC before providing opportunity to the
Government
servant
to
submit
his
representation/reply to the report of the
inquiring authority. It is also pertinent to
note that though the disciplinary authority
is not bound by the advice of the
Commission, nonetheless, the advice of
the Commission, whether CVC or UPSC,
is capable of influencing the mind of the
disciplinary authority and in such an
eventuality
it
would
not
be
an
independent,
impartial
and
fair
2 All. Union of India & Ors. Vs Ravindra Kumar Singh & Anr.
2123
application of mind by the disciplinary
authority to the findings of the inquiring
authority. The import of CVC's advice at
the initial stage without having the benefit
of the Government servant's response to
the inquiry report is prone to seriously
impact the decision making approach of
the disciplinary authority. Thus, such a
procedure is not only in contravention of
sub-rules (2) and (3)(a) of rule 15 but
also violative of the principles of natural
justice.

17. Sub-rule 3(b) of rule 15 also
requires the disciplinary authority to
forward or cause to be forwarded a copy
of the advice of the Commission received
under clause (a) to the Government
servant
to
provide
him
another
opportunity to respond to the advice of
the
Commission.
Thus,
a
two-fold
protection has been provided to the
Government servant (i) to respond to the
report of the inquiry to provide a fair
opportunity to the disciplinary authority
to examine the report of the inquiry in the
light of the defence of the Government
servant; and (ii) in the event the advice of
the
Commission
is
against
the
Government
servant,
to
enable
the
Government servant to again respond to
such advice for the impartial and due
application of mind by the disciplinary
authority.

18. In Managing Director, ECIL v
B. Karunakar & others [(1993) 4 SCC
727] a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that it is the right of
the employee to have the report of the
inquiry
officer
to
defend
himself
effectively notwithstanding whether he
asked for the report or not. The report has
to be furnished to him even if the statutory
rules do not permit furnishing of the
report or are silent on this aspect. This is
in consonance with Article 311(2) of the
Constitution of India and principles of
natural justice. However, where the
disciplinary authority before providing
opportunity to the Government servant
makes up its mind to an impose penalty
and further strengthens its opinion with
the advice of CVC or UPSC, the very
purpose of asking the Government servant
to submit his representation is frustrated
and renders it meaningless and illusory.

19. The role and purpose of the
Central Vigilance Commission in the
matter of disciplinary proceedings is
prescribed under Section 19 of the
Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003.
Such consultation is on the basis of the
rules and regulations governing vigilance
or disciplinary matters relating to persons
appointed to public services and posts in
connection with the affairs of the Union.
Any regulations made under the Central
Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 have to
be read harmoniously with the provisions
of rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.

20. In the present case, from the
record we find that vide letter dated
20.08.2009, the disciplinary authority
sought the second stage advice of CVC.
While seeking advice the disciplinary
authority not only simply forwarded the
report of the inquiring authority but also
its own findings and conclusions on each
article of charge. The opinion of the
disciplinary authority recorded in the
aforesaid letter is as under:

"Taking into account the findings of
the Inquiry Officer as well as the views of
the undersigned, it is considered that the
imposition of one of the major penalty on
Shri R.K Singh, Inspector (now Supdt)
recommended by the CVC in its first stage
Advice aforementioned would be just, fair
and proper. Accordingly, I strongly
recommend that one of the major penalty
under Rule 11 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965
2124 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
should be imposed upon Shri R.K. Singh,
Inspector (now Supdt)."

CVC vide its office memorandum
dated 22.01.2010 communicated to the
disciplinary authority for acceptance of
the inquiry officer's report for imposition
of suitable major penalty in agreement
with the disciplinary authority. The
aforesaid memorandum reads as under:

"Sub:
Disciplinary
Proceedings
against Shri R.K. Singh, Inspector (now
Supdt.).

CBEC may refer to their U.O. Note
No.V-566/5/2001-Pt.II-Cus/04
dated
07.01.2010 on the subject cited above.

2. Commission has observed that the
IO's report and as

the views of the DA are appropriate as
the inquiry establishes the active involvement
of
the
CO
in
leaving
his
station
unauthorisedly for abetting the export fraud
which was unraveled by DRI.

3. Commission, hence, in agreement
with DA, advises for acceptance of IO's
Report and imposition of suitable major
penalty upon Shri R.K. Singh, then
Inspector (now Supdt.).

4. Department's files are returned
herewith.
Receipt
of
Commission's
advice/Department's
files
may
be
acknowledged.
Action
taken
may
be
intimated."

From
the
above
office
menmorandum, we find that CVC has not
discharged its role in accordance with
law. As a matter of fact, CVC seems to
have been influenced by the opinion of the
disciplinary authority and has endorsed
its opinion without any application of
mind, and vice versa, the disciplinary
authority being influenced by the opinion
of CVC imposed the penalty. In the entire
process, the principles of natural justice
have
been
sacrificed
by
both
the
authorities.

21.
The
applicant
has
also
challenged
the
competence
of
the
Commissioner, Central Excise to issue the
charge memorandum. It is stated that the
Commissioner was not competent to issue
the charge-sheet. Reliance is placed upon
order dated 16.01.2003 issued by the
Ministry of Finance, Department of
Revenue, CBEC, New Delhi, whereby the
Chief
Commissioner,
Central
Excise/Customs, Lucknow was declared
as the cadre controlling authority. Copy
of this letter is placed on record as
Annexure-1 with OA No.723/2010 in OA
No.75/2010. Aforesaid letter reads as
under:

"Sub:
Declaration
of
Chief
Commissioner of Central Excise/Customs
as Cadre Controlling Authorities upto
Group 'B' level staff.

Sir

I am directed to say that the question
of declaring the Chief Commissioner of
Central
Excise/Customs
as
cadre
controlling authority in respect of staff
upto Group 'B' level had been under
consideration of the Central Board of
Excise and Customs (hereinafter referred
to as the Board) for some time. It has now
been decided by the Board that all the
powers that are presently being exercised
by the respective Chief Commissioners as
the cadre controlling authority should
henceforth
be
exercised
by
their
respective Chief Commissioners. However
there would be no merger or bifurcation
of the existing cadres i.e. the functions of
each cadre controlling authority shall be
exercised separately and independently by
the chief Commissioner. This in effect
would imply that the independent entity of
each cadre shall remain intact and
unchanged.
2 All. Union of India & Ors. Vs Ravindra Kumar Singh & Anr.
2125

2. As the cadre controlling authority,
the Chief Commissioners' mandate of
responsibility should also extend to:

(a)
All
establishment
matters
including recruitment, promotion and
confirmation upto the level of Group B
staff;

(b)
Holding
of
Departmental
Promotion Committee meetings;

(c) Monitoring the implementation of
the Board's instructions with regard to
transfers and equitable distribution of
manpower
and
material
resources
between Commissioners/Zones; and

(d)
Adequate
representation
of
employees belonging to the SC/ST and
OBC categories in the cadre under his
control.

3. It is also clarified that in the
formations
comprising
both
Commissioners and Chief Commissioners,
it would be the Chief Commissioner who
would allocate and post staff to various
formations
including
Commissioners'/Chief
Commissioners'
office.

4. It has also been decided to declare
the Chief Commissioners as Head of the
Department in order to enable them to
carry out their responsibilities."

22. From the perusal of the aforesaid
letter,
we
find
that
the
Chief
Commissioner was declared as the cadre
controlling authority for purposes of
activities mentioned therein. Insofar as
the
disciplinary
proceedings
are
concerned,
Part-II
of
the
Schedule
appended to the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965
prescribes the description of service,
appointing authority and the competent
authority to impose penalties. Part-II of
the Schedule deals with the Central Civil
Services Group 'B'. Entry 12 of the
aforesaid Schedule reads as under:
Seri
al
No.
Descr
iption
of
servic
e
Appointing
Authority
Authority competent to
impose
penalties
and
penalties which it may
impose (with reference to
item numbers in Rule 11

Authority
Pen
alti
es
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
12.
Centr
al
Excis
e
Servic
e,
Group
'B'-
(inclu
ding
Deput
y
Head
quarte
rs
Assist
ant to
the
Colle
ctor )
and
Distri
ct
Opiu
m
Office
rs,
Group
''B'
Collector of
Central
Excise/land
Customs;
Narcotics
Commissio
ner
Collector of Central
Excuse/Land
Customs

Director
of
Inspection; Director
of
Revenue
Intelligence;
Narcotics
Commissioner.

In respect of (i) a
member
of
the
Service Serving in
(Statistics
and
Intelligence Branch
Central Excise) :
Deputy
collector
(Statistics
and
Intelligence
Branch).

(ii)
any
other
member
of
the
Service:
Assitant6
Collector of Central
Excise, Group ''A'
All
All

(i)
to
(iv)

(i)

From this Schedule, it is evident that
the
Collector
of
Central
Excise
(Commissioner)
is
the
competent
disciplinary authority to impose all
penalties prescribed under rule 11. The
Schedule is statutory in nature. Letter
dated 16.01.2003 has not amended the
Schedule
and
thus
may
be
for
administrative purposes, but not for
purposes
of
imposition
of
penalty.
Otherwise also this communication does
not in any manner deals with the powers
of the Chief Commissioner to impose the
penalty in disciplinary proceedings. Thus
statutory rule would prevail and the
2126 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Commissioner was and continues to be
the competent authority for imposing
penalty
upon
the
applicant.
The
contention of the applicant is thus
rejected.

23. The only relief claimed in OA
No.316/2007 is challenge to the chargesheet on the ground that the same has
been issued by an incompetent authority.
In view of the above, there is no merit in
this OA, which is liable to be dismissed.
Ordered accordingly.
24. As far as OA No. 75/2010 is
concerned, we have already recorded our
opinion that the procedure adopted by the
disciplinary authority is in contravention
to sub-rules (2)and (3) (a) of rule 15 of
the CCS(CCA)Rules, 1965, as also
violative of principles of natural justice.
The impugned penalty order is thus liable
to be set aside on this count. We order
accordingly. notwithstanding the setting
aside of the impugned penalty order, the
matter is remitted back to the disciplinary
authority to pass a fresh order after
taking into consideration the reply of the
applicant to the inquiry report, without
taking into consideration the second stage
advice of CVC."

7. Aggrieved by the order dated
01.09.2017, the present writ petition has
been filed by the petitioners.

8. Sri R.C. Saxena learned counsel
for applicant-respondent No. 1 has raised
preliminary objection on the issue of
maintainability of writ petition through
affidavit. The relevant portion of the
affidavit is quoted below:-

"(i) The present writ petition is
barred by the doctrine of Estoppel:- The
present writ petition is liable to be
dismissed for the reason that after serving
the certified copy of Judgement and order
dated
1.9.2017
passed
by
Learned
Tribunal in O.A. No.75/2010 along with
representation
dated
23.9.2017,
the
Disciplinary Authority, Commissioner,
CGST & Central Excise Lucknow in terms
and in compliance of Judgement and
order dated 1.9.2017 of the Learned
Tribunal issued the letter dated 12.10.20
17 requiring the deponent to submit the
representation against the inquiry report
dated 29.7.2009 within a period of 15
days for taking decision after considering
the representation, if submitted by the
deponent and thereafter the deponent in
compliance of letter dated 12.10.2017
submitted
representation
dated
24.10.2017 and further representation
dated 29.6.2018 to the Disciplinary
authority for taking decision but no
decision has yet been taken by the
disciplinary
authority
in
terms
of
judgement and order dated 1.9.2017.
From the above it is absolutely clear that
the Petitioners accepted the judgement of
the Learned Tribunal dated 1.9.2017 and
also
implemented
the
impugned
judgement and order dated 1.9.2017 by
issuing letter dated 12.10.2017. Thus,
from
the
own
actions
of
the
Petitioners/Respondents that they had no
intention to challenge the impugned
judgement and order of the learned
tribunal as the letter dated 12.10.2017
issued by themselves for implementing the
judgement and order dated 1.9.2017 of
the learned tribunal they are barred &
stopped by the Doctrine of Estoppel as
such the present writ petition is liable to
be dismissed on this ground alone. The
true electrostat copy of the letter dated
12.10.2017 excluding the copy of inquiry
report and the representations dated
24.10.2017 & 29.6.2018 submitted by the
deponent are filed here with as Annexure
2 All. Union of India & Ors. Vs Ravindra Kumar Singh & Anr.
2127
No.-CA-1, CA-2 & CA-3 to this counter
affidavit.

(ii) Writ Petition is liable to be
dismissed for concealment of material
facts/documents:-
The
petitioners/respondents have cunningly
and most dishonestly have concealed the
most material facts/documents in the writ
petition
that
for
the
purpose
of
compliance of judgement and order of
Learned Tribunal dated 1.9.2017 the
letter dated 12.10.2017 contained in
Annexure No. CA-1 was already issued to
the deponent requiring the deponent to
submit his representation for taking
appropriate decision by the disciplinary
authority which was submitted by the
deponent on 24.10.2017 & 29.6.2018
contained in Annexure No.-CA-2 & CA-3
and the disciplinary authority despite the
above has yet not taken any decision. In
view
of
the
above,
since
the
petitioners/respondents
have
not
approached this Hon'ble Court with clean
hands and are guilty of concealment of
material facts and documents, the writ is
liable to be dismissed for the said
reasons.

(iii) Moving of two Applications
seeking for extension of time to comply
with the judgement and order before the
Learned Tribunal in 0.A. No.75/2010,
debars the petitioners/respondents to
challenge the said impugned judgement
and order dated 1.9.2017 before this
Hon'ble Court:- It is the well settled legal
position that either the respondents may
comply with the directions of the Hon'ble
Court within the time specified or if the
compliance is not possible for any reason
within the specified period, the only
course open to the Respondents is that
they should moved the concerned court
for the purpose of extension of further
time for compliance of the said directions.
In the present case also since the
Petitioners/respondents could not take
decision within a specified time of 3
months, they approached and filed two
applications for further extension of time
before the Learned Tribunal in OA
No.75/2010 for complying with judgement
and order dated 1.9.2017. Moving of
above
two
applications
for
further
extension of time itself finds mention in
para 29 and 31 of the writ petition.
Therefore, on one hand when above
applications
of
the
petitioners/respondents
seeking
for
extension of time for compliance of
iudgement and order dated 1.9.2017 are
still pending with the learned tribunal in
the aforesaid O.A. No.75/2010, they are
under legal obligation to comply with the
judgement and order dated 1.9.2017 and
they can not permitted to challenge the
same judgement and order dated 1.9.2017
for compliance of which they have sought
for extension of time before Learned
Tribunal. In this regard the deponent
refers and rely upon the decision of
Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of M.L.
Sachdev vs Union of India & another
reported in 1991 SCC(L&S) 606, Para 7
in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has held
that once it was found that before the
extended date the direction was not being
complied with, it was the obligation of the
respondent-contemnor to approach the
court for further extension of time or to
receive such direction as the court in its
discretion thought it appropriate to make.
Thus, it is absolutely clear that the very
purpose
of
moving
application
for
extension of further time is to aimed at to
comply with the judgement and order and
its direction and not for challenging the
iudgement and order before higher court
in the garb of said application for
extension of time as such the present writ
2128 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
is barred by principles of Estoppel and
constructive resjudicata.

(iv) The present writ petition is
liable to be dismissed on the ground of
delay and laches:- The Hon'ble Tribunal
passed the judgement and order dated
1.9.2017 contained in Annexure No. 1 to
the writ petition considering the entire
facts and grounds raised on behalf of
petitioner and the respondents and
decided all the issues involved into the
matter,
setting
aside
the
impugned
punishment
order
of
compulsory
retirement and remitted back the matter to
the disciplinary authority for passing a
fresh order within a period of three
months. The petitioner/respondents within
a period of about one month partially
complied with the judgement and order
dated 1.9.2017 by issuing letter dated
12.10.2017 contained in Annexure No.-
CA-1 and when remaining compliance
about taking of final decision could not be
possible within the specified period of 3
months, they approached the learned
Tribunal for extension of time by means of
two applications. From the moving of
these applications for extension of time
for complying with the directions of
Learned
Tribunal,
the
petitioners/respondents can not get rid off
from the 3 months limitation for filing the
writ petition. The reason is that seeking of
time for compliance of directions is all
together contrary to the question of
limitation for filing of writ petition. It is
wonder that the petitioners/ respondents
have not even mentioned any facts and
grounds for condoning the period beyond
three months in any part of the entire writ
petition.
It
appears
that
the
petitioners/respondents misleading the
Hon'ble court and not disclosing that the
period of limitation for challenging the
judgement and order dated 1.9.2017 had
already expired as on 1.12.2017 and
further expiry of one year, filed the above
writ petition which was liable to have
been dismissed on the ground of delay
and laches. It is not disputed that even if
any writ petition suffers from the delay
and laches, the Hon'ble Court has power
to condone the delay for sufficient reasons
to be pleaded and brought on record but
the delay in question has to be explained
with reasons so that the concerned
Hon'ble court may be able to pass
appropriate order but in the present case
the relevant facts and reason about
Condonation of delay have not been
pleaded at all instead several letters of
departmental correspondents of different
subsequent dates have been referred in
the writ petition which are irrelevant as
regards the question of limitation for
filing
of
writ
petition
against
the
judgement and order dated 1.9.2017. In
view of the above, the present writ
petition is liable to be dismissed on the
ground of limitation also."

9. Learned counsel for petitioners, in
rebuttal, so far as the matter in regard to
delay in filing the writ petition, submits
that after passing of the judgment by
Tribunal dated 01.09.2017 the steps were
taken as stated in paragraph Nos. 29 to 34
of the writ petition, so keeping in view the
said facts as well as the judgment passed
by Hon'ble the Apex Court int eh case of
Smt. Sudama Devi Vs. Commissioner
and others, 1983 (2) SCC 1 and in the
case of State of Rajasthan & others Vs.
Bal Kishan Mathur (dead) Through
Legal Representatives and others, 2014
(1) SCC 592, delay in filing the writ
petition may be condoned.

10. Sri K.D. Nag, learned counsel
for petitioners-Union of India while
2 All. Union of India & Ors. Vs Ravindra Kumar Singh & Anr.
2129
opposing the other objections raised by
learned counsel for respondent as well as
on merit of judgment passed by the
Tribunal submits as under:-

"1. That it is admitted fact that there
were very serious allegations against
Ravindra Kumar Singh (OP-1 in instant
WP), including those relating to extending
assistance to the offenders by misusing is
official position and attempting to get
released the detained export consignments
of offenders, against the interest of the
Customs department. Hence Disciplinary
proceedings were conducted against the
OP-1 in accordance with law wherein full
opportunity was provided to him. The
Charge Sheet was issued on 29.09.2003,
whereas after providing full opportunity,
the punishment order of compulsory
Retirement of R. K. Singh (OP-1) was
passed by the disciplinary authority on
30.07.2010. (refer Para-12 of WP).

2. That it is also admitted fact that a
Memorandum
of
Charges
dated
29.09.2003 was served to R. K. Singh
(OP-1), to which he submitted his reply
dated
08.10.2003.
The
gravity
and
seriousness of Charges is evident as the
Article of Charges have been quoted in
the final Judgment and Order dated
01.09.2017, impugned in the writ petition
(refer Para-3 of WP).

3. That it is also admitted fact that
the enquiry officer proceeded with the
enquiry proceedings in accordance of law.
After giving full opportunity and after
observing all norms of natural Justice, the
inquiry was concluded on 04.06.2009. At
that stage R. K. Singh submitted detailed
Statement of Defense dated 21.07.2009
and after considering the statement of
defense of R. K. Singh (OP-1 in instant
WP), the inquiry officer submitted Inquiry
Report
dated
29.07.2009
to
the
disciplinary authority (refer Para-5 of
WP).

4. That it is also admitted that vide
office order dated 05.02.2010 (i.e. Show
Cause
Notice-
before
awarding
punishment) the (i) copy of the Inquiry
Report dated 29.07.2009 and (ii) copy of
IInd stage advice memo dated 22.01.2010
of CVC was serve to R. K. Singh (OP- 1
in WP) for his reply /representation in the
matter of action proposed against him.
The fact of serving the copy of the Inquiry
Report dated 29.07.2009 and copy of IInd
stage advice memo dated 22.01.2010 of
CVC has been acknowledged by the
Tribunal in the end of paragraph 5 of the
impugned judgment dated 01.09.2017
(Ann. - 1 to wp). As such all norms of
opportunity of representation, fair play
and natural justice were observed at that
stage also. As such no prejudice caused to
R. K. Singh (refer Para-7 of WP).

5. That OP-1 (R. K. Singh) submitted
his representation dated 12.03.2010 in
response to the office order dated
05.02.2010 (i.e. Show Cause Notice
before awarding punishment) (refer Para9 of WP).

6. That after considering the entire
material
relating
to
disciplinary
proceeding including the representation
dated 12.03.2010 of OP-1 (R. K. Singh)
in response to the office order dated
05.02.2010 (i.e. Show Cause Notice -
before
awarding
punishment),
the
punishment order dated 30.07.2010 for
'compulsory retirement' of R. K.Singh
(OP-1 in instant WP) was passed by the
disciplinary authority (refer Para-12 of
WP).

7. That it is pertinent to mention that
the Disciplinary Proceedings in question
against the opposite party commenced on
29.09.2003,
with
the
issuance
of
Memorandum
of
Charges
dated
2130 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
29.09.2003 (Charge Sheet) and got
concluded on 30.07.2010 by issuance
punishment order dated 30.07.2010 for
compulsory retirement of R. K. Singh in a
span of seven year duration. In the
prolong
detailed
Disciplinary
Proceedings, all possible opportunities of
representation /reply hearing in his
defense were provided to the opposite
party and all opportunities were fully
availed by the opposite party.

8. That during the course of
Disciplinary Proceedings, opposite party
(R.K.
Singh)
filed
two
original
applications i.e. OA No. 316 / 2007 and
OA
No.75
/2010,
in
the
Central
Administrative
Tribunal,
Lucknow
Bench, Lucknow, but he did not plead as
to what and factual prejudice was caused
to him actual and factual prejudice was
caused to him and in what manner during
inquiry proceedings through which he
was compulsorily retired.

9.
That
the
Tribunal
has
acknowledge that along with the copy of
Inquiry
Report,
the
advice
of
the
commission (CVC) was also send to the
R. K. Singh for his

comments
-
before
passing
punishment order. As such it cannot be
said that there is failure of opportunity of
hearing to the Government Servant, and
in fact the final decision of imposition of
penalties was taken only after considering
the reply dated 12.03.20100 of R. K.
Singh in response to the office order dated
05.02.2010 (i.e. Show Cause Notice -
before
awarding
punishment)
of
disciplinary authority (refer Para-25 of
WP).

10. That for allowing the OA No.75 /
2010 vide impugned judgment dated
01.09.2017, the Learned Tribunal relied
on the legal principle laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India on the
issue of 'Non Supply of Report of Inquiry
Officer' in the matter of Managing
Director,
ECIL,
Hyderabad
Vs.
B.
Karunakar - (1993) 4 SCC 727.

11. That in paragraph 30 (v) of the
judgment in - Managing Director, ECIL,
Hyderabad Vs. B. Karunakar, reported at
(1993) 4 SCC 727, Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India observed -

"30 (v) ........ Whether in fact,
prejudice
has
been
caused
to
the
employee or not on account of the denial
to him of the report, has to be considered
on the facts and circumstances of each
case. Where, therefore, even after the
furnishing of the report, no different
consequence would have followed, it
would be a perversion of justice to

permit the employee to resume duty
and to get all the consequential benefits. It
amounts to rewarding the dishonest and
the guilty and thus to stretching the
concept of justice to illogical and
exasperating limits. It amounts to an -
unnatural expansion of natural justice
which in itself is antithetical of justice.

In the instant matter in hand of R. K.
Singh,
a
Show
Cause
Notice-before
awarding punishment (i.e. order dated
05.02.2010) was issued to R. K. Singh and
along with that the (i) copy of the Inquiry
Report dated 29.07.2009 and (ii) copy of IInd
stage advice memo dated 22.01.2010 of
CVC was serve to R. K. Singh (OP-1 in WP)
for his reply /representation in the matter of
action proposed against him. The fact of the
serving the copy of the Inquiry Report dated
29.07.2009 and copy of IInd stage advice
memo dated 22.01.2010 of CVC has been
acknowledged by the Tribunal in the end of
paragraph 5 of the impugned judgment dated
01.09.2017 (Ann.-1 to WP).

The Learned Tribunal failed to
record the appropriate findings as to what
actual and factual prejudice was caused to
2 All. Union of India & Ors. Vs Ravindra Kumar Singh & Anr.
2131
R. K. Singh and in what manner. Thus the
impugned judgment dated 01.09.2017
(Ann. 1 to WP) is in sheer violation to the
principle laid down in Managing Director,
ECIL, Hyderabad Vs. B. Karunakar
(1993) 4 SCC 727 itself.

12. That in support of contention of
the writ petition, the petitioner is further
relying on the judgment given in the
matter of S. K. Singh Vs. Central Bank of
India & others (1996) 6 SCC 415 (copy
attached), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India held - since the dismissed
employee failed to explain, as to what
prejudice was caused to him on account
of non-supply of the Charge Sheet, the
'dismissal order' was rightly not interfered
with by the Hon'ble Single Judge and also
rightly not interfered by the Division
Bench of High Court. Lastly Hon'ble
Apex Court also dismissed the SLP filed
by the dismissed employee.

13. That in support of contention of
the writ petition, the petitioner is further
relying on the paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 36 & 44 of the judgment given in the
matter of - Haryana Financial Corporation
& another Vs. Kailash Chandra Ahuja -
(2008) 9 SCC 31 (copy attached).

14. That in support of contention of
the writ petition, the petitioner is further
relying on the paragraphs 7, 8, 9 & 10 of
the judgment given in the matter of -
Uttarakhand Transport Corporation &
another Vs. Sukhver Singh - (2018) 1
SCC 231 (copy attached).

15. That in preliminary objection
dated 25.03.2019, the counsel for OP-1
has opposed the writ petition on the
ground of 'Estoppel' as the departmental
authorities invited objections of OP-1 in
furtherance of judgment dated 01.09.2017
(Ann. 1 to WP), impugned in instant writ
petition. Hence departmental authorities
are stopped to challenge the judgment
dated 01.09.2017 passed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal.

In reply it most respectfully submit
that parties (particularly the departmental
authorities)
before
the
Central
Administrative Tribunal, in the OA have
every 'legal right' rather 'legal duty' to
challenge the judgment of the Tribunal
and seek judicial review at next higher
forum i.e. the Hon'ble High Court. It is
most respectfully submitted that 'legal
right' or 'legal duty' cannot be blocked on
the ground of 'Estoppel'.

It is further submitted that none of
the legal right of the OP-1 are getting
affected by judicial review /judicial
scrutiny by the Hon'ble High Court of the
judgment dated 01.09.2017 passed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal.

16. That in the 'Counter Affidavit'
dated 18.04.2019, the OP-1 has referred
the Judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
delivered
in
the
matter
of
S.
P.
Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath -
1994 AIR 853.

In this connection it is submitted the
judgment of Apex Court delivered in the
matter of S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs.
Jagannath relates to the property dispute,
where some manipulation were made in
the property related document by one
party and preliminary decree was obtain
at the back of aggrieved party.

In the instant writ petition, unwanted
interference by the Central Administrative
Tribunal in the departmental disciplinary
proceedings is to be examined by the
Hon'ble High Court."

11. In order to consider the matter in
respect to condonation of delay, we feel
appropriate to go through the law as laid
down by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the
case
of
Smt.
Sudama
Devi
Vs.
Commissioner and others, 1983 (2) SCC
2132 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1 and in the case of State of Rajasthan &
others Vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (dead)
Through
Legal
Representatives
and
others, 2014 (1) SCC 592, wherein it has
been held as under:-