# Vice Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh & others v. Ram Prakash Shukla

- **Citation:** (2004) 2 ILRA 626
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2004-07-19
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 848 of 2004
- **Bench:** M. Katju, Umeshwar Pandey
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/vice-chancellor-aligarh-muslim-university-aligarh-others-v-ram-prakash-shukla-40284
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

Constitution
of
India,
Article
226Temporary
Appointment-Petitioner
holding post of Security Asstt. purely on
Temporary basis-circular dated 20.5.03
provided
such
appointee
either
as
teaching
on
non
teaching
staff
to
continue
upto
30.6.03-initial
appointment
on
fixed
periodSubsequently
extended
till
regular
selection is made-in view of circular
issued by the university-petitioner has
no right to hold the post-thereafter.
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
2 All] V.C., Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh and others V. Ram Prakash Shukla
627
Admittedly the respondent Ram Prakash
Shukla
was
a
purely
temporary
appointee and hence he had no right to
the post. No proposal was sent for
extension of his service and therefore his
service came to an end on 30.6.2003, in
view of the order of the competent
authority dated 20.5.2003.
Para 5
Case law discussed:
1991 (1) ACC-691
1994 (5) SCC 177
AIR 1992 SC 496
(1995) 1 SCC 638
J.T. 2002 (1) SC-431
1996 (8) SC-46

## Text

http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2004
626
the State Government for payment of his
legitimate dues and even after litigation
and the decree having become final, it is
not expected of the State Government to
withhold the payment of its retired
employee for years together until the
decree is put in execution and attachment
orders are passed. The State Government
is expected to act fairly with its
employees and such unfair attitude having
been adopted by the State Government
does
entitle
the
writ-petitioner
for
payment of interest, which has rightly
been awarded.

9. However, the rate of interest
awarded at 12% per annum appears to be
slightly on the higher side. Considering
the then prevailing market rate of interest
and also the current market rate of
interest, in our view, simple interest at the
rate of 9% per annum for the entire period
ought to have been awarded. The finding
of the writ court that the writ-petitioner
would be entitled to interest after
December, 1997 is also justified. In our
view, the rate of interest for such period
should also be 9% per annum.

10. Since we find that the rate of
interest awarded was slightly on the
higher side, in our view, after calculating
the same at 9% simple interest per annum,
a quantified amount of Rs.1,75,000/-
ought to be paid to the writ-petitioner
towards interest for the delay in payment
of his legitimate dues after his retirement,
which would meet the ends of justice. It is
further provided that the writ-petitioner
shall also be entitled to cost of litigation,
which is assessed at Rs.5,000/- for writ
court as well as in this appeal. Thus the
writ-petitioner would be entitled to
payment of Rs.1,80,000/-.

11. This special appeal, accordingly,
stands partly allowed. It is thus directed
that the appellants shall jointly and
severally ensure payment of an amount of
Rs.1,80,000/- to the writ-petitioner by
means of an account payee bank draft
within a period of three months from
today. It is further provided that in case
the said amount is not paid within three
months, the writ-petitioner shall further be
entitled to payment of interest at the rate
of 9% on the said amount of Rs.1,80,000/-
from today till the date of actual payment
for delay of this payment. In case the
amount of Rs.1,80,000/- is paid to the
writ-petitioner within the stipulated period
of three months, no further interest shall
be payable by the appellants.
Appeal Partly Allowed.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.7.2004

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE M. KATJU, J.
THE HON'BLE UMESHWAR PANDEY, J.

Special Appeal No. 848 of 2004

Vice
Chancellor,
Aligarh
Muslim
University, Aligarh & others ...Appellants
Versus
Ram Prakash Shukla
 ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:

Counsel for the Respondents:

Constitution
of
India,
Article
226Temporary
Appointment-Petitioner
holding post of Security Asstt. purely on
Temporary basis-circular dated 20.5.03
provided
such
appointee
either
as
teaching
on
non
teaching
staff
to
continue
upto
30.6.03-initial
appointment
on
fixed
periodSubsequently
extended
till
regular
selection is made-in view of circular
issued by the university-petitioner has
no right to hold the post-thereafter.
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
2 All] V.C., Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh and others V. Ram Prakash Shukla
627
Admittedly the respondent Ram Prakash
Shukla
was
a
purely
temporary
appointee and hence he had no right to
the post. No proposal was sent for
extension of his service and therefore his
service came to an end on 30.6.2003, in
view of the order of the competent
authority dated 20.5.2003.
Para 5
Case law discussed:
1991 (1) ACC-691
1994 (5) SCC 177
AIR 1992 SC 496
(1995) 1 SCC 638
J.T. 2002 (1) SC-431
1996 (8) SC-46

(Delivered by Hon'ble M. Katju, J.)

1. Heard Sri Shashi Nandan and
Smt. Suneeta Agarwal for the appellant
and
Sri
Hemant
Kumar
for
the
respondent.

2. This special appeal has been filed
against the impugned judgment of the
learned Single Judge, dated 13.5.2004.
We have carefully perused the impugned
judgment and we are of the opinion that
the same cannot be sustained.

3. Admittedly the respondent was a
purely temporary appointee who was
appointed
temporarily
as
Security
Assistant in the Proctor's office for a
period of six months or till some
arrangement/regular appointment is made
or until further orders whichever is
earlier. He joined duties on 23.3.2001. His
term was extended from 23.11.2001 for a
period of one year and again he was
allowed on 20.12.2001 to continue till
further orders or till the regular selection
is made whichever is earlier.

4. It appears that a circular dated
20.5.2003 was issued by the competent
authority
of
the
Aligarh
Muslim
University (Vice Chancellor) copy of
which is Annexure 4 to the stay
application filed with this appeal. By this
order dated 20.5.2003 the competent
authority directed that the appointments
of temporary employees sanctioned on
various
non-teaching/technical
cadre
posts & group D employee till further
orders be now treated to have been made
only upto 30.6.2003. By the same order it
was also directed that the proposal for
further
extension
of
temporary
appointments
beyond
30.6.2003
alongwith, detailed justification may be
sent to the Registrar on the prescribed
format.

5. Admittedly the respondent Ram
Prakash Shukla was a purely temporary
appointee and hence he had no right to the
post. No proposal was sent for extension
of his service and therefore his service
came to an end on 30.6.2003, in view of
the order of the competent authority dated
20.5.2003.

6. The Learned Single Judge
allowed the writ petition on the ground
that the petitioner was discriminated
against the writ petition as the services of
some other persons were extended.
Regarding the persons Sri Shashi Nandan,
learned
counsel
for
the
appellant
submitted that proposals were sent for
extending their service as they were
needed in the respective departments,
whereas there was no proposal in respect
of the writ petitioner as he was not
needed. It is not for this Court to decide
whether a person is needed or not needed.
The Court must exercise judicial restraint
in such matters and should not interfere in
such matters which lie within the domain
of the University or competent authority.
Some attitude should be given to the
executive and it is not proper for this
Court to interfere on the lightest pretext.
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2004
628

7. The respondent in this appeal
(writ petitioner) was purely temporary
appointee and hence had no right to the
post, as held by the Supreme Court in
Kaushal Kishore vs. State of U.P., (1991)
SCC 691, Commissioner, Food and Civil
Supllies vs. Prakash Chandra Saxena,
(1994) 5 SCC 177, Triveni Shanker
Saxena vs. State of U.P., AIR 1992 SC
496, Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas
Nigam Ltd. vs. Devendra Kumar Jain,
(1995) 1 SCC 638, Dr. Chanchal Goyal
vs. State of Rajasthan (2003) 3 SCC 485,
Shailaja Shivajirao Patil vs. President, JT
2002 (1) SC 431, Secretary, Ministry of
Works and Housing Government of India
vs. Mohinder Singh Jagdev, JT 1996 (8)
SC 46, etc. These decisions have been
followed by a Division Bench of this
Court
in
Mathura
Vrindavan
Development Authority, Mathura vs.
State Public Services Tribunal and others,
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4002
decided on 25.11.2003.

8. For the reasons given above we
are of the opinion that this appeal
deserves to be allowed. The impugned
judgment of the learned Single Judge
dated 13.5.2004 is set aside and the writ
petition stands dismissed.
Appeal Allowed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.07.2004

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE KRISHNA MURARI, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2948 of 2004

Radha Krishna and others ...Petitioners
Versus
Sri Brij Kishore & others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Ajit Kumar
Sri Mohit Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Tripathi B.G. Bhai
C.S.C.

U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act 1953Section 5 (3) Abetment of Suit-suit for
permanent injunction-During pendancy
of suit the village in question brought
under
Consolidation
Proceeding-only
relief for Injunction-No declaration of
title on right claimed-held not liable to
abate.

The findings recorded by revisional court
that suit filed by the plaintiff was only
for relief of injunction and did not
involve any declaration of the rights and
title and hence not liable to be abated,
does not suffer from any infirmity and
are hereby affirmed.

Para 18
Case law discussed:
1984 ACJ 490
1999 (1) AWC 152
AIR 1966 SC 1718
1990 RE 466

(Delivered by Hon'ble Krishna Murari, J.)

1. The short question which arises
for consideration, in this case, is whether,
a suit where only a relief for permanent
injunction has been claimed is liable to be
abated by reason of Section-5 (2) of U.P.
Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953
(hereinafter referred to as the Act).

2. The facts relevant for the purpose
of
the
case
are
that
the
plaintiff/respondent filed original suit no.
342/90 in the Court of Civil Judge,
Mathura, seeking a relief for permanent
injunction
to
restrain
the
defendant/petitioner from interfering in
his possession or from taking possession
forcibly and raising any construction over
the land in dispute. During the pendency
of the proceedings an application no. 24-