# Veeri Singh v. Union of India & Ors - **Citation:** (2016) 5 ILRA 1578 - **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad - **Decided:** 2016-05-17 - **Bench:** Bala Krishna Narayana, Shashi Kant - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/veeri-singh-v-union-of-india-ors-43788 - **Pages:** 7 ## Headnote under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980. The detention order dated 18.09.2015 was passed by the District Magistrate, Firozabad. The State Government approved the detention under Section 12(1) of the Act after receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board. PROCEDURE: The detention order was founded on an incident dated 06.08.2015 involving indiscriminate firing in a densely populated locality resulting in the death of two persons and injuries to another. An FIR was registered as Case Crime No. 332 of 2015 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302 IPC and Section 7 of the Criminal Law 5 All. Veeri Singh Vs Union of India & Ors. 1579 Amendment Act. The petitioner was arrested on the same day and lodged in District Jail, Firozabad. While in judicial custody, he was served with the detention order along with grounds of detention. STATUTORY PROVISIONS: Section 3(2), National Security Act, 1980 Section 12(1), National Security Act, 1980 Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302 IPC Section 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act CASE LAW REFERRED: Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan, AIR 1964 SC 334 Shashi Aggarwal v. State of U.P., (1988) 1 SCC 436 Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah, (1985) 4 SCC 232 Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, (1986) 4 SCC 416 HEADNOTE: Preventive Detention - National Security Act, 1980 - Detenu already in judicial custody - Mere likelihood of bail insufficient - Absence of cogent material showing propensity to indulge in prejudicial activities - Nonapplication of mind - Detention order vitiated. Where a person is already in judicial custody, a preventive detention order can be sustained only if the detaining authority records satisfaction based on cogent material that there is a real possibility of release on bail and that upon such release the detenu is likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. A bald assertion in the grounds of detention, without supporting material, that the detenu would repeat such activities is insufficient. Preventive detention founded merely on the possibility of bail amounts to non-application of mind and is liable to be quashed. FACTS: Incident dated 06.08.2015 involving indiscriminate firing Two persons killed; one injured FIR registered under serious penal provisions Petitioner arrested and remanded to judicial custody Detention order passed during incarceration Grounds recorded likelihood of bail and repetition of activities CONTENTIONS: For the Petitioner: Detaining authority failed to record compelling reasons No material showing likelihood of prejudicial activities post-bail Mere possibility of release on bail insufficient Order suffers from complete non-application of mind For the Respondents: Incident disturbed public order Gravity of offence justified detention Authority was satisfied about likelihood of bail and repetition ANALYSIS: Detenu was already in judicial custody on the date of detention. Grounds disclose only a bald apprehension of repetition of offences. No cogent or credible material placed to justify such apprehension. 1580 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES Law laid down by the Supreme Court mandates more than mere possibility of bail. Preventive detention is a serious encroachment on personal liberty and requires strict compliance. CONCLUSION: The impugned detention order dated 18.09.2015 was passed without any material justifying the apprehension that the petitioner, if released on bail, would indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The order suffers from non-application of mind and cannot be sustained. ORDER: The Habeas Corpus writ petition is allowed. The detention order dated 18.09.2015 passed by the District Magistrate, Firozabad is quashed. The petitioner shall be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other case. No order as to costs. ## Text 1578 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES of the accident, the deceased Dinesh Kumar Shukla was a bachelor of about 20 years old. Hence on the basis of the decision in Sarla Verma (supra) applying the multiplier of 18, the amount will come to Rs.3,24,000/-. Besides this amount the claimants have been held entitled to Rs.2,000/- on account of funeral and ritual expenses. Therefore, the total amount comes to Rs.3,26,000/- and the claimants are entitled to get the said amount of compensation instead of the amount awarded by the Tribunal. They would also be entitled to get interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the claim petition till realization. 18. In view of the above, the appeal is partly allowed. The impugned judgment and award stands modified to the above extent. The amount which has already been received by the respondents nos.1 and 2 shall be adjusted and the rest of the amount be paid at an early date. No order as to cost. 19. The original record shall be returned to the Tribunal forthwith. -------- ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.05.2016 BEFORE THE HON'BLE BALA KRISHNA NARAYANA, J. THE HON'BLE SHASHI KANT, J. Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No.- 7281 Of 2016 Veeri Singh ...Petitioner Versus Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents Counsel for the Petitioner: Kamlesh Kumar Dwivedi Counsel for the Respondents: G.A., A.S.G.I., T.A. Singh PROCEEDINGS: This Habeas Corpus writ petition was filed challenging the legality of the preventive detention of the petitioner under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980. The detention order dated 18.09.2015 was passed by the District Magistrate, Firozabad. The State Government approved the detention under Section 12(1) of the Act after receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board. PROCEDURE: The detention order was founded on an incident dated 06.08.2015 involving indiscriminate firing in a densely populated locality resulting in the death of two persons and injuries to another. An FIR was registered as Case Crime No. 332 of 2015 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302 IPC and Section 7 of the Criminal Law 5 All. Veeri Singh Vs Union of India & Ors. 1579 Amendment Act. The petitioner was arrested on the same day and lodged in District Jail, Firozabad. While in judicial custody, he was served with the detention order along with grounds of detention. STATUTORY PROVISIONS: Section 3(2), National Security Act, 1980 Section 12(1), National Security Act, 1980 Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302 IPC Section 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act CASE LAW REFERRED: Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan, AIR 1964 SC 334 Shashi Aggarwal v. State of U.P., (1988) 1 SCC 436 Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah, (1985) 4 SCC 232 Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, (1986) 4 SCC 416 HEADNOTE: Preventive Detention - National Security Act, 1980 - Detenu already in judicial custody - Mere likelihood of bail insufficient - Absence of cogent material showing propensity to indulge in prejudicial activities - Nonapplication of mind - Detention order vitiated. Where a person is already in judicial custody, a preventive detention order can be sustained only if the detaining authority records satisfaction based on cogent material that there is a real possibility of release on bail and that upon such release the detenu is likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. A bald assertion in the grounds of detention, without supporting material, that the detenu would repeat such activities is insufficient. Preventive detention founded merely on the possibility of bail amounts to non-application of mind and is liable to be quashed. FACTS: Incident dated 06.08.2015 involving indiscriminate firing Two persons killed; one injured FIR registered under serious penal provisions Petitioner arrested and remanded to judicial custody Detention order passed during incarceration Grounds recorded likelihood of bail and repetition of activities CONTENTIONS: For the Petitioner: Detaining authority failed to record compelling reasons No material showing likelihood of prejudicial activities post-bail Mere possibility of release on bail insufficient Order suffers from complete non-application of mind For the Respondents: Incident disturbed public order Gravity of offence justified detention Authority was satisfied about likelihood of bail and repetition ANALYSIS: Detenu was already in judicial custody on the date of detention. Grounds disclose only a bald apprehension of repetition of offences. No cogent or credible material placed to justify such apprehension. 1580 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES Law laid down by the Supreme Court mandates more than mere possibility of bail. Preventive detention is a serious encroachment on personal liberty and requires strict compliance. CONCLUSION: The impugned detention order dated 18.09.2015 was passed without any material justifying the apprehension that the petitioner, if released on bail, would indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The order suffers from non-application of mind and cannot be sustained. ORDER: The Habeas Corpus writ petition is allowed. The detention order dated 18.09.2015 passed by the District Magistrate, Firozabad is quashed. The petitioner shall be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other case. No order as to costs. (Delivered by Hon'ble Bala Krishna Narayana, J.) 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, learned A.G.A. for the State and Sri T.A. Singh, learned counsel for the Union of India. 2. The validity of the detention of Veeri Singh has been challenged in this writ petition. He has been detained by the District Magistrate, Firozabad respondent no.3 by an order dated 18.09.2015 made by him under section 3(2) National Security Act, 1980 (herein after referred as to NSA). The State Government after receipt of the opinion of the advisory board has approved the detention as required under section 12(1) of that Act. 3. The activities on the basis of which the impugned detention order has been passed by the respondent no.3 District Magistrate, Firozabad are said to have been taken place on 06.08.2015 at about 18:30 hours in Kasba Mohalla Charbag, Police Station Linepar, District Firozabad, in which two persons namely Kuldeep and Onkar Nath Gupta were shot dead and one person Nityanand had received bullet injuries as a result of the indiscriminate firing made by the petitioner and his accomplices Pradeep, Sanjeev, Raju, Pappu alias Deepi, Mohan Singh, Karan Singh, Kali Lala, Vimal, Pappu alias Rajnesh 3-4 unknown persons. On the basis of the F.I.R. of the incident lodged by the informant, Case Crime No. 332 of 2015, under sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302 IPC and 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act was registered against the petitioner and other accused at Police Station Linepar, District Firozabad. 4. As a result of dare devil crime committed by the petitioner and his accomplices in broad day light in a densely populated area, an atmosphere of fear and terror had engulfed the local residents. Tempo of life and public order in the area was totally disturbed. In order to restore normalcy, additional police force had to be requisitioned from the nearby police stations. Top officers of police and district administration had to rush to the place of incident. The petitioner, who was nominated as an accused in the aforesaid case was arrested by the police on 06.08.2015 and sent in District Jail, Firozabad. 5 All. Veeri Singh Vs Union of India & Ors. 1581 5. While the petitioner was in District Jail, Firozabad, he was served with the impugned detention order dated 18.09.2015 along with the grounds of detention. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a valid detention order should reflect that the authority was aware that the detenu was already in prison under judicial custody and there was reliable material before him on the basis of which he had reason to believe that there was every possibility of the detenu being released on bail and in case of such release the detenu would indulge in prejudicial activities and in order to prevent him from indulging in any activities affecting the public order or the tranquility of the community, it was imperative to pass an order for his preventive detention and unless the aforesaid satisfaction is recorded, the application of mind by the detaining authority cannot be proved and testing the impugned order on the aforesaid principle, the impugned order appears to suffer from vice of complete non application of mind. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that since on the date of the passing of the detention order, the petitioner was already in jail and mere possibility of his released on bail was not enough for preventive detention unless there was material before the respondent no.3 justifying the apprehension that detenu would indulge in prejudicial activities in case of his release on bail. He next submitted that although the detaining authority has in the grounds of detention recorded his satisfaction that the petitioner who was in jail on account of his being accused in case crime no. 332 of 2015, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302 IPC and Section 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act, had moved a bail application before the Sessions Judge and there was strong possibility of his being released on bail and in the eventuality of his being released on bail he would again indulge in similar activities prejudicial to the public order but in the instant case there was no material made apparent on record that the detenu if released on bail was likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintainance of public order and hence the impugned detention order cannot sustained and is liable to be set aside. In support of his aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on Shashi Aggarwal Vs. State of U.P. and others reported in 1988 (1) SCC 436 and Rameshwar Shaw Vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan & another reported in AIR 1964 SC 334. 8. Per contra learned AGA submitted that the impugned detention order does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity requiring any interference by this Court. He further submitted that there was sufficient material before the respondent no.3 justifying his belief that in case the detenu was released on bail, he would again indulge in activities disturbing the public order. 9. We have very carefully scanned the impugned order and the grounds of detention and also the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 1 to 3 and 5 in this writ petition and we are constrained to observe that no material justifying the apprehension that detenue would indulge in prejudicial activities in case of his being released on bail was placed before the respondent no.3. In our opinion the bald statement made in the grounds of detention that the petitioner upon being released on bail would repeat his criminal activities prejudicially affecting the maintainance of public order, was not enough to justify passing of an order of preventive detention 1582 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES against him. We stand fortified in our view by the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Rameshwar Shaw (supra) and Shahshi Agarwal (supra). 10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraphs 9 and 10 of its judgement rendered in the case of Rameshwar Shaw (supra) has observed as hereunder :- "9. It is also true that in deciding the question as to whether it is necessary to detain a person, the authority has to be satisfied that if the said person is not detained, he may act in a prejudicial manner, and this conclusion can be reasonably reached by the authority generally in the light of the evidence about the past prejudicial activities of the said person. When evidence is placed before the authority in respect of such past conduct of the person, the authority has to examine the said evidence and decide whether it is necessary to detain the said person in order to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner. That is why this Court has held in Ujagar Singh v. The State of Punjab and jagjit Singh -v. The State of Punjab(1) that the past conduct or antecedent history of a person can be taken into account in making a detention order, and as a matter of fact, it is largely from prior events showing tendencies or inclinations of a man that an inference could be drawn whether he is likely even in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 10. In this connection, it is, however, necessary to bear in mind that the past conduct or antecedent history of the person on which the authority purports to act, should ordinarily be proximate in point of time and should have a rational connection with the conclusion that the detention of the person is necessary. It would, for instance, be irrational to take into account the conduct of the person which took plate ten years before the date of his detention and say that even though after the said incident took place nothing is known against the person indicating his tendency to act in a prejudicial manner, even so on the strength of the said incident which is ten years old, the authority is satisfied that his detention is necessary. In other words, where an authority is acting bona fide and considering the question as to whether a person should be detained, he would naturally expect that evidence on which the said conclusion is ultimately going to rest must be evidence of his past conduct or antecedent history which reasonably and rationally justifies the conclusion that if the said person is not detained, he may indulge in prejudicial activities. We ought to add that it is both inexpedient and undesirable to lay down any inflexible test. The question about the validity of the satisfaction of the authority will have to be considered on the facts of each case. The detention of a person without a trial is a very serious encroachment on his personal freedom, and so, at every stage, all questions in relation to the said detention must be carefully and solemnly considered" 11. Similarly the Apex Court in paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 of its judgment rendered in Smt. Shahsi Agarwal (supra) which are being reproduced hereinbelow has held as hereunder :- "8. The principles applicable in these types of preventive detention cases have been explained in several decisions of this Court. All those cases have been considered in a 5 All. Veeri Singh Vs Union of India & Ors. 1583 recent decision in Poonam Lata v. M. L. Wadhawan, [1987] 4 SCC 48. The principles may be summarised as follows. Section 3 of the National Security Act does not preclude the authority from making an order of detention against a person while he is in custody or in jail, but the relevant facts in connection with the making of the order would make all the difference in every case. The validity of the order of detention has to be judged in every individual case on its own facts. There must be material apparently disclosed to the detaining authority in each case that the person against whom an order of preventive detention is being made is already under custody and yet for compelling reasons, his preventive detention is necessary. 9. We will now refer to the two decisions which according to Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad are not in tune with the ratio of the decision in Alijan Milan's case (supra). In Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate Etah and Ors., [1985]4 SCC 232 at p. 234, this Court observed: "On a reading of the grounds, particularly the paragraph which we have extracted above, it is clear that the order of detention was passed as the detaining authority was apprehensive that in case the detenu was released on bail he would again carry on his criminal activities in the area. If the apprehension of the detaining authority was true, the bail application had to be opposed and in case bail was granted, challenge against that order in the higher forum had to be raisec;. Merely on the ground that an accused in detention as an under-trial prisoner was likely to get bail an order of detention under the National Security Act should not ordinarily be passed." What was stressed in the above case is that an apprehension of the detaining authority that the accused if enlarged on bail would again carry on his criminal activities is by itself not sufficient to detain a person under the National Security Act. 10. Every citizen in this country has the right to have recourse to law. He has the right to move the court for bail when he is arrested under the ordinary law of the land. If the State thinks that he does not deserve bail the State could oppose the grant of bail. He cannot, however, be interdicted from moving the court for bail by clamping an order of detention. The possibility of the Court granting bail may not be sufficient. Nor a bald statement that the person would repeat his criminal activities would be enough. There must also be credible information or cogent reasons apparent on the record that the detenu, if enlarged on bail, would act prejudicially to the interest of public order. That has been made clear in Binod Singh v. District Magistrate Dhanbad, [1986] 4 SCC 416 at 421, where it was observed: "A bald statement is merely an ipse dixit of the officer. If there were cogent materials for thinking that the detenu might be released then these should have been made apparent. Etemal vigilance on the part of the authority charged with both law and order and public order is the price which the democracy in this country extracts from the public officials in order to protect the fundamental freedoms of our citizens." 1584 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES 12. In the instant case, there was no material made apparent on record that the detenue, if released on bail will indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintainance of public order. The detention order appears to have been made merely on the ground that the petitioner who was in jail had moved an application for bail and there was strong possibility of his being released bailed out. We do not think that the impugned order of detention can be justified on that basis. 13. The habeas corpus writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned detention order dated 18.09.2015 passed by District Magistrate, Firozabad, respondent no.3 is hereby quashed. 14. The petitioner shall be forthwith , if he is not wanted in any other case. 15. There shall however be no order as to costs. --------- APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATE: ALLAHABAD 16.05.2016 BEFORE THE HON'BLE DILIP GUPTA, J. THE HON'BLE RAVINDRA NATH KAKKAR, J. Income Tax Appeal No.- 135 Of 2016 Raja Harpal Singh Inter College ...Appellant Versus Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax ...Respondent Counsel for Appellant: Naveen Chandra Gupta Counsel for Respondent: S.C. HEAD NOTE: Income Tax Act, 1961-Sections 200(3), 272A(2)(k), 272A(4), 260-A-Penalty for delay in filing e-TDS statements-Deductor regularly depositing TDS but failing to file e-TDS returns for several assessment years-Opportunity of hearing-Explanation offered belatedly before appellate authority-Partial relief granted-Penalty sustained post-appointment of regular Principal-No substantial question of law. Failure to furnish quarterly e-TDS statements within the prescribed time constitutes a clear violation of Section 200(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and attracts penalty under Section 272A(2)(k) notwithstanding the fact that tax deducted at source was duly deposited within time and no immediate loss of revenue was demonstrated.