# Ved Prakash Saini & Ors v. State Of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 9 ILRA 468
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-09-23
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 35876 of 2022
- **Bench:** Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, Amitabh Kumar Rai
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ved-prakash-saini-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53914
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

references under Section 18 of the Act, 1894,
can seek redetermination of compensation
under Section 28-A based on enhanced awards
granted to similarly situated landowners under
the same acquisition notification ?

HEADNOTE
Land
acquisition
-
Re-determination
of
compensation - Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
Section 28-A - Beneficent legislation with the
object to remove inequality in compensation -
Landowners not filing reference under Section
18 held eligible to seek re-determination -
Limitation under Section 28-A computed from
the award relied upon for redetermination and
not from earlier set-aside awards - Right of
landowners to rely upon subsequent award
granting higher compensation recognized -
persons entitled to apply under Section 28-A are
not restricted to relying only on the earliest
award but can invoke the provision on the basis
of any subsequent award granting higher
compensation, provided the application is filed
within three months thereof - Objection of
limitation raised by acquisition beneficiary/KUMS
9 All. Ved Prakash Saini & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
469
rejected - Earlier enhancement order of 1990
having been set aside could not form basis for
limitation - Acceptance of compensation without
protest not a bar - Entitlement to statutory
benefits
including
solatium,
additional
compensation and interest affirmed - Direction
for implementation issued - Writ petition by
landowners allowed.
HELD
Court held that Section 28-A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 is a beneficent provision
which must be interpreted liberally to achieve its
object of removing inequality in compensation
awards; that the limitation period for filing
applications under Section 28-A commences
from the date of the award on which the
applicant relies for redetermination and not
from any earlier award; that the landowners'
applications dated 26.04.2016 were well within
the prescribed period of three months from the
Reference Court's award dated 30.01.2016; that
the order dated 17.02.2022 passed by the
Special
Land
Acquisition
Officer
granting
enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs.108/-
per square metre along with statutory benefits
was
legally
sound
and
deserved
implementation; and that the objections raised
by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti regarding
limitation and maintainability lacked merit and
were contrary to established legal principles.
Consequently, the leading writ petition filed by
the landowners was allowed and the connected
writ petitions filed by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi
Samiti were dismissed, with a direction to the
Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti to comply with the
order dated 17.02.2022 and deposit the
enhanced compensation along with statutory
benefits within six weeks, failing which the
amount would carry interest at the rate of 12%
per annum from the date of default until actual
payment; it was further declared that the
landowners
were
entitled
to
enhanced
compensation at Rs.108/- per square metre
together with 30% solatium, 12% additional
compensation and interest at the prescribed
rates, and the writ petitions were disposed of
accordingly, without any order as to costs.
(Paras 8, 9)
Writ petitions by acquisition body/KUMS
dismissed. (E-5)

CASE LAW CITED
Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC
736
Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC
273
Banwari
v.
Haryana
State
Industrial
&
Infrastructure Development Corpn. Ltd., 2025
AIR (SC) 165
Narendra v. State of U.P., (2017) 9 SCC 426
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi,
(2017) 16 SCC 680;
Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai v. State
of Gujarat and another, (2018) 16 SCC 445

List of Acts
Land
Acquisition
Act,
1894

List of Keywords
Land acquisition - Section 28-A - Redetermination of compensation - Beneficent
legislation
-
Limitation
-
Subsequent
enhancement award - Same notification - No
reference under Section 18 - Acceptance of
compensation - Equality in compensation -
Statutory benefits - Solatium - Interest -
Acquisition

## Text

_Characters 0–39,748 of 50,634. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39748 for what follows._

468 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
see whether the impugned order is based on
records or whether the authorities have
applied their own mind to the relevant
facts. When the facts do exist on record and
Government have applied their mind to
those facts and came to the conclusion that
from the facts so collected they were
satisfied
that
the
Committee
had
contravened clauses (v) and (vi) of SubSection (3) of Section 16-D of the Act ,
they have rightly exercised the power under
Sub-Section (4) of Section 16D of the Act.

Conclusions:-

34. In the case at hand, after perusal of
the records and pleadings, I am satisfied
that the State Government before passing
the
impugned
order,
have
put
the
Committee of Management to notice and
the Committee of Management duly replied
to the notice and also presented its case
before the Special Secretary as discussed
above. Under these circumstances, I am of
the view that there are no illegality or
errors in the impugned order dated
19.05.2025
passed
by
the
Special
Secretary, Govt. of U.P. After taking into
consideration of the material, I am also of
the view that the Committee should not be
allowed to be in the management of the
institution. Accordingly, the Authorized
Controller is directed to immediately take
over the Management of the institution and
set right the running of the institution on
proper line, then conduct the election
within the period prescribed under the Act
and hand over the management to newly
elected body.

35. The instant writ petition is
accordingly, dismissed.
----------
(2025) 9 ILRA 468
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.09.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MAHESH CHANDRA
TRIPATHI, J.
THE HON'BLE AMITABH KUMAR RAI, J.

Writ C No. 35876 of 2022
&
Connected With Other Cases

Ved Prakash Saini & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sudeep Harkauli

Counsel for the Respondents:
Archit Mandhyan, C.S.C., Chandra Shekhar
Singh, Suresh C. Dwivedi

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether landowners who did not initially file
references under Section 18 of the Act, 1894,
can seek redetermination of compensation
under Section 28-A based on enhanced awards
granted to similarly situated landowners under
the same acquisition notification ?

HEADNOTE
Land
acquisition
-
Re-determination
of
compensation - Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
Section 28-A - Beneficent legislation with the
object to remove inequality in compensation -
Landowners not filing reference under Section
18 held eligible to seek re-determination -
Limitation under Section 28-A computed from
the award relied upon for redetermination and
not from earlier set-aside awards - Right of
landowners to rely upon subsequent award
granting higher compensation recognized -
persons entitled to apply under Section 28-A are
not restricted to relying only on the earliest
award but can invoke the provision on the basis
of any subsequent award granting higher
compensation, provided the application is filed
within three months thereof - Objection of
limitation raised by acquisition beneficiary/KUMS
9 All. Ved Prakash Saini & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
469
rejected - Earlier enhancement order of 1990
having been set aside could not form basis for
limitation - Acceptance of compensation without
protest not a bar - Entitlement to statutory
benefits
including
solatium,
additional
compensation and interest affirmed - Direction
for implementation issued - Writ petition by
landowners allowed.
HELD
Court held that Section 28-A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 is a beneficent provision
which must be interpreted liberally to achieve its
object of removing inequality in compensation
awards; that the limitation period for filing
applications under Section 28-A commences
from the date of the award on which the
applicant relies for redetermination and not
from any earlier award; that the landowners'
applications dated 26.04.2016 were well within
the prescribed period of three months from the
Reference Court's award dated 30.01.2016; that
the order dated 17.02.2022 passed by the
Special
Land
Acquisition
Officer
granting
enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs.108/-
per square metre along with statutory benefits
was
legally
sound
and
deserved
implementation; and that the objections raised
by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti regarding
limitation and maintainability lacked merit and
were contrary to established legal principles.
Consequently, the leading writ petition filed by
the landowners was allowed and the connected
writ petitions filed by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi
Samiti were dismissed, with a direction to the
Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti to comply with the
order dated 17.02.2022 and deposit the
enhanced compensation along with statutory
benefits within six weeks, failing which the
amount would carry interest at the rate of 12%
per annum from the date of default until actual
payment; it was further declared that the
landowners
were
entitled
to
enhanced
compensation at Rs.108/- per square metre
together with 30% solatium, 12% additional
compensation and interest at the prescribed
rates, and the writ petitions were disposed of
accordingly, without any order as to costs.
(Paras 8, 9)
Writ petitions by acquisition body/KUMS
dismissed. (E-5)

CASE LAW CITED
Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC
736
Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC
273
Banwari
v.
Haryana
State
Industrial
&
Infrastructure Development Corpn. Ltd., 2025
AIR (SC) 165
Narendra v. State of U.P., (2017) 9 SCC 426
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi,
(2017) 16 SCC 680;
Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai v. State
of Gujarat and another, (2018) 16 SCC 445

List of Acts
Land
Acquisition
Act,
1894

List of Keywords
Land acquisition - Section 28-A - Redetermination of compensation - Beneficent
legislation
-
Limitation
-
Subsequent
enhancement award - Same notification - No
reference under Section 18 - Acceptance of
compensation - Equality in compensation -
Statutory benefits - Solatium - Interest -
Acquisition beneficiary - Writ jurisdiction

CASE ARISING FROM
Order dated 17.02.2022 passed by the Special
Land Acquisition Officer, Moradabad,4 under
Section 28-A of the Act, 1894.

Appearances for Parties
Advs For Petitioner: Sudeep Harkauli, Suresh
C. Dwivedi; Ravi Prakash Pandey
Advs For Respondents: C.S.C.;

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mahesh Chandra
Tripathi, J.)

1. Heard Shri Sudeep Harkauli,
learned
counsel
for
the
land-owners
(petitioners in the WRIT-C No. 35876 of
2022
and
respondents
in
all
other
connected writ petitions filed by the Krishi
Utpadan Mandi Samiti1 mentioned at
Serial Nos.2 to 10), Shri Suresh C.
Dwivedi, learned counsel for the Krishi
Utpadan Mandi Samiti and Shri Devesh
Vikram, learned Additional Chief Standing
Counsel and Shri Fuzail Ahmad Ansari,
470 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
learned Standing Counsel for the Staterespondents.

2. Since all the afore-noted writ
petitions involve a common legal issue,, i.e.
whether landowners who did not initially
file references under Section 18 of the
Act, 1894, can seek redetermination of
compensation under Section 28-A based
on enhanced awards granted to similarly
situated landowners under the same
acquisition notification, with the consent
of learned counsel for the parties, all the
afore-noted petitions have been clubbed
and heard together and are being disposed
of by this common judgment. The WRIT-C
No. 35876 of 20222 is made the leading
writ petition.

A. PRAYERS:

The Leading Writ Petition:-

3. This writ petition has been filed,
inter alia, praying for a writ, order, or
direction in the nature of mandamus,
directing
the
KUMS
to
decide
the
representation of the petitioners/landowners
dated 03.09.2022. It is further prayed that a
direction in the nature of mandamus be
issued to the KUMS to deposit the money
mentioned in the letter dated 15.03.2022
and to comply with the orders passed under
Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act,
18943.

Writ Petitions filed by the KUMS
mentioned at Serial Nos.2 to 10:-

3.1 The writ petitions at Serial
Nos. 2 to 10 have been filed, inter alia,
seeking a direction in the nature of
certiorari to quash the impugned order
dated 17.02.2022 passed by the Special
Land Acquisition Officer, Moradabad,4
under Section 28-A of the Act, 1894. It is
further prayed that a direction in the nature
of mandamus be issued restraining the
SLAO from compelling the KUMS to
deposit the amount of compensation as redetermined by the impugned judgment and
order dated 17.02.2022.

B. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE
CASE:

4. That the brief facts of the case are
that the KUMS, Moradabad had made a
proposal for acquiring 47.98 1⁄2 acres of
land situated at village Majhola, Tehsil and
District Moradabad for the purpose of
construction of a Market Yard by the Krishi
Utpadan
Mandi
Samiti,
Moradabad.
Pursuant to such proposal, after making
preliminary
enquiries
and
preparing
compensation
statements,
the
State
Government issued a notification under
Section 4(1)/17(4) of the Act, 1894 on
30.04.1977, which was duly published on
14.05.1977 for acquiring the land of the
landowners situated in village Majhola,
Tehsil and District Moradabad. Thereafter,
a declaration under Section 6(1)/17 of the
Act, 1894 was also issued on the same date
i.e. 30.04.1977 and was published on
14.05.1977.

4.1.
The
possession
of
the
acquired land was thereafter taken by the
acquiring body/ KUMS on 10.07.1977 and
the award was declared by the SLAO,
Moradabad under Section 11 of the Act,
1894 on 09.08.1982. The compensation
was determined at the rate of Rs.15.75 per
square yard. However, some of the tenure
holders
were
dissatisfied
with
the
compensation awarded by the SLAO vide
award dated 09.08.1982. Accordingly, one
Land Acquisition Reference No.59 of 1983
came to be filed by a tenure-holder namely
9 All. Ved Prakash Saini & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
471
Moti, who subsequently died and was
substituted by his heir Yad Ram. The said
Land Acquisition Reference was rejected
by order dated 03.02.1989 passed by the
learned 1st Additional District Judge,
Moradabad.
Similarly,
other
Land
Acquisition References filed by tenure
holders, namely L.A.R. Nos.65 of 1983,
128 of 1983 and 64 of 1983, were also
rejected by the Reference Court vide
judgment dated 03.02.1989.

4.2
Thereafter
review
applications were filed by the landowners/
tenure holders/ claimants in respect of the
aforesaid references which had been
rejected on 03.02.1989. The said review
applications were filed inter alia on the
grounds that there was an apparent error on
the face of the record and further on the
ground
that
other
Land
Acquisition
Reference Cases being L.A.R. Nos.63 of
1983, 55 of 1983 and 57 of 1983 had been
decided on 24.03.1989 whereby the learned
Reference Court allowed compensation at
the rate of Rs.64/- per square metre. These
review applications were registered as
Misc. Case No.9 of 1989 (Hori Lal and
others vs. KUMS and another), Misc. Case
No.10 of 1989 (Yad Ram vs. KUMS and
others), Misc. Case No.11 of 1989 (Gulab
Singh and others vs. KUMS and others)
and Misc. Case No.12 of 1989 (Jagram vs.
KUMS and others). The learned 1st
Additional
District
Judge,
Moradabad/Reference Court allowed the
said review applications vide judgment and
order dated 14.03.1990 and enhanced the
compensation of the acquired land to
Rs.64/- per square metre, along with
statutory benefits of 30% solatium and 9%
interest.

4.3. Subsequently, the KUMS
challenged the awards of the Reference
Court granting compensation @ Rs.64/- per
square metre by filing various first appeals
before this Hon'ble Court. First Appeal
No.522 of 1993 (KUMS vs. Khusi Ram
and others) was decided on 26.02.2004,
whereby the appeal filed by KUMS was
allowed and the matter was remanded to
the Reference Court for fresh determination
of market value. Similarly, other first
appeals were also filed, such as First
Appeal No.295 of 1990 (KUMS vs. State
of U.P. and others) arising out of L.A.R.
No.71 of 1983, which was allowed on
05.04.2004, and First Appeal No.193 of
1991
filed
against
the
order
dated
14.03.1990 in L.A.R. No.59 of 1983 (Moti
through L.Rs. Yad Ram vs. State of U.P.),
which too was allowed on 05.04.2004,
whereby this Hon'ble High Court remitted
the matters to the Reference Court with a
direction to re-determine the compensation.

4.4.
In
compliance
of
the
aforesaid directions of this Hon'ble High
Court, the Reference Court re-opened the
matters
and
proceeded
afresh.
Vide
judgment dated 30.01.2016, it decided
L.A.R. Nos.60 of 1983 (Ram Prasad vs.
State of U.P.), 64 of 1983 (Jagram vs. State
of U.P.), 65 of 1983 (Hori Lal vs. State of
U.P.) and 58 of 1983 (Jhabban Singh and
others vs. State of U.P. and others),
awarding compensation at the rate of
Rs.108/- per square metre. Subsequently,
vide judgment dated 19.09.2017 in L.A.R.
No.59 of 1983 (Moti through L.R. Yad
Ram vs. State of U.P. and others), similar
compensation @ Rs.108/- per square metre
was awarded.

4.5. Against the orders of the
Reference Court dated 30.01.2016 and
19.09.2017, the KUMS preferred First
Appeals before this Hon'ble Court, which
were numbered as First Appeal Nos.246 of
472 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
2016, 229 of 2016, 233 of 2016, 231 of
2016 and 230 of 2016, and all of which
came to be dismissed vide common
judgment dated 05.02.2020. First Appeal
No.26 of 2018 filed against the order dated
19.09.2017 in L.A.R. No.59 of 1983 was
also dismissed on 08.02.2021, following
the decision dated 05.02.2020.

4.6 The judgment of this Hon'ble
Court dated 05.02.2020 was challenged by
the KUMS before the Hon'ble Apex Court
by filing Special Leave to Appeal (C)
No.8759 of 2020, which too was dismissed
by the Hon'ble Apex Court on 26.10.2020.

4.7.
Thereafter,
claimants/
landowners moved applications before the
SLAO, Moradabad on 10.02.2021 for
disposal of their applications filed under
Section 28-A, notices were issued to the
KUMS calling for objections. The KUMS
filed detailed objections on 01.11.2021 and
25.11.2021 raising the plea of limitation
and maintainability of the application under
Section 28-A. Thereafter, the SLAO,
Moradabad
proceeded
to
pass
the
impugned order dated 17.02.2022 allowing
the applications under Section 28-A of the
Act, 1894, whereby the compensation was
re-determined at Rs.108/- per square metre
along with statutory benefits, solely relying
upon the Reference Court's award dated
19.09.2017 in L.A.R. No.59 of 1983, and
thereby
enhanced
compensation
was
accorded to the landowners for their
acquired land.

4.8. Consequently, the petitioners
preferred the leading writ petition for
compliance of the aforesaid order dated
17.02.2022. The KUMS has preferred the
writ petitions noted above at Serial Nos.2
to 10 for quashing of the impugned order
dated 17.02.2022. The writ petitions
preferred by the KUMS were dismissed by
the writ court vide order dated 12.12.2022
and the leading writ petition was disposed
of on 14.03.2023. The said orders were
challenged before the Apex Court in Civil
Appeal Nos. 12973-12980/2024 and other
connected appeals, in which Honble Apex
Court has clarified that Section 28A(3) can
only be invoked by aggrieved claimants,
and not by the acquisition beneficiary.
Consequently, the High Court's orders
were set aside by the Apex Court by order
dated 21.11.2024, and the matters were
remitted for fresh consideration on merits,
with all issues left open. In light of the
order dated 21.11.2024 passed in Civil
Appeal No. 12973 of 2024 [@ SLP
(CIVIL) NO.9683/2023], a report was
placed before the learned Registrar General
for restoring the instant matters, whereupon
the same have been restored.

4.9. The facts noted above have
not been disputed by the parties.

C. SUBMISSIONS:

5. Shri Sudeep Harkauli, learned
counsel for the landowners, in support of
the leading writ petition, submits that this
petition
has
been
filed
seeking
implementation
of
the
order
dated
17.02.2022
passed
in
eight
separate
applications under Section 28-A moved by
the landowners, wherein it was held that
their land had been acquired under the
same
notification
as
that
of
other
landowners who were granted enhanced
compensation by the Reference Court vide
order dated 30.01.2016. Consequently, the
landowners
were
found
entitled
to
compensation at the enhanced rate of
Rs.108/- per sq. mtr. along with 30%
solatium, 12% additional compensation,
and interest at the rate of 9% from the date
9 All. Ved Prakash Saini & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
473
of possession for the first year and 15%
thereafter till actual payment. Despite the
lapse of eight months, no payment has been
made, although the order has not been
challenged before any court. Hence, in the
absence of any interim order, the KUMS is
duty-bound to comply, and the leading writ
petition deserves to be allowed.

5.1. Shri Sudeep Harkauli,
learned counsel for the landowners, in
opposition of the writ petitions noted at
Sl. Nos. 2 to 10 filed by the KUMS,
submits that the sole objection raised by the
KUMS before the SLAO as well as before
this Hon'ble Court is that the applications
under Section 28-A were not filed within
the statutory period of three months,
contending that since the first order of
enhancement was passed on 14.03.1990,
the applications ought to have been filed
within three months thereof. He submits
that this objection is wholly misconceived
and unsustainable, as the said order was
challenged by the KUMS in First Appeal
and was set aside by this Hon'ble Court,
thereby ceasing to exist and hence cannot
be relied upon for computing limitation
under Section 28-A. He further submits that
the controversy in hand is no more res
integra and stands conclusively settled by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in Banwari and
others v. Haryana State Industrial and
Infrastructure Development Corporation
Limited (HSIIDC) and another5, wherein
it has been clarified that applications may
be filed within three months of any
reference
order
relied
upon by
the
landowners. In the present case, the
landowners relied on the order dated
30.01.2016 and filed their applications on
26.04.2016, well within limitation. As no
other objection has been raised, it is evident
that the connected petitions lack merit and
deserve dismissal.

5.2.
Lastly,
Shri
Sudeep
Harkauli,
learned
counsel
for
the
landowners, submits that the landowners
have been running from pillar to post since
2016
and
despite
the
order
dated
17.02.2022, the respondent-KUMS has
failed to accord them the benefit.

6. Shri Suresh C. Dwivedi, learned
counsel for the KUMS submits that the
impugned order dated 17.02.2022 passed
by the SLAO, Moradabad is wholly illegal,
arbitrary, and liable to be set aside. It is
argued that the claimants accepted the
compensation determined in 1982 without
protest and did not prefer any reference
under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition
Act.
Even
when
compensation
was
enhanced by the Reference Court in 1990,
and again in 2016, the claimants did not file
any application under Section 28-A of the
Act, 1894 within the prescribed period of
90 days. Instead, they remained silent for
nearly 27 years and moved an application
only on 18.12.2017 after the order dated
19.09.2017. Such a delayed application is
clearly barred by limitation and cannot be
entertained. The SLAO failed to appreciate
this vital aspect and decided the matter
mechanically without recording any finding
on limitation or considering the KUMS'
objections.
Furthermore,
interest
on
enhanced compensation cannot be awarded
under Section 28-A, as the Collector has no
such power. It is settled law that stale
claims cannot be revived after inordinate
delay, and public authorities cannot be
financially burdened for the negligence of
the claimants. Hence, the impugned order
dated 17.02.2022 deserves to be quashed.

6.1.
Shri
Devesh
Vikaram,
learned
Additional
Chief
Standing
Counsel
for
the
State-respondents
474 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
supports the arguments advanced by
learned counsel for the KUMS.

D. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS:

7. Having heard the learned counsel
for all parties and having perused the
record, this Court finds that the present
case involves the fundamental question of
whether landowners who did not initially
file references under Section 18 of the Act,
1894,
can
seek
redetermination
of
compensation under Section 28-A based on
enhanced awards granted to similarly
situated
landowners
under
the
same
acquisition notification. The resolution of
this issue requires a careful examination of
the statutory provisions, the object and
purpose
of
Section
28-A,
and
the
authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Banwari and others
(supra).

7.1. Before delving into the
specific contentions raised, it is imperative
to understand the legislative intent behind
Section 28-A of the Act, 1894. For ready
reference, Section 28 of the Act, 1894 is
reproduced herein below:

"28. Collector may be directed to
pay interest on excess compensation.- If
the sum which, in the opinion of the Court,
the Collector ought to have awarded as
compensation is in excess of the sum which
the Collector did award as compensation,
the award of the Court may direct that the
Collector shall pay interest on such excess
at the rate of [nine per centum] 6 per
annum from the date on which he took
possession of the land to the date of
payment of such excess into Court:

[Provided that the award of the
Court may also direct that where such
excess or any part thereof is paid into
Court after the date of expiry of a period of
one year from the date on which possession
is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per
centum per annum shall be payable from
the date of expiry of the said period of one
year on the amount of such excess or part
thereof which has not been paid into Court
before the date of such expiry.] 7

[28-A. Re-determination of the
amount of compensation on the basis of
the award of the Court8 .- (1) Where in an
award under this Part, the Court allows to
the applicant any amount of compensation
in excess of the amount awarded by the
Collector under section 11, the persons
interested in all the other land covered by
the same notification under section 4, subsection (1) and who are also aggrieved by
the
award
of
the
Collector
may,
notwithstanding that they had not made an
application to the Collector under section
18, by written application to the Collector
within three months from the date of the
award of the Court require that the amount
of compensation payable to them may be
re-determined on the basis of the amount of
compensation awarded by the Court:

Provided that in computing the
period of three months within which an
application to the Collector shall be made
under this sub-section, the day on which
the award was pronounced and the time
requisite for obtaining a copy of the award
shall be excluded.

(2) The Collector shall, on receipt
of an application under sub-section (1),
conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all
the persons interested and giving them a
reasonable opportunity of being heard, and
make an award determining the amount of
compensation payable to the applicants.
9 All. Ved Prakash Saini & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
475

(3) Any person who has not
accepted the award under sub-section (2)
may,
by
written
application
to
the
Collector, require that the matter be
referred
by
the
Collector
for
the
determination of the Court and the
provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, so far
as may be, apply to such reference as they
apply to a reference under section 18.]".

7.2. As eloquently observed by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India
and another vs. Pradeep Kumari and
Others9 case (which has been reaffirmed in
Banwari'
case),
Section
28-A
is
a
beneficent provision enacted to address the
inherent inequality in compensation awards
that arose due to the inability of inarticulate
and poor landowners to effectively utilize
the reference mechanism under Section 18
of the Act, 1894. The Statement of Objects
and Reasons reveals that the primary
objective underlying Section 28-A is to
remove
disparity
in
compensation
payments for lands of similar quality and
characteristics that fall under the same
acquisition notification. This provision
recognizes the harsh reality that while some
landowners, owing to their resources,
awareness, and access to legal counsel,
could successfully challenge inadequate
compensation awards through references,
others - particularly the poor, illiterate, and
marginalized sections of society - remained
deprived of just compensation despite
owning land of identical or similar quality.

7.3. The Hon'ble Apex Court in
Banwari
and
others
(supra)
has
categorically held that Section 28-A being
a beneficent legislation must be construed
liberally to advance its policy objective of
extending benefits rather than adopting a
restrictive interpretation that would curtail
the relief intended to be provided. This
principle
of
beneficial
construction
demands that courts should not, through
judicial interpretation, read words into the
statute that are not present therein,
particularly when such reading would
restrict the scope and amplitude of the
beneficial provision. As observed in
Pradeep Kumari (supra) and reiterated in
Banwari and others (supra), that "in the
matter of construction of a beneficent
provision it is not permissible by judicial
interpretation to read words which are not
there and thereby restrict the scope of the
said
provision."
This
fundamental
principle must guide our interpretation of
Section 28-A in the present case.

7.4.
The
primary
contention
raised by the KUMS relates to the question
of limitation, arguing that applications
under Section 28-A should have been filed
within
three
months
of
the
first
enhancement order dated 14.03.1990. This
argument is fallacious as it demonstrates a
fundamental misunderstanding of both the
statutory
provision
and
the
judicial
precedents. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Banwari
and
others
(supra)
has
conclusively settled this controversy by
holding that the limitation period under
Section 28-A commences from the date of
the specific award on the basis of which
redetermination is sought, not from the date
of any earlier award that may have been
subsequently challenged or set aside. The
Court observed that "the limitation for
moving the application under Section 28A will begin to run only from the date of
the award on the basis of which
redetermination
of
compensation
is
sought."

7.5. Applying the principles laid
down in Banwari and others (supra) to the
facts of the present case, it is undisputed
476 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
that all the lands in question were acquired
under
the
same
notification
dated
30.04.1977. This satisfies the fundamental
requirement that the person seeking benefit
under Section 28-A must be interested in
land covered by the same notification as
that of the landowner who obtained
enhanced compensation. The Reference
Court vide judgment dated 30.01.2016
awarded
enhanced
compensation
at
Rs.108/- per square metre to similarly
situated landowners. This award was
upheld by this Court and subsequently by
the Hon'ble Apex Court, attaining finality.
The landowners filed their applications
under Section 28-A on 26.04.2016, well
within three months of the Reference
Court's judgment dated 30.01.2016. This
satisfies the limitation requirement as
interpreted in Banwari and others (supra).
Additionally, the landowners had not filed
any reference under Section 18, which is a
prerequisite for invoking Section 28-A.

7.6. The KUMS' argument that
limitation should be computed from date of
the order dated 14.03.1990 is legally
untenable for multiple reasons. First, the
order dated 14.03.1990 was successfully
challenged by the KUMS itself in First
Appeals, which were allowed by this Court,
thereby setting aside the said order. An
order that has been judicially annulled
cannot
serve
as
the
foundation
for
computing
limitation
for
subsequent
proceedings.
Second,
as
clarified
in
Banwari and others (supra), the cause of
action for a Section 28-A application arises
from the specific award on which the
applicant relies for redetermination. In the
present case, the landowners specifically
relied upon the award of the year 2016, not
any order of the year 1990. Third,
accepting the KUMS' argument would lead
to the absurd situation where landowners
would be required to file applications based on
awards that were subsequently set aside,
rendering the entire exercise futile.

7.7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Pradeep Kumari (approved in Banwari and
others) has addressed scenarios similar to the
present case where multiple awards are
rendered at different times. The Hon'ble Apex
Court held that persons entitled to apply under
Section 28-A are not restricted to relying only
on the earliest award but can invoke the
provision based on any subsequent award that
grants higher compensation, provided the
application is filed within three months of such
award. This interpretation serves the beneficial
purpose of the legislation by ensuring that
landowners are not penalized for circumstances
beyond their control, such as becoming aware
of enhancement awards at different times or
relying
on
awards
that
provide
better
compensation.

7.8. The KUMS' contention that
these are "stale claims" after 27 years is
misconceived. The concept of stale claims
typically applies to situations where parties
sleep over their rights for unreasonably long
periods without justifiable cause. However, in
the present case, the landowners could not have
filed applications under Section 28-A until a
valid, final award granting enhancement was
available. The 1990 award was challenged and
set aside, making it impossible to rely upon.
The
landowners
promptly
filed
their
applications within three months of the 2016
award, demonstrating diligence rather than
negligence. The delay, if any, was occasioned
by the prolonged litigation initiated by the
KUMS itself, and it would be inequitable to
penalize landowners for delays caused by the
acquiring body's own actions.

7.9. The argument that public
authorities should not bear financial burden
9 All. Ved Prakash Saini & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
477
due to negligence of landowners/claimants
is misplaced in the present context. Section
28-A was enacted precisely to address
situations where landowners, due to various
constraints, could not initially challenge
inadequate compensation. The legislative
intent is clear - to ensure that all
landowners under the same acquisition
receive equitable compensation regardless
of their initial ability to pursue legal
remedies.
Moreover,
as
observed
in
Banwari and others (supra), the provision
serves the inarticulate and poor, who form
a significant portion of landowners affected
by acquisitions. Denying them the benefit
of
enhanced
compensation
would
perpetuate the very inequality that Section
28-A was designed to eliminate.

7.10.
Regarding
the
KUMS'
objection to the award of interest, it is wellsettled that when compensation is enhanced
under
Section
28-A,
the
landowner
becomes entitled to statutory benefits
including interest as prescribed under the
Act,
1894.
The
SLAO's
power
to
redetermine
compensation
necessarily
includes
the
authority
to
grant
consequential benefits that flow from such
redetermination. The KUMS' allegation
that
the
SLAO
decided
the
matter
"mechanically" is unfounded. A perusal of
the impugned order dated 17.02.2022
reveals that the SLAO carefully considered
the applications, issued notices to all
concerned parties, heard their objections,
and applied the correct legal principles. The
decision to grant enhanced compensation
based on the Reference Court's award was
legally sound and well-reasoned.

7.11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Banwari and others (supra) has
comprehensively addressed and resolved
the
apparent
conflict
between
the
judgments in Union of India v. Pradeep
Kumari
and
Others
(supra)
and
Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai
v. State of Gujarat and another10. The
Hon'ble Apex Court observed that both
cases were decided by Benches of equal
strength comprising three learned Judges,
with Pradeep Kumari being rendered on
10th March 1995 and Ramsingbhai on
24th April 2018. However, upon careful
analysis,
the
Court
noted
that
the
Ramsingbhai judgment failed to take note
of the earlier view taken by the three-Judge
Bench in Pradeep Kumari, making it a
case decided per incuriam. The Apex Court
emphasized that Pradeep Kumari, being
earlier in point of time and having
elaborately
considered
the
relevant
statutory provisions of Section 28-A of the
Act, 1894, along with its Statement of
Objects and Reasons and principles of
beneficial interpretation, would constitute
the binding precedent. In contrast, the
Ramsingbhai
(supra)
judgment
was
characterized as a "short judgment" that
merely referred to the text of Section 28A(1) without the comprehensive analysis
undertaken in Pradeep Kumari (supra).

7.12. Relying on the Constitution
Bench decision in National Insurance
Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and
others11, the Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated
that an earlier decision of a co-equal Bench
binds subsequent Benches of the same
strength, and a judgment can be considered
per incuriam when it cannot be reconciled
with a previously pronounced judgment of
a co-equal Bench. Consequently, the Apex
Court held that Pradeep Kumari (supra),
having undertaken elaborate consideration
of the beneficent nature of Section 28-A
and its interpretative principles, remains the
correct legal position, while Ramsingbhai
(supra),
not
having
considered
this
478 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
precedent, cannot be treated as laying down
the accurate legal principle.

7.13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in
another Constitution Bench judgment of
Union of India vs. Hansoli Devi12, has
also definitively clarified the scope and
application of Section 28-A of the Land
Acquisition
Act,
1894,
particularly
addressing two fundamental questions that
had generated considerable litigation across
various High Courts. The Hon'ble Apex
Court has categorically held that when a
landowner's application seeking reference
under Section 18 is dismissed on grounds
of delay or other technical reasons, such
dismissal amounts to "not filing an
application" within the meaning of Section
28-A, thereby preserving the landowner's
right to seek benefits under this beneficial
provision.

7.14. The Hon'ble Apex Court
emphasized that the expression "did not
make an application" should be interpreted
as "did not make an effective application"
that was entertained and resulted in a
substantive
reference
being
answered,
noting that a time-barred application that
does not fructify into any meaningful
reference cannot be considered an effective
application. Furthermore, the Apex Court
has unequivocally ruled that accepting
compensation from the Land Acquisition
Collector, whether with or without protest,
does not disqualify a person from being
considered "aggrieved" under Section 28A, observing that imposing such additional
conditions would amount to denying
substantial rights not contemplated by the
Legislature itself.

7.15.
The
Apex
Court's
interpretation ensures that the beneficial
nature of Section 28-A is preserved in its
true spirit, allowing eligible landowners to
seek re-determination of compensation
based on enhanced awards obtained by
others in similar circumstances, while
maintaining
the
legislative
intent
of
providing relief to those who had not
initially sought reference but subsequently
became aware of higher compensation
awards
granted
to
similarly
situated
landowners.

7.16. The principles laid down in
Hansoli Devi (supra) also support the case
of the petitioners in the present matter. In
fact, the case of the landowners herein
stands on an even stronger footing than that
of Hansoli Devi (supra), where the
landowner had indeed made an application
under Section 18 of the Act, 1894, which
was dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches, but the Hon'ble Apex Court held
that such application was not an "effective
application" and, considering the beneficial
nature of Section 28-A, granted relief.
However,
in
the
instant
case,
the
landowners never made any application
under Section 18 of the Act, 1894, which
makes their position squarely within the
protective scope of Section 28-A as
interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court.

7.17. Beyond the strict legal
interpretation, the case also involves
fundamental principles of equity and
natural justice. It would be manifestly
unjust to deny the landowners enhanced
compensation when their lands were
acquired under the same notification, at the
same time, and for the same public purpose
as
those
who
received
higher
compensation. The doctrine of equal
treatment demands that similarly situated
persons
should
receive
similar
compensation for similar lands. The record
reveals that all procedural requirements
9 All. Ved Prakash Saini & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
479
have been meticulously followed. The
landowners
filed
proper
applications,
notices were issued to all parties, objections
were heard, and a reasoned decision was
rendered.
The
SLAO's
order
dated
17.02.2022 demonstrates due application of
mind and correct appreciation of legal
principles.

7.18. While the KUMS raises
concerns about financial implications, it
must be remembered that compensation for
land acquisition is not a gratuitous payment
but a constitutional obligation under Article
31 of the Constitution of India. The State's
duty to provide just compensation is not
diminished by financial considerations.
Moreover, Section 28-A serves the larger
public policy of ensuring equitable
treatment of all landowners affected by
acquisition. The fact that the Hon'ble
Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 12973 of
2024 remanded the matter for fresh
consideration on merits, with all issues
left open, provides this Court with the
opportunity to examine the case in light
of the settled legal position in Banwari
and others (supra). The remand order
clarifies that Section 28-A(3) can only be
invoked by aggrieved claimants, not by
acquisition
beneficiaries,
further
supporting the landowners' case.

7.19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Banwari and others (supra) has laid
down
specific
conditions
which
are
required to be satisfied for invoking the
provisions of Section 28-A(1) of the Act,
1894. In the present case, all these
conditions are satisfied comprehensively.
These conditions are as follows:

"(i) An award has been made by
the Court under Part III of the Act after
coming into force of Section 28-A;

(ii) By the said Award, the
amount of compensation in excess of the
amount
awarded
by
the
Collector
under Section 11 has been allowed to the
applicant in that reference;

(iii) The person moving the
application
under Section
28-A
is
interested in other land covered by the
same notification under Section 4(1) to
which the said award relates;

(iv) The person moving the
application did not move the application
under Section 18;

(v) The application is moved
within three months from the date of the
award
on
the
basis
of
which
redetermination of amount of compensation
is sought; and

(vi) Only one such application
can be moved under Section 28-A for
redetermination of the compensation by the
applicant."

7.20.