# Urmila Devi v. State Of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 8 ILRA 760
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-08-13
- **Case number:** Writ B No. 746 of 2025
- **Bench:** Alok Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/urmila-devi-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53757
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

C.S.C., Mukesh Sharma, Satendra Nath Rai

Issue for Consideration
whether the petitioner, having divested
herself of the entire disputed land through
sale deed and gift deed, retained any locus
standi to maintain the writ petition.

Headnotes
Property Law - U.P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1950 - Section 176
- Partition of Holding - Locus Standi -
Alienation of Entire Interest - Effect on
Continuation of Litigation - Right or
Interest in Disputed Property - Once a
petitioner has sold or otherwise divested
all rights in the property in dispute, he
becomes a stranger to the lis and cannot
continue litigation in respect thereof -
Right to Sue - Requirement of Subsisting
Interest - Only a person having a direct or
substantial interest in the subject matter
can prosecute or defend proceedings.
Held: Once the petitioner has been divested all
the rights vested in the property he would be
stranger to the said dispute and accordingly will
not have any right to litigate with regard to the
said property - Had the petitioner retained even
a fractional interest in the said property, such
retention would have been adequate to sustain
his participation in the proceedings - But,
having divested himself of the entire property,
the petitioner neither stands to gain nor to
suffer any loss by the outcome of the litigation -
The principle that a litigant must demonstrate a
subsisting right in the subject matter of dispute
to maintain a proceeding has been consistently
affirmed by the Courts - Applying the above
principles, petitioner lacked locus standi - writ
petition
not
maintainable.

(Paras
5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12) (E-7)

Case Law Cited
Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC
524; K. Venkatachalam v. A. Swamickan,
(1999) 4 SCC 526; Ram Swarup v. Board of
Revenue, AIR 1966 All 623; Usha Sinha v.
Dina Ram & Ors., (2008) 7 SCC 144; Ram
Pyare Verma v. Third Addl. District Judge,
Faizabad, 2015 (128) RD 273

List of Acts
Constitution of India; U.P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1950

List of Keywords
Divestment of property; locus standi; subsisting
right; partition; co-sharers; sale deed; gift deed;
disputed property; mutation; maintainability;
Subsequent transferee; stranger

Case Arising From
Order dated 17.3.2020 passed by Sub Divisional
Magistrate, Utraula, District Balrampur
Appellate order passed by the Additional
Commissioner, Administration-II, Devi Patan
Mandal, Gonda dated 20.11.2024
Order dated 04.07.2025, passed by the Board of
Revenue

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner: Ashok Kumar Singh,
Savitri Arya, Surya Prakash.
Advs. for the Respondents: C.S.C., Mukesh
Sharma, Satendra Nath Rai.

## Text

760 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
property, then, in case they are not in
excess of their share, prepare the Kurras on
the basis of such possession as per sub Rule
(e) of Rule 109 (5) of the Rules, 2016.

38. The Lekhpal, if he finds that the
conditions contained in sub rules (g) and (e) are
not applicable shall thereafter proceed to partition
the property considering the conditions laid
down in sub Rules (a), (b), (c), (d), and (f) of rule
109 (5) of the Rules, 2016.

39. This Court, upon considering various
judgments of the Supreme Court as well as
provisions of the Revenue Court Rules, is of the
considered opinion that primacy has to be given
to family settlement, which has been acted upon,
and the co-tenure holders are in possession of
their respective shares. In case there is no dispute
between the parties with regard to the family
settlement, the Kurras has to be prepared to take
into consideration the family settlement, which is
duly recognised in sub Rule (g) of Rule 109 (5)
of the Rules, 2016.

40. Applying the aforementioned principle
to the present case, it is evident that the trial court
has appropriately taken into account the fact that
the parties are in possession of their respective
shares pursuant to a family settlement, under
which the land was equally divided among the
three sons of Razzaq. In addition, the court
noted that three sale deeds had been executed
between the parties, each describing the
disputed land with precise boundaries. This
clearly indicates that the parties were ad
idem regarding the partition of the land by
metes and bounds, and that there was no
dispute concerning the validity of the
family settlement, and therefore proceeded
to partition the property in terms of the
Vahami Batwara. It is relevant to note that
even the plaintiff at no stage had assailed
the validity or existence of the Vahami
Batwara.

41. Furthermore, the plaintiff himself had
purchased the share of his brother, Abdul
Hassan, through a registered sale deed dated
19/09/1998. The property acquired was distinctly
described with defined boundaries, further
reinforcing the conclusion that each co-tenure
holder is in possession of his respective share.

