# Vansh Nigam & Anr v. Workmens Compensation Commissioner/ Collector Lakhimpur Kheri & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 2 ILRA 1565
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-02-27
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 12432 of 2025
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/vansh-nigam-anr-v-workmens-compensation-commissioner-collector-lakhimpur-kheri-54179
- **Pages:** 11

## Text

2 All.Vansh Nigam & Anr. Vs. Workmens Compensation Commissioner/Collector Lakhimpur Kheri
 & Ors.
1565
opposite party no.2 is entitled and in case the allottee has deposited any excess amount, the same
would not be refunded to it in furtherance of the order dated 07.11.2024.

44. The original allotment was made in favour of the opposite party no.2 on 24.11.2010. A
supplementary deed was executed on 29.04.2014 and registered on 29.04.2014 and a possession
certificate in respect of the revised land area was issued on 05.05.2014, as has been pleaded by
GNIDA itself in para 37 of the Writ Petition. Execution of lease deed in respect of land in respect
of which it has been held that GNIDA had no right to transfer and subsequent execution of a
correction deed decreasing the land area, was without any fault of the opposite party no. 2. The
lessee could not even prepare a development plan, what to say about execution of the plan, till a
possession certificate in respect of the revised land area was issued on 05.05.2014. Therefore, the
revisional authority has not committed any error or illegality.

45. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The orders dated 29.05.2024 (Annexure No.2 to the
petition) and 07.11.2024 (Annexure No.7 to the petition) passed by the Revisional Authority on the
review applications filed by the petitioner are set aside. The finding recorded in the order dated
19.10.2023, passed by the opposite party no.1 - the State Government, in Revision No.6430/77-423/01 Appeal/23, under Section 41(3) of U. P. Urban Development and Planning Act, 1973
(Annexure No.3 to the petition) that the lessee ' opposite party no. 2 is entitled to get zero period
benefit till execution and registration of the supplementary deed dated 29.04.2014 is upheld. The
direction for declaring zero period from 16.03.2016 to 04.08.2017 in respect of 9,937 square meter
land is set aside. The direction of the revisional authority regarding refund of stamp duty is also set
aside. The petitioner is directed to issue a revised demand notice by giving zero period benefit to
the opposite party no. 2 till execution and registration of the supplementary deed dated 29.04.2014
and giving a reasonable time to the opposite party to deposit the amount. In case the opposite party
deposits the amount as aforesaid, no coercive action shall be taken against it and the petitioner will
execute the requisite deeds/documents in favour of the opposite party no.2/its allottees in
accordance with the law.
----------
(2026) 2 ILRA 1565
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 27.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Writ C No. 12432 of 2025

Vansh Nigam & Anr. ...Petitioner
Versus
Workmens Compensation Commissioner/ Collector Lakhimpur Kheri & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for consideration
1566 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The petitioners' father died of electrocution in 2015, leaving behind two minor children who were his sole
dependents. Upon attaining majority, they filed for compensation under the Public Liability Insurance Act,1991
which the collector initially rejected as time-barred under the statutory five year limitation period.

Headnotes
Civil law-Constitution of India, 1950- Public Liability Insurance Act,1991- Sections 5,6,7 and
Rule 5-Limitation Act,1963-Sections 6, 8 and 29(2)-Condonation of delay for minors-Death due
to electrocution-Claim filed by minor dependents after attaining majority-Rejection by collector
as time-barred under five-year reflecting period of section 6(3)-The Collector functions as court
as the Act and Rules confer inherent powers under section 151 CPC-In the absence of express
exclusion, the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act apply to proceedings under this
special statute by virtue of section 29(2)-Petitioners being minors at the time of accident are
entitled to the benefit of section 6 and may institute the application within three years of the
cessation of legal disability-Impugned order quashed.(Para 19 to 24)

Held
The court held that the Collector functions as a "court" while adjudicating claims, as the the Public Liability
Insurance Act and rules confer inherent powers under section 151 of CPC. Consequently, Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act,1963 applies, as its provisions are not expressly excluded by the special statute. Petitioners who
were minors at the time of accident, are entitled to the benefit of section 6 and may file for relief within three
years of attaining majority. Furthermore, the Collector cannot dismiss a claim as time barred when he failed
his statutory duty under section 5 to verify the accident and invite applications. The impugned order was
quashed and the matter was remanded for a fresh decision on its merits. (E-6)

Case law Cited
Laxmi Engineering works Vs P.S.G.Industrial Institute: (1995) 3 SCC 583 & M/s Consolidated Engg.
Enterprises Vs Principal Secy. Irrigation Deptt. & Ors 2008(7) SCC 169, Vijay Madanlal Choudhary Vs Union of
India, Bhakra Beas Management Board Vs Excise & Taxation Officer: (2020) 17 SCC 692-referred to.

List of Acts
Constitution of India, 1950
Public Liability Insurance Act,1991
Limitation Act,1963
Code of Civil Procedure,1908

List of Keywords
Public Liability Insurance Act,1991, Limitation Act,1963, Legal Disability, Minority, Condonation of Delay,
Collector as a "Court", Inherent powers, Section 29(2) Applicability, Statutory Duty of Collector, Beneficial
legislation, Electrocution compensation.

Case Arising from
CIVIL JURISDICTION: WRIT-C No.- 12432 of 2025
 Vansh Nigam & Anr. Vs. Workmens Compensation Commissioner/Collector Lakhimpur Kheri &
3 Ors
From the judgment and order dated 27.02.2026 of the High Court of judicature at Allahabad.

Appearances for Parties
Adv. for Petitioner(s):-
Deo Raj Singh
Advs. for Respondent(s):-
C.S.C., Aprajita Bansal, Neerav Chitravanshi
2 All.Vansh Nigam & Anr. Vs. Workmens Compensation Commissioner/Collector Lakhimpur Kheri
 & Ors.
1567
(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Sri Deo Raj Singh, Advocate, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Aparajita
Bansal, Advocate, the learned counsel for the opposite parties.

2. The instant writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed
by the petitioners namely (i) Vansh Nigam, aged about 19 years, S/o Late Indresh Kumar and (ii)
Khushi Nigam, aged about 17 years, minor daughter of Late Indresh Kumar, through her brother
and guardian Vansh Nigam, aged about 19 years, challenging the validity of an order dated
05.06.2025 passed by the Collector, Lakhimpur Kheri, in Case No. 673 of 2024 under Section 6 of
the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 rejecting the petitioners' claim under Section 6 of the
Public Liability Insurance Act 1991.

3. Briefly stated, facts of the case are that the petitioners' father, Indresh Kumar expired on
28.04.2015 due to electrocution while he was merely 30 years of age. He used to run a beetle shop
cum provision store and also used to do cultivation. His income was Rs.20,000/- per month and he
was the sole earning member of his family. At the time death of their father, the petitioners were
aged 9 years and 7 years respectively.

4. When the petitioner no. 1 attained majority and the petitioner no. 2 was still a minor aged
16 years, they filed an application under Section 6 (3) of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991
before the Prescribed Authority / Collector, Kheri for claiming compensation under the aforesaid
Act. The opposite parties filed a written statement stating that no claim under Section 6(3) of the
aforesaid Act can be filed after the expiry of 5 years since the date of the accident and, therefore,
the suit is time-barred.

5. Upon this, the petitioners filed an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963
stating that they had filed a Miscellaneous Case No. 3 of 2016, under Order XXXIII, Rule 1 CPC
for permission to file a suit in forma pauperis. That suit was dismissed in default on 25.11.2023.
After the petitioner no.1 attained majority, he has filed the application under Section 6(3) of the
Public Liability Insurance Act without any further delay.

6. The Prescribed Authority / Collector has rejected the application by the impugned order
dated 05.06.2025 holding that an application under Section 6(3) of the Public Liability Insurance
Act can be entertained only within a period of 5 years since the date of the accident. The
application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act has been filed belatedly, and therefore, the same
cannot be allowed.

7. Challenging the validity of the aforesaid order, the learned counsel for the petitioner has
placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Laxmi Engineering
Works Vs. P.S.G. Industrial Institute: (1995) 3 SCC 583 and M/s Consolidated Engg. Enterprises
Vs. Principal Secy. Irrigation Deptt. and others: 2008 (7) SCC 169, which are on the point of
applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
1568 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

8. Per contra, Ms. Aprajita Bansal, the learned counsel for the opposite party has submitted
that Section 6(3) of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 permits entertaining applications under
Section 6(1) within a period of five years from the date of accident and it does not contain any
provision for condonation of delay for filing of application. She has submitted that the impugned
order does not suffer from any illegality.

9. Before proceeding to examine the validity of the impugned order, it would be appropriate to
have a look at some relevant provisions of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991, which are
being reproduced below:

'5. Verification and publication of accident by Collector.- Whenever it comes to the
notice of the Collector that an accident has occurred at any place within his jurisdiction, he shall
verify the occurrence of such accident and cause publicity to be given in such manner as he deems
fit for inviting applications under sub-section (1) of Section 6.

6. Application for claim for relief.'(1) An application for claim for relief may be made'

(a) by the person who has sustained the injury;

(b) by the owner of the property to which the damage has been caused;

(c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives
of the deceased; or

(d) by any agent duly authorised by such person or owner of such property or all or any
of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be:

Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any
such application for relief, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the
legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be
impleaded as respondents to the application.

(1-A) Where any damage has been caused to any public property or private property due
to manufacture, processing, treatment, package, storage, transportation, use, collection,
destruction, conversion, transfer or such other processes, of such hazardous substance, an
application for claim for restoration of the property may be made by the owner of the property or
such other person, as may be prescribed, to the Collector.

(2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector and shall be in
such form, contain such particulars and shall be accompanied by such documents as may be
prescribed.

(3) No application for relief shall be entertained unless it is made within five years of the
occurrence of the accident.'
2 All.Vansh Nigam & Anr. Vs. Workmens Compensation Commissioner/Collector Lakhimpur Kheri
 & Ors.
1569

7. Award of relief.'(1) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1) of Section 6, the
Collector shall, after giving notice of the application to the owner and after giving the parties an
opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, each of the claims, and may make an
award determining the amount of relief which appears to him to be just and specifying the person
or persons to whom such amount of relief shall be paid.

(2) The Collector shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned
expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award.

(3) When an award is made under this section,'

(a) the insurer, who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award and to the
extent specified in sub-section (2-B) of Section 4, shall, within a period of thirty days of the date of
announcement of the award, deposit that amount in such manner as the Collector may direct;

(b) the Collector shall arrange to pay from the Relief Fund, in terms of such award and
in accordance with the scheme made under Section 7-A, to the person or persons referred to in
sub-section (1) such amount as may be specified in that scheme;
(c) the owner shall, within such period, deposit such amount in such manner as the Collector may
direct.

(4) In holding any inquiry under sub-section (1), the Collector may, subject to any rules
made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as he thinks fit.

(5) The Collector shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking
evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and
production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed;
and the Collector shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and
Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).

(6) Where the insurer or the owner against whom the award is made under sub-section
(1) fails to deposit the amount of such award within the period specified under sub-section (3), such
amount shall be recoverable from the owner, or as the case may be, the insurer as arrears of land
revenue or of public demand.

(7) A claim for relief in respect of death of, or injury to, any person or damage to any
property shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and every endeavour shall be made to
dispose of such claim within three months of the receipt of the application for relief under subsection (1) of Section 6.

(8) Where an owner is likely to remove or dispose of his property with the object of
evading payment by him of any amount of the award, the Collector may, in accordance with the
provisions of Rules 1 to 4 of Order XXXIX of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908), grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act.
1570 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(9) Where the environment is affected or damaged due to manufacture, processing,
treatment, package, storage, transportation, use, collection, destruction, conversion, transfer or
such other processes, of such hazardous substance, the Central Government may, on an
application made by the Central Pollution Control Board or the State Pollution Control Board, as
the case may be, allocate the fund from the Environmental Relief Fund for restoration of the
damage so caused in the manner as may be prescribed.'

10. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 23 of the Public Liability Insurance Act,
1991, the Central Government has framed the'Public Liability Insurance Rules, 1991, Rule 5
whereof is as follows:

'5. Powers of Collector.'(i) The Collector may follow such summary procedure for
conducting an inquiry on an application for relief under the Act, as he thinks fit.

(ii) The Collector shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the following purposes
namely:'

(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath.

(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;

(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;

(d) subject to the provisions of Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
requisitioning any public record or document or copy of such record or document from any office;

(e) issuing commissions for the examining of witness or documents;

(f) dismissing an application for default or proceeding ex-parte;

(g) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed
by it ex parte;

(h) inherent powers of a civil court preserved under Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.'

11. It is also important to note that there is no provision in the Public Liability Insurance Act
which prohibits applicability of the Limitation Act to proceedings under the Act.

12. Section 5 of the Public Liability Insurance Act casts a statutory duty upon the Collector
that upon coming to know about the occurrence of an accident, he should himself verify the
occurrence of such accident and thereafter he should invite applications under Section 6(1) of the
Act for claiming relief under the Act by making a proper publication. There is nothing on record to
indicate that the Collector has performed this statutory duty by making any publication inviting
applications after the accident in which the petitioners aged 9 and 7 years had lost their father.
2 All.Vansh Nigam & Anr. Vs. Workmens Compensation Commissioner/Collector Lakhimpur Kheri
 & Ors.
1571

13. As the Public Liability Insurance Act is a special Act, Section 6(3) whereof provides the
limitation period of five years for filing an application under Section 6(1) of the Act, which is
different from the limitation period of three years prescribed by the Schedule for suits claiming
money decrees, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if the period of five years was the period
prescribed by the Schedule under the Limitation Act and for the purpose of determining any period
of limitation prescribed for an application under Section 6(1) of the Public Liability Insurance Act,
the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 shall apply as they are not expressly excluded by any
provision of the Public Liability Insurance Act.

14. One more aspect needs to be examined, and that is that the Limitation Act normally
applies to Courts and not Tribunals. In this regard, it becomes important to keep in mind the
provisions of Section 7 (5) of the Public Liability Insurance Act, which provides that the Collector
shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of
enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of
documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the
Collector shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter
XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). The most important thing is that Rule
5 (ii) (h) of the'Public Liability Insurance Rules, 1991, provides the Collector shall have the
inherent powers of a civil court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Civil
Courts' inherent powers under Section 151 C.P.C. are not conferred upon tribunals and it is the
single most important feature which indicates that while performing adjudicatory functions under
the Public Liability Insurance Act, the Collector functions as a Court so as to make the provisions
of the Limitation Act applicable to it.

15. In the case of'Vijay Madanlal Choudhary'v.'Union of India,'2022 SCC OnLine SC 929,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to a King's Bench judgment in the case of'Seaford Court
Estates ld., which is as follows: -

'274.'We may profitably advert to the judgment in'Seaford Court Estates ld.'[1949] 2 K.B.
481, which states:

''A judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the
language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have
been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of
Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a
defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to
work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not
only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions
which gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must
supplement the written word so as to give 'force and life' to the intention of the legislature.'That
was clearly laid down by the resolution of the judges in'Heydon's case,'(1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a, and it
is the safest guide today. Good practical advice on the subject was given about the same time by
Plowden in his second volume'Eyston'v.'Studd'(1574) 2 Plowden 465.'Put into homely metaphor it
is this: A judge should ask himself the question: If the makers of the Act had themselves come
across this ruck in the texture of it, how would they have straightened it out? He must then do as
1572 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which it is woven, but he can and
should iron out the creases.' (Emphasis added)

16. The Public Liability Insurance Act is a beneficial legislation which has been enacted to
provide for public liability insurance for the purpose of providing immediate relief to the persons
affected by accidents covered under the provisions of the Act. Section 5 of the Public Liability
Insurance Act casts a statutory duty upon the Collector that upon coming to know about the
occurrence of an accident, he should himself verify the occurrence of such accident and thereafter
he should invite applications under Section 6(1) of the Act for claiming relief under the Act by
making a proper publication. Therefore, its provisions should be interpreted in a manner which
would be in consonance with the object of the Act. It could never have been the intention of the
framers of the Public Liability Insurance Act that the benefits under the Act will be denied to minor
children of a deceased victim of an accident merely because they were minors and due to this legal
disability, they could not file the application within that period and when they filed the application
immediately after attaining majority, the limitation period of five years mentioned in Section 6(3)
of the Act had expired.

17. Therefore I hold that the Prescribed Authority / Collector acts as a Court and applicability
of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 to an application under Section 6(1) of the Public
Liability Insurance Act is not barred.

18. Now I proceed to examine certain relevant provisions of the Limitation Act, which are
being reproduced below: -

'Section 6 - Legal disability

(1) Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of
a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or
an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability
has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefore in the third
column of the Schedule.

(2) Where such person is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned,
affected by two such disability, or where, before his disability has ceased, he is affected by another
disability, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after both
disabilities have ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified.

(3) Where the disability continues up to the death of that person, his legal representative
may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the death, as would
otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified.

(4) Where the legal representative referred to in sub-section (3) is, at the date of the
death of the person whom he represents, affected by any such disability, the rules contained subsections (1) and (2) shall apply.
2 All.Vansh Nigam & Anr. Vs. Workmens Compensation Commissioner/Collector Lakhimpur Kheri
 & Ors.
1573

(5) Where a person under disability dies after the disability ceases but within the period
allowed to him under this section, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the
application within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have been available to that
person had he not died.

Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, 'minor' includes a child in the womb.'

Section 7 - Disability of one of several persons

Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for
the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the
concurrence of such person, time will run against them all; but, where no such discharge can be
given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such
discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased.

Explanation I.-- This section applies to a discharge from every kind of liability, including
a liability in respect of any immovable property.

Explanation II.-- For the purposes of this section, the manager of a Hindu undivided
family governed by the Mitakshara law shall be deemed to be capable of giving a discharge
without the concurrence of the other members of the family only if he is in management of the joint
family property.

Section 8 - Special exceptions

Nothing in section 6 or in section 7 applies to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption, or
shall be deemed to extend, for more than three years from the cessation of the disability or the
death of the person affected thereby, the period of limitation for any suit or application.'

Section 29 - Savings

(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25'of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of
1872).

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a
period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of
section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the
purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by
any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only
in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local
law.

(3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to
marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any
such law.
1574 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(4) Section 25 and 26'and the definition of "easement" in section 2'shall not apply to
cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may for the
time being extend.'

19. In'Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Excise & Taxation Officer: (2020) 17 SCC 692,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the provisions contained in Section 29(2) of the Limitation
Act would be attracted where there is no express exclusion or by implication.

20. In'Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt. (supra) it was held that: -

"20.'Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act inter alia provides that where any special or
local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the
period of limitation prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such
period was the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions
contained in Sections 4 to 24 shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent, they are not expressly
excluded by such special or local law'.'

21. As the petitioners were minors at the time of the accident in which they lost their father,
they certainly have the right to file the application within a period of three years after attaining
majority, as per the provisions contained in Sections 6 and 8 of the Limitation Act.

22. It is also to be kept in mind that at the time of the accident, the petitioners were children
aged 9 and 7 years and due to legal disability they could not file an application for claiming
compensation for death of their father and for their failure to file an application during their
disability due to minority, the Collector has rejected their application as barred by limitation period
whereas the Collector himself is guilty of non-performance of his statutory duty under Section 5 of
the Public Liability Insurance Act which requires that after coming to know about the occurrence of
an accident, the Collector should himself verify the occurrence of an accident and thereafter he
should invite applications under Section 6(1) of the Act for claiming relief under the Act by making
a proper publication.

23. Therefore, the Collector has committed a legal error in dismissing the application under
Section 6(1) of the Public Liability Insurance Act as barred by the period of limitation of five years
as provided in Section 6(3) of the Act.

24. In view of the foregoing discussion, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated
05.06.2025 passed by the District Magistrate / Collector Lakhimpur Kheri in Case No. 673 of 2024
under Section 6 of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 , rejecting the petitioners' claim under
Section 6 of the Public Liability Insurance Act 1991 as time barred, is quashed. The matter is
remanded to the Prescribed Authority / Collector Lakhimpur Kheri for being decided afresh on its
merits in accordance with the law, expeditiously, without granting any unnecessary adjournment to
any of the party keeping in view the provision contained in Section 7(7) of the Public Liability
Insurance Act, which mandates that a claim for relief in respect of death of any person shall be
disposed of as expeditiously as possible and every endeavour shall be made to dispose of such
2 All. Shailesh Kumar Yadav IPS Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
1575
claim within three months of the receipt of the application for relief under sub-section (1) of
Section 6.
----------
(2026) 2 ILRA 1575
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.
THE HON'BLE MRS. SWARUPAMA CHATURVEDI, J.

Writ C No. 27261 of 2007

Shailesh Kumar Yadav IPS ...Petitioner
Versus
U.O.I. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for consideration
The matter involves an IPS officer challenging CIC orders that imposed a maximum penalty and
recommended disciplinary action for a 145-day delay in providing RTI information.

Headnotes
Civil law-Constitution of India,1950-Article 226-Right to Information Act,2005-Sections 20(1) &
20(2)-Penalty and Disciplinary Action-Applicability-Pre conditions for penalty-Requirement of
"without reasonable cause" or "mala fide" intent-Delay of 145 days in furnishing informationStaff shortage and heavy workload justifying delay-Imposing maximum penalty of Rs. 25000
without awaiting the directed inquiry report is a procedural impropriety-Disparaging remarks
and pre-determined bias by Information Commissioner is against the natural justiceAllowed.(Para 16 to 36)
Held
The court held that Section 20 of the RTI Act does not mandate a penalty for every delay, the Commission
must first form a reasoned opinion that the officer acted without "reasonable cause" or with "mala fide"
intent. Mere institutional negligence or delays caused by staff shortages and heavy workloads do not
constitute "persistent default" as required for disciplinary recommendations under section 20(2).The CIC
committed procedural impropriety by imposing the maximum penalty of Rs. 25000 without awaiting the
results of its own directed inquiry report. Disparaging remarks made by the Information Commissioner against
the petitioner reflected a pre-determined bias and a lack of impartiality, violating the principles of natural
justice. The court quashed the impugned orders finding them arbitrary and legally unsustainable. (E-6)

Case law Cited
Manohar Vs State of Maharashtra, (2012) 13 SCC 14, Yudhister VS State Information Commission Haryana &
Ors, 2017 SCC OnLine P&H 6592, Shailesh Kumar Yadav Vs Union of India & Ors, Special Leave to Appeal (C)
No. 10430 of 2009-referred to.

List of Acts
Constitutions of India, 1950
Right to Information Act, 2005

List of Keywords