# Uttar Pradesh and others v. Premlata) decided

- **Citation:** (2021) 11 ILRA 1068
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-11-10
- **Bench:** Saurabh Lavania
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/uttar-pradesh-and-others-v-premlata-decided-46480
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

overruling - where the question of law has
been declare & settled by the Courts, then it
has to be held that the said question of law
was in existence right from day one -
decision
of
Apex
Court
enunciating
a
principle of law is applicable to all cases
irrespective of its stage of pendency because
it is assumed that what is enunciated by the
Supreme Court is, in fact, the law from
inception - Prospective operation is only
exception to this general rule - Under the
doctrine of "prospective overruling" the law
declared by the Court applies to the cases
arising in future only and its applicability to
the cases which have attained finality is
saved - principle of prospective overruling
would not apply in respect of the judgment
passed by the Supreme Court unless and until
it is expressly so mentioned in the judgment
- However, where the rights of a party have
been considered and declared, then the said
proceedings cannot be reopened on the
ground that the judgment on the basis of
which, the rights were declared, has been
overruled . (para 8, 9, 12, 14, 16, 17)

Held - though the date of accident is 07.03.2013 but
still the judgment passed in the case of National
Insurance Company Ltd. Vs Pranay Sethi & ors.,
which is of the year 2017, is applicable in the present
first appeal from order which is continuation of
original proceedings

B. Civil Law - Accident claim - Motor Vehicles
Act,1988 - Enhancement of compensation -
Deceased was 20 years old at the time of
accident on 07.03.2013 & was black smith
when he was hit by Vehicle and succumbed
to the injuries - Tribunal assumed notional
income to be Rs. 3,000/- per month, based
upon the age of father of the deceased
applied the multiplier of 11, No amount
towards future prospects was provided by
the
Tribunal
&
under
the
head(s)
of
miscellaneous expenses and loss of estate
Tribunal awarded Rs. 5000/- each - Held -
Court held notional income of the deceased
to be Rs. 5,000/- per month- Future
prospects at 40% as deceased was selfemployed & below 40 years - multiplier of 18
applied as the age of the deceased was 20

## Text

_Characters 0–39,870 of 59,713. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39870 for what follows._

1068 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
public authorities are at liberty to follow any other
procedure or relax the qualifications laid down by
the rules for the post. However, to this general rule
which is to be followed strictly in every case, there
are some exceptions carved out in the interests of
justice and to meet certain contingencies. One such
exception is in favour of the dependants of an
employee dying in harness and leaving his family
in penury and without any means of livelihood. In
such cases, out of pure humanitarian consideration
taking into consideration the fact that unless some
source of livelihood is provided, the family would
not be able to make both ends meet, a provision is
made in the rules to provide gainful employment
to one of the dependants of the deceased who may
be eligible for such employment. The whole object
of granting compassionate employment is thus to
enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. ...
What is further, mere death of an employee in
harness does not entitle his family to such source
of livelihood. The Government or the public
authority concerned has to examine the financial
condition of the family of the deceased, and it is
only if it is satisfied, that but for the provision of
employment, the family will not be able to meet
the crisis that a job is to be offered to the eligible
member of the family. (emphasis added)

10. The Court further referring to its earlier
decision in Mumtaz Yunus Mulani Vs. State of
Maharashtra's case (surpa), in para 26,
observed:

"26. The judgment of a Bench of two Judges
in Mumtaz Yunus Mulani v. State of
Maharashtra (2008) 11 SCC 384 has adopted the
principle that appointment on compassionate
grounds is not a source of recruitment, but a means
to enable the family of the deceased to get over a
sudden financial crisis. The financial position of
the family would need to be evaluated on the basis
of the provisions contained in the scheme."

11. Hon'ble Supreme Court very recently in
Civil Appeal No. 6003 of 2021 (The State of
Uttar Pradesh and others Vs. Premlata) decided
on October 5, 2021, in para 10 of the judgment,
referring to the above authorities on the subject,
said as under:

"10. Thus as per the law laid down by this
court in the aforesaid decisions, compassionate
appointment is an exception to the general rule of
appointment in the public services and is in
favour of the dependents of a deceased dying in
harness and leaving his family in penury and
without any means of livelihood, and in such
cases, out of pure humanitarian consideration
taking into consideration the fact that unless some
source of livelihood is provided, the family would
not be able to make both ends meet, a provision is
made in the rules to provide gainful employment
to one of the dependants of the deceased who
may be eligible for such employment. The whole
object of granting compassionate employment is
thus to enable the family to tide over the sudden
crisis.

 (emphasis added)

12. Taking into account the above binding
precedents and in view of the discussions made
hereinabove, we do not find any error in the
order passed by learned Single Judge, impugned
herein, so as to warrant interference.

13. The appeal lacks merits and is,
accordingly, dismissed.
----------
(2021)12ILR A1068
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 10.11.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH LAVANIA, J.

First Appeal From Order No. 71 of 2015

Dayal & Anr. ...Appellants
Versus
Sanjeev Batra & Anr. ...Respondents
11 All. Dayal & Anr. Vs. Sanjeev Batra & Anr.
1069
Counsel for the Appellants:
Balendru Shekhar, Prakash Chandra

Counsel for the Respondents:
Vashu Deo Mishra

A. Interpretation - Doctrine of prospective
overruling - where the question of law has
been declare & settled by the Courts, then it
has to be held that the said question of law
was in existence right from day one -
decision
of
Apex
Court
enunciating
a
principle of law is applicable to all cases
irrespective of its stage of pendency because
it is assumed that what is enunciated by the
Supreme Court is, in fact, the law from
inception - Prospective operation is only
exception to this general rule - Under the
doctrine of "prospective overruling" the law
declared by the Court applies to the cases
arising in future only and its applicability to
the cases which have attained finality is
saved - principle of prospective overruling
would not apply in respect of the judgment
passed by the Supreme Court unless and until
it is expressly so mentioned in the judgment
- However, where the rights of a party have
been considered and declared, then the said
proceedings cannot be reopened on the
ground that the judgment on the basis of
which, the rights were declared, has been
overruled . (para 8, 9, 12, 14, 16, 17)

Held - though the date of accident is 07.03.2013 but
still the judgment passed in the case of National
Insurance Company Ltd. Vs Pranay Sethi & ors.,
which is of the year 2017, is applicable in the present
first appeal from order which is continuation of
original proceedings

B. Civil Law - Accident claim - Motor Vehicles
Act,1988 - Enhancement of compensation -
Deceased was 20 years old at the time of
accident on 07.03.2013 & was black smith
when he was hit by Vehicle and succumbed
to the injuries - Tribunal assumed notional
income to be Rs. 3,000/- per month, based
upon the age of father of the deceased
applied the multiplier of 11, No amount
towards future prospects was provided by
the
Tribunal
&
under
the
head(s)
of
miscellaneous expenses and loss of estate
Tribunal awarded Rs. 5000/- each - Held -
Court held notional income of the deceased
to be Rs. 5,000/- per month- Future
prospects at 40% as deceased was selfemployed & below 40 years - multiplier of 18
applied as the age of the deceased was 20
years at the time of accident - Loss of estate
Rs 15000/- +Loss of Funeral expense Rs
15000/- + Loss of consortium to both
appellants Rs 40000/- +Rs 40000/- person
getting amount towards loss of consortium is
not entitled to compensation towards loss of
love and affection - interest @ 7%, from the
date of filing of claim petition till realization
(Para 34)

Allowed. (E-5)

Cases Relied on :

1. National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs Pranay Sethi
& ors. (2017) 16 SCC 680: 2017 ACJ 2700

2. Sarwan Kumar Vs Madan Lal Aggarwal (2003) 4
SCC 147

3. M.A. Murthy Vs St. of Karn. (2003) 7 SCC 517

4. K. Madhava Reddy Vs St. of A.P. (2014) 6 SCC 537

5. B.A. Linga Reddy Vs Karnataka State Transport
Authority (2015) 4 SCC 515

6. P.V. George Vs St. of Kerala (2007) 3 SCC 557

7. Bengal Iron Corpn. Vs CTO 1994 Supp (1) SCC 310

8. U.O.I. (E-5)s Madras Telephone SC & ST Social
Welfare Assn. (2006) 8 SCC 662

9. Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. Vs Nanu
Ram & ors. 2018 SCC Online SC 1546

10. Chameli Devi & ors. Vs Jivrail Mian & ors. 2019
(4) TAC 724 (S.C.)

11. Syed Sadiq & ors. Vs Divisional Manager, United
India Insurance Com. Ltd.; (2014) 2 SCC 735

12. Smt. Sheela Pandey W/O Late Surendra Kumar
Pandey & ors. Vs The New India Insurance Co. Ltd.
Bena Ghabar Branch & ors.s F.A.F.O. (D) No. 748 of
2011
1070 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
13. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs Resha Devi &
ors. 2017 (4) T.A.C. 288 (All.)

14. New India Assurance Company Limited Vs Smt.
Somwati & ors. 2020 (3) T.A.C. 711 (S.C.),

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania, J.)

1. Heard Sri Prakash Chandra, learned
counsel for the appellants and Sri Vashu Deo
Mishra, learned counsel for the respondents.

2. The present appeal has been filed for
enhancement of compensation awarded by Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal (in short "Tribunal"),
vide judgment and order dated 22.10.2014 passed
in Claim Petition No. 134 of 2013 (Dayal and
Others Versus Sanjeev Batra and Others).

3. Facts, in brief, as pleaded in claim petition
before the Tribunal, are that the deceased Heera
Lal, who was 20 years old at the time of accident,
on 07.03.2013 at about 06:30 AM while he was
waiting for some vehicle to reach Lucknow at a
place which is situated at Lucknow-Raebareli
National Highway near village Mastipur, P.S.-
Nigoha, Lucknow, was hit by Vehicle Tata Ace
bearing Registration No. UP-32 CZ-5364 and he
succumbed to the injuries sustained in the accident
and the driver of the Tata Ace was driving it rash
and negligently, are not in dispute. The plea that
the deceased was earning Rs. 5,000/- per month
was not accepted by the Tribunal. The Tribunal, on
the basis of notional income i.e. Rs. 3,000/- per
month, awarded the compensation. No amount
towards future prospects was provided by the
Tribunal. Under the head(s) of miscellaneous
expenses and loss of estate, the Tribunal awarded
Rs. 5000/- each.

4. For the purposes of adjudication of the
claim, the Tribunal framed the following issues:-

"1- D;k fnukad 07&3&2013 dks le; djhc
06%30 cts lqcg y[kuÅ jk;cjsyh jktekxZ ij] xzke eLrhiqj
ds lkeus Fkkuk fuxksgka] y[kuÅ esa VkVk ,sl okgu la[;k
;w0ih0&32@lh0tsM0&5364 ds pkyd us okgu ds bUrtkj
esa [kM+s ghjk yky dks VDdj ekj nh ftlls mls dkQh pksVsa
vkbZ ftlds QyLo:i ?kVukLFky ij gh mldh e`R;q gks
x;h?

2- D;k nq?kZVuk ds le; VkVk ,sl okgu la[;k
;w0ih0&32@lh0tsM0&5364 foi{kh la[;k&2] chek dEiuh ls
chfer Fkh?

3- D;k nq?kZVuk ds le; VkVk ,sl okgu la[;k
;w0ih0&32@lh0tsM0&5364 ds pkyd ds ikl oS/k ,oa
izHkkoh pkyu vuqKfIr Fkh?

4- D;k ;kphx.k {kfriwfr ds :i esa /kujkf'k ikus
ds vf/kdkjh gSa] ;fn gkWa rks fdruh vkSj fdlls ?"

5. There is no dispute regarding the
findings recorded by the Tribunal on issue nos. 1
to 3. The issue no. 4 which relates to grant of
compensation is in question before this Court.

6. While pressing the present appeal for
enhancement of compensation, the first issue
raised is to the effect that the Tribunal wrongly
applied the multiplier. Elaborating on this
aspect, learned Counsel for the appellants
submitted that multiplier of 18 ought to have
been applied after taking note of the age of the
deceased i.e. 20 years at the time of accident,
however, in the present case the multiplier of 11
has been applied by the Tribunal after
considering the age of the father of the deceased.
In this regard reliance has been placed on the
judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in
the case of National Insurance Company Ltd.
Vs. Pranay Sethi and Others; reported in
(2017) 16 SCC 680: 2017 ACJ 2700. Relevant
paragraph 59 reads as under:-

59. In view of the aforesaid analysis,
we proceed to record our conclusions:

59.1. The two-Judge Bench in Santosh
Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co.
Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ)
726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC
11 All. Dayal & Anr. Vs. Sanjeev Batra & Anr.
1071
(L&S) 167] should have been well advised to
refer the matter to a larger Bench as it was
taking a different view than what has been stated
in Sarla Verma[Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6
SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2
SCC (Cri) 1002] , a judgment by a coordinate
Bench. It is because a coordinate Bench of the
same strength cannot take a contrary view than
what has been held by another coordinate
Bench.

59.2. As Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh,
(2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 :
(2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S)
149] has not taken note of the decision in Reshma
Kumari [Reshma
Kumari v. Madan
Mohan,
(2013) 9 SCC 65 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 :
(2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 826] , which was delivered at
earlier
point
of
time,
the
decision
in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC
54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri)
817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] is not a binding
precedent.

59.3. While determining the income, an
addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of
the deceased towards future prospects, where the
deceased had a permanent job and was below the
age of 40 years, should be made. The addition
should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was
between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was
between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition
should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as
actual salary less tax.

59.4. In case the deceased was selfemployed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40%
of the established income should be the warrant
where the deceased was below the age of 40 years.
An addition of 25% where the deceased was
between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where
the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60
years should be regarded as the necessary method
of computation. The established income means the
income minus the tax component.

59.5. For
determination
of
the
multiplicand, the deduction for personal and
living expenses, the tribunals and the courts
shall be guided by paras 30 to 32 of Sarla
Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121
: (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri)
1002] which we have reproduced hereinbefore.

59.6. The selection of multiplier shall
be
as
indicated
in
the
Table
in Sarla
Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121
: (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri)
1002] read with para 42 of that judgment.

59.7. The age of the deceased should
be the basis for applying the multiplier.

59.8. Reasonable
figures
on
conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss
of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs
15,000, Rs 40,000 and Rs 15,000 respectively.
The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at
the rate of 10% in every three years."

7. On the issue of multiplier, the learned
Counsel for the Insurance company Sri Vashu
Deo Mishra, submitted that the judgment passed
in the case of Pranay Sethi (Supra), is of the
year 2017 and it is not applicable in the present
case as the accident in which Heeralal expired is
of year 2013. However, he could not dispute the
ratio of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Pranay Sethi
(Supra). The submission of learned Counsel for
the Insurance Company Sri Vashu Deo Mishra,
on the issue of applicability of law laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment
passed in the case of Pranay Sethi (Supra) is
fallacious and unsustainable as law is otherwise.

8. All the judgments apply retrospectively
except otherwise provided. It is well established
principle of law that the principle of prospective
operation of over ruling of judgment, does not
apply except where it is specifically mentioned.
1072 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
is normally assumed to be the law from
inception.
Prospective
operation
is
only
exception to this general rule. It is trite law that
where the question of law has been settled by the
Courts, then it has to held that the said question
of law was in existence right from the first day.

9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Sarwan Kumar vs. Madan Lal Aggarwal;
reported in (2003) 4 SCC 147 , observed as
under:-

"15. For the first time this Court
in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab accepted the
doctrine of "prospective overruling". It was
held: (AIR p. 1669, para 51)

"51. As this Court for the first time has
been called upon to apply the doctrine evolved
in
a
different
country
under
different
circumstances, we would like to move warily in
the beginning. We would lay down the following
propositions: (1) The doctrine of prospective
overruling can be invoked only in matters
arising under our Constitution; (2) it can be
applied only by the highest court of the country
i.e. the Supreme Court as it has the
constitutional
jurisdiction
to
declare
law
binding on all the courts in India; (3) the scope
of the retroactive operation of the law declared
by the Supreme Court superseding its ''earlier
decisions' is left to its discretion to be moulded
in accordance with the justice of the cause or
matter before it."

The
doctrine
of
"prospective
overruling" was initially made applicable to the
matters arising under the Constitution but we
understand the same has since been made
applicable to the matters arising under the
statutes as well. Under the doctrine of
"prospective overruling" the law declared by the
Court applies to the cases arising in future only
and its applicability to the cases which have
attained finality is saved because the repeal
would otherwise work hardship on those who
had trusted to its existence. Invocation of the
doctrine of "prospective overruling" is left to the
discretion of the Court to mould with the justice
of the cause or the matter before the Court. This
Court while deciding Gian Devi Anand case did
not hold that the law declared by it would be
prospective in operation. It was not for the High
Court to say that the law laid down by this Court
in Gian Devi Anand case would be prospective
in operation. If this is to be accepted then
conflicting rules can supposedly be laid down by
different
High
Courts
regarding
the
applicability of the law laid down by this Court
in Gian Devi Anand case or any other case.
Such a situation cannot be permitted to arise. In
the absence of any direction by this Court that
the rule laid down by this Court would be
prospective in operation, the finding recorded by
the High Court that the rule laid down in Gian
Devi Anand case by this Court would be
applicable to the cases arising from the date of
the judgment of this Court cannot be accepted
being erroneous."

10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of M.A. Murthy vs. State of Karnataka;
reported in (2003) 7 SCC 517, observed as
under:-

"8. The learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that the approach of the
High Court is erroneous as the law declared
by this Court is presumed to be the law at all
times. Normally, the decision of this Court
enunciating a principle of law is applicable
to all cases irrespective of its stage of
pendency because it is assumed that what is
enunciated by the Supreme Court is, in fact,
the law from inception. The doctrine of
prospective overruling which is a feature of
American jurisprudence is an exception to
the normal principle of law, was imported
and applied for the first time in L.C. Golak
11 All. Dayal & Anr. Vs. Sanjeev Batra & Anr.
1073
Nath v. State
of
Punjab.
InManaging
Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar the view was
adopted. Prospective overruling is a part of
the principles of constitutional canon of
interpretation and can be resorted to by this
Court while superseding the law declared by
it earlier. It is a device innovated to avoid
reopening of settled issues, to prevent
multiplicity of proceedings, and to avoid
uncertainty and avoidable litigation. In other
words, actions taken contrary to the law
declared prior to the date of declaration are
validated in larger public interest. The law as
declared applies to future cases. (See Ashok
Kumar
Gupta v. State
of
U.P. and Baburam v. C.C. Jacob.) It is for
this Court to indicate as to whether the
decision
in
question
will
operate
prospectively. In other words, there shall be
no prospective overruling, unless it is so
indicated in the particular decision. It is not
open to be held that the decision in a
particular case will be prospective in its
application by application of the doctrine of
prospective overruling. The doctrine of
binding
precedent
helps
in
promoting
certainty
and
consistency
in
judicial
decisions
and
enables
an
organic
development of the law besides providing
assurance to the individual as to the
consequences of transactions forming part of
the daily affairs. That being the position, the
High Court was in error by holding that the
judgment which operated on the date of
selection was operative and not the review
judgment in Ashok Kumar Sharma case No.
II. All the more so when the subsequent
judgment is by way of review of the first
judgment in which case there are no
judgments at all and the subsequent judgment
rendered on review petitions is the one and
only judgment rendered, effectively and for
all purposes, the earlier decision having been
erased
by
countenancing
the
review
applications. The impugned judgments of the
High Court are, therefore, set aside."

11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of K. Madhava Reddy vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh; reported in (2014) 6 SCC 537,
observed as under:-

"10. We have heard the learned
counsel for the parties at length. The doctrine of
prospective overruling has its origin in
American jurisprudence. It was first invoked in
this country in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab,
with this Court proceeding rather cautiously in
applying the doctrine, was conscious of the fact
that the doctrine had its origin in another
country and had been invoked in different
circumstances. The Court sounded a note of
caution in the application of the doctrine to the
Indian conditions as is evident from the
following passage appearing in Golak Nath
case wherein
this
Court
laid
down
the
parameters within which the power could be
exercised. This Court said: (AIR p. 1669, para
51)

"51. As this Court for the first time
has been called upon to apply the doctrine
evolved
in
a
different
country
under
different circumstances, we would like to
move warily in the beginning. We would lay
down the following propositions: (1) The
doctrine of prospective overruling can be
invoked only in matters arising under our
Constitution; (2) it can be applied only by
the highest court of the country i.e. the
Supreme Court as it has the constitutional
jurisdiction to declare law binding on all the
courts in India; (3) the scope of the
retroactive operation of the law declared by
the Supreme Court superseding its ''earlier
decisions' is left to its discretion to be
moulded in accordance with the justice of
the cause or matter before it."
1074 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

11. It is interesting to note that the
doctrine
has
not
remained
confined
to
overruling of earlier judicial decision on the
same issue as was understood in Golak Nath
case. In several later decisions, this Court has
invoked the doctrine in different situations
including in cases where an issue has been
examined and determined for the first time. For
instance in India Cement Ltd. v. State of T.N.,
this Court not only held that the levy of the cess
was ultra vires the power of the State
Legislature brought about by an amendment to
the Madras Village Panchayat Amendment Act,
1964 but also directed that the State would not
be liable for any refund of the amount of that
cess which has been paid or already collected.
In Orissa Cement Ltd. v. State of Orissa, this
Court drew a distinction between a declaration
regarding the invalidity of a provision and the
determination of the relief that should be
granted in consequence thereof. This Court held
that it was open to the Court to grant, mould or
restrict the relief in a manner most appropriate
to the situation before it in such a way so as to
advance the interest of justice."

12. Reference may also be made to the
decision of this Court in Union of India v.
Mohd. Ramzan Khan where non-furnishing of a
copy of the enquiry report was taken as violative
of the principles of natural justice and any
disciplinary action based on any such report
was held liable to be set aside. The declaration
of law as to the effect of non-supply of a copy of
the report was, however, made prospective so
that no punishment already imposed upon a
delinquent employee would be open to challenge
on that account."

13. In Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of
U.P., a three-Judge Bench of this Court held
that although Golak Nath case regarding
unamendability of fundamental rights under
Article 368 of the Constitution had been
overruled in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of
Kerala yet the doctrine of prospective overruling
was upheld and followed in several later
decisions. This Court further held that the
Constitution does not expressly or by necessary
implication provide against the doctrine of
prospective overruling. As a matter of fact
Articles 32(4) and 142 are designed with words
of width to enable the Supreme Court to declare
the law and to give such directions or pass such
orders as are necessary to do complete justice.
This Court observed: (Ashok Kumar Gupta case,
SCC pp. 246-47, para 54)

"54. ... So, there is no acceptable
reason as to why the Court in dealing with the
law in supersession of the law declared by it
earlier could not restrict the operation of law, as
declared, to the future and save the transactions,
whether statutory or otherwise, that were
effected on the basis of the earlier law. This
Court is, therefore, not impotent to adjust the
competing rights of parties by prospective
overruling
of
the
previous
decision
in Rangachari ratio. The decision in Mandal
case postponing the operation for five years
from the date of the judgment is an instance of,
and an extension to the principle of prospective
overruling following the principle evolved
in Golak Nath case."

14. Dealing with the nature of the
power exercised by the Supreme Court under
Article 142, this Court held that the expression
"complete justice" are words meant to meet
myriad situations created by human ingenuity or
because of the operation of statute or law
declared under Articles 32, 136 or 141 of the
Constitution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
observed: (Ashok Kumar Gupta case, SCC pp.
250-51, para 60)

"60. ... The power under Article 142 is
a constituent power transcendental to statutory
prohibition. Before exercise of the power under
Article 142(2), the Court would take that
11 All. Dayal & Anr. Vs. Sanjeev Batra & Anr.
1075
prohibition (sic provision) into consideration
before taking steps under Article 142(2) and we
find no limiting words to mould the relief or
when this Court takes appropriate decision to
mete out justice or to remove injustice. The
phrase ''complete justice' engrafted in Article
142(1) is the word of width couched with
elasticity to meet myriad situations created by
human ingenuity or cause or result of operation
of statute law or law declared under Articles 32,
136 and 141 of the Constitution and cannot be
cribbed or cabined within any limitations or
phraseology. Each case needs examination in
the light of its backdrop and the indelible effect
of the decision. In the ultimate analysis, it is for
this Court to exercise its power to do complete
justice or prevent injustice arising from the
exigencies of the cause or matter before it. The
question of lack of jurisdiction or nullity of the
order of this Court does not arise. As held
earlier, the power under Article 142 is a
constituent power within the jurisdiction of this
Court. So, the question of a law being void ab
initio or nullity or voidable does not arise."

15. In Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd.
v. State of U.P., this Court held that the doctrine
of prospective overruling was in essence a
recognition of the principle that the court
moulds the relief claimed to meet the justice of
the case and that the Apex Court in this country
expressly enjoys that power under Article 142 of
the Constitution which allows this Court to pass
such decree or make such order as is necessary
for doing complete justice in any case or matter
pending before this Court. The Hon'ble Court
observed: (SCC p. 532, para 27)

"27.
In
the
ultimate
analysis,
prospective
overruling,
despite
the
terminology, is only a recognition of the
principle that the court moulds the reliefs
claimed to meet the justice of the case --
justice not in its logical but in its equitable
sense. As far as this country is concerned, the
power has been expressly conferred by
Article 142 of the Constitution which allows
this Court to ''pass such decree or make such
order as is necessary for doing complete
justice in any cause or matter pending before
it''. In exercise of this power, this Court has
often denied the relief claimed despite
holding in the claimants' favour in order to
do ''complete justice'."

16. The "doctrine of prospective
overruling" was, observed by this Court as a
rule of judicial craftsmanship laced with
pragmatism and judicial statesmanship as a
useful tool to bring about smooth transition
of the operation of law without unduly
affecting the rights of the people who acted
upon the law that operated prior to the date
of the judgment overruling the previous law."

12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of B.A. Linga Reddy vs. Karnataka
State Transport Authority; reported in
(2015) 4 SCC 515, observed as under:-

34. The view of the High Court
in Ashrafulla has been reversed by this Court.
The decision is of retrospective operation, as it
has not been laid down that it would operate
prospectively; more so, in the case of reversal of
the judgment. This Court in P.V. George v. State
of Kerala held that the law declared by a court
will have a retrospective effect if not declared so
specifically. Referring to Golak Nath v. State of
Punjab it had also been observed that the power
of prospective overruling is vested only in the
Supreme Court and that too in constitutional
matters. It was observed: (P.V. George case,
SCC pp. 565 & 569, paras 19 & 29) "19. It may
be true that when the doctrine of stare decisis is
not adhered to, a change in the law may
adversely affect the interest of the citizens. The
doctrine of prospective overruling although is
applied to overcome such a situation, but then it
must be stated expressly. The power must be
1076 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
exercised in the clearest possible term. The
decisions of this Court are clear pointer thereto.

* **

29. Moreover, the judgment of the Full
Bench has attained finality. The special leave
petition has been dismissed. The subsequent
Division Bench, therefore, could not have said as
to whether the law declared by the Full Bench
would have a prospective operation or not. The
law declared by a court will have a retrospective
effect if not otherwise stated to be so specifically.
The Full Bench having not said so, the subsequent
Division Bench did not have the jurisdiction in that
behalf."

35. In Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, it
has been laid down that there is retrospective
operation of the decision of this Court. The
interpretation of the provision becomes effective
from the date of enactment of the provision.
In M.A. Murthy v. State of Karnataka, it was held
that the law declared by the Supreme Court is
normally assumed to be the law from inception.
Prospective operation is only exception to this
normal rule. It was held thus: (M.A. Murthy case,
SCC pp. 520-21, para 8)

"8. The learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that the approach of the High Court is
erroneous as the law declared by this Court is
presumed to be the law at all times. Normally, the
decision of this Court enunciating a principle of
law is applicable to all cases irrespective of its
stage of pendency because it is assumed that what
is enunciated by the Supreme Court is, in fact, the
law from inception. The doctrine of prospective
overruling which is a feature of American
jurisprudence is an exception to the normal
principle of law, was imported and applied for the
first time in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab.
InECIL v. B. Karunakar the view was adopted.
Prospective overruling is a part of the principles of
constitutional canon of interpretation and can be
resorted to by this Court while superseding the law
declared by it earlier. It is a device innovated to
avoid reopening of settled issues, to prevent
multiplicity
of
proceedings,
and
to
avoid
uncertainty and avoidable litigation. In other
words, actions taken contrary to the law declared
prior to the date of declaration are validated in
larger public interest. The law as declared applies
to future cases. (See Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State
of U.P. and Baburam v. C.C. Jacob.) It is for this
Court to indicate as to whether the decision in
question will operate prospectively. In other
words, there shall be no prospective overruling,
unless it is so indicated in the particular decision.
It is not open to be held that the decision in a
particular case will be prospective in its
application by application of the doctrine of
prospective overruling. The doctrine of binding
precedent helps in promoting certainty and
consistency in judicial decisions and enables an
organic development of the law besides providing
assurance to the individual as to the consequences
of transactions forming part of the daily affairs.
That being the position, the High Court was in
error by holding that the judgment which operated
on the date of selection was operative and not the
review judgment in Ashok Kumar Sharma case. All
the more so when the subsequent judgment is by
way of review of the first judgment in which case
there are no judgments at all and the subsequent
judgment rendered on review petitions is the one
and only judgment rendered, effectively and for all
purposes, the earlier decision having been erased
by countenancing the review applications. The
impugned judgments of the High Court are,
therefore, set aside."

13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of P.V. George vs. State of Kerala; reported in
(2007) 3 SCC 557 has held as under:-

"27. The rights of the appellants were
not determined in the earlier proceedings.
According to them, merely a law was declared
which was prevailing at that point of time; but
11 All. Dayal & Anr. Vs. Sanjeev Batra & Anr.
1077
the appellants were not parties therein. Thus, no
decision was rendered in their favour nor any
right accrued thereby."

14. Thus, it is clear that the principle of
prospective overruling would not apply in
respect of the judgment passed by the Supreme
Court unless and until it is expressly so
mentioned in the judgment. Furthermore, there
cannot be an estoppel against the statute.

15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Bengal Iron Corpn. vs. CTO; reported in
1994 Supp (1) SCC 310 has held as under:-

"18. ... ............ There can be no
estoppel against the statute. ... ............... Law is
what is declared by this Court and the High
Court -- to wit, it is for this Court and the High
Court to declare what does a particular
provision of statute say, and not for the
executive. Of course, the Parliament/Legislature
never speaks or explains what does a provision
enacted by it mean. (SeeSanjeev Coke Mfg.
Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.)"

16. Thus, where the question of law has
been settled by the Courts, then it has to be held
that the said question of law was in existence
right from day one.

17. However, where the rights of a party
have been considered and declared, then the said
proceedings cannot be reopened on the ground
that the judgment on the basis of which, the
rights were declared, has been overruled. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of
India v. Madras Telephone SC & ST Social
Welfare Assn., reported in (2006) 8 SCC
662; has held as under:-

"21. Having regard to the above
observations and clarification we have no doubt
that such of the applicants whose claim to
seniority and consequent promotion on the basis
of the principles laid down in the Allahabad
High Court's judgment inParmanand Lal
case have been upheld or recognised by the
Court or the Tribunal by judgment and order
which have attained finality will not be
adversely affected by the contrary view now
taken in the judgment in Madras Telephones.
Since the rights of such applicants were
determined in a duly constituted proceeding,
which determination has attained finality, a
subsequent judgment of a court or tribunal
taking a contrary view will not adversely affect
the applicants in whose cases the orders have
attained finality. We order accordingly."

18. Thus, it is clear that the judgment
passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Pranay Sethi (supra) would apply in the
present case as the order passed by the Tribunal
has been challenged. It is not a case where the
claimants have tried to reopen a case which has
already been finalized. It goes without saying
that it is settled proposition of law that an appeal
is continuation of original proceedings.

19. Sri Mishra on the issue of multiplier
also submitted that multiplier has correctly been
applied by the Tribunal. In this regard he placed
reliance upon the judgment passed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shakti
Devi Vs. New India Insurance Company
Limited And Another; reported in 2011 (1)
TAC 4 (SC). On this aspect the view of this
Court is that the latest view of Constitution
Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court would prevail
over the view taken in the judgment passed in
the case of Shakti Devi (Supra) as such also the
argument of the Counsel for the Company on the
issue of multiplier has no force.

20. Considering the aforesaid, on the issue
of multiplier, this Court after taking note of age
of deceased i.e. 20 years at the time of accident,
is of the view that in the instant case for grant of
compensation the multiplier of 18 is the correct
1078 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
multiplier and has to be applied and the Tribunal
based upon the age of father of the deceased has
wrongly applied the multiplier of 11.

21. It is next submitted by the learned
Counsel for the appellants that notional
income of Rs. 3,000/- per month i.e. Rs.
36,000/- per annum of deceased, who was
black smith (yksgkj) and at the time of death
was earning about Rs. 5,000/- per month as
pleaded in the claim petition, has wrongly
been considered by the Tribunal for grant of
compensation. He submitted that accident took
place on 07.03.2013 and on account of injury
sustained the son of the appellant no. 1
expired on spot. As such, considering the date
of death of the son of the appellant no. 1 as
also the law on this issue, the notional income
of the deceased should be considered as Rs.
6,000/- per month.

22. Opposing the aforesaid, Sri Mishra
learned Counsel for the Insurance Company,
submitted that in the claim petition the income
of the deceased, per month, has been shown as
Rs. 5,000/-, as such, beyond this amount the
income cannot be enhanced.

23. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the
judgment passed in the case of Magma General
Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Nanu Ram and
Others; reported in 2018 SCC Online SC 1546;
observed as under:-

"8.3 With respect to the income of the
deceased, as the family could not produce any
evidence to show that the income of the
deceased was Rs 15,000 per month, as claimed,
the High Court took his income to be Rs 6000,
which is marginally above the minimum wage of
an unskilled worker at Rs 5342.

This
finding
is
also
not
being
interfered with.

8.4. The Insurance Company has
submitted that the father and the sister of the
deceased could not be treated as dependents,
and it is only a mother who can be dependent of
her son. This contention deserves to be repelled.
The deceased was a bachelor, whose mother had
pre-deceased him. The deceased's father was
about 65 years old, and an unmarried sister. The
deceased was contributing a part of his meagre
income to the family for their sustenance and
survival. Hence, they would be entitled to
compensation as his dependents.

8.5. The Insurance Company has
contended that the High Court had wrongly
awarded Rs. 1,00,000 towards loss of love and
affection, and Rs. 25,000 towards funeral
expenses.

The judgment of this Court in Pranay
Sethi (supra) has set out the various amounts to
be awarded as compensation under the
conventional heads in case of death. The
relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced
herein below :

"(54)....Therefore, we think it seemly to
fix reasonable sums.