42. The 2nd appellate court, which is the
Board of Revenue, had clearly failed to
appreciate the fact of partition having already
taken place on the basis of an oral family
settlement. It further fell into error when they
found a lacuna in the judgment of the trial court,
having ignored the provisions of sub-Rules (a),
(b), (c), (d), and (f) of Rule 109 (5) of the Rules,
2016. As we have already held, in case it is
found that there has been a family settlement
between the co-tenure holder, then primacy has
to be given to such a settlement, the property
ought to be partitioned on the basis of the same,
in case the same has been arrived at bonafidely.

43. In light of the above, the writ petition is
allowed, the judgment of the Board of Revenue
dated 17/06/25 is set aside, and the judgments of
the Sub Divisional Magistrate dated 31/08/2020
and the 1st appellate Court dated 21/12/2021 are
affirmed.
----------
(2025) 8 ILRA 760
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 13.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Writ B No. 746 of 2025

Urmila Devi ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
8 All. Urmila Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
761
Ashok Kumar Singh, Savitri Arya, Surya
Prakash

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Mukesh Sharma, Satendra Nath Rai

Issue for Consideration
whether the petitioner, having divested
herself of the entire disputed land through
sale deed and gift deed, retained any locus
standi to maintain the writ petition.

Headnotes
Property Law - U.P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1950 - Section 176
- Partition of Holding - Locus Standi -
Alienation of Entire Interest - Effect on
Continuation of Litigation - Right or
Interest in Disputed Property - Once a
petitioner has sold or otherwise divested
all rights in the property in dispute, he
becomes a stranger to the lis and cannot
continue litigation in respect thereof -
Right to Sue - Requirement of Subsisting
Interest - Only a person having a direct or
substantial interest in the subject matter
can prosecute or defend proceedings.
Held: Once the petitioner has been divested all
the rights vested in the property he would be
stranger to the said dispute and accordingly will
not have any right to litigate with regard to the
said property - Had the petitioner retained even
a fractional interest in the said property, such
retention would have been adequate to sustain
his participation in the proceedings - But,
having divested himself of the entire property,
the petitioner neither stands to gain nor to
suffer any loss by the outcome of the litigation -
The principle that a litigant must demonstrate a
subsisting right in the subject matter of dispute
to maintain a proceeding has been consistently
affirmed by the Courts - Applying the above
principles, petitioner lacked locus standi - writ
petition
not
maintainable.

(Paras
5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12) (E-7)

Case Law Cited
Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC
524; K. Venkatachalam v. A. Swamickan,
(1999) 4 SCC 526; Ram Swarup v. Board of
Revenue, AIR 1966 All 623; Usha Sinha v.
Dina Ram & Ors., (2008) 7 SCC 144; Ram
Pyare Verma v. Third Addl. District Judge,
Faizabad, 2015 (128) RD 273

List of Acts
Constitution of India; U.P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1950

List of Keywords
Divestment of property; locus standi; subsisting
right; partition; co-sharers; sale deed; gift deed;
disputed property; mutation; maintainability;
Subsequent transferee; stranger

Case Arising From
Order dated 17.3.2020 passed by Sub Divisional
Magistrate, Utraula, District Balrampur
Appellate order passed by the Additional
Commissioner, Administration-II, Devi Patan
Mandal, Gonda dated 20.11.2024
Order dated 04.07.2025, passed by the Board of
Revenue

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner: Ashok Kumar Singh,
Savitri Arya, Surya Prakash.
Advs. for the Respondents: C.S.C., Mukesh
Sharma, Satendra Nath Rai.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Mathur, J.)

1. Heard Shri Ashok Kumar Singh
'Pankaj', learned counsel for the petitioner,
learned Standing Counsel for respondents
no. 1 to 4, Shri Satendra Nath Rai, learned
counsel for respondents no. 5 to 7 and Shri
Mukesh Sharma, learned counsel for
respondent no.8.

2. In view of the order proposed to be
passed, notice to respondent no. 9 is
dispensed with.

3. By means of present writ petition,
the petitioner has challenged the order
dated 17.3.2020 passed by Sub Divisional
Magistrate, Utraula, District Balrampur as
well as the appellate order passed by the
Additional Commissioner, Administration-
762 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
II, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda dated
20.11.2024 and order dated 04.07.2025,
passed by the Board of Revenue, wherein
all the three orders the matter has been
decided against the petitioner.

