# Vijay Kumar Banswar v. Awadhesh Kumar Jaisawal

- **Citation:** (2023) 11 ILRA 571
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-11-23
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 6728 of 2023
- **Bench:** Alok Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/vijay-kumar-banswar-v-awadhesh-kumar-jaisawal-49375
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Law
-
U.P.
Urban
Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972 - Section 21(1)(a) - Bonafide
Need - Eviction - Comparative Hardship -
Cross-Examination
-
Compensation:
Petitioner, a tenant running a machine parts
business for 37 years, challenged the Rent
Controller's order dated 13.12.2022 allowing
eviction under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act for
572 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the landlord's bonafide need to establish a
furniture business for his unemployed son, and
the District Judge's order dated 24.04.2023
dismissing the appeal. The High Court held that
the landlord's need was bonafide, supported by
evidence of the son's unemployment and the
requirement of a larger space for the proposed
business. The petitioner failed to disprove the
landlord's
need
or
establish
alternative
accommodation
availability.
The
plea
of
comparative
hardship
was
adequately
considered by the Rent Controller, finding the
petitioner's business relocatable with minimal
hardship compared to the landlord's need. The
rejection of the petitioner's application for crossexamination was upheld, as cross-examination
is discretionary and unnecessary where facts
can be proved by documentary evidence. The
writ petition was dismissed, but considering the
petitioner's long tenancy, the landlord was
directed to pay Rs. 25,000/- as compensation
under the second proviso of Section 21(1) of the
Act.

Held: The landlord's bonafide need for the
premises to establish a furniture business for his
unemployed
son
was
established.
The
petitioner's objections regarding alternative
accommodation and comparative hardship were
unsustainable.
The
rejection
of
crossexamination was justified as no necessity was
shown. Writ petition dismissed with Rs. 25,000/-
compensation to the petitioner for long tenancy.

Writ petition dismissed.

Case Law Discussed:

## Text

11 All. Vijay Kumar Banswar Vs. Awadhesh Kumar Jaisawal
571
Government
servant
or
would
be
considered to be in Government service
entitled for the benefit of the Government
order dated 02.06.2023 read with the
clarification dated 16.06.2023? The answer
is obviously No !

33. In this regard, it would also be
pertinent to mention that in a matter
pertaining to the employees of the
autonomous bodies who were claiming as a
matter of right the same service benefits at
par with the Government employees merely
because the autonomous bodies 'adopted'
the Government service rules, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of State of
Maharashtra and anr Vs. Bhagwan and
Ors reported in (2022) 4 SCC 193 has
held as under:-

"26. As per the law laid down by this
Court in a catena of decisions, the
employees of the autonomous bodies
cannot claim, as a matter of right, the same
service
benefits
on
par
with
the
Government employees. Merely because
such autonomous bodies might have
adopted the Government Service Rules
and/or in the Governing Council there may
be a representative of the Government
and/or merely because such institution is
funded by the State/Central Government,
employees of such autonomous bodies
cannot, as a matter of right, claim parity
with
the
State/Central
Government
employees. This is more particularly, when
the employees of such autonomous bodies
are governed by their own Service Rules
and
service
conditions.
The
State
Government
and
the
Autonomous
Board/Body cannot be put on par."

33. From a perusal of the aforesaid
judgment also it emerges that merely
because the autonomous bodies have
'adopted' the government service rules, the
same would not confer any right of the
employees of the autonomous bodies to
claim the same benefits as are admissible to
government employees inasmuch as they
would not fall within the ambit of being
government employees or in government
service.

33. Accordingly, keeping in view the
aforesaid discussion, no merit is found in
the writ petition. The writ petition is
accordingly dismissed.

34. The Court records the assistance
provided by Ms. Megha Sachan, Law Clerk
of this Court.
----------
(2023) 11 ILRA 571
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 23.11.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Writ-A No. 6728 of 2023

Vijay Kumar Banswar ...Petitioner
Versus
Awadhesh Kumar Jaisawal ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Aakash Prasad, Amitav Singh, