# Ved Prakash v. Kanhaiya Lal - **Citation:** (2016) 7 ILRA 48 - **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad - **Decided:** 2016-07-25 - **Bench:** Vinod Kumar Misra - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ved-prakash-v-kanhaiya-lal-44108 - **Pages:** 4 ## Text 48 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES 8. Having embarked upon this exercise, in the opinion of this Court, both the assessing authority as well as the Tribunal completely misdirected the enquiry, which was liable to be undertaken under sub-section (4). It is on account of this approach that no findings have been entered by the Tribunal as to whether the goods had been duly accounted for by the assessee. The Tribunal, this Court notes, does not refer to any evidence nor records any reason to dispel what the first appellate authority recorded in his order namely that the goods had been duly recorded in the books of accounts of the assessee. 9. For all the aforesaid reasons, the order of the assessing authority dated 14 February 2001 as also that of the Tribunal dated 18 September 2006 cannot be sustained. 10. The revision is accordingly allowed. The orders dated 14 February 2001 and 18 September 2006 passed by the assessing authority and the Tribunal respectively are hereby set aside. ----------- APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 25.07.2016 BEFORE THE HON'BLE VINOD KUMAR MISRA, J. Second Appeal No.- 524 Of 2016 Ved Prakash ...Appellant Versus Kanhaiya Lal ...Respondent Counsel for Appellant: Sudhanshu Pandey Counsel for Respondent: Sanjay Kumar Mishra Held The unregistered tenancy/lease agreement dated 29.04.2001 created rights in immovable property (shops), and therefore required compulsory registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. In view of Section 49 of the Registration Act, an unregistered document required to be registered cannot be received in evidence to prove the terms affecting immovable property. Both the trial court and the first appellate court erred in relying upon the unregistered agreement and interpreting its terms for granting relief. Admission of execution of the document by parties does not cure the defect of non-registration when the document is compulsorily registrable. The first appellate court committed illegality in decreeing the suit based on clauses of an inadmissible document. 7 All. Ved Prakash Vs Kanhaiya Lal 49 The substantial question of law was answered in favour of the appellant: The unregistered tenancy/lease deed was inadmissible in evidence, and the appellate court's judgment relying upon it was erroneous and perverse. CASE LAW CITED M/s. K.B. Saha & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Development Consultant Ltd. 2008 (72) ALR 638 (SC) Official Liquidator of M.E. Moola Sons Ltd. v. Perin R. Burjorjee 1932 Law Suit (P.C.) 45 (Privy Council) (Delivered by Hon'ble Vinod Kumar Misra, J.) 1. Appellant-Ved Prakash has preferred the Second Appeal against the judgement and decree dated 28.1.2016 passed by learned Additional District Judge (Special Judge Ante Corruption Act), Court No. 5, Gorakhpur in Civil Appeal No. 32 of 2013, Kanhaiya Lal Vs. Ved Prakash by which the learned Appellate Court has set asisde the judgement and decree dated 13.8.2013 passed by learned Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No. 12, Gorakhpur in Original Suit No. 945 of 2001 and decreed the suit filed by plaintiff-respondent. 2. Following substantial question of law was framed in the present appeal:- "Whether basis of Original Suit, namely, the unregistered tenancy/lease deed dated 29.4.2001, was inadmissible in evidence and the judgement of the first appellate court relying on it is erroneous and perverse, if so, its effect?" 3. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and respondent, at length. 4. So far as the factual matrix of the case is concerned, it is admitted from the both of the sides that Achhey Lal, Bachha Lal and Kanhaiya Lal were tenants of respondent's three shops. As the shops were in dilapidated condition, it was agreed between landlord-Ved Prakash, Kanhaiya Lal and other two tenants, namely, Achhey Lal and Bachha Lal that they will vacate the dilapidated shops and landlord will construct there new shops and after construction, its possession will be handed over to the tenants on the same place at where their earlier shops were situated. For the cost of construction Rs. 30,000/- each was to be provided by the each of the tenants to the landlord. In this regard, an agreement was executed between the landlord and tenants on 29.4.2001 and all the terms and conditions were stipulated in the above agreement. It was also agreed in the agreement that construction will be completed by 30th June, 2001. On 27.8.2001, appellant-defendant, Ved Prakash issued notice to tenants, Achhey Lal, Bacha Lal and Kanhaiya Lal, in which, he informed the tenants that they have failed to provide him Rs. One lakh fifty thousand each for the completion of the construction of the shops. So landlord has taken money from other person and has given the shop to the other person. 50 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES 5. Plaintiff-Kanhaiya Lal filed Original Suit No. 945 of 2001 against the defendant-Ved Prakash in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gorakhpur for giving the possession of the shop in question to the plaintiff as per memorandum of tenancy dated 29.4.2001. In the above suit, defendant filed its written statement and contested the case. Learned trial court vide judgement dated 13.8.2008 dismissed the suit. Plaintiff assailed the judgement of the trial court by preferring the Appeal No. 32 of 2013 before the learned District Judge, Gorakhpur. Appeal was transferred to the learned Additional District Judge, Court No.-5, Gorakhpur. Learned first appellate court vide judgement dated 28.1.2016 has allowed the appeal and set asided the judgement of the learned trial court dated 13.8.2013 and decreed the suit. Appellate Court judgement has been challenged before this Court in the form of Second Appeal in which substantial question of law has been framed as indicated above. 6. In fact, neither the trial court nor the first appellate court has adverted to this issue whether the agreement dated 29.4.2001 being the unregistered document can be read in evidence. Both the courts below have taken into consideration the above agreement and have given their finding upon interpreting its terms. Basically, an agreement by which rights are created in immovable property is required to be registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act and in case, it is not registered then it cannot be read in evidence as per Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that it was admitted from both the sides that an agreement with terms and conditions mentioned in it, was executed between the parties, so it is admitted to both the sides. So question of its not registered and not admissible in evidence, does not arise. This argument of learned counsel for the respondent is not worth credence. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon 1932 Law Suit (P.C.) 45, Privy Council (From Rangoon) (F.B.) Official Liquidator of M E Moola Sons Ltd Vs. Perin R Burjorjee. In the cited case law, unregistered agreement was not affecting any immovable property. In the present case unregistered agreement is affecting the immovable property i.e. shops. So learned counsel for the respondent will not get any benefit with the above case law of the Privy Council. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has cited case law reported in 2008 (72)ALR 638 SC, M/s. K.B. Saha and Sons Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Development Consultant Ltd. It has been held in the above case law that document if inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of its terms can be admitted in evidence. To use a document for the purpose of proving an important clause would not be using it as a collateral purpose. 10. So both the courts below have fallen in error in relying on the agreement dated 29.4.2001 and deciding the case on its basis. Agreement is unregistered. So plaintiff cannot base its case upon this unregistered agreement. Consequently, appellate court committed illegality in decreeing the suit on the basis of the misinterpretation of the clauses of agreement which could not be read in evidence at all. 7 All. Mohd. Ajaz Vs Managing Director & Ors. 51 11. In the light of the above, this Court answers the substantial question of law in this way that unregistered tenancy/lease deed dated 29.4.2001 which was basis of the original suit was inadmissible in evidence and the judgement of the first appellate court relying on it, is erroneous and perverse and is liable to be set asided. 12. Appeal is, accordingly, allowed. However, plaintiff will get back his Rs. 30,000/-with 6% of interest from the date of suit till payment is made from defendant on the basis of theory of undue enrichment. ------------ ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: LUCKNOW 22.07.2016 BEFORE THE HON'BLE RAKESH SRIVASTAVA, J. Service Single No.- 7027 Of 1996 Mohd. Ajaz ...Petitioner Versus Managing Director & Ors. ...Respondents Counsel for Petitioner: Ghaus Beg, Vishal Chaudhary Counsel for Respondents: S.K.Kaliya Held The petitioner was appointed purely on contract basis for a fixed term with clear stipulations that: The appointment would automatically terminate on expiry of the contractual period. No notice was required upon termination. No claim for regularisation or extension could be made. The petitioner's contractual appointment expired on 31.05.1996 by efflux of time. Merely because the petitioner was allowed to continue for some time beyond the contractual period on daily wage basis, no legal right accrued in his favour to claim continuation or renewal. In service jurisprudence, concepts such as holding over or adverse possession of post do not apply. A writ of mandamus cannot be issued to compel renewal of a contractual appointment or to continue a temporary employee whose term has expired. The alleged oral termination is legally immaterial because the appointment had already come to an end automatically under the terms of the contract. Additionally, more than 20 years had elapsed since termination; therefore, no equitable relief could be granted. The writ petition was dismissed. CASE LAW CITED: