# / v. Smt. Pushpa Devi & others

- **Citation:** (2007) 1 ILRA 30
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2006-10-11
- **Case number:** First Appeal No. 281 of 1992
- **Bench:** Prakash Krishna
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/v-smt-pushpa-devi-others-40874
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Land Acquisition Act-Section 18-Right to
sue mean right to hold / possess the
property-Transfer
of
land
already
acquired-but before the award-whether
such
transfree
has
right
to
press
reference
for
enhancement
of
compensation-held-'yes'
as
per
provisions
of
Art.
300-A
of
the
constitution-right
to
property
is
constitutional right-Transfree shall stand
in the shoes of transferer with right to
claim for enhancement of compensation.

Held: Para 17 & 18

From the above discussion it is clear that
right to receive compensation is not a
mere right to sue but is an actionable
claim which can be transferred, as held
by the Supreme Court in the case of
Khorshed Shapoor (supra).

Besides above right to property has been
recognized as a constitutional right by
Article 300-A of the Constitution of India
inserted
by
the
Constitution
(44th
Amendment) Act, 1978 w.e.f. 20th of
June, 1979 wherein it has been provided
for that no person shall be deprived of
his property saved by the authority of
law. This article also supports the view,
as
canvassed
by
the
claimant
respondents who are transferee from the
original land owner. Such transferee
shall stand in the shoes of the transferer
to receive compensation with a right to
file
a
reference
application
for
enhancement of the compensation if the
compensation awarded by the Land
Acquisition Officer is not as per correct
market value prevalent on the date of
the relevant notifications.
Case law discussed:
2004 (3) AWC-2195
AIR 1980 SC-775
1999 ALJ-153
(1905) 1 K.B.-260
AIR 1932 Cal.-719
1999 ALJ-153
AIR 1980 SC-775
1962 (1) SCR-676
AIR 1989 SC-1652
AIR 1958 SC-328
AIR 1992 SC-1604

## Text

30 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.10.2006

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PRAKASH KRISHNA, J.

First Appeal No. 281 of 1992

U.P. Avas Evam Vikash Parishad

 ...Opposite Party/Appellant
Versus
Smt. Pushpa Devi & others ...Respondents

Connected with
1.First Appeal No. 280 of 1992
2.First Appeal No. 282 of 1992
3.First Appeal No. 298 of 1992

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri P.K. Singhal
Sri Shree Kant

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri K.S. Kushwaha
Smt. Sunita Agrawal
Sri V.K. Sharma

Land Acquisition Act-Section 18-Right to
sue mean right to hold / possess the
property-Transfer
of
land
already
acquired-but before the award-whether
such
transfree
has
right
to
press
reference
for
enhancement
of
compensation-held-'yes'
as
per
provisions
of
Art.
300-A
of
the
constitution-right
to
property
is
constitutional right-Transfree shall stand
in the shoes of transferer with right to
claim for enhancement of compensation.

Held: Para 17 & 18

From the above discussion it is clear that
right to receive compensation is not a
mere right to sue but is an actionable
claim which can be transferred, as held
by the Supreme Court in the case of
Khorshed Shapoor (supra).

Besides above right to property has been
recognized as a constitutional right by
Article 300-A of the Constitution of India
inserted
by
the
Constitution
(44th
Amendment) Act, 1978 w.e.f. 20th of
June, 1979 wherein it has been provided
for that no person shall be deprived of
his property saved by the authority of
law. This article also supports the view,
as
canvassed
by
the
claimant
respondents who are transferee from the
original land owner. Such transferee
shall stand in the shoes of the transferer
to receive compensation with a right to
file
a
reference
application
for
enhancement of the compensation if the
compensation awarded by the Land
Acquisition Officer is not as per correct
market value prevalent on the date of
the relevant notifications.
Case law discussed:
2004 (3) AWC-2195
AIR 1980 SC-775
1999 ALJ-153
(1905) 1 K.B.-260
AIR 1932 Cal.-719
1999 ALJ-153
AIR 1980 SC-775
1962 (1) SCR-676
AIR 1989 SC-1652
AIR 1958 SC-328
AIR 1992 SC-1604

(Delivered by Hon'ble Prakash Krishna, J.)

1. The above four first appeals were
heard together and are being disposed of
by a common judgment. The learned
counsel for the parties jointly agreed that
a common question of law is involved in
these appeals and they can be disposed of
on the said common question. In order to
appreciate the controversy involved in
these four cases the facts of first appeal
no.281 of 1992 are being taken into
account as the arguments were advanced
by the learned counsel for the parties in
this appeal only and they submitted that
the said arguments cover the remaining
1 All] U.P. Avas Evam Vikash Parishad V. Smt. Puspa Devi and others
31
appeals also. The brief facts of the case
are as follows:-

2. It arises out of L.A. Case No.121
of 1987 decided on 13th of November,
1991 along with other land acquisition
cases filed by Amar Singh and two cases
by Smt. Usha Singh being L.A. Case Nos.
115 of 1987, 120 of 1987 and 122 of 1987
respectively.

3. A parcel of land measuring
130.35 acres of village Mathura Bangar
was acquired by the State Government for
the development of residential colony of
U.P. State Avas Evam Vikas Parshad,
Lucknow which included 35.01 acres of
land of village Mathura Bangar involved
in these appeals. The compensation
offered by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer was enhanced by the Reference
Court, namely, District Judge Mathura by
the judgment under appeal. Although in
the memo of appeal the enhancement of
the compensation by the Reference Court
has been challenged but during the course
of the argument enhancement of the
compensation was not pressed by Shri
Shri Kant, Advocate, the learned counsel
for the appellant. It is, therefore, not
necessary to notice in detail the facts
concerning the market value of the land
involved in these appeals on the date of
relevant notification issued under Section
28 of U.P. Avas Evam Vikash Parishad
Act equivalent to Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act.

4. As many as sixteen grounds have
been raised in the memo of appeal but the
learned counsel for the appellant did not
advance any argument with reference
thereto, rather he did not press any of the
grounds raised in the memo of the appeal.
However,
he
has
raised
a
new
ground/argument in these appeals that the
reference
application
was
not
maintainable by the claimant respondents
as they have purchased a mere right to sue
from the original claimants before the
award by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer, as submitted by Shri Shri Kant,
the learned counsel for the appellant. The
said argument was built up on the basis of
a document paper No.4 C, which is a copy
of the report submitted by the Special
Land Acquisition Officer (Dwitiya) U.P.
Avas Evam Vikash Parishad, Kamla
Nagar, Agra, under Section 19 of the
Land Acquisition Act. At the tail end of
the said report under the column No.10
headed as Special Particulars (Vishesh
Vivaran) it has been mentioned that the
original Bhoomidhars of the acquired
plots after obtaining the permission from
Settlement Officer Consolidation have
sold 1/4th share in favour of the person
who has sought the reference for a sum of
Rs.17, 000/-, by means of sale deed dated
16th of November, 1985 Right to receive
compensation along with other rights has
been sold for a sum of Rs.17, 000/- in
favour of the person who has sought
reference. The contention of the learned
counsel for the appellant is that the said
sale by the original land owners is not
permissible in law in as much as a mere
right to sue has been transferred and such
transfer is impermissible under Section 6
(e) of the Transfer of Property Act. Strong
reliance particularly on paragraph 18 of
the Agra Development Authority Vs.
State of U. P. and others 2004 (3) AWC
2195 by the learned counsel for the
appellants.

5. The case was initially heard on
22nd of September, 2003 and the
following order was passed:-
32 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
"Shri Sri Kant, the learned counsel
for the appellant at the very outset
submitted that he is pressing the appeal on
one point namely that the claimant
respondents were not entitled to make any
reference application before the Reference
Court. Elaborating it, it was submitted
that the claimant respondents purchased
only a mere right to sue and not an
actionable claim. Page 44 of the paper
book was referred in support of his
submission which is a copy of the report
wherein under column 10 it is mentioned
that the claimant respondents purchased
1/4th share from Ram Lal in the disputed
property by means of the sale deed dated
16th of November, 1995 for a sum of
Rs.17, 000/- only while under the award a
sum of Rs.87, 828/- has been awarded.
Evidently the said point was not raised
either by the Reference Court or in the
memo
of
the
appeal.
Smt.
Sunita
Agrawal, the learned counsel for the
respondents submitted that she has been
taken by surprise and needs time to
examine the case from the said angle.

As jointly prayed list on 3rd of
October, 2006."

6. It was taken up on 3rd of October
2006 on which date the arguments were
concluded.

7. In contra, the learned counsel for
the
respondents
submitted
that
the
aforesaid
argument
besides
being
meritless, cannot be permitted to be raised
in the present appeal for the first time at
the time of its hearing. In other words, the
said objection was not raised either before
the Special Land Acquisition Officer or
before the Reference Court and therefore,
should not be permitted to be at this fag
end of the litigation. On merits reliance
has been placed upon the following three
cases:-

(I
)Mrs.
Khorshed
Shapoor
Vs.
Assistant Controller of Estate AIR
1980 S.C. 775.
(ii) U.P. Avas Evam Vikash Parishad
Vs. Smt. Kanak and others 1999
ALJ 153.
(iii) Dawson Vs. Great Northern and
City Rail. Co. (1905) 1 K.B. 260 =
(1904 -7) All England law Reports
Reprint.

8. I have given careful consideration
to the aforesaid submissions of the
learned counsel for the parties. At the
very outset it may be noted that the
appellants are disputing the legality and
validity of the sale deed executed by the
original land owner in their favour. The
copy of the said sale deed which is a
primary document has not been produced
by the parties either before this Court or
before the Reference Court, as admitted
by the learned counsel for the appellants.
In absence of original or certified copy of
the sale deed, the argument that only a
mere right to sue was transferred under
the said sale deed cannot be accepted or
entertained. However, the learned counsel
for the appellant submitted that since the
point raised by him goes to the very root
of the matter and the sale deed is the basis
of the respondents' claim, its nonfiling
before the Reference Court or before this
Court is inconsequential. It is difficult to
accept the said argument. Without looking
the document in question namely sale
deed it is difficult to draw inference that
merely a right to sue was transferred in
favour of the claimant respondents, who
are transferee from the original land
owner.
1 All] U.P. Avas Evam Vikash Parishad V. Smt. Puspa Devi and others
33
9. The report of the Special Land
Acquisition
Officer
submitted
under
Section 19 of the Land Acquisition Act
cannot be read in evidence with reference
to the nature of the right transferred under
the sale deed in favour of the claimant
respondents. The sale deed being the
primary evidence should have been
produced by the party who is interested to
challenge its legality or validity.

10. Apart from the above, the
problem can be looked from the another
angle also. The U.P. Avas Evam Vikash
Parishad, the present appellant, had the
opportunity not to accept the sale deed in
question at the initial stage of the
litigation. The present appellant having
accepted the said sale deed as genuine and
a legal document transferring the rights,
title and interest of the original land
holder
in
favour
of
the
claimant
respondent, the appellant cannot be
permitted to turn around and urge that
such transaction is void and is liable to be
ignored on the basis of report of its one of
the officers. From the said report it is
clear beyond doubt that a sum of Rs.87,
828/- has been paid to the transferee
namely claimant respondents in pursuance
of the award, on the basis of the sale deed
in question dated 16th of November 1985.
A party cannot be permitted to take
contradictory and different stand qua a
document at different stages of litigation.

11. Even otherwise I do not find any
merit in the submission of the learned
counsel that what was transferred was
mere a right to sue, for the reasons more
than one. No doubt the Division Bench
judgment relied upon by the appellant in
the case of Agra Development Authority
Vs. State of U.P. (supra) supports the
contention of the appellant, but on deeper
probing the facts are distinguishable. In
the said case, the compensation awarded
by the Special Land Acquisition Officer
under the Land Acquisition Act was duly
paid to the owner who subsequently
transferred their right after filing the
reference application in favour of the
respondents therein. Moreover as is
apparent from paragraph 23 of the report
a specific issue was framed to the effect
"whether the transferees of the original
claimants,
are
entitled
to
the
compensation in place of the original
claimant? If so to what extent?" Meaning
thereby in the aforesaid ruling, the
acquiring
authority
namely
Agra
Development Authority was disputing the
transfer by the original claimants from its
very inception on the ground that the and
claimants have transferred their rights to
sue only, after receiving the amount
awarded by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer. But in the case in hand, the facts
are distinct. The transfer in question was
made even before the award of sum by the
Special Land Acquisition Officer. As
demonstrated
above, no
such
issue
challenging
the
entitlement
of
the
transferee (claimant respondents) was
raised before the Reference Court. No
such ground has been raised in the memo
of the appeal.

12. The Division Bench has placed
reliance upon a judgment of the Calcutta
High Court in Manmatha Nath Dutt Vs.
Matilal Mitra, AIR 1932 Cal 719 and
quoted a passage from it. A bare perusal
of the passage quoted from the judgment
of the Calcutta High Court it is clear that
assignment in that case was by a person
who was out of the possession of the
immovable property and was to the effect
" that assignee would have right to sue
without conveying any interest in the
34 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
property, the assignee would not be
entitled to maintain any suit for the
recovery of the property."

13. The above quoted portion of the
judgment of the Calcutta High Court
makes the controversy involved in the
present case distinguishably. Further
reliance has been placed on another
judgment of the Calcutta High Court and
of this Court wherein it has been held that
a claim for unliquidated damages for
breach of contract is not an actionable
claim within the Section 3 of the Transfer
of Property Act, so also an action for
damages in tort is not assignable.
Ultimately in paragraph - 18 of the report,
which has been strongly relied upon it has
been held as follows:-

"18. Thus, the above decisions show
that a distinction has been drawn between
a mere right to sue and an actionable
claim. To give an example, if A files a suit
against B claiming certain property or
certain money then if A executes a deed in
favour of C transferring all his right in
respect of the litigation before the suit is
decided such a conveyance would be
invalid being hit by Section 6 (e) of the
Transfer of Property Act. However, if the
suit of A against B is decreed, and after
the decree, but before its execution. A
transfers all his rights under the decree to
C this is conveyance would not be hit by
Section 6 (e) vide AIR 1935 Cal 751 : AIR
1955 Mad 165 etc.

14. In the aforesaid judgment, as
pointed out by Smt. Sunita Agrawal, the
learned counsel for the respondents, the
earlier Division Bench judgment of this
Court in the case of U.P. Avas Evam
Vikas Parishad Vs. Smt. Kanak and
others 1999 ALJ 153 (supra) which in its
turn has relied upon a judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of Khorshed
Shapoor Vs. Assistant Collector, Estate
Duty, AIR 1980 SC 775 have not been
noted or considered. It appears that the
aforesaid two judgments which were
otherwise binding on the Division bench
were not brought to the notice of the
Division Bench who has delivered the
judgment
in
the
case
of
Agra
Development Authority (supra).

15. The Apex Court in the case of
Khorshed
Shapoor
Vs.
Assistant
Collector, Estate Duty (supra), in para 10
has observed with reference to the
provisions of the Estate Duty Act that,

"........................but
the
right
to
receive compensation at market value on
the dates of the relevant notifications
unquestionably accrued to the deceased
which was property and it would be such
property that would pass on the death of
the deceased. That such right is property
is well settled and if necessary reference
may be made to a decision of this Court in
Lakshmi Kant Jha v. Commissioner of
Wealth Tax, Bihar and Orissa, (1973) 90
ITR 97, a case under the Wealth Tax Act,
1957 where it has been clearly held that
the right to receive compensation in
respect of the Zamindari estate which was
acquired by the Government under the
Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, even
though the date of payment was deferred,
was property and constituted an asset for
the purpose of that taxing statute. In other
words, since the lands where lost to the
estate of the deceased before the relevant
date, namely, the date of death, it would
be the right to receive compensation
under the Land Acquisition Act that will
have to be evaluated under the Estate
Duty Act. Counsel for the appellant did
1 All] U.P. Avas Evam Vikash Parishad V. Smt. Puspa Devi and others
35
not dispute this position but he contended
that no sooner the Collector (the Special
Deputy Collector herein) made his awards
determining the amounts of compensation
payable to the claimants under Section 11
of the Land Acquisition Act, the right to
receive compensation must be regarded as
having merged in the awards, the
determination having been made by a
statutory public official and what the
claimants would be left with thereafter
was merely a right to agitate the
correctness of such determination and this
right to claim further compensation being
merely a right to litigate was no asset or
property and further that such right would
become asset or property only after the
Civil Court finally adjudicated upon such
claim. The High Court, while negativing
this contention, has held that the "right to
receive extra compensation" was not a
separate or different right independent of
"the right to receive compensation".

It has observed thus:

"The right to receive compensation
for the lands acquired by the Government,
at their market value at the date of the
acquisition is one and indivisible right.
There
is
no
right
to
'receive
compensation' and a separate right to
receive 'extra compensation'. The only
right is to receive the compensation for
the lands acquired by the Government,
which is the fair market value on the date
of acquisition."

It has repelled the argument that
there are two separate rights-One a right
to receive compensation and other a right
to receive extra or further compensation
and held that under the Land Acquisition
Act, the claimant has only one right,
which is to receive compensation for the
land at their market value on the date of
relevant notification and it is this right
which is quantified by the Collector under
Section 11 and by the Civil Court under
Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act.
The award made by the Collector under
Section 11 is nothing more than an offer
of the compensation made by the
Government to the claimants whose
property is acquired. It has relied upon an
earlier judgment of the Privy Council in
Ezra Vs. Secretary of State for India
(1905) ILR 32 Cal 605 which has been
followed by the Apex Court subsequently
in number of cases such as Raja Harish
Chandra Vs. Deputy Land Requisition
Officer, (1962) 1 SCR 676 and recently in
the case of Chiman Lal Hargovinddass
Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer
A.I.R. 1989 SC 1652 it is apt to quote the
following observation of the Apex Court
from the aforesaid decision of the
Khorshed Shapoor (supra):-

".......................The
claimant
can
litigate the correctness of the award
because his right to compensation is not
fully redeemed but remains alive which
he prosecutes in Civil Court. That is why
when a claimant dies in a pending
reference his heirs are brought on record
and are permitted to prosecute the
reference............"

16. A Division Bench of this Court
in U.P. Avas Evam Vikash Parishad Vs.
Kanak
(supra)
has
considered
the
controversy involved in hand in depth and
has made a survey of all decisions directly
touching the point as also the relevant
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. It
has repelled the contention of the
acquiring body that such transfer is a
mere right to sue. Its conclusion is
36 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
recorded in para 31 of the report which is
reproduced below:-
"In view of the discussions made
above we hold that the sale deeds
whereby the respondent-claimants once
have acquired property rights in the land
acquired and the right to receive
compensation, did not envisage transfer
of mere right to sue, transfers of property
in
the
acquired
land
are
not
of
champertous nature, hit by the provisions
of S. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act and
S.23 of the Indian Contract Act."

17. From the above discussion it is
clear that right to receive compensation is
not a mere right to sue but is an actionable
claim which can be transferred, as held by
the Supreme Court in the case of
Khorshed Shapoor (supra).

18. Besides above right to property
has been recognized as a constitutional
right by Article 300-A of the Constitution
of India inserted by the Constitution (44th
Amendment) Act, 1978 w.e.f. 20th of
June, 1979 wherein it has been provided
for that no person shall be deprived of his
property saved by the authority of law.
This article also supports the view, as
canvassed by the claimant respondents
who are transferee from the original land
owner. Such transferee shall stand in the
shoes
of
the
transferer
to
receive
compensation with a right to file a
reference application for enhancement of
the compensation if the compensation
awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer
is not as per correct market value
prevalent on the date of the relevant
notifications.

19. The Apex Court in Bombay
Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vs.
State of Bombay and Others AIR 1958
S.C. 328 has held while interpreting word
"property" with reference to Article 19 (1)
of the Constitution that it has been used in
a wider connotation and includes money.
The citizens have a right to hold money
subject to law only.

20. In a slightly different context the
Apex Court in Jagdish Das Singh Vs.
Natthu Singh AIR 1992 S.C. 1604 has
considered the Section 21 of the Specific
Relief Act with reference to a situation
when the subject matter of suit for
specific performance of the contract to
sell has been acquired by the State
Government under the Land Acquisition
Act. It has been held that under the Indian
Law of Contract, for no fault of the
plaintiff
contract
for
performance
becomes impossible; in this situation
Section
21
enables
award
of
compensation in lieu and substitution of
specific performance. This decision to
some extent also supports the contention
of the respondents that right to receive
compensation is not a mere right to sue
but is right to hold property. The effect of
the acquisition of the subject matter of the
suit is that instead of getting immovable
property,
the
plaintiff
will
get
compensation in lieu and substitution of
specific performance. In other words, the
plaintiff gets the compensation in terms of
money which itself is a property.

No other point was pressed by the
learned counsel for the appellant.

21. In view of the above discussion,
the aforesaid contention raised by the
appellants has no force and is liable to be
rejected. There is no merit in the appeal.
All the appeals are dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
---------
1 All] Surendra Pal Singh V. State of U.P. and others
37
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.10.2006

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE V.C. MISRA, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.1853 of 2006

Surendra Pal Singh

...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri A.N. Rai

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri C.B. Yadav
Sri G.P. Yadav
S.C.

U.P. Plice Officers of the Sub-ordinate
Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules
1991-Rule 8 (2)-dismissal from servicepetitioner alone found guilty for non
reporting election duty habitual of
misbehaving with other police man and
public in drunken state-while dispense
with departmental enquiry-No reason
recorded
dismissal
order-held
highly
unjustified-not
commensurate
with
alleged charges-order quashed.

Held: 8 & 12

In view of clause (b) of sub-rule (2) of
the Rule 8 of the Rules clearly shows
that the authority is empowered to
dismiss or remove a person without
initiating proper enquiry and disciplinary
proceedings, as contemplated by the
Rules provided he is satisfied that for
some
reason
it
is
not
reasonably
practicable to hold such enquiry but the
reasons have to be recorded in writing
by the authority concerned. In the
present case, there is not even a whisper
of any reason or ground as to why it was
not reasonably practicable to hold such
enquiry.

Thus I am of the view that disciplinary
authority while exercising its special
power to dispense with departmental
enquiry proceeding at the time of
dismissing the service of the petitioner
has failed to strictly comply with the
provisions as provided under Rule 8 (2) b
of the Rules and failed to record the
reasonable
ground,
which
is
highly
unjustified and the impugned order
dated 17.8.2005 (Annexure No.5 to the
writ petition) passed by respondent no.5
is liable to be struck down, consequently
the impugned order dated 9th October,
2005 passed by the respondent no.4 and
the order dated 12th December, 2005
passed
by
the
respondent
no.3
(Annexures No. 7 and 9 to the writ
petition respectively) are also liable to
be quashed.
Case law discussed:
2005 (1) ESC (HC)-505
1990 (20) SLR-488 (P of H)
1998 (1) UPLBEC-638
1994 (3) UPLBEC-638

(Delivered by Hon'ble V.C. Misra, J.)

1. Sri R.N. Rai, learned counsel for
the
petitioner
and
learned
standing
counsel on behalf of the respondents are
present. Counter and rejoinder affidavits
have been exchanged. On the joint request
of learned counsel for the parties, this writ
petition is being decided finally at the
admission stage in terms of the Rules of
the Court.

2. This writ petition has been filed
by the petitioner for quashing orders dated
17th August, 2005, passed by respondent
no.5, 9th October, 2005 passed by
respondent no.4 and 12th December, 2005
passed by respondent no.3 (Annexures
No. 5, 7 and 9 to the writ petition
respectively) and further for a direction to
the respondents to allow the petitioner to
work on the post of Constable in Civil