# Vidhyawati Verma v. Amita Srivastava and Ors

- **Citation:** (2013) 2 ILRA 731
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2013-05-06
- **Case number:** Second Appeal No. 36 of 2010
- **Bench:** Sudhir Agarwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/vidhyawati-verma-v-amita-srivastava-and-ors-42576
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Code of Civil Procedure-Section 100-
Second Appeal-Substantial question of
law-suit for cancellation of Sale deeddismissed by both Courts below-with
finding the amount of sale consideration
given before sub Registrars-presumption
in favor of endorsement made by subRegistrar-under
Section
60(2)
of
Registration Act Available concurrent
findings of fact can not be interfered
unless illegality irregularity or perversity
pointed out-appeal dismissed.

Held: Para-22
However, that itself would not result in
any benefit to the plaintiff-appellant in
the present case for the reason that the
oral evidence has been discussed by Trial
Court and after discussion it has found
that plaintiff has miserably failed to
prove her case. The Lower Appellate
Court has also recorded a concurrent
finding. In the discussion of courts below
about oral evidence adduced by plaintiffappellant,
no
illegality,
irregularity,
inconsistency or perversity has been
shown or pointed out. The only thing
hammered repeatedly by counsel for
plaintiff-appellant is that defendants did
not produce her own bank's passbook
and, therefore, a conclusive inference
should have been drawn in favour of
plaintiff to prove her case and the suit
ought
to
have
been
decreed.
This
assumption per se is fallacious and
misconceived.
Therefore,
the
entire
judgment in Ishwar Dass Jain (supra) I
find is of no help to plaintiff-appellant at
all.

Case Law discussed:
(1999) 8 SCC 396; AIR 2012 SC 2528; Second
Appeal No. 2276 of 1977; AIR 2000 SC 426;
JT 2003(1) SC 150; 2008 All. C.J. 1346; AIR
1988 SC 1858; 1992(1) SCC 647; 1995
Suppl.(4)
SCC
534;
1998(2)
SCC
295;
1991(1)SCC 143; AIR 1982 SC 20

## Text

2 All] Vidhyawati Verma Vs. Amita Srivastava and Ors.
731
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 06.05.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SAAEED-UZ-ZAMAN SIDDIQI J.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.05.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.

Second Appeal No. 36 of 2010

Vidhyawati Verma

 ...Petitioner
Versus
Amita Srivastava and Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ashok Kumar Singh
Dr. Vinod Kumar Rai

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri A.K. Dave, Sri Abhishek Mishra
Sri K.N. Mishra

Code of Civil Procedure-Section 100-
Second Appeal-Substantial question of
law-suit for cancellation of Sale deeddismissed by both Courts below-with
finding the amount of sale consideration
given before sub Registrars-presumption
in favor of endorsement made by subRegistrar-under
Section
60(2)
of
Registration Act Available concurrent
findings of fact can not be interfered
unless illegality irregularity or perversity
pointed out-appeal dismissed.

Held: Para-22
However, that itself would not result in
any benefit to the plaintiff-appellant in
the present case for the reason that the
oral evidence has been discussed by Trial
Court and after discussion it has found
that plaintiff has miserably failed to
prove her case. The Lower Appellate
Court has also recorded a concurrent
finding. In the discussion of courts below
about oral evidence adduced by plaintiffappellant,
no
illegality,
irregularity,
inconsistency or perversity has been
shown or pointed out. The only thing
hammered repeatedly by counsel for
plaintiff-appellant is that defendants did
not produce her own bank's passbook
and, therefore, a conclusive inference
should have been drawn in favour of
plaintiff to prove her case and the suit
ought
to
have
been
decreed.
This
assumption per se is fallacious and
misconceived.
Therefore,
the
entire
judgment in Ishwar Dass Jain (supra) I
find is of no help to plaintiff-appellant at
all.

Case Law discussed:
(1999) 8 SCC 396; AIR 2012 SC 2528; Second
Appeal No. 2276 of 1977; AIR 2000 SC 426;
JT 2003(1) SC 150; 2008 All. C.J. 1346; AIR
1988 SC 1858; 1992(1) SCC 647; 1995
Suppl.(4)
SCC
534;
1998(2)
SCC
295;
1991(1)SCC 143; AIR 1982 SC 20

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.)

1. This is a plaintiff's second appeal
filed under Section 100 C.P.C. After
hearing this appeal under Order 41 Rule
11 C.P.C. this Court formulated following
substantial question of law on 30.04.2010:

"(i)
Whether
the
transaction
regarding sale of house was fair, proper
and transparent and defendant respondent
no.1 took advantage of her relationship
from the plaintiff, who was mother?

(ii) Whether the factum of sale
consideration is proved from the oral and
documentary evidence produced before
the court below or the findings in this
regard are based on presumption?

(iii) Whether the Courts below have
committed illegality in not recording the
finding regarding formation of a valid
contract and payment of sale consideration
732 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
between the parties and the impugned
judgments of the Courts below are vitiated
on account of misreading of evidence on
record.

2. Sri Ashok Kumar Singh, learned
counsel appearing for appellant and Sri
K.N.
Mishra
and
Sri
A.K.
Dave,
Advocates for respondents have advanced
their submissions on aforesaid questions.

3. To appreciate the above issue, the
bare facts necessary for adjudication of
aforesaid questions I may refer to the case
set up by parties before the courts below.

4. The plaintiff-appellant, Smt.
Vidhyawati Verma instituted Original
Suit No. 12 of 2006 in the Court of Civil
Judge (Senior Division), Allahabad for
cancellation
of
sale
deed
dated
17.11.1997 registered on 16.12.1997 in
respect to House No. 1027, G.T.B. Nagar
Kareli Scheme, Allahabad and for a
decree of injunction and possession.

5. The plaint case set up by her is
that she herself was working as Nurse in
the medical department under Central
Government and retired therefrom in
1992. The disputed house was allotted to
her by U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad
(hereinafter referred to as the "Parishad")
pursuant whereto an agreement for sale
was
executed
on
25.03.1980
and
possession was delivered to plaintiff on
the
same
day.
She
paid
all
the
installments/consideration to Parishad,
whereafter a sale deed was executed in
her favour on 28.07.1997. The plaintiff
initially had two sons and two daughters
but her younger son, Raju Verma died in
1994 leaving only one son, Sudhir Verma.
The names of her daughters are Reeta
Srivastava and Amita Srivastava.

6. Her son Sudhir Verma was
married in 1996 and was appointed in
Accounts Department of CDA Pension in
1997. He was allotted a Government
accommodation and started living therein.
Her daughter, Reeta Srivastava is residing
with her husband at Preetam Nagar,
Allahabad. Her younger daughter, Amita
Srivastava,
whose
husband
is
an
employee in HYDLE Department is also
living separately with him. However
plaintiff had extra affection to her
younger daughter, Amita Srivastava who
used to visit and serve her (plaintiff) in
various ways. Taking advantage thereof
the younger daughter and her husband
manipulated and got a forged sale deed
executed on 17.11.1997, registered on
16.12.1997, though no consideration was
paid to her. The sale deed is forged and
fictitious.

7. The suit was contested by
defendants. Besides, they also lodged a
counter claim for execution of sale deed,
alleging that despite and payment of
entire consideration, the plaintiff is not
delivering possession of disputed house
and, therefore, possession thereof be
directed to be handed over to them.

8. The Trial Court formulated eleven
issues in all but for the purpose of present
appeal the issues No. 1, 2 and 3, relevant,
are reproduced as under:

^^1& D;k cSukek cgd vferk JhokLro
ftldh jftLVah fnukWad 22&02&2007 dks gq;h
fujLr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS \

2& D;k okn xzLr Hkou ftldk fooj.k okn
i= ds var esa ntZ gS ds lEcU/k esa izfroknhx.k ds
fo:) LFkkbZ fu"k/kkKk tkjh fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS\ ;fn
gkWa rks mldk izHkko \

3& D;k oknxzLr Hkou ftldk fooj.k okni=
ds vUr esa ntZ gS] ds n[kyukek dh fMdh okfnuh ds
i{k esa tkjh djrs gq;s izfroknhx.k dks oknxzLr Hkou
2 All] Vidhyawati Verma Vs. Amita Srivastava and Ors.
733
ds Hkwry ds dejksa ls csn[ky fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS\
,oa D;k okfnuh dks dCtk fnyk;s tkus ;ksX; gS\^^

1. Whether the sale-deed executed in
favour of Amita Srivastava, registered on
22.02.2007, deserves to be cancelled?

2. Whether the building in litigation,
particulars whereof have been mentioned
at the bottom of the plaint, warrants an
order of permanent injunction against the
Defendants? If yes, its effect?

3. Whether the building in litigation,
particulars whereof have been mentioned
at the bottom of the plaint, warrants a
decree for occupancy to be passed in
favour of the lady Plaintiff, the eviction of
the Defendants from its ground floor
rooms and possession thereof to be
handed over to the lady Plaintiff?"
(English translation by the Court)

9. In respect to issue no. 1 the Trial
Court, from the evidence of parties, found
that the plaintiff admitted to have visited the
office of Sub-Registrar for the purpose of
registration.
The
part
payment
of
consideration was made through cheque and
payment thereof credited in the accounts of
plaintiff as was found proved by Trial Court.
It also found that the plaintiff has signed the
instrument of sale and on this aspect also
there was no dispute. The witnesses to the
sale deed were also relatives to both parties.
DW-2, Sri Umesh Prakash Singh proved the
case of defendants. Though the plaintiff set
up case of fraud and misrepresentation but
could not adduce any evidence whatsoever,
except of her oral statement as well as
statement of her son Sudhir Verma as PW-1
and PW-3.

10. PW-2, Smt. Vidyawati though
claimed to be an independent witness but
her deposition also did not support the case
of plaintiff. Instead it proved that her
relations with son Sudhir Verma were
strange and he used not to take care and
maintain his mother. The plaintiff denied of
having receipt of any amount whatsoever
but Rs. 55,000/- in all were paid through
three cheques and all were found credited in
the bank account of plaintiff which clearly
belie her case and prove that she was
making a false statement. It is in these facts
and circumstances, the Trial Court decided
issue No. 1 against plaintiff and in that view
of the matter the issues No. 2 and 3 were
also decided against her. With respect to
possession it found that plaintiff being
mother of defendant no. 1 and mother-inlaw of defendant no. 2, there was nothing
uncommon if there was an agreement
between parties that despite sale of disputed
house, the plaintiff may continue to stay
therein.
The
suit
was
consequently
dismissed by Trial Court vide judgment and
decree dated 24.02.2009 and thereagainst
the plaintiff's appeal has been dismissed by
Lower Appellate Court giving concurrent
findings vide judgment and decree dated
09.10.2009.

11. Learned counsel for the
appellant
endeavour
to
show
that
defendants having failed to produce the
passbook of their bank Account No.
17106 of Punjab National Bank of the
relevant date and year as was summoned
by plaintiff and in respect whereof an
order was also passed by Trial Court, it
was incumbent upon it to draw an
inference against defendant no. 1 that she
did not possess requisite founds to make
payment as claimed by her and, therefore,
there was no evidence that Rs. 40,000/-,
i.e., the balance towards consideration
was actually paid to plaintiff.
734 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013

12. It is no doubt that the defendants
though were required to produce pass
book of bank Account No. 17106 of
Punjab National Bank of the year 1997
but the said pass book was not produced.
The question would be, whether this very
fact, even if an adverse inference is drawn
against defendants, would be sufficient to
entitle the plaintiff to have her suit
decreed whereby she has sought to cancel
sale deed 17.11.1997.

13. Even if no evidence or no
contest is made by defendants still suit
straight-away cannot be decreed unless
the plaintiff proves its case. The sale deed
in question was sought to be cancelled on
the
ground
of
fraud
and
misrepresentation. It is not a case of
Pardanashin lady or illiterate rural folk so
as to tilt or shift onus to prove the
aforesaid facts upon defendants in view of
Section 16(3) of Contract Act. Here the
plaintiff is a well educated lady, capable
to maintain herself, having served in a
Government department and at the time of
execution of sale deed, was a retired
employee.
The
receipt
of
partial
consideration through bank's transaction,
credit whereof were shown in plaintiff's
bank account was attempted to explain
that aforesaid amount was subsequently
refunded to defendant no. 1 but this
alleged refund, as a matter of act, has not
been proved at all. Rs. 55,000/- through
cheques were paid to plaintiff and this
fact was found proved through the bank
account statement of plaintiff. So far as
remaining 40,000/- is concerned, the said
amount is said to have been paid at the
time of registration. It is not disputed that
registered sale deed contains endorsement
of Sub-Registrar about the compliance of
requirements of Registration Act, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1908")
as also the statement made before SubRegistrar
that
vendor
has
received
consideration
money
from
vendee.
Section 60(2) of Act, 1908 also provides a
statutory
presumption
in
favour
of
endorsement made by Sub-Registrar on
the registered sale deed and such statutory
presumption can be negatived or ignored
only when there are cogent and credible
evidence to show something otherwise.
No such evidence has been adduced
before the courts below and none referred
to before this Court. The mere fact that
defendants did not adduce pass book of
her own bank account, by itself, therefore,
would not have turned anything in the
case. A suit could have been decreed only
if the plaintiff succeeds in proving her/his
case and not on the weakness of defence
taken by defendants. It is no doubt true
that even if no written statement is filed
and the defendants have not contested the
matter yet the plaintiff is not entitled for
decree of suit inasmuch as he/she is under
an obligation to prove his/her case and
only then he/she can be granted relief and
not otherwise.

14. Under Order VIII Rule 10
C.P.C. the Court has been enabled to
proceed to deliver a judgment where
defendants or one of several defendants
have chosen not to contest the suit by
filing written statement but it does not
mean that plaintiff is absolved from his
obligation to prove the case. The
procedure
prescribed
therein
is
discretionary. In the context of Order VIII
Rule 10 C.P.C. the Apex Court has
considered the matter in Balraj Taneja &
Anr. Vs. Sunil Madan & Anr., (1999) 8
SCC 396 and observed:

"30. As pointed out earlier, the Court
has not to act blindly upon the admission
2 All] Vidhyawati Verma Vs. Amita Srivastava and Ors.
735
of a fact made by the defendant in his
Written Statement nor the Court should
proceed to pass judgment blindly merely
because a Written Statement has not been
filed by the defendant traversing the facts
set out by the plaintiff in the plaint filed in
the Court. In a case, specially where a
Written Statement has not been filed by
the defendant, the Court should be a little
cautious in proceeding under Order 8
Rule 10 CPC. Before passing the
judgment against the defendant it must
see to it that even if the facts set out in the
plaint are treated to have been admitted,
a judgment could possibly be passed in
favour of the plaintiff without requiring
him to prove any fact mentioned in the
plaint. It
is
a
matter
of
Court's
satisfaction and, therefore, only on being
satisfied that there is no fact which need
be
proved
on
account
of
deemed
admission, the Court can conveniently
pass a judgment against the defendant
who has not filed the Written Statement.
But if the plaint itself indicates that there
are disputed questions of fact involved in
the case regarding which two different
versions are set out in the plaint itself, it
would not be safe for the Court to pass a
judgment without requiring the plaintiff to
prove the facts so as to settle the factual
controversy. Such a case would be
covered by the expression "the Court may,
in its discretion, require any such fact to
be proved" used in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5
of Order 8, or the expression "may make
such order in relation to the suit as it
thinks fit" used in Rule 10 of Order 8."

15. The above quote in Balraj
Taneja & Anr. (supra), has been
followed
recently
in
C.N.Ramappa
Gowda Vs. C.C. Chandregowda (D) by
L.Rs. & Anr., AIR 2012 SC 2528
wherein also it has been held that Court is
duty bound to adjudicate even in the
absence of complete pleadings or in
absence of pleadings of one or more
party. In para 14 of the judgment, the
court said that effect of non-filing of
written statement and proceeding to try
the suit is clearly to expedite disposal of
the suit. It is not penal in nature wherein
the defendant has to be penalised for non
filing of written statement by trying the
suit in a mechanical manner by passing a
decree. Apex Court reiterated its earlier
observations in following words:

"....We wish to reiterate that in a
case where written statement has not been
filed, the Court should be a little more
cautious in proceeding under Order 8
Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure and
before passing a judgement, it must
ensure that even if the facts set out in the
plaint are treated to have been admitted,
a judgement and decree could not
possibly be passed without requiring him
to prove the fact pleaded in the plaint. It
is only when the Court for recorded
reasons is fully satisfied that there is no
fact which needs to be proved at the
instance of the Plaintiff in view of the
deemed admission by the Defendant, the
Court can conveniently pass a judgement
and decree against the Defendant who
has not filed the written statement. But, if
the plaint itself indicates that there are
disputed questions of fact involved in the
case arising from the plaint itself giving
rise to two versions, it would not be safe
for the Court to record an ex-parte
judgement without directing the Plaintiff
to prove the facts so as to settle the
factual controversy. In that event, the exparte judgement although may appear to
have decided the suit expeditiously, it
ultimately gives rise to several layers of
appeal after appeal which ultimately
736 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
compounds the delay in finally disposing
of the suit giving rise to multiplicity of
proceeding which hardly promotes the
cause of speedy trial. However, if the
Court is clearly of the view that the
Plaintiff's case even without any evidence
is prima facie unimpeachable and the
Defendant's approach is clearly a dilatory
tactic to delay the passing of a decree, it
would be justified in appropriate cases to
pass even an uncontested decree. What
would be the nature of such a case
ultimately will have to be left to the
wisdom and just exercise of discretion by
the trial court who is seized of the trial of
the suit."

16. The above two authorities have
been referred to and followed recently by
this Court in Maharaji Kunwar Vs.
Sheo Shanker, Second Appeal No. 2276
of 1977, decided on 10.04.2013.

17. On behalf of plaintiff reliance
has been placed on Apex Court's
decisions in Ishwar Dass Jain Vs. Sohan
Lal, AIR 2000 SC 426; Krishna Mohan
Kul @ Nani Charan Kul and another
Vs. Pratima Maity and others, JT
2003(1) SC 150; and, Late Sohan Lal
Vs. Sabhajeet, 2008 All.C.J. 1346.

18. Having gone through the
aforesaid authorities very carefully, I do
not find as to how they can advance the
case of plaintiff-appellant.

19. In Ishwar Dass Jain (supra) a
suit
was
filed
for
redemption
of
usufructuary mortgage dated 15.04.1969
and for possession. It was dismissed by
Trial Court, Appellate Court as well as
High Court. The High Court observed that
notwithstanding the fact the defendants
executed
registered
mortgage
dated
15.04.1969, the real relationship between
parties was that of landlord and tenant and
the defendants, thus, could not have been
evicted except under Rent Control Law.
Before Apex Court one of the question
raised, whether there was a substantial
question of law arisen from the case so as
justify hearing of appeal after issuing
notice to respondents-defendants. It was
contended that a vital evidence which
could have led to a different conclusion
was omitted or if inadmissible evidence
was relied on which if omitted could have
led to a different conclusion, would have
given rise to a substantial question of law
for the purpose of justifying interference
of High Court in appeal under Section
100 C.P.C. even though there are
concurrent findings of facts or findings of
facts arrived at by Lower Appellate Court.
As
a
proposition
of
law
if
the
contingencies, as noticed above, exist it
would have justified interference by the
Second Appellate Court under Section
100 C.P.C. The Apex Court in paras 11
and 12 of the judgment, after relying on
its earlier decisions in Dilbagrai Punjabi
Vs. Sharad Chandra, AIR 1988 SC
1858; Jagdish Singh Vs. Nathu Singh,
1992(1) SCC 647, Sundra Naicka
Vadiyar Vs. Ramaswami Ayyar, 1995
Suppl.(4) SCC 534; Mehrunissa Vs.
Visham Kumari, 1998(2) SCC 295; and,
Sri Chnad Gupta Vs. Gulzar Singh,
1991(1) SCC 143, said:

"11. There are two situations in which
interference with findings of fact is
permissible. The first one is when material or
relevant evidence is not considered which, if
considered would have led to an opposite
conclusion. This principle has been laid
down in a series of judgments of this Court
in relation to Section 100 CPC after the 1976
amendment. . ."
2 All] Vidhyawati Verma Vs. Amita Srivastava and Ors.
737

"12. The second situation in which
interference with findings of fact is
permissible is where a finding has been
arrived at by the appellate court by
placing reliance on inadmissible evidence
which if it was omitted, an opposite
conclusion was possible. . . . "

20. Having said so this Court finds
that the question of proving a document
would have arisen if its execution is
denied. That question does not arise in the
present case inasmuch as the sale deed in
question was admittedly a registered
instrument and it was before the Court.
The signature on the registered instrument
were not disputed by plaintiff though she
tried to explain that the same were
obtained by giving her an impression that
this is a document of will and not sale
deed. This explanation had to be proved
by
plaintiff
but
she
failed.
This
explanation would not result doubting the
very existence and factum of execution of
instrument but would have justified only a
suspicion against such document, if such
explanation would have been proved.
However, the plaintiff failed to prove this
explanation.

21. Then comes the third question,
whether an oral evidence is admissible
under Section 91(1) of Evidence Act to
prove that a document though executed
was a sham document. It cannot be
doubted that terms and conditions settled
in a document cannot be contradicted by
oral evidence but the factum about the
circumstances in which a document was
executed etc., for that purpose oral
evidence is admissible. There is no doubt
about it and if any authority is required I
may refer to the decision in Gangabai Vs.
Chhabubai, AIR 1982 SC 20.

22. However, that itself would not
result in any benefit to the plaintiffappellant in the present case for the
reason that the oral evidence has been
discussed by Trial Court and after
discussion it has found that plaintiff has
miserably failed to prove her case. The
Lower Appellate Court has also recorded
a concurrent finding. In the discussion of
courts below about oral evidence adduced
by
plaintiff-appellant,
no
illegality,
irregularity, inconsistency or perversity
has been shown or pointed out. The only
thing hammered repeatedly by counsel for
plaintiff-appellant is that defendants did
not produce her own bank's passbook and,
therefore, a conclusive inference should
have been drawn in favour of plaintiff to
prove her case and the suit ought to have
been decreed. This assumption per se is
fallacious and misconceived. Therefore,
the entire judgment in Ishwar Dass Jain
(supra) I find is of no help to plaintiffappellant at all.

23. Coming to the next authority,
i.e., Krishna Mohan Kul @ Nani
Charan Kul (supra), I find that there also
the Court has discussed as to what a
substantial question of law would be and
upon whom the burden of proof lie with
reference to Sections 101, 104 and 111 of
Evidence Act. There the Court has very
clearly held that the initial burden to
prove the case would lie upon plaintiff.

24. The decision of this Court in
Late Sohan Lal (supra) also lends no
support to plaintiff-appellant inasmuch as
if the two circumstances, as discussed
above,
are
satisfied
which
permits
interference with the findings of fact,
there is no doubt that under Section 100
CPC this Court can interfere but the moot
question is, whether these circumstances
738 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
actually exist in a particular case or not.
In
the
present
case
both
these
circumstances do not exist at all.

25. In view of above, I answer all
the three questions against plaintiffappellant and hold that the plaintiff not
only failed to prove that sale of house was
not fair, proper and transparent but also
that the defendants-respondents took
advantage of their relationship with
plaintiff. Similarly, I hold that the factum
of sale consideration having been paid to
plaintiff stand proved and otherwise case
set up by plaintiff, she failed to prove.

26. In the result, the appeal, being
devoid of merit, is dismissed with costs
throughout.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.05.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE AMAR SARAN, J.
THE HON'BLE DINESH GUPTA, J.

Crl. Misc. Writ Petition No. 62 of 2013

Anil Kumar Sharma

 ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Hitesh Pachori

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.G.A.

Constitution of India Art. 226- Speedy
Trail-submition of charge sheet by police
u/s 173 Cr. P.C.-DGP directed to ensure
presence
of
accused
before
the
magistrate-for that purposes police to
get ready the photo state copy of case
diary-direction
for
strict
compliance
issued-expressing great concern with the
decision of Home Secretary for not
providing the copy-magistrate also must
refrain from taking cognizance unless
accused is produced with I.O. report u/s
173(2)
Cr.P.C.-Registrar
General
to
ensure compliance of direction-put up
matter on 19.07.2013.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Amar Saran, J.)

1. Heard Sri Sudhir Mehrotra,
learned Special Counsel for the Allahabad
High Court and Sri Vimlendu Tripathi,
learned Additional Government Advocate
representing the State.

2. Two affidavits of compliance
dated 8.3.13 on behalf of the Home
Department and the Director General of
Police, UP have been filed by the learned
Additional Government Advocate.

3. An affidavit of compliance of the
Registrar General, High Court dated
15.5.13 has been filed by Sri Mehrotra.

4. As a final report has been
submitted by the I.O. regarding which an
affidavit dated 8.3.13 has also been filed,
it will now be a matter for consideration
by the Court concerned on whether to
accept or to reject the final report. No
further orders are needed in the matter, so
far as the petitioner is concerned.

5. However as a number of other
issues have arisen for expediting the
process of trials and associated matters in
the State of U.P., as a result of this Courts'
orders in this petition, affidavits and
reports furnished by the parties from
whom this Court has sought directions/
information, looking to the importance of
the matter, this bench will continue to
monitor the said matters by an on-going
hearing
of
this
petition.