# Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Meerut v. Shouraj Singh and others

- **Citation:** (2012) 1 ILRA 43
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2012-01-11
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1787 of 2012
- **Bench:** Krishna Murari
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/uttar-pradesh-state-road-transport-corporation-meerut-v-shouraj-singh-and-others-42186
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

U.P. Industrial Dispute Act-1942-Section
33-C-direction to give salary illegally
with-held-order passed by prescribed
authority-challenged on ground without
adjudication-direction
for
salaryexecution
under
section
33-C-not
maintainable-where inspite of repeated
direction of High Court work man not
allowed light work-non payment of
salary
during
intervening
period-no
dispute
of
employee-employer
relationship-direction under section 33-C
held-proper.

Held: Para 7

Admittedly, this Court vide order dated
21.04.2000 directed the Corporation to
assign
some
lighter
work
to
the
respondent, which was not followed and
another order dated 05.05.2000 was
passed
directing
the
respondentworkman to resume the duties of driver
44 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
and to run the bus from Meerut to Delhi.
The said order was also quashed by this
Court vide order dated 18.08.2000 and a
categorical direction was issued that the
workman may be assigned lighter work
other than that of the driver. Even when
this order was not complied with by the
corporation, notices in the contempt
proceedings were issued and then the
petitioner-corporation
directed
the
respondent-workman
to
resume
the
duties as Chowkidar on 01.01.2001.
Case law discussed:
(2008) 7 SCC 22; 2005 SCC (L&S) 1081

## Text

1 All] Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Meerut V. Shouraj Singh and others
43
limitation prescribed in proviso to sub
Section (3) of Section 125 of the Code of
the Criminal Procedure, 1973, it is open for
the Magistrate to impose sentence up to
maximum of one month for each month of
default and that a composite order of this
nature can be passed by the Magistrate.

28. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Shahada Khatoon (supra) did
not lay down the ratio that regardless of the
extent of default on the part of the husband
in paying maintenance, the Magistrate can
impose imprisonment of maximum of one
month.

29. In view of the aforesaid
discussions and case law on the point in
hand, the submissions of the learned
counsel for the revisionist can not be
accepted. On consideration of the facts and
circumstances of the case of the instant
revision and case law cited above, it is held
that the impugned order dated 27.9.1993
passed by the Magistrate is perfectly just
and legal and the same suffers from no
illegality or infirmity of any kind. Since
the husband/revisionist herein failed to pay
the complete outstanding amount of
maintenance as ordered by the learned
Magistrate vide order dated 18.8.1989
inspite of having financial capacity and
sufficient means to pay the same had
knowingly made default in payment of the
said amount, the Magistrate is fully
competent to recover the maintenance
amount
remaining
unpaid
from
the
husband and to pay the same to Smt.
Kamlesh Kumari, wife of the revisionist.

30. The learned Magistrate concerned
is directed to issue recovery warrant for the
maintenance amount remaining unpaid
according to law discussed above and if
the warrant remains unexecutable by any
other reason, then to sentence the
defaulting husband according to law.

31. The revision petition being
devoid of merits is accordingly dismissed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.01.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE KRISHNA MURARI, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1787 of 2012

Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport
Corporation, Meerut

 ...Petitioner
Versus
Shouraj Singh and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri J.N. Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri S.M.N. Abbas Abedi
C.S.C.

U.P. Industrial Dispute Act-1942-Section
33-C-direction to give salary illegally
with-held-order passed by prescribed
authority-challenged on ground without
adjudication-direction
for
salaryexecution
under
section
33-C-not
maintainable-where inspite of repeated
direction of High Court work man not
allowed light work-non payment of
salary
during
intervening
period-no
dispute
of
employee-employer
relationship-direction under section 33-C
held-proper.

Held: Para 7

Admittedly, this Court vide order dated
21.04.2000 directed the Corporation to
assign
some
lighter
work
to
the
respondent, which was not followed and
another order dated 05.05.2000 was
passed
directing
the
respondentworkman to resume the duties of driver
44 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
and to run the bus from Meerut to Delhi.
The said order was also quashed by this
Court vide order dated 18.08.2000 and a
categorical direction was issued that the
workman may be assigned lighter work
other than that of the driver. Even when
this order was not complied with by the
corporation, notices in the contempt
proceedings were issued and then the
petitioner-corporation
directed
the
respondent-workman
to
resume
the
duties as Chowkidar on 01.01.2001.
Case law discussed:
(2008) 7 SCC 22; 2005 SCC (L&S) 1081

(Delivered by Hon'ble Krishna Murari, J. )

1. Heard Shri J.N. Singh, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Shri
S.M.N. Abbas Abedi for respondent no.
1.

2. Respondent-workman moved an
application under Section 33-C (2) of
the Industrial Disputes Act (for short the
Act) with a prayer to direct the
petitioner-employer to make payment of
Rs.53,787.70/- along with interest as
salary for the period 16.03.2000 to
03.01.2001, which was illegally not
paid. Prescribed authority, Labour Court
vide award dated 17.10.2011 allowed
the claim of the respondent-workman.
Aggrieved,
the
petitioner
has
approached this Court.

3. It is contended that without
there being any adjudication with
respect to entitlement of the workman
for payment of salary during this period,
the claim of the respondent-workman
could not have been awarded in
proceedings under Section 33-C (2) of
the Act by the Prescribed authority,
inasmuch as the said proceedings are in
the nature of execution proceedings.
Reliance in support of the contention
has been placed on the judgment of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of D.
Krishnan & Anr. Vs. Special Officer,
Vellore Cooperative Sugar Mill &
Anr., (2008) 7 SCC 22.

4. The facts as they emerge out
from the pleadings of the parties are that
respondent-workman, who was working
on the post of driver in the petitionercorporation, was declared unfit on
medical grounds to work as a driver.
When the petitioner-employer did not
allot him any light work, respondentworkman filed Writ Petition No. 18757
of 2000. Vide order dated 21.04.2000,
the corporation was directed to allow
the workman to resume the duty and to
allot him some light work. Even
thereafter
the
petitioner-corporation
instead of allotting him some light
work, passed an order dated 05.05.2000
allocating him the duty to drive the bus
from Meerut to Delhi and back treating
it to be a light work. Respondent again
approached this Court by seeking a
review of the order dated 21.04.2000,
which was allowed vide order dated
18.08.2000 and order dated 05.05.2000
passed by Regional Manager was
quashed
and
the
corporation
was
directed to assign lighter work to the
respondent-workman other than that of
the driver. Even thereafter, the order
was not complied by the corporation, as
a result, contempt proceedings were
initiated, wherein notices were issued.
Thereafter, vide order dated 01.01.2001,
respondent-workman was allowed to
resume duty as Chowkidar. Since the
petitioner did not pay the salary from
16.03.2000 to 03.01.2001, respondentworkman moved an application under
Section 3-C (2) of the Act claiming
payment for the said period. Prescribed
1 All] Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Meerut V. Shouraj Singh and others
45
authority
finding
that
though
the
respondent-workman
continued
in
employment
of
the
petitionercorporation and despite orders passed
by this Court, petitioner did not allow
him to work on any post other than that
of driver, he was entitled for payment of
salary for the said period, inasmuch as
the respondent-workman was not at
fault.

5. It is undisputed that without
there being a pre-determination or
adjudication, proceedings under Section
33-C (2) of the Act, which are in the
nature of execution, cannot be initiated.

6. The question which arises for
consideration in this case is whether
there was any dispute with regard to the
entitlement of the respondent-workman
for wages during this period?

7. Admittedly, this Court vide
order dated 21.04.2000 directed the
Corporation to assign some lighter work
to the respondent, which was not
followed
and another
order dated
05.05.2000 was passed directing the
respondent-workman to resume the
duties of driver and to run the bus from
Meerut to Delhi. The said order was
also quashed by this Court vide order
dated 18.08.2000 and a categorical
direction was issued that the workman
may be assigned lighter work other than
that of the driver. Even when this order
was
not
complied
with
by
the
corporation, notices in the contempt
proceedings were issued and then the
petitioner-corporation
directed
the
respondent-workman to resume the
duties as Chowkidar on 01.01.2001.

8. The narration of the above facts
clearly goes to show that respondentworkman was not allowed to work
despite orders passed by this Court by
the petitioner-corporation itself and,
thus, it cannot be said that there was any
dispute with respect to right to wages
for the said period, which requires any
adjudication.

9. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of State of U.P. & Anr. Vs. Brijpal
Singh, 2005 SCC (L&S) 1081, has
categorically held that right to money or
benefit which is sought to be executed
under Section 33-C (2) of the Act must
be an existing one and must arise in
course of and in relation to relationship
between
industrial
workman
and
employer.

10. In the facts of the present case,
there was an existing right vested in the
respondent-workman for payment of
wages which did not require any
adjudication,
hence,
the
argument
advanced on behalf of the petitioner has
no force as well as the case of D.
Krishnan & Anr. (supra) relied upon
by the petitioner in respect of his
contention is not applicable and is
clearly distinguishable on facts.

11. In view of above facts and
discussions, there is no force in the writ
petition and the same, accordingly,
stands dismissed.
---------
46 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.01.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SABHAJEET YADAV,J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2239 of 2008

Ram Shiromani Yadav
 ...Petitioner
Versus
The Conciliation Officer and others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ajay Kumar Srivastava
Sri Manu Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri V. Singh
Sri K.K. Pandey
C.S.C.

U.P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947-Section
10
(1)-oral
termination-without
following
statutory
provision-without
taking
recourse
of
reconciliation
proceeding-rejection
of
reference
by
Govt. apparent error-already 6 years
elapsed-No fruitful purpose will serve by
referring matter before the Govt. for
considering
to
make
referencemandamus issued to refer the dispute
before
Industrial
Tribunal
for
adjudication.

Held: Para 19

In instant case besides other assertions
since petitioner has stated before the
respondent no.1 that his services were
terminated
on
4.3.2006
without
compliance of provisions of Industrial
Dispute Act and since then a period of
about six years have already passed,
therefore, it would not be expedient in
the interest of justice to relegate the
matter before appropriate government
for reconsideration of the issue for
referring
the
dispute
for
industrial
adjudication to the appropriate tribunal
or labour court, which will again take
some considerable time. In wake of facts
and circumstances of the case, referred
herein before, in my opinion, it is fit case
where a writ of mandamus should be
issued to the respondent no.1 to refer
the dispute for industrial adjudication to
the appropriate industrial tribunal or
labour court forthwith. Accordingly, a
writ of mandamus is issued directing the
respondent
no.1/appropriate
government to refer the dispute raised
by
the
petitioner
for
industrial
adjudication
before
the
appropriate
industrial
tribunal
or
labour
court
forthwith on receipt of certified copy of
the order passed by this court.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sabhajeet Yadav,J. )

1. Heard learned counsel for the
parties.

2. By this petition, the petitioner has
challenged the order dated 13.8.2007
passed by the respondent no.1 (Annexure6 to the writ petition), whereby the
petitioner's application for referring the
industrial dispute to the Labour court has
been rejected. A writ of mandamus is also
sought for directing the respondents no. 2
and 3 to reinstate the petitioner in service
as Peon in the institution in question and
pay increments & salary for the period of
illegal removal from the institution.

3. The brief facts leading to the case
are that the petitioner was duly appointed
as Peon (Paricharak) in the Allahabad
Public School Subedarganj, Chaufatka,
Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the
'Institution')
on
23.1.2001
but
the
respondents were taking work from him
from morning 6.00 a.m. to evening 7.00
p.m. everyday and were compelled the
petitioner to do 'Jhadu Pochha' work. It is
stated that the respondents were paying