# Vijai Kumar Yadav v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 1869
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-13
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 10432 of 2019
- **Bench:** Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/vijai-kumar-yadav-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54898
- **Pages:** 13

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4 All. Vijai Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1869
employee from available sources. The department cannot be permitted to derive advantage
from its own lapse, nor can such deficiency be used as a ground to deny legitimate service benefits
to an employee or his legal heirs. The relevant extract from the said judgment is reproduced
hereunder:-

 "11. It is trite that the responsibility of safe keeping and upkeep of service records of an
employee is upon the department itself and not the employee and in case such service records are
missing or misplaced, onus is upon the department itself to complete such service details of an
employee. In the absence of any such service records, the department cannot take benefit of such
an omission nor such burden can be shifted upon the employee so as to deny him benefits to which
he is justifiably expected."

Conclusion and Directions

24. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the undisputed factual matrix of the case, this
Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner is entitled to the release of all consequential
service benefits of her late husband. Accordingly, the opposite parties are directed to ensure the
payment of all retiral dues, including gratuity, General Provident Fund (GPF), and family pension,
in respect of late Ram Nath Gupta, who died in harness on 02.12.2016 while serving as Pharmacist
(Homeopathy) at Government Homeopathic Hospital, Dhanaupur, Sultanpur. The aforesaid
amounts shall be released within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified
copy of this order, along with simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum, calculated from the date
on which the petitioner became entitled to such benefits, i.e., 21.12.2016, being the date on which
the application for release of post-retiral dues was submitted.

25. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 1869
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. MANJU RANI CHAUHAN, J.

Writ A No. 10432 of 2019

Vijai Kumar Yadav ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue(s) for consideration
(a) Whether a termination based on alleged "suppression of facts" can stand if the non-disclosure did not
result in an unfair eligibility advantage or prejudice to the employer?
(b) Whether a variance in the recorded DOB across different genuine certificates automatically amounts to
fraud or actionable civil misconduct?
1870 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Headnotes
A. Service Law - The petitioner successfully passed his Purva Madhyama (2001) and Shastri (2009) degrees
from Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya, Varanasi, and his Uttar Madhyama from the U.P. Secondary
Sanskrit Education Board, Lucknow. Based on these foundational educational qualifications, he completed the
Basic Training Certificate (BTC) course in 2010 and qualified the U.P. Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) in 2013.
Pursuing a recruitment drive initiated in 2013, the petitioner was appointed to the post of Assistant Teacher in
a Junior Basic School by the Basic Shiksha Adhikari (BSA), Mau, via an appointment order dated 08.08.2014.
He joined and served without any complaints or adverse remarks.
Following a Right to Information (RTI) application filed by a third party, an inquiry was conducted into the
petitioner's qualifications. The inquiry revealed that the petitioner's Class VIII scholar register (1994-95), his
Class IX admission form at National Inter College, and an unsubmitted 1998 High School certificate recorded
his DOB as 02.07.1984. However, the Purva Madhyama certificate (2001) used to secure his BTC admission
and subsequent teacher appointment recorded his DOB as 07.07.1987. On 27.06.2019, the BSA, Mau,
dismissed the petitioner from service on grounds of deliberate concealment of material facts and misconduct,
directing the lodgment of a FIR against him. The petitioner moved the High Court via this writ petition to
quash the dismissal.
B. Unless it is shown that the alleged misrepresentation had a direct bearing on the selection
process or conferred a tangible advantage upon the candidate, the extreme consequence of
nullifying the appointment cannot be justified. (Para 66, 68)

The sine qua non for sustaining an allegation of fraud is not merely the existence of an
irregularity, but the presence of a deliberate design to secure an advantage which materially
impacts the selection. In absence thereof, the action of the authorities in branding the appointment as void
would not withstand judicial scrutiny. (Para 67, 69)

The respondents have failed to establish any element of fraud, misrepresentation, or deliberate concealment
on the part of the petitioner. The discrepancy in the DOB, in the factual conspectus of the present case, does
not rise to the level of culpability so as to justify the extreme measure of cancellation of appointment. (Para
63)

C. In the absence of any foundational finding, the mere existence of variance in the DOB across
different certificates pales into insignificance. No categorical or definitive finding has been recorded by
the competent authority to the effect that the petitioner had deliberately relied upon the Madhyama certificate
in substitution of the earlier High School certificate with a view to secure any undue benefit or to mislead or to
gain an advantage in the matter of appointment. The controversy, therefore, remains largely academic and
does not have a determinative bearing on the core issue involved in the present case. (Para 71, 72)

Courts do not adjudicate upon abstract or hypothetical questions which do not directly impact
the lis. Since the respondents themselves have not returned any finding attributing motive or advantage to
the petitioner on account of the alleged discrepancy, this Court finds no occasion to enter into an elaborate
examination of the said issue. (Para 73)

There is no categorical or substantiated allegation to the effect that the educational documents furnished by
the petitioner before the respondents were forged, fabricated, or otherwise false in nature. (Para 75)

The impugned order dated 27.06.2019 is quashed. Since no interim order was operating in favour of the
petitioner during the pendency of the writ petition, and the petitioner has admittedly not discharged any
duties for the intervening period, he shall not be entitled to claim salary for the said period, in
consonance with the well-settled principle of "no work, no pay." (Para 76, 78, 80)

Writ petition allowed.
4 All. Vijai Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1871
Case Law Cited
1. Kavita Kuril Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2023 (12) ADJ 571 (Para 24)
2. Sheoraj Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others, Writ-A No. 35397 of 2012, decided on 27.08.2012 (Para 27)
3. Kamla Kant Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and others, Writ-A No. 10431 of 2019, decided on 06.02.2023 (Para 27)
4. Ashok Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others, Writ-A No. 1064 of 2021, decided on 22.07.2024 (Para 64)

List of Keywords
misrepresentation, suppression, advantage, termination, void, irregularity, fraud, selection, date of birth,
discrepancy.

Appearances for Parties
For Petitioner(s): Ashok Khare, Sr. Advocate, Siddharth Khare
For Respondent(s): Shashi Prakash Singh, C.S.C., Syed Nadeem Ahmad

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan, J.)

1. Heard Mr. Siddharth Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Shashi Prakash Singh,
learned counsel for the respondent-BSA and Mr. Shailendra Singh, learned Standing Counsel for
the State-respondents.

2. The writ petition has been filed with the following prayers:-

 "(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated
27.06.2019 passed by Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Mau.

 (ii) Issue a writ, order or direction of suitable nature restraining the respondents from
taking any action on the basis of the order impugned.

 (iii) Issue a writ, order or direction of suitable nature commanding the respondents not to
interfere in the working of the petitioner as Assistant Teacher under the respondents and to pay the
petitioner his regular monthly salary on the said post regularly every month.

 (iv) Issue any other suitable writ, order or direction which this Court may deem fit and
proper under the facts and circumstances of the case."

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner possesses the requisite
academic and professional qualifications for appointment to the post in question. It is contended
that the petitioner passed the Purva Madhyama examination from Sampurnanand Sanskrit
Vishwavidyalaya, Varanasi in the year 2001, and thereafter qualified the Uttar Madhyama
examination conducted by the U.P. Secondary Sanskrit Education Board, Lucknow. Subsequently,
the petitioner is stated to have obtained the Shastri degree from Sampurnanand Sanskrit
Vishwavidyalaya in the year 2009.

4. On the strength of the aforesaid qualifications, it is further submitted that the petitioner
was granted admission to the Basic Training Certificate (BTC) course in the year 2010, which he
successfully completed. A BTC Training Certificate for the said session was duly awarded to him
by the Examination Regulatory Authority, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad.
1872 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
5. It is also urged that the petitioner has qualified the U.P. Teacher Eligibility Test (TET),
2013, for the Primary Level, and thus fulfills all essential eligibility criteria prescribed for
appointment as an Assistant Teacher.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the petitioner, being duly
qualified and fully eligible in terms of the prescribed criteria, applied for consideration for
appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher pursuant to the selection process initiated in the year
2013. The said selection pertained to appointments in Junior Basic Schools established and
administered by the Board of Basic Education across various districts of the State, including
District Mau. It is contended that the petitioners candidature was duly considered in accordance
with the applicable rules and procedure governing the said recruitment exercise.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that, pursuant to the aforesaid
selection process, the petitioner was duly selected and appointed to the post of Assistant Teacher
vide appointment order dated 08.08.2014 issued by the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Mau. It is
contended that the petitioner, in compliance with the said appointment order, joined his duties
forthwith and has since been discharging his functions diligently and to the full satisfaction of the
respondent authorities, without any complaint or adverse remark.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that one Rajesh Yadav submitted an
application dated 18.10.2018 before the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Mau, purportedly under the Right
to Information Act, 2005, seeking supply of copies of the petitioner's educational qualification
certificates and mark sheets on the basis of which he had been granted appointment.

9. It is contended that, notwithstanding the fact that the said application was not
maintainable in law, the Additional Director of Education (Basic), by means of communication
dated 26.03.2019, directed the petitioner to furnish copies of his educational qualification
certificates.

10. In response to the aforesaid communication, the petitioner duly furnished self-attested
copies of all his educational certificates along with a covering letter dated 30.05.2019.

11. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Mau issued a
notice dated 15.05.2019, calling upon the petitioner to appear for a personal hearing on 30.05.2019
in connection with the alleged discrepancies in the certificates and mark sheet submitted by the
petitioner on 30.04.2019.

12. In compliance with the aforesaid notice, the petitioner duly furnished a detailed reply
dated 03.06.2019, addressing the allegations levelled therein.

13. On 27.06.2019, a further order came to be passed by the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Mau,
whereby the petitioner was purportedly dismissed from service, coupled with a direction for
lodging of a First Information Report against him.
4 All. Vijai Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1873
14. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that his admission to the BTC Training
Course, 2010 was granted on the basis of duly obtained academic qualifications, namely, Purva
Madhyama from Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya (2001), Uttar Madhyama from the U.P.
Secondary Sanskrit Education Board, Lucknow, and Shastri degree (2009) from Sampurnanand
Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya.

15. It is further contended that none of the aforesaid certificates or mark sheets have ever
been alleged to be forged, fabricated, or otherwise tainted with any discrepancy. Even the
impugned order is conspicuously silent in this regard and does not record any adverse finding qua
the genuineness of these foundational qualifications.

16. In such circumstances, the very substratum of the petitioner's eligibility and induction
into the BTC Training Course remains unimpeached, and in the absence of any finding discrediting
the said qualifications, the impugned action stands vitiated in law and is liable to be set aside.

17. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order proceeds on an
erroneous and wholly misconceived premise by placing reliance upon an alleged discrepancy in the
date of birth recorded in a High School Certificate of the year 1998, wherein the date of birth is
mentioned as 02.07.1984, as against the date recorded in the Purva Madhyama certificate as
07.07.1987.

18. It is vehemently contended that the aforesaid High School Certificate has neither been
relied upon nor ever produced by the petitioner at any stage. The same was not utilized for seeking
admission to the BTC Training Course, 2010, nor was it furnished at the time of appointment. No
benefit, whatsoever, has been derived by the petitioner on the basis of the said certificate at any
point in time.

19. In such circumstances, the reliance placed upon a document which neither forms part of
the petitioners record nor has been used by him for any official purpose is wholly unjustified and
legally unsustainable. The impugned order, to the extent it is founded upon such extraneous and
irrelevant consideration, stands vitiated in law and is liable to be set aside.

20. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that there is no allegation, much less any
finding, that his appointment was procured by fraud or on the basis of any forged or fabricated
mark sheet.

21. It is further contended that the petitioners appointment is founded upon his Purva
Madhyama qualification (2001), wherein his date of birth is recorded as 07.07.1987. On the
strength of the said qualification, the petitioner duly pursued and obtained Uttar Madhyama and
Shastri qualifications, thereafter successfully completed the BTC training in the year 2012 and
qualified the U.P. Teacher Eligibility Test (UP-TET) in 2013.

22. It is emphatically urged that all the aforesaid certificates and mark sheets are genuine
and have never been questioned or discredited by the respondents. In the absence of any allegation
1874 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of fraud, misrepresentation, or fabrication, there existed no justifiable basis for passing the
impugned order.

23. Accordingly, the impugned action, being arbitrary, unfounded, and contrary to settled
principles of law, is liable to be set aside.

24. The petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered in Kavita Kuril vs.
State of U.P. and others, reported in 2023 (12) ADJ 571, to contend that the date of birth
recorded in the High School mark sheet is to be treated as final and determinative, and the same
forms the basis for its entry in the service book.

25. Building upon the said proposition, it has been urged that the date of birth of the
petitioner, as reflected in Purva Madhyama mark sheet of the year 2001, i.e., 07.07.1987, deserves
to be accepted for all intents and purposes. It is, thus, submitted that once such date of birth has
consistently formed the foundation of the petitioner's educational and service records, any
discrepancy in other certificates cannot be made a ground to sustain the impugned order.

26. In essence, the argument advanced is that in the absence of any allegation of fraud or
manipulation, and where the date of birth has been uniformly acted upon by the authorities
themselves, the same attains finality and cannot be unsettled to the detriment of the petitioner.
Consequently, the impugned action, being founded merely upon a variance in date of birth in
different certificates, is liable to be held unsustainable in the eyes of law.

27. Placing reliance upon the judgments rendered in Sheoraj Singh vs. State of U.P. and
others (Writ-A No. 35397 of 2012, decided on 27.08.2012) and Kamla Kant Yadav vs. State of
U.P. and others (Writ-A No. 10431 of 2019, decided on 06.02.2023), learned counsel for the
petitioner has endeavoured to contend that even in cases where there exists a discrepancy in the
date of birth recorded in two High School mark sheets, such discrepancy by itself would not vitiate
the appointment, provided the certificate relied upon for securing appointment is genuine and not
tainted by fraud or fabrication.

28. He submits that, where a candidate has appeared in the High School examination more
than once and different mark sheets reflect different dates of birth, the mere non-disclosure of one
such mark sheet would not ipso facto amount to fraud or misconduct, so long as the mark sheet
relied upon for appointment is a valid and genuine document. The Honble Court, in the said
cases, has clearly held that unless it is established that the certificate in question is forged or
fabricated, or that the discrepancy has conferred an undue advantage upon the candidate, such as
rendering him eligible despite being otherwise ineligible, the appointment cannot be annulled
merely on the ground of variance in the date of birth.

29. He further submits that, where, on both the dates of birth, the candidate would not fall
within the category of being underage or otherwise ineligible, the element of deceit or prejudice to
the employer is conspicuously absent. In such circumstances, the act cannot be construed as
misconduct warranting termination.
4 All. Vijai Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1875
30. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that the impugned order has
been passed in complete disregard of the procedure prescribed under the Rules, 1999, inasmuch as
no proper or detailed inquiry, as mandatorily required, has been conducted prior to taking the
impugned action. It is urged that the absence of such an inquiry vitiates the entire decision-making
process, rendering the impugned order wholly arbitrary and in flagrant violation of the principles of
natural justice.

31. It has been further submitted that the educational certificate of Purva Madhyama issued
by Sampooranand Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya in the year 2001 continues to hold the field and has
neither been cancelled nor declared invalid by any competent authority. On the strength of the said
certificate, the petitioner has admittedly acquired further qualifications, namely Uttar Madhyama,
Shastri degree, and has also secured admission to the BTC training course, all of which have been
accepted by the concerned authorities at the relevant point of time.

32. In such circumstances, it is contended that once the foundational certificate remains
intact and has been consistently acted upon by the respondents themselves, no adverse inference of
fraud or misrepresentation can be drawn against the petitioner. The allegation of fraud, in the
absence of any cogent material or a duly conducted inquiry culminating in a definitive finding,
cannot be sustained in law.

33. Thus, it is urged that the impugned orders, having been passed without adherence to the
prescribed procedure and in violation of the principles of natural justice, coupled with the absence
of any legally sustainable finding of fraud, are liable to be set aside.

34. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondentDistrict Basic Education
Officer has submitted that the impugned action is fully justified and has been taken upon due
consideration of the material brought on record during the course of inquiry.

35. It is contended that pursuant to a complaint dated 10.04.2019, an inquiry was instituted,
culminating in a report dated 18.06.2019 submitted by the Inquiry Officer. As per the said report,
the scholar register pertaining to Class VIII, bearing Registration No. 2188 of the session 1994-95,
records that the petitioner passed Class VIII in the year 1996, wherein the date of birth is entered as
02.07.1984. Further, the application form submitted by the petitioner for admission to Class IX in
National Inter College also reflects the date of birth as 02.07.1984. It is further pointed out that the
High School records, including the relevant gazette notification, similarly indicate the date of birth
of the petitioner as 02.07.1984.

36. On the strength of the aforesaid material, it is argued that the petitioner was fully aware
of the earlier recorded date of birth, yet deliberately withheld the said information and instead
relied upon the Purva Madhyama certificate reflecting a different date of birth. Such nondisclosure, according to the respondents, is not a mere discrepancy but a conscious suppression of
material facts, which goes to the root of the matter.

37. It is thus submitted that the act of the petitioner in seeking appointment on the basis of
a certificate reflecting a different date of birth, without disclosing the existence of prior records to
1876 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the contrary, clearly amounts to misconduct. The element of deliberate concealment disentitles the
petitioner from any equitable relief under writ jurisdiction.

38. In view thereof, it is urged that the impugned orders, having been passed on the basis of
a duly conducted inquiry and supported by documentary evidence, do not suffer from any illegality
or infirmity warranting interference by this Court.

39. Learned counsel for the respondent further contends that it is a settled proposition of
law that in cases involving concealment of material facts or fraud, the requirement of conducting a
detailed inquiry or affording an elaborate opportunity of hearing stands considerably diluted. It is
urged that where the foundational facts are borne out from undisputed documentary evidence, the
principles of natural justice cannot be stretched to an extent so as to defeat the ends of justice.

40. It has been further submitted that, notwithstanding the aforesaid legal position, the
petitioner was, in fact, afforded adequate opportunities to explain his stand. As is evident from the
impugned order itself, repeated notices were issued calling upon the petitioner to furnish an
explanation with regard to the non-disclosure of earlier certificates reflecting a different date of
birth. However, the petitioner failed to furnish any plausible or satisfactory explanation for such
non-disclosure.

41. In such circumstances, it is contended that the plea of violation of principles of natural
justice is wholly misconceived and untenable. The conduct of the petitioner, in deliberately
withholding material information despite being afforded sufficient opportunity, clearly disentitles
him from invoking the equitable jurisdiction of this Court.

42. Accordingly, it is urged that the impugned order, having been passed after due
consideration of the available material and after affording reasonable opportunity to the petitioner,
does not suffer from any procedural impropriety or legal infirmity warranting interference.

43. Heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and perused the entire
material available on record.

44. At the outset, this Court is constrained to observe that the edifice of the respondents
case rests upon the solitary circumstance of a divergence in the dates of birth as reflected in
different educational records of the petitioner. However, a mere discrepancy, bereft of any
attendant element of deceit, cannot, by any judicially accepted standard, be elevated to the pedestal
of fraud or wilful misrepresentation.

45. Fraud, it is trite, is not to be presumed; it must be pleaded with specificity and
established by cogent and unimpeachable evidence. The record, in the present case, is
conspicuously silent on any material which may evince a deliberate design on the part of the
petitioner to secure an undue or unwarranted advantage by projecting a particular date of birth. The
certificates relied upon by the petitioner are not alleged to be forged, fabricated, or spurious; rather,
they are documents issued by competent authorities and continue to subsist in the eyes of law.
4 All. Vijai Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1877
46. The gravamen of the allegation is non-disclosure of certain earlier certificates reflecting
a different date of birth. Yet, non-disclosure, to assume the character of misconduct, must be shown
to be purposeful, calculated, and actuated by a discernible intent to deceive. In the absence of such
mens rea, the omission remains, at best, an irregularity and not a culpable act warranting the drastic
consequence of annulment of appointment.

47. What further dislodges the respondents case is the incontrovertible position that, even
if the date of birth as recorded in the High School certificate is accepted, the petitioner would
nonetheless remain within the bounds of eligibility for appointment to the post in question. Thus,
the foundational requirement of gain or advantage an indispensable concomitant of fraud is wholly
absent. The alleged discrepancy, therefore, does not translate into any prejudice either to the
employer or to competing candidates.

48. This Court cannot remain oblivious to the well-settled judicial pronouncements in
Sheoraj Singh (supra), wherein it has been unequivocally held that mere variance in dates of birth
across certificates, in the absence of forgery or demonstrable advantage, does not ipso facto
constitute misconduct. The ratio laid down therein lends authoritative support to the proposition
that authenticity of the document and absence of undue benefit are determinative factors.

49. However, upon a careful consideration of the present factual matrix, this Court finds
that the applicability of the aforesaid judgments is contingent upon certain foundational facts being
satisfied. The protection extended in the said cases is predicated upon the existence of two genuine
High School mark sheets issued by the same examining body, coupled with the absence of any
allegation of fraud and absence of any consequential advantage gained by the candidate.

50. If, in the present case, the discrepancy pertains not merely to two High School
certificates but extends to different classes of certificates, or where the foundational document
forming the basis of appointment itself is under a cloud, the ratio of the aforesaid judgments may
not be attracted in its full rigour.

51. Nevertheless, if it is demonstrated that the petitioner has relied upon a bona fide and
genuine certificate, that no element of forgery or fabrication is involved, and that irrespective of the
differing dates of birth the petitioner remained eligible for appointment, then the principle laid
down in the aforesaid judgments would lend considerable support to the petitioner's case.

52. Thus, the issue is not merely of discrepancy in date of birth, but of the nature of the
document relied upon, the existence or absence of fraudulent intent, and the question whether any
undue advantage has been derived. The answer to these factors would ultimately determine the
applicability of the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions.

53. However, the matter does not end merely upon noticing non-disclosure. The Court is
equally bound to examine whether such omission has, in fact, resulted in any prejudice to the
employer or conferred any undue advantage upon the petitioner. In the present case, it is not in
dispute that both the certificates relied upon by the parties are genuine and issued by competent
authorities, and there is no allegation of fabrication or manipulation. More importantly, the
1878 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
difference in the dates of birth reflected therein has not been shown to have afforded any advantage
to the petitioner, either in terms of eligibility, age relaxation, or otherwise.