4. The facts in brief, as stated in the
writ petition, are that the petitioner had
purchased the half of the land of Gata No.
280 Min. through a registered sale deed on
18.05.1991 from the recorded tenure
holder, Prameshwari and his name was
duly mutated in the revenue records. The
opposite parties no. 5 to 7 are the
successor in interest of the recorded tenure
holder and undoubtedly are owners of the
remaining portion of Gata No. 280 and in
the aforesaid circumstances, the suit for
partition for half of the land was filed
before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, under
Section 176 of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. At
the stage of preparation of Kura (share)
objections were filed by the petitioner and a
prayer was made to divide the land in such
a manner that both the co-sharers have
equal land of P.W.D. Road side, which is
of higher value land. The Sub Divisional
Magistrate decided the matter in favour of
respondents no. 5 to 7 rejecting the prayer
made by the petitioner. By means of order
dated 17.3.2020 the petitioner thereafter,
filed an application for recall of the order
dated 17.3.2020, which was also rejected
and thereafter filed an appeal before the
Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda,
which was also rejected on 20.11.2024. A
Second Appeal was filed before the Board
of Revenue, which has also been rejected
by means of the impugned order dated
4.7.2025. All the aforesaid orders have
been assailed in the present writ petition.

5. At the very outset learned counsel
for the petitioner has submitted that the
petitioner does not have any right or
interest in the disputed property, in as
much as, he has gifted 0.2160 hectare of
land by means of a registered sale deed on
2.6.2021 and the remaining portion of the
land i.e. 0.107 hectare by means of a sale
deed on 19.7.2021. He submits that after
divesting with the aforesaid portion of the
land no further portion remains with the
petitioner and accordingly he has no right
to further litigate in the said matter after
that he has divested himself in the said
property.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has opposed the objection made by the
respondents, he does not firstly dispute the
said fact that the entire portion of land
stands divested by sale deed dated
19.7.2021 and gift deed dated 2.6.2021 but
submits that despite the aforesaid fact, the
petitioner still has right to pursue his legal
remedies. In support of his submission he
has relied upon the judgment in the case of
Ram Chander Vs. Deputy Director of
Cosmopolitan,
passed
in
Case
Consolidation No. 47 of 2013. In the said
judgment he has relied upon the judgment
which was quoted therein in the case of
Ram
Pyare
Verma
Versus
Third
Additional District Judge, Faizabad, 2015
(128) RD 273; wherein he has held that
impleadment of the purchaser who had
bought the property during the pendency of
the suit is not necessary. The purchaser
during the pendency of the lis steps into the
shoes of the original defendant/ judgement
debtor. It is only the aforesaid judgment
was quoted but the petitioner could not
reduced the entire judgment even perusal of
the aforesaid clearly indicates that the same
does not apply in the case of the petitioner,
in as much as, it is clearly held that the
purchaser steps into the shoes of the
original defendant and accordingly the
proceedings if any, can be continued after
8 All. Urmila Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
763
impleading the subsequent purchaser. He
further relied upon another judgment in the
case of Usha Sinha Vs. Dina Ram and
others; (2008)7 Supreme Court Cases 144,
which was the matter when the question
before the Court was pertaining to an
execution of a decree and which case also
does not apply to the facts of the present
case and it is clearly distinguishable.

7. Considering the objections raised by
the respondents, it is noticed that once the
petitioner has been divested all the rights
vested in the property he would be stranger
to the said dispute and accordingly will not
have any right to litigate with regard to the
said
property.

One
of
the
basic
consideration for any person in any
litigation in his right or interest in the
disputed property. Even if the right is
removed still a person has a right to litigate
even if he has contingent right he can
contest and participate in the litigation
which is distinguishable from a person
who has absolutely no right in the property
and initially had a right but had
subsequently divested such a right. In the
present case there is no dispute that the
petitioner has sold of entire portion of the
disputed property and does not have any
right or interest in the said land. Even if a
small portion had been retained by the
petitioner then he would have sufficient
interest to continue with the litigation but
we are not persuaded by the argument of
the petitioner that despite selling of and
divesting the entire land, he would continue
with the litigation.

8. In the present case, it is an admitted
position that the petitioner has transferred
the whole of his share in the disputed land
and no portion thereof remains vested in
him. Had the petitioner retained even a
fractional interest in the said property, such
retention would have been adequate to
sustain his participation in the proceedings.
But, having divested himself of the entire
property, the petitioner neither stands to
gain nor to suffer any loss by the outcome
of the litigation. In such a situation, the
only person competent to prosecute or
defend the proceedings would be the
transferee, or any person lawfully stepping
into the shoes of the petitioner, unless it is
shown that some residual right or interest
continues to subsist in favour of the
petitioner.

9. The principle that a litigant must
demonstrate a subsisting right in the subject
matter o dispute to maintain a proceeding
has been consistently affirmed by the
Courts.

In
Ramesh
Hirachand
Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of
Greater Bombay [(19920)2 SCC 524], the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the
primary test for determining locus standi is
whether the person approaching the Court
has a direct or substantial interest in the
outcome of the litigation. Similarly, in K.
Venkatachalam v. A Swamickan [(1999)4
SCC 526], it was emphasized that a person
who becomes a stranger to the subject
matter, having divested all interest therein,
cannot be permitted to prosecute the
proceedings. The Allahabad High Court in
Ram Swarup v. Board of Revenue [AIR
1966 All 623] reiterated that once a party
has completely alienated his interest in the
disputed land, the proper course is for the
transferee or assignee to be substituted in
his place, as the transferor ceases to have
any enforceable right.

10. Applying the above principles, it is
clear that since the petitioner has sold away
the entire disputed property, he lacks the
necessary locus standi to continue with the
present proceedings.
764 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

11. In the aforesaid circumstances, this
Court is of the view that once the petitioner
has sold of and divested upon the disputed
property, he cannot persuade the court to
decide any lis in the dispute and for this
reason, this Court is of the considered view
that the petitioner does not have any right
to continue the litigation subsequent to
divesting of the said land.

12. In the light of the above, I find that
this petition is not maintainable at the
behest of the petitioner and consequently
dismissed.
----------
(2025) 8 ILRA 764
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH SHYAM
SHAMSHERY, J.

Writ B No. 8309 of 1978

Azimullah & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Dost Mohammad & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
S.P. Misra, O.P. Misra, Ramesh Chandra,
Shashi Prakash Misra

Counsel for the Respondents:
Ashok Tripathi, H.S.N. Tripathi, P.S. Tiwari,
Prem Shanker Tripathi, S.C.

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to two objections under S. 9-A
(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of
Holdings Act, 1953, and whether the Deputy
Director of Consolidation exceeded jurisdiction
under S. 48 by disturbing concurrent findings of
the Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer
(Consolidation) regarding ownership and cotenancy rights.
Headnotes
Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (U.P.)
- Ss. 9-A (2), 48 - Jurisdiction of Deputy
Director of Consolidation - Concurrent
findings - Interference without finding of
perversity - Held, unsustainable - Consent
Decree (dated 5.10.1957) - Decree passed
by a Judicial Officer cannot be set-aside
by Deputy Director of Consolidation as
well as no contrary interpretation could be
taken - Finding based on assumption -
beyond
jurisdiction
-
Remand
-
Contradictory directions - One order
granting
1/5th
share
and
another
remanding on sole tenancy claim - Held,
legally not sustainable - Consolidation
proceedings - Delay of 48 years - No
remand warranted at belated stage -
Court may decide finally to end prolonged
litigation.
Held: Deputy Director of Consolidation has wide
powers, but it is not expected by him to disturb
finding of facts and concurrent findings recorded
by Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer
of Consolidation, except when the findings are
perverse i.e. not supported by evidence brought
on record - Consolidation Officer and Settlement
Officer
(Consolidation)
rightly
relied
on
Compromise Decree dated 5.10.1957, declaring
Ali Hasan as Bhumidhar - Deputy Director's
finding rejecting the decree was based merely
on assumption and without evidence - thus
exceeding jurisdiction - Remand regarding Smt.
Dukhni's inheritance claim was without basis, as
concurrent finding that she failed to prove
herself
daughter
of
Marchia
remained
undisturbed - Directions were contradictory -
granting 1/5th share to Dost Mohammad and
simultaneously remanding for Smt. Dukhni's
sole tenancy - hence unsustainable - After 48
years, remand not in interest of justice;
concurrent findings restored - Petition allowed -
Impugned
order
of
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation set aside - legal consequence to
follow. (Paras 22,23,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32)
(E-7)

Case Law Cited
Sheo Nand v. Deputy Director of Consolidation,
Allahabad, (2000) 3 SCC 103

List of Acts