# Vanshraj Sharma v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 9 ILRA 900
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-09-20
- **Case number:** Writ A No.18864 of 2016
- **Bench:** Rajnish Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/vanshraj-sharma-v-state-of-u-p-ors-49285
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

in 1995-interim order for salary in 1994the
said
Writ
dismissed
for
non
prosecution-Petitioner not entitled for any
benefit except the salary as directed.

W.P. dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

900 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the last selected candidates as the posts
which were vacant due to non joining of
the selected candidates was to be filled
from the list already available with the
respondents, wherein the petitioners have
obtained less than the tie break marks of
113.75.

35. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, this Court finds no good ground
to interfere in this matter.

36. Accordingly, the writ petition is
dismissed.
----------
(2022) 9 ILRA 900
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 20.09.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJNISH KUMAR, J.

Writ A No.18864 of 2016

Vanshraj Sharma ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Amar Nath Dubey, Sri Anurag Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Petitioner seeks seniority from date of
getting salary-appointed on regular basis
in 1995-interim order for salary in 1994the
said
Writ
dismissed
for
non
prosecution-Petitioner not entitled for any
benefit except the salary as directed.

W.P. dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Kunhayammed & ors. Vs St. of Kerala & anr.;
(2000) 6 SCC 359
2. Civil Appeal No. 2417 of 2022; St. of U.P. &
ors. Vs Prem Chopra

3. Sanjay K. Sinha-II & ors. Vs St. of Bihar &
ors.; (2004) 10 SCC 734,

4. Rashi Mani Mishra & ors. Vs St. of U.P. & ors.;
2021 SCC Online SC 509

5. Malook Singh & ors. Vs St. of Punj. & ors.;
Civil Appeal No.6026-6028 of 2021
(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajnish Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Sri Anurag Singh, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri Pratyush
Tripathi, learned Additional Chief Standing
Counsel.

2. By means of the present writ
petition, the petitioner has assailed the
order dated 13.07.2016 passed by the Chief
Conservator of Forest, Southern Region,
U.P.,
Allahabad,
by
which
the
representation of the petitioner dated
23.04.2016
has
been
rejected.
The
petitioner has further prayed for a direction
to the opposite party nos. 1 to 5 to provide
seniority to the petitioner from February
1994.

3. It would be apt to refer the brief
facts of the case for adjudication of the case
in hand. Initially, the petitioner was
engaged on daily wage basis on the post of
Driver in the Forest Department. He
approached this Court by means of Writ
Petition No.307(S/S) of 1994 claiming his
regularization. The interim order was
passed in the writ petition on 21.01.1994,
by means of which it was provided that the
opposite parties shall consider the matter of
regularization of the petitioner and the
petitioner shall be paid salary in the regular
scale of pay as admissible to the driver
until further orders. In pursuance thereof, a
Selection Committee was constituted and in
9 All. Vanshraj Sharma Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
901
pursuance of the report of the Selection
Committee, the petitioner was appointed on
the post of driver by means of the order
dated 25.01.1995 in the pay scale of 9501500 and he was paid the regular salary by
the Divisional Director, Social Forestry
Division Pratapgarh. The said order was
passed subject to final outcome of the
pending writ petition. The services of the
petitioner were confirmed vide order dated
06.02.2009. The aforesaid writ petition was
dismissed for want of prosecution on
18.01.2013.

4. The petitioner again approached this
Court
by
means
of
Writ
Petition
No.7632(S/S) of 2009 for payment of regular
salary w.e.f February 1994 to 25.01.1995 in
compliance of the interim order dated
29.01.1994
passed
in
Writ
Petition
No.307(S/S) of 1994. In the said writ petition,
learned counsel for the petitioner after
arguing at some length restricted his prayer
for a direction to the extent that for redressal
of his grievance, the petitioner may be
permitted to make a fresh representation to
the opposite party no.5 therein and he may be
directed to consider and decide the same
within some stipulated period. Accordingly,
the writ petition was disposed of by means of
the order dated 19.11.2019, without entering
into the merits of the case, with liberty to the
petitioner to make a fresh representation to
the opposite party no.5 and the opposite party
no.5 was directed to consider and decide the
representation, in case the petitioner moves
representation within 10 days, by a reasoned
and speaking order as per law. In pursuance
thereof, representation was decided and the
petitioner was paid remaining salary w.e.f.
01.02.1994 to 25.01.1995.

5.

The
petitioner
preferred
a
representation on 10.01.2014 for correction
of his seniority and claiming seniority from
01.02.1994
on
the
ground
that
the
petitioner has been given regular pay scale
since February 1994 in compliance of order
passed by this Court on 29.01.1994 in Writ
Petition No.307(S/S) of 1994 and the
regular appointment has been given to the
petitioner on 25.01.1995, therefore he is
entitled for seniority w.e.f. 01.02.1994. The
petitioner again preferred a representation
on 17.11.2015. However, though some
recommendations were made but the
petitioner was not given the seniority and
the tentative seniority list was issued on
22.03.2016, in which the petitioner was
placed at serial No.19 on the basis of the
date of appointment i.e. 25.01.1995. The
objections were called from the employees.
The
petitioner
also
filed
objection.
Thereafter he again approached this Court
by means of Writ Petition No.7976(S/S) of
2016, which was disposed of by means of
order dated 13.04.2016. The order dated
13.04.2016 is extracted here-in-below:

"Heard learned counsel for the
parties.

Let the petitioner implead the
Chief
Conservation
Officers,
Forest
Division, U.P. Allahabad as opposite party
in the writ petition during the course of the
day.

Let the newly impleaded opposite
party no. 6 consider and take a decision on
the recommendation of the opposite party
no. 5 in accordance with rules, if there is
no other legal impediment. If in the process
of considering the same it is found that the
seniority of other persons would be affected
then the benefit of seniority placement as
claimed shall not be given to the petitioner
unless an opportunity to submit objection is
provided to the affected persons and then
objections are considered as per law. The
902 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
officer shall also verify the relevant facts as
regards the validity of the petitioner's
appointment/ regularization and the result
of Writ Petition No. 307(SS) of 1994. All
pleas are open for being considered by
him. This exercise shall be completed
within a period of three months from the
date a certified copy of this order is
submitted.

With the aforesaid observations,
the writ petition is disposed of. There shall
be no orders as costs."

6. In pursuance of the aforesaid order
passed by this Court on 13.04.2016, the case
of the petitioner has been considered and the
representation, filed in pursuance to the
aforesaid order, on 23.04.2016 has been
rejected by means of the impugned order
dated 13.07.2016, contained in Annexure No.
1 to the writ petition, providing therein that
the petitioner shall remain at serial No.19 of
the Zonal Seniority List. Being aggrieved by
the said order, the petitioner has approached
this Court by means of the present writ
petition assailing the said order.

7. Submission of learned counsel for
the petitioner is that the petitioner was treated
as a regular employee in compliance of the
order dated 21.09.1994 passed in Writ
Petition No.307 (S/S) of 1994 and paid salary
in regular Pay-Scale w.e.f. 01.02.1994 but the
petitioner has not been given seniority from
that date, whereas the petitioner was
appointed on regular basis on the basis of said
interim order on 25.01.1995, therefore he is
entitled for seniority from February 1994.
Thus the impugned order is not sustainable
and liable to be quashed.

8. Learned Additional Chief Standing
Counsel, while opposing the submission of
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner,
submitted that the salary in regular payscale was paid to the petitioner only in
compliance of the interim order passed by
this Court as he was working on daily wage
basis, however he was appointed on regular
basis on 25.01.1995, therefore he is entitled
for seniority only from that date. He further
submitted that the said writ petition was
dismissed for non-prosecution, therefore
the claim made in the said writ petition was
not adjudicated, therefore the petitioner is
not entitled for any benefit of the interim
order except the salary which has already
been paid. He further submitted that the
petitioner was appointed on 25.01.1995 and
he is entitled for all service benefits
including seniority and has been given
from the said date. The impugned order has
rightly been passed in accordance with law.
The writ petition is mis-conceived and
liable to be dismissed.

9. I have considered the submissions
of learned counsel for the parties and
perused the records.

10. The issue involved in this case is
as to whether the petitioner is entitled for
seniority w.e.f. 25.01.1995, the date of
appointment of the petitioner or from
February 1994, from when the petitioner
has been paid salary in regular pay scale in
compliance of interim order passed by this
Court in Writ Petition No.307 (S/S) of
1994, while the petitioner was working on
daily wage basis.

11. The petitioner was initially
appointed, on the post of driver in the
Forest Department, on daily wage basis. It
appears that the petitioner was not being
regularized, therefore he approached this
Court
by
means
of
Writ
Petition
No.307(S/S) of 1994. An interim order was
passed in the said writ petition on
9 All. Vanshraj Sharma Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
903
29.01.1994 and the opposite parties were
directed
to
consider
the
matter
of
regularization of the petitioner. Further
direction was issued that the petitioner shall
be paid salary in the regular scale of pay as
admissible to the driver until further orders.
In
pursuance
thereof,
a
Selection
Committee
was
constituted
and
the
petitioner was considered by the Selection
Committee for appointment and on the
basis of the report of the Selection
Committee, the petitioner was appointed on
the post of driver under the Drivers Service
Rules by means of the order dated
25.01.1995 and paid salary in the regular
scale of pay. The writ Petition No.307 (S/S)
of 1994 was dismissed for non-prosecution
on 18.01.2013. Therefore the issue as to
whether the petitioner was
regularly
appointed or not and he is entitled for
regularization
from
a
date
prior
to
25.01.1995 or not, has not been adjudicated
by this Court, whereas the petitioner has
been appointed after due selection by
means of the order dated 25.01.1995.

12. The petitioner approached this
Court by means of Writ Petition No.7632
(S/S) of 2009 for a direction to the opposite
parties to pay regular pay scale w.e.f.
February
1994
to
25.01.1995,
in
compliance of the interim order dated
21.01.1994 passed in Writ Petition No.307
(S/S) of 1994. The said writ petition was
disposed of vide order dated 19.11.2009 on
a request made by learned counsel for the
petitioner, without entering into the merits
of the case, with liberty to the petitioner to
move fresh representation and direction
was issued to consider and dispose of the
representation of the petitioner. Therefore
the order passed by this Court in the said
writ petition was only to the extent of
payment of salary w.e.f. February 1994 to
25.01.1995 in the regular pay scale of
driver in compliance of interim order dated
21.01.1994.
The
respondents,
in
compliance of the aforesaid order dated
19.11.2009,
passed
the
order
dated
27.05.2010 and paid the difference of
salary in the regular pay scale paid between
February 1994 to 25.01.1995 in compliance
of the order dated 21.01.1994, which was
received by the petitioner.

13. The seniority of the petitioner was
fixed at serial No.19 in the seniority list of
Southern Zone, U.P., Allahabad. Though
some recommendations were made for
giving seniority to the petitioner w.e.f.
February 1994 but no decision was taken,
therefore the petitioner approached this
Court
by
means
of
Writ
petition
No.7976(S/S) of 2016 (Vanshraj Sharma
versus State of U.P. and others). The said
writ petition was disposed of by means of
order dated 13.04.2016, which has been
reproduced above in paragraph 5 with
direction to the newly impleaded opposite
party no.6 i.e. Chief Conservation Officer,
Forest Division, U.P. Allahabad to consider
and take decision on the recommendation
of the opposite party no.5 therein, in
accordance with the Rules, if there is no
other legal impediment. It was also
provided that if in the process of
considering the same, it is found that the
seniority of other persons would be
affected, then the benefit of seniority and
placement as claimed shall not be given to
the petitioner unless an opportunity to
submit objection is provided to the affected
persons and then objections are considered
as per law. It was also specifically provided
in the order dated 13.04.2016 passed by
this Court in the aforesaid writ petition that
the officer shall also verify the relevant
facts as regards the validity of the
petitioner's appointment/ reguarlization and
the result of writ petition No.307 (S/S) of
904 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1994. Therefore it is apparent that the case
of the petitioner for seniority w.e.f.
February 1994 was to be considered in the
light of the result of the writ petition
No.307 (S/S) of 1994, which was dismissed
for non-prosecution on 18.01.2013. In
pursuance of the aforesaid order, the
petitioner preferred a representation on
23.04.2016.

14. The representation of the
petitioner has been considered by the
respondent No.4 and rejected by means of
the order dated 13.07.2016, impugned in
this writ petition. The respondent no.4 has
recorded that the Writ Petition No.307(S/S)
of 1994 was dismissed for non-prosecution
on 18.01.2013.

15. Admittedly, the petitioner has
been appointed on regular basis by means
of the order dated 25.01.1995, therefore
merely on the ground that an interim order
was passed by this Court on 01.02.1994 in
the writ petition filed by the petitioner for
payment of salary in the regular pay scale
does not entitle him seniority from the date,
the same was paid by the respondents under
the interim order passed by this Court. The
writ petition was dismissed for nonprosecution, therefore as to whether the
petitioner has been appointed regularly or
not or as to whether he is entitled for
regularization prior to 25.01.1995 has not
been adjudicated upon by this Court,
therefore once the writ petition was
dismissed, any interim order passed therein
would have no effect except for the
direction issued by the order because there
cannot be two orders governing the field at
a time and the interim order merges into
final order.

16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Kunhayammed and others versus
State of Kerala and another; (2000) 6 SCC
359, while considering the doctrine of
merger has held that there cannot be more
than one operative orders governing the
same subject matter at a given point of
time.

17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in
a recent judgment and order dated
25.03.2022 passed in Civil Appeal No.
2417 of 2022; State of U.P. and others
versus Prem Chopra, has held that once
the proceedings, wherein a stay was
granted, are dismissed, any interim order
granted earlier in the said proceedings
merges with the final order, therefore the
interim order comes to an end with the
dismissal
of
the
proceedings.
The
relevant paragraph 24 is extracted herein-below:-

"24. From the above discussion,
it is clear that imposition of a stay on the
operation of an order means that the order
which has been stayed would not be
operative from the date of passing of the
stay order. However, it does not mean that
the stayed order is wiped out from the
existence, unless it is quashed. Once the
proceedings, wherein a stay was 7 granted,
are dismissed, any interim order granted
earlier merges with the final order. In other
words, the interim order comes to an end
with the dismissal of the proceedings. In
such a situation, it is the duty of the Court
to put the parties in the same position they
would have been but for the interim order
of the court, unless the order granting
interim stay or final order dismissing the
proceedings specifies otherwise. On the
dismissal of the proceedings or vacation of
the interim order, the beneficiary of the
interim order shall have to pay interest on
the amount withheld or not paid by virtue
of the interim order."
9 All. Vanshraj Sharma Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
905

18. Thus the petitioner is not entitled
for any benefit on account of the interim
order except the salary as directed, which
has been paid to the petitioner.

19. The definition of substantive
appointment given under the Rules of 1991
is, "substantive appointment" means an
appointment,
not
being
an
ad
hoc
appointment, on a post in the cadre of the
service, made after selection in accordance
with the service rules relating to that
service. Therefore the seniority can be
reckoned only from the date of substantive
appointment and the period of service, on
the basis of appointment made dehors the
Rules, cannot be counted for the purpose of
seniority. In the present case, initially the
petitioner was appointed on daily wage
basis, which is made only in exigencies of
service.

20. It is also noticed by this Court that
while considering the case of the petitioner
in compliance of order passed by this
Court, an explanation was also called from
Sri Inder Prasad, who is at serial No.18 of
the seniority list. He, in his objection, has
stated that he was appointed on regular
basis on 28.02.1994 and the petitioner is
junior to him. Therefore the petitioner, who
was
appointed
on
regular
basis
on
25.01.1995 cannot be given seniority over
and above him.

21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in
the case of Sanjay K. Sinha-II and others
versus State of Bihar and others; (2004)
10 SCC 734, has held that it is settled law
that appointments made contrary to the
rules are merely fortuitous and do not
confer
benefit
of
seniority
on
the
appointees
over
and
above
the
regular/substantive
appointees
to
the
service.

22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in
the case of Rashi Mani Mishra and others
versus State of U.P. and others; 2021 SCC
Online SC 509, considering the Rules of
1991 has held that as per Seniority Rules
1991, applicable in the present case,
seniority is to be counted from the date of
"substantive appointment" and "substantive
appointment" means, an appointment, not
being an ad hoc appointment.

23.

Relying
on
the
aforesaid
judgment, recently the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Malook Singh and
others versus State of Punjab and others;
Civil Appeal No.6026-6028 of 2021, by
means of the judgment and order dated
28.09.2021, has held that seniority which
has to be counted from "substantive
appointment" would not include ad hoc
service. Relevant paragraph 20 of the
judgment is extracted here-in-below:-

"20. The law on the issue of
whether the period of ad hoc service can be
counted for the purpose of determining
seniority has been settled by this Court in
multiple cases. In Direct Recruits (supra),
a Constitution Bench of this Court has
observed:

"13. When the cases were taken
up for hearing before us, it was faintly
suggested that the principle laid down in
Patwardhan case [(1977) 3 SCC 399: 1977
SCC (L&S) 391: (1977) 3 SCR 775] was
unsound and fit to be overruled, but no
attempt was made to substantiate the plea.
We were taken through the judgment by the
learned counsel for the parties more than
once and we are in complete agreement
with the ratio decidendi, that the period of
continuous officiation by a government
servant, after his appointment by following
the
rules
applicable
for
substantive
906 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
appointments, has to be taken into account
for determining his seniority; and seniority
cannot be determined on the sole test of
confirmation, for, as was pointed out,
confirmation is one of the inglorious
uncertainties
of
government
service
depending neither on efficiency of the
incumbent nor on the availability of
substantive vacancies. The principle for
deciding inter se seniority has to conform
to the principles of equality spelt out by
Articles 14 and 16. If an CA 602628/2021 appointment is made by way of
stop-gap arrangement, without considering
the claims of all the eligible available
persons and without following the rules of
appointment, the experience on such
appointment cannot be equated with the
experience of a regular appointee, because
of
the
qualitative
difference
in
the
appointment. To equate the two would be to
treat two unequals as equal which would
violate the equality clause. But if the
appointment is made after considering the
claims of all eligible candidates and the
appointee
continues
in
the
post
uninterruptedly till the regularization of his
service in accordance with the rules made
for regular substantive appointments, there
is no reason to exclude the officiating
service for purpose of seniority. Same will
be the position if the initial appointment
itself is made in accordance with the rules
applicable to substantive appointments as
in the present case. To hold otherwise will
be discriminatory and arbitrary.....

47. To sum up, we hold that

(A) Once an incumbent is
appointed to a post according to a rule, his
seniority has to counted from the date of
appointment and not according to date of
his confirmation. The corollary to the
above rule is that where the initial
appointment is only ad hoc and not
according to rules and made as a stop-gap
arrangement, the officiation in such post
cannot be taken into account considering
the seniority." (emphasis supplied)

The decision in Direct Recruits
(supra) stands for the principle that ad hoc
service cannot be counted for determining
the seniority if the initial appointment has
been made as a stop gap arrangement and
not according to rules. The reliance placed
by the Single Judge in the judgement dated
6 December 1991 on Direct Recruits
(supra) to hold that the ad hoc service
should be counted for conferring the
benefit of seniority in the present case is
clearly misplaced. This principle laid down
in Direct Recruits (supra) was subsequently
followed by this Court in Keshav Chandra
Joshi v. Union of India15. Recently a two
judge Bench of this Court inRashi Mani
Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh16, of
which one of us (Justice DY Chandrachud)
was a part, observed that the services
rendered by ad hoc employees prior to
their regularization cannot be counted for
the purpose of seniority while interpreting
the Uttar Pradesh Regularization of Ad
Hoc Appointment Rules. This Court noted
that
under
the
applicable
Rules,
"substantive appointment" does not include
ad hoc appointment and thus seniority
which has to be counted from "substantive
appointment" would not include ad hoc
service. This Court also clarified that the
judgement in Direct Recruits (supra)
cannot be relied upon to confer the benefit
of seniority based on ad hoc service since it
clearly states that ad hoc appointments
made as stop gap arrangements do not
render the ad hoc service eligible for
determining seniority. This Court speaking
through Justice MR Shah made the
following observations:
9 All. Vanshraj Sharma Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
907

"36. The sum and substance of
the above discussion would be that on a
fair reading of the 1979 Rules, extended
from time to time; initial appointment
orders in the year 1985 and the subsequent
order of regularization in the year 1989 of
the ad hoc appointees and on a fair reading
of the relevant Service Rules, namely
Service Rules, 1993 and the Seniority
Rules, 1991, our conclusion would be that
the services rendered by the ad hoc
appointees prior to their regularization as
per the 1979 Rules shall not be counted for
the purpose of seniority, vis-à-vis, the
direct recruits who were appointed prior to
1989 and they are not entitled to seniority
from the date of their initial appointment in
the year 1985. The resultant effect would
be that the subsequent re- determination of
the seniority in the year 2016 cannot be
sustained which was considering the
services rendered by ad hoc appointees
prior to 1989, i.e., from the date of their
initial appointment in 1985. This cannot be
sustained and the same deserves to be
quashed and set aside and the seniority list
of 2001 counting the services rendered by
ad hoc appointees from the date of their
regularization in the year 1989 is to be
restored.

37. Now so far as the reliance
placed upon the decision of this Court in
the case of Direct Recruit Class II
Engg.Officers' Assn. (supra), relied upon
by the learned Senior Advocate appearing
on behalf of the ad hoc appointees is
concerned, it is required to be noted that
even in the said decision also, it is observed
and held that where initial appointment
was made only ad hoc as a stop gap
arrangement and not according to the
rules, the officiation in such post cannot be
taken into account for considering the
seniority. In the case before this Court, the
appointments were made to a post
according to rule but as ad hoc and
subsequently they were confirmed and to
that this Court observed and held that
where appointments made in accordance
with the rules, seniority is to be counted
from the date of such appointment and not
from the date of confirmation. In the
present case, it is not the case of
confirmation of the service of ad hoc
appointees in the year 1989. In the year
1989, their services are regularized after
following due procedure as required under
the 1979 Rules and after their names were
recommended by the Selection Committee
constituted under the 1979 Rules. As
observed hereinabove, the appointments in
the year 1989 after their names were
recommended by the Selection Committee
constituted as per the 1979 Rules can be
said to be the "substantive appointments".
Therefore, even on CA 6026-28/2021 facts
also, the decision in the case of Direct
Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn.
(supra) shall not be applicable to the facts
of the case on hand. At the cost of
repetition, it is observed that the decision
of this Court in the case of Direct Recruit
Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. (supra) was
considered by this Court in the case of
Santosh Kumar (supra) when this Court
interpreted the very 1979 Rules."

The notification dated 3 May
1977 stated that the ad hoc appointments
were made in administrative interest in
anticipation of regular appointments and on
account of delay that takes place in making
regular appointment through the concerned
agencies. In this regard, the vacancies were
notified to the Employment Exchange or
advertisements were issued, as the case
maybe, by appointing authorities. The
appointments were not made on the
recommendation of the Punjab Subordinate
908 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Service
Selection
Board.
However,
subsequently a policy decision was made to
regularize the ad hoc appointees since their
ouster after a considerable period of service
would have entailed hardship. Thus, the
initial appointment was supposed to be a
stop gap arrangement, besides being not in
accordance with the rules, and the ad hoc
service cannot be counted for the purpose
of seniority."

24. In view of above, this Court is of
the view that the petitioner is entitled for
seniority only from the date of his
substantive appointment on 25.01.1995,
which has been made after considering his
case by the Selection Committee in
accordance with law. Therefore this Court
is of the view that there is no illegality or
error in the impugned order challenged in
the present writ petition. The writ petition
has been filed on mis-conceived grounds
and it lacks merit.

25.

The
writ
petition
is,
accordingly,dismissed. No order as to
costs.
----------
(2022) 9 ILRA 908
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.07.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.

Writ A No.9842 of 2022

Seema Gupta ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Awadh Behari Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Civil Law - Intermediate Act, 1921Regulation
no.
103-Compassionate
Appointment-Petitioner's
claim
for
Compassionate Appointment rejected-on the
ground that she is divorced daughter of the
deceased employee-does not come within
definition of 'Family' under rule no.103 of
Act,1921-exclusion of a daughter on the basis of
her marital status is against the specific
provision of the Constitution-Regulation no. 103
against Article 14 and 15.

W.P. allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

Smt. Vimla Srivastava Vs St. of U.P. & anr.
reported in 2015(4) UPLBEC 3388
(Delivered by Hon'ble Manish Mathur, J.)

1.

Heard
learned
counsel
for
petitioner and learned State Counsel
appearing on behalf of respondents no. 1
and 2.

2. In view of order being proposed to
be passed, notices to respondents no.3 and
4 stand dispensed with.

3. Petition has been filed assailing the
order dated 06.06.2022 passed by the
District Inspector of Schools concerned
whereby petitioner's representation for
compassionate
appointment
has
been
rejected on the ground that she is divorced
daughter of the deceased employee and
therefore does not come within the
definition of 'Family' as envisaged under
Regulation No.103 of the Regulations
framed under the Intermediate Education
Act, 1921.

4. Learned counsel for petitioner
submits that the petitioner's father Late
Shiv Tahal Gupta was appointed Assistant