54. It is well settled that while suppression of a material fact may, in given circumstances,
vitiate an appointment, such principle cannot be applied in a mechanical or pedantic manner. The
doctrine of proportionality and the requirement of absence of prejudice must guide the exercise of
judicial review. Where the discrepancy is neither deliberate so as to secure an unfair benefit nor has
it resulted in distortion of the selection process, the extreme consequence of cancellation of
appointment would be wholly disproportionate.

55. In the considered opinion of this Court, the omission on the part of the petitioner to
disclose the earlier certificate, though not to be appreciated, does not rise to the level of a culpable
suppression so as to invalidate the appointment, particularly when no tangible advantage has
accrued and the selection process remains unaffected. To visit the petitioner with the drastic
consequence of termination in such circumstances would be unjust and inequitable.

56. Accordingly, this Court holds that the impugned action of the respondents in cancelling
the appointment of the petitioner cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and is liable to be set aside.
The writ petition, therefore, deserves to be allowed.

57. The ratio decidendi of the judgment rendered in Kavita Kuril vs. State of U.P. and
others, 2023 (12) ADJ 571, is that the date of birth recorded in the High School certificate is to be
treated as the primary and conclusive proof of age, particularly when the same has been
consistently relied upon by the authorities for the purposes of service records. The Court, in the
said case, held that once the date of birth has been duly entered in the service book on the basis of
such foundational document and there is no allegation of fraud, misrepresentation, or fabrication,
the same cannot be lightly altered or disregarded on the basis of discrepancies in other educational
certificates.

58. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that
the reliance placed by the petitioner upon the said judgment is of limited assistance. The
distinguishing feature lies in the nature of the certificates in question. In the case at hand, the
petitioner seeks to place primacy not on the High School certificate, but on the Madhyama and
Purva Madhyama mark sheets of the year 2001, to assert the date of birth as 07.07.1987.

59. It is trite that the High School certificate, being the earliest public document issued by a
recognized Board, ordinarily carries greater evidentiary value in determination of date of birth. The
ratio in Kavita Kuril (supra) is premised upon this very principle. However, in the present factual
matrix, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the said date of birth, as claimed, is borne out from
the High School certificate or that the same formed the basis of initial entry in service records
without dispute.

60. Moreover, where there exists a discrepancy in foundational documents themselves, the
matter assumes a different complexion. In such a situation, the benefit of the principle laid down in
4 All. Vijai Kumar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1879
the aforesaid judgment cannot be extended in a mechanical manner, particularly when the
authenticity and primacy of the document relied upon by the petitioner is itself in question.

61. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the ratio of the judgment in
Kavita Kuril (supra), though well-settled, does not squarely apply to the facts of the present case,
and the petitioner cannot derive any substantial benefit therefrom.

62. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles, the impugned action of the respondents
appears to be founded more on suspicion than on substantiated proof. The inference of fraud, which
entails grave civil consequences, cannot be drawn on the basis of equivocal circumstances or mere
inconsistencies in record, howsoever inconvenient they may appear.

63. In sum, this Court is of the considered and unequivocal opinion that the respondents
have failed to establish any element of fraud, misrepresentation, or deliberate concealment on the
part of the petitioner. The discrepancy in the date of birth, in the factual conspectus of the present
case, does not rise to the level of culpability so as to justify the extreme measure of cancellation of
appointment.

64. An analogous issue fell for consideration before this Court in Ashok Kumar Singh vs.
State of U.P. and others (Writ-A No. 1064 of 2021, decided on 22.07.2024), wherein the
appointment of the petitioner therein came to be annulled on the premise that he had submitted a
B.Ed. mark sheet, which, though not an essential qualification for the post of Assistant Teacher,
was only of a preferential nature. The learned Single Judge, upon finding that the petitioner had
failed to furnish any plausible explanation despite due opportunity, proceeded to hold that the
submission of such mark sheet amounted to securing public employment on the basis of a false
document, thereby rendering the initial appointment void ab initio.

65. However, the aforesaid judgment was carried in appeal, and the Division Bench, in
Special Appeal No. 987 of 2024, decided on 25.02.2025, set aside the order of the learned Single
Judge. While the Division Bench observed that the reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge
was, in abstraction, well-founded, it nonetheless proceeded to hold that the foundational element of
fraud was not substantiated on the facts of the case.

66. The Division Bench, in a nuanced and legally calibrated exposition, held that mere
submission of a higher or additional qualification, which is neither essential nor shown to have
been relied upon by the selection committee in conferring appointment, would not ipso facto
establish fraud. It was further observed that the records did not demonstrate that the petitioner had
secured any undue advantage on account of the B.Ed. qualification, nor was there any material to
indicate that such qualification was manipulated or fabricated.

67. The Court emphasized that fraud, being a serious imputation carrying grave civil
consequences, must be predicated upon clear evidence of deception coupled with resultant gain. In
absence of any such demonstrable nexus between the alleged misrepresentation and the conferment
of appointment, the charge of fraud was held to be unsustainable.
1880 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
68. The ratio which unmistakably emanates from the aforesaid Division Bench judgment is
that unless it is shown that the alleged misrepresentation had a direct bearing on the selection
process or conferred a tangible advantage upon the candidate, the extreme consequence of
nullifying the appointment cannot be justified. Mere possession or disclosure of an additional
qualification, particularly when it is neither essential nor acted upon, would not, in itself, vitiate the
appointment.

69. The principle enunciated therein squarely fortifies the proposition that the sine qua non
for sustaining an allegation of fraud is not merely the existence of an irregularity, but the presence
of a deliberate design to secure an advantage which materially impacts the selection. In absence
thereof, the action of the authorities in branding the appointment as void would not withstand
judicial scrutiny.

70. So far as the issue pertaining to the discrepancy in the date of birth is concerned, and
the question as to which certificate ought to be accorded primacy for the purposes of recording the
date of birth, this Court finds that the same does not arise for substantive adjudication in the present
lis.

71. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that no categorical or definitive finding has
been recorded by the competent authority to the effect that the petitioner had deliberately relied
upon the Madhyama certificate in substitution of the earlier High School certificate with a view to
secure any undue benefit. There is a conspicuous absence of any conclusion that such reliance was
actuated by a calculated intent to mislead or to gain an advantage in the matter of appointment.

72. In the absence of any such foundational finding, the mere existence of variance in the
date of birth across different certificates pales into insignificance. The controversy, therefore,
remains largely academic and does not have a determinative bearing on the core issue involved in
the present case.

73. It is a settled principle that Courts do not adjudicate upon abstract or hypothetical
questions which do not directly impact the lis. Since the respondents themselves have not returned
any finding attributing motive or advantage to the petitioner on account of the alleged discrepancy,
this Court finds no occasion to enter into an elaborate examination of the said issue.

74. Accordingly, no further observations are warranted on the aforesaid aspect.

75. In view of the aforesaid discussion, and upon an overall conspectus of the facts and the
legal position governing the field, this Court finds that there is no categorical or substantiated
allegation to the effect that the educational documents furnished by the petitioner before the
respondents were forged, fabricated, or otherwise false in nature.

76. In absence of any such foundational infirmity, coupled with the consideration of the
relevant statutory provisions and the authoritative pronouncements relied upon by learned counsel
for the petitioner, the impugned action cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.
4 All. C/M St. Johns Girls Junior High School Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1881
77. Accordingly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed, and is hereby, allowed.

78. The impugned order dated 27.06.2019, passed by the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Mau, is
hereby quashed.

79. The respondents are directed to permit the petitioner to resume/join his duties
forthwith.

80. It is, however, made clear that since no interim order was operating in favour of the
petitioner during the pendency of the writ petition, and the petitioner has admittedly not discharged
any duties for the intervening period, he shall not be entitled to claim salary for the said period, in
consonance with the well-settled principle of 'no work, no pay.'

81.