# Urmila Devi Pal v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 5 ILRA 1106
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-05-12
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 215 of 2023
- **Bench:** Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/urmila-devi-pal-v-state-of-u-p-ors-50149
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Salary - Normally, a
belated service related claim will be
rejected on the ground of delay and laches
(where remedy is sought by filing a writ
5 All. Urmila Devi Pal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1107
petition). One of the exceptions to the
said rule is cases relating to a continuing
wrong, with reference to the date on
which the continuing wrong commenced,
if
such
continuing
wrong
creates
a
continuing source of injury. But there is an
exception
to
the
exception.
If
the
grievance is in respect of any order or
administrative decision which related to
or affected several others also, and if the
reopening of the issue would affect the
settled rights of third parties, then the
claim will not be entertained. (Para 21)

The Writ Petition was filed claiming certain
arrears of salary, which was not paid on the
ground of the petitioner's unauthorised absence
and it is not a continuing cause of action. (Para
22)

B. It is settled law that although there is
no limitation prescribed for filing a writ
petition, the same should necessarily be
filed with reasonable promptitude and
merely
by
making
repetitive
representations,
the
conduct
of
the
appellant in not approaching the Court for
redressal of her grievance for a very long
period, which in the present case is more
than two decades, cannot be justified and
making repetitive representations would
not dilute the effect of undue delay in
filing the writ petition and will not create
any fresh cause of action. (Para 24)

The appellant had approached this court on two
occasions earlier by filing two writ petitions i.e.
WP No. 4664 (S/S) of 2005 and WP No. 4848
(S/S) of 2014 but she chose not to raise her
grievances of non-payment of salary for some
period between the years 1998 to 2001, which
was raised by her in Writ A No. 6123 of 2022,
although cause of action for the same had
already accrued to her. The writ petition filed
for the reliefs which could have been
claimed by the appellant while filing the
earlier writ petitions and which were not
claimed by her, would be clearly hit by the
principles contained in Order II Rule 2 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (Para
27)

C. It is clear as crystal that even if the
court or tribunal directs for consideration
of representations relating to a stale claim
or dead grievance it does not give rise to a
fresh cause of action. The dead cause of
action
cannot
rise
like
a
phoenix.
Similarly,
a
mere
submission
of
representation to the competent authority
does not arrest time. (Para 25)

Even at the time of hearing of the aforesaid writ
petition, the learned counsel for the appellant
chose not to press for the reliefs claimed in the
writ petition and he confined his prayer for a
direction
for
decision
of
the
appellant's
representation.
The
representation
has
accordingly been decided by a reasoned and
speaking order. This court would not substitute
the reasoning given by the Director in the
impugned order. (Para 28)

Special appeal dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

## Text

1106 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
special fees in the form of revenue on
account of sale, the order passed by the
Licensing Authority in its finding, after
referring to the submissions, records the
reason that on the basis of the above
referred submissions, in the licensed
premises on the date of prohibition (Gandhi
Jayanti), foreign liquor of a different shop
and beer of a different shop were recovered
for which an FIR was lodged; on the basis
of the said finding, the authority proceeded
to record that on the basis of the illegal
keeping of foreign liquor and beer, there
was a loss of special fees to the State.

39. It is essential to notice that the
special fees is chargeable for sale of liquor
and beer at the restaurants, however, the
said special fees or its loss can be caused
only if the sale is effected. Merely by
recovery of the liquor allegedly belonging
to another shop and there being no finding
in respect of the sale of such liquor, there is
no basis whatsoever to record that loss of
special fees was being caused and thus, to
that extent, the finding recorded is wholly
perverse.

40. On the basis of the findings as
recorded above, this Court finds that the
infractions in respect of Condition Nos.5 &
6 of the license which were alleged in the
show-cause notice are not established and
proved
against
the
petitioner.
The
infractions specified in Rule 18(1)(a) to (i)
were not alleged in the show-cause notice,
as such, the same are not established
against the petitioner.

41. The infractions with regard to
violation of Condition No.7 of the license
stands partially justified, however, the
same is compoundable at the rate of
Rs.30,000/- in terms of the table under
Rule 18(5).

42. The allegation with regard to loss
of special fees is not sustainable.

43. The writ petition stands partly
allowed.

44. It is directed that the respondents
authorities shall pass a fresh order for
compounding of the offence in respect of
the infractions of Condition No.7 of the
license at the rates specified in the table to
Rule 18(5) (Serial No.10 of the list) by
passing a fresh order within a period of one
month from today.

45. The orders impugned in the
present writ petition except to the extent as
indicated above, are quashed.

46. Necessary consequences to
follow.
----------
(2023) 5 ILRA 1106
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED:LUCKNOW 12.05.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DEVENDRA KUMAR
UPADHYAYA, J.
THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Special Appeal No. 215 of 2023

Urmila Devi Pal ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Om Prakash Mani Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Service Law - Salary - Normally, a
belated service related claim will be
rejected on the ground of delay and laches
(where remedy is sought by filing a writ
5 All. Urmila Devi Pal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1107
petition). One of the exceptions to the
said rule is cases relating to a continuing
wrong, with reference to the date on
which the continuing wrong commenced,
if
such
continuing
wrong
creates
a
continuing source of injury. But there is an
exception
to
the
exception.
If
the
grievance is in respect of any order or
administrative decision which related to
or affected several others also, and if the
reopening of the issue would affect the
settled rights of third parties, then the
claim will not be entertained. (Para 21)

The Writ Petition was filed claiming certain
arrears of salary, which was not paid on the
ground of the petitioner's unauthorised absence
and it is not a continuing cause of action. (Para
22)

B. It is settled law that although there is
no limitation prescribed for filing a writ
petition, the same should necessarily be
filed with reasonable promptitude and
merely
by
making
repetitive
representations,
the
conduct
of
the
appellant in not approaching the Court for
redressal of her grievance for a very long
period, which in the present case is more
than two decades, cannot be justified and
making repetitive representations would
not dilute the effect of undue delay in
filing the writ petition and will not create
any fresh cause of action. (Para 24)

The appellant had approached this court on two
occasions earlier by filing two writ petitions i.e.
WP No. 4664 (S/S) of 2005 and WP No. 4848
(S/S) of 2014 but she chose not to raise her
grievances of non-payment of salary for some
period between the years 1998 to 2001, which
was raised by her in Writ A No. 6123 of 2022,
although cause of action for the same had
already accrued to her. The writ petition filed
for the reliefs which could have been
claimed by the appellant while filing the
earlier writ petitions and which were not
claimed by her, would be clearly hit by the
principles contained in Order II Rule 2 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (Para
27)

C. It is clear as crystal that even if the
court or tribunal directs for consideration
of representations relating to a stale claim
or dead grievance it does not give rise to a
fresh cause of action. The dead cause of
action
cannot
rise
like
a
phoenix.
Similarly,
a
mere
submission
of
representation to the competent authority
does not arrest time. (Para 25)

Even at the time of hearing of the aforesaid writ
petition, the learned counsel for the appellant
chose not to press for the reliefs claimed in the
writ petition and he confined his prayer for a
direction
for
decision
of
the
appellant's
representation.
The
representation
has
accordingly been decided by a reasoned and
speaking order. This court would not substitute
the reasoning given by the Director in the
impugned order. (Para 28)

Special appeal dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. U.O.I. Vs Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648
(Para 21)

2. St. of Uttaranchal & anr. Vs Sri Shiv Charan
Singh Bhandari & ors., 2013 (12) SCC 179 (Para
25)

3. The St. of W. B. Vs Debabrata Tiwari & ors.,
2023 SCC OnLine 219 (Para 26)

Precedent distinguished:

1. Tukaram Kana Joshi & ors. Vs M.I.D.C.,
(2013) 1 SCC 353 (Para 17)

2. Sukh Dutt Ratra & anr. Vs St of H. P. & ors.,
(2022) 7 SCC 508 (Para 17)

Present appeal challenges judgment and
order dated 19.04.2023, passed by an
Hon'ble Single Judge dismissing the writ
petition, which was filed by the appellantpetitioner for quashing of the order dated
13.01.2023 passed by Director, Bal Vikas
Seva
Evam
Pushtahar,
rejecting
her
representation dated 29.09.2022.
1108 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Sri Om Prakash Mani
Tripathi Advocate, the learned counsel for
the appellant and Sri V. P. Nag, the learned
Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of
the State.

2. By instituting the instant Special
Appeal filed under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of
the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, the
appellant -petitioner has challenged the
judgment and order dated 19.04.2023,
passed by an Hon'ble Single Judge
dismissing the Writ-A No. 2924 of 2023,
which was filed by the appellant-petitioner
for quashing of the order dated 13.01.2023
passed by Director, Bal Vikas Seva Evam
Pushtahar, rejecting her representation
dated 29.09.2022.

3. Briefly stated, facts of the case, as
pleaded in the writ petition, are that the
petitioner was appointed on the post of
Mukhya Sevika on 31.05.1995 and she
joined her duties on 25.04.1996.

4. On 15.06.2005, the petitioner was
transferred to Sultanpur. The petitioner
challenged this transfer order by filing Writ
Petition No. 4664 (S/S) of 2005 and on
25.07.2005 an interim order was passed in
the
aforesaid
writ
petition
that
the
petitioner shall not be relieved in pursuance
of the transfer order. The writ petition was
finally disposed of by means of a judgment
and order dated 30.09.2005, directing that
if the petitioner makes any representation
within a period of ten days for change of
the place of posting in accordance with the
Government Order dated 13.07.2000, she
will be accommodated in any of the blocks
in District Lucknow, except the home
block, or in any block in any adjoining
district and till then no coercive measure
shall be taken against her. In furtherance of
the aforesaid judgment and order dated
30.09.2005, the petitioner was given
posting in District Lucknow.

5. The petitioner filed another writ
petition, bearing Writ Petition No. 4848
(S/S) of 2014, raising her grievance of nonpayment of some dues of salary, medical
leave and benefit of 6th Pay Commission
recommendations, which was disposed off
by means of a judgment and order dated
04.09.2014 directing that the Director,
Child
Development
and
Nutrition,
Lucknow should take a decision on the
petitioner's representation.

6. On 27.3.2015, the Director passed
an order in compliance of the aforesaid
order dated 04.09.2014, passed by this
Court in Writ Petition No.4849 (S/S) of
2014, stating that as per the report
submitted by the District Program Officer,
Lucknow, medical leave for the period
03.08.2007 to 20.08.2007 (18 days),
03.07.2008 to 17.07.2008 (15 days),
04.06.2009 and 26.06.2009 to 27.06.2009
(3 days), 01.02.2011 to 28.02.2011 (28
days) and 01.07.2013 to 31.08.2013 had
already been sanctioned and no leave
application was available for two days'
absence in September, 2012 and three days'
absence in May, 2013. It was further stated
in the order that the benefit of the 6th Pay
Commission's
recommendations
had
already been given to the petitioner.

7. The petitioner thereafter filed WritA No.6123 of 2022 claiming salary for the
period 02.03.2001 to 31.10.2001, salary
and other allowances for the period
16.05.1998 to 01.03.2001, assured carrier
progression for the year 2003 and some
other dues. However, after advancing
submissions at some length in support of
5 All. Urmila Devi Pal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1109
the writ petition, the learned counsel for the
petitioner confined his prayer for issuance
of a direction to the Director, Bal Vikas
Seva Evam Pushtahar to consider and
decide the petitioner's representation dated
10.08.2022. The Hon'ble Single Judge
disposed off the writ petition without
entering into the merits of the case by
directing the Director, Bal Vikas Seva
Evam Pushtahar to consider and decide the
petitioner's
representation
dated
10.08.2022 with a reasoned and speaking
order, in accordance with law.

8. In compliance of the aforesaid
order, the Director, Bal Vikas Seva Evam
Pushtahar
decided
the
petitioner's
representation by a detailed and reasoned
order dated 13.01.2023.

9. Regarding the petitioner's claim for
payment
of
salary
for
the
period
20.06.2005 to 26.10.2006, it has been
stated that by means of a letter dated
24.04.2007 sent by the Directorate, the
petitioner had been informed that in case
she submits a leave application for the
period of her absence, the same will be
considered in accordance with the rules but
the petitioner did not submit any leave
application and, therefore, she was not
entitled to receive salary of the period of
her absence without leave.

10. Regarding petitioner's claim for
payment
of
salary
for
the
period
02.03.2001 to 31.10.2001, it has been
stated that Rs.17,120/- had been paid to the
petitioner for the dates on which she had
attended her duties during the period
between March, 2001 to August, 2001, as
against her claim for payment of salary for
8 days in March, 2001, 7 days in April,
2001, 29 days in March, 2001, 2 days in
June, 2001, 9 days in July, 2001 and 26
days in August, 2001 and for the rest of the
days, when she was unauthorizedly absent
without any prior information / leave
application, she was not entitled to receive
payment of salary.

11. Regarding the petitioner's claim
for payment of salary for the period of her
suspension, the Director has stated that as
per a letter dated 04.01.2023 sent by the
District Program Officer, Barabanki, the
arrears of salary for the period of
suspension (16.05.1998 to 09.02.2001) has
been paid to the petitioner by Child
Development
Project,
Pure
Dalai,
Barabanki.

12. In respect of the petitioner's claim
for payment of salary of two days in
September, 2012 and three days in May,
2013 it has been stated that the petitioner
was absent without any information on the
aforesaid days and therefore her claim for
payment of salary was not found to be
proper.

13. Regarding the petitioner's claim
for payment of arrears of increment in
salary it was stated in the order that
Rs.6,39,057/- only has been paid to her
through
Token
No.464142024
dated
10.01.2023 and the salary for the days on
which the petitioner remained absent
without leave, was not paid to her.

14. After the aforesaid detailed
discussion, the order states that the
petitioner remained unauthorizedly absent
for 23 days between 01.03.2001 to
23.03.2001, for 61 days in the year 200102, for 276 days in the year 2005-06, for
209 days in the financial year 2006-07, for
two days in the financial year 2012-13 and
for 30 days in financial year 2013-14. Thus,
the petitioner remained unauthorizedly
1110 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
absent from her duties for a total of 665
days in her service tenure, without
obtaining any kind of leave and, therefore,
her service was not continuous and she is
not entitled to claim the Assured Carrier
Progression (ACP) benefit.

15. The aforesaid order dated
13.01.2023
was
challenged
by
the
petitioner by filing Writ A No. 2924 of
2023. The Hon'ble Single Judge dismissed
the writ petition by means of a judgment
and order dated 19.04.2023, which is under
challenge in this special appeal. The
Hon'ble Single Judge held that the order
passed by the Director narrates the facts
and circumstances of the case and reasons
for non-payment of salary etc. and this
court would not substitute the reasoning
given in the impugned order, which takes
notice of the fact that the petitioner had
remained unauthorizedly absent from duty
for 665 days.

16. The Hon'ble Single Judge held
that earlier the petitioner had filed multiple
writ petitions and the subsequent writ
petition filed by the petitioner suffers from
gross delay and latches, as it had been filed
27 years after accrual of the alleged cause
of action. The Hon'ble Single Judge further
held that the writ petition had been filed in
respect of the stale claim which the
petitioner
chose
not
to
raise
while
approaching this court on two earlier
occasions by filing two writ petitions. The
Hon'ble Single Judge held that the writ
petition had been filed raising monetary
claims and such a writ petition could not be
entertained 27 years after accrual of the
cause of action. The Hon'ble Single Judge
observed that the writ petition was liable to
be dismissed with exemplary cost but the
court
refrained
from
imposing
cost,
keeping in view the fact that the petitioner
is a Class III employee, who is on the verge
of retirement.

17. Sri O. P. M. Tripathi, the learned
counsel for the appellant has submitted that
non-payment of service related dues is a
continuing cause of action and, therefore,
the writ petition did not suffer from any
delay or latches. He has relied upon two
judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court
in the cases of Tukaram Kana Joshi and
others Vs. M.I.D.C.: (2013) 1 SCC 353 &
Sukh Dutt Ratra and another Vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh and others: (2022) 7
SCC 508.

18. In Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of
H.P. (Supra), the petitioners' land was
utilized by the respondent State for
construction of a Road in the year 19721973,
without
any
land
acquisition
proceedings and without payment of any
compensation.Pursuant to a judgment by
the
Himachal
Pradesh
High
Court
inDevender Singhv.State of H.P., CWP No.
816 of 1992 directing the State to initiate
land acquisition proceedings, a Notification
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 was issued on 16-10-2001 and
the award was passed on 20-12-2001.
Proceedings under Section 18 of the Act for
enhancement
of
compensation
were
initiated by ten neighbouring land owners,
whose lands were similarly utilised for the
construction of the same road and an award
dated 4-10-2005 was passed by the
Reference Court in their favour. This led
the appellants to file a writ petition before
the
High
Court
in
2011,
seeking
compensation for the subject land or
initiation of acquisition proceedings. The
High Court held that the matter involved
disputed questions of law and fact for
determination on the starting point of
limitation, which could not be adjudicated
5 All. Urmila Devi Pal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1111
in writ proceedings. The writ petition was
disposed of, with liberty to file a civil suit
in accordance with law. In the aforesaid
background, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that: -

"19.The facts of the present case
reveal that the State has, in a clandestine
and arbitrary manner, actively tried to limit
disbursal of compensation as required by
law, only to those for which it was
specifically prodded by the courts, rather
than to all those who are entitled. This
arbitrary action, which is also violative of
the appellants' prevailing Article 31 right
(at
the
time
of
cause
of
action),
undoubtedly warranted consideration, and
intervention by the High Court, under its
Article 226 jurisdiction."

19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
referred to the following passage from
Tukaram
Kana
Joshiv.Maharashtra
Industrial Development Corpn. (MIDC),
(Supra), wherein the Court was dealing
with a similar fact situation: -

"11.There are authorities which state
that delay and laches extinguish the right
to put forth a claim. Most of these
authorities
pertain
to
service
jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a
wrong done to them decades ago, recovery
of statutory dues, claim for educational
facilities and other categories of similar
cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a
few authorities that lay down that delay
and laches debar a citizen from seeking
remedy, even if his fundamental right has
been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of
the Constitution, the case at hand deals
with a different scenario altogether. The
functionaries of the State took over
possession of the land belonging to the
appellants without any sanction of law.
The appellants had asked repeatedly for
grant of the benefit of compensation. The
State must either comply with the procedure
laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or
any other permissible statutory mode."

(Emphasis supplied)

20. The aforesaid observations were
made keeping in view the facts of the cases
that government had utilized the land of the
petitioners
without
payment
of
compensation. The right to property is a
constitutional right protected by Article
300-A of the Constitution of India and,
therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had
held that the State could not deprive a
citizen of his property without sanction of
law and in such circumstances, the delay in
initiating the litigation would not be an
absolute
impediment.
However,
the
Hon'ble Supreme Court explicitly observed
that there are authorities pertaining to
service jurisprudence which state that delay
and laches extinguish the right to put forth
a claim.

21. In Union of India v. Tarsem
Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that: -

"7.To summarise, normally, a belated
service related claim will be rejected on
the ground of delay and laches (where
remedy is sought by filing a writ petition)
or limitation (where remedy is sought by an
application to the Administrative Tribunal).
One of the exceptions to the said rule is
cases relating to a continuing wrong.
Where a service related claim is based on a
continuing wrong, relief can be granted
even if there is a long delay in seeking
remedy, with reference to the date on which
the continuing wrong commenced, if such
continuing wrong creates a continuing
source of injury. But there is an exception
1112 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
to the exception. If the grievance is in
respect of any order or administrative
decision which related to or affected
several others also, and if the reopening of
the issue would affect the settled rights of
third parties, then the claim will not be
entertained. For example, if the issue
relates to payment or refixation of pay or
pension, relief may be granted in spite of
delay as it does not affect the rights of third
parties. But if the claim involved issues
relating to seniority or promotion, etc.,
affecting others, delay would render the
claim
stale
and
doctrine
of
laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as
the consequential relief of recovery of
arrears for a past period is concerned, the
principles relating to recurring/successive
wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the
High Courts will restrict the consequential
relief relating to arrears normally to a
period of three years prior to the date of
filing of the writ petition."

 (Emphasis supplied)

22. The learned Counsel for the
appellant has submitted that the Writ
Petition was filed in respect of a continuing
cause of action and, therefore, it could not
have been dismissed on the ground of
delay. However, as has already been noted
above, the Writ Petition was filed claiming
certain arrears of salary, which was not paid
on
the
ground
of
the
petitioner's
unauthorised absence and it is not a
continuing cause of action and we do not
find merit in the aforesaid submission of
the learned Counsel for the petitioner.

23. Sri O. P. M. Tripathi, the learned
counsel
for
the
appellant
has
next
submitted that she had made several
representations for payment of salary and
as she had been pursuing her grievances
with
the
authorities
by
making
representations, it cannot be said that the
writ petition suffers from delay and latches.
He has further submitted that as by means
of the order dated 22.09.2022, passed in
Writ-A No.6123 of 2022, this court had
directed the Director, Bal Vikas Seva Evam
Pushtahar to consider and decide her
representation
dated
10.08.2022,
the
subsequent writ petition filed by her
challenging the order of rejection of her
representation and claiming payment of
salary is not barred by delay.

24. The aforesaid submission also
does not have any merit because it is settled
law that although there is no limitation
prescribed for filing a writ petition, the
same should necessarily be filed with
reasonable promptitude and merely by
making
repetitive
representations,
the
conduct of the appellant in not approaching
the Court for redressal of her grievance for
a very long period, which in the present
case is more than two decades, cannot be
justified
and
making
repetitive
representations would not dilute the effect
of undue delay in filing the writ petition
and will not create any fresh cause of
action.

25. In the case of State of Uttaranchal and
another Vs. Sri Shiv Charan Singh
Bhandari and others: 2013 (12) SCC 179
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "it is
clear as crystal that even if the court or
tribunal
directs
for
consideration
of
representations relating to a stale claim or
dead grievance it does not give rise to a
fresh cause of action. The dead cause of
action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly,
a mere submission of representation to the
competent authority does not arrest time."

26. The aforesaid decision has been
relied upon by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
5 All. Bhawani Prasad Sahu & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1113
in a recent judgment in the case of The
State of West Bengal Vs. Debabrata Tiwari
and others: 2023 SCC OnLine 219, where
after submitting an application in the year
2005-06 the petitioners did nothing further
to pursue the matter for a period of ten
years. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that
such prolonged delay in approaching the
High Court may be regarded as a waiver of
a remedy and such a delay would disentitle
the writ petitioners to the discretionary
relief under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India.

27. In the present case, the appellant
had approached this court on two occasions
earlier by filing two writ petitions i.e. Writ
Petition No. 4664 (S/S) of 2005 and Writ
Petition No. 4848 (S/S) of 2014 but she
chose not to raise her grievances of nonpayment of salary for some period between
the years 1998 to 2001, which was raised
by her in Writ A No. 6123 of 2022,
although cause of action for the same had
already accrued to her. The writ petition
filed for the reliefs which could have been
claimed by the appellant while filing the
earlier writ petitions and which were not
claimed by her, would be clearly hit by the
principles contained in Order II Rule 2 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

28. Even at the time of hearing of the
aforesaid writ petition, the learned counsel
for the appellant chose not to press for the
reliefs claimed in the writ petition and he
confined his prayer for a direction for
decision of the appellant's representation.
The representation has accordingly been
decided by a reasoned and speaking order.
We find ourselves in complete agreement
with the view taken by the Hon'ble Single
Judge that this court would not substitute
the reasoning given by the Director in the
impugned order.

29. We are also in agreement with the
reason given by Hon'ble Single Judge for
dismissing the writ petition that it had
been filed with gross delay and as such it
was liable to be dismissed for this reason
also.

30. Therefore, we are not persuaded
to take any view other than the view taken
by Hon'ble Single Judge that the writ
petition filed by the petitioner in the year
2003 regarding her grievances against nonpayment of salary for various intermittent
periods starting from the period 1998,
suffers from gross delay and latches and
also that the order under challenge in the
writ petition was a well reasoned order and
this
court
would not
substitute
the
reasoning given by the Director in the
order.

31. In view of the aforesaid
discussions, we are of the considered
opinion that the special appeal lacks merit
which is accordingly dismissed. However,
there will be no order as to the costs.
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(2023) 5 ILRA 1113
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 17.05.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DINESH KUMAR SINGH, J.

Writ-A No. 4476 of 2019
with other connected cases

Bhawani Prasad Sahu & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Amrendra Nath Tripathi, Ashutosh Shahi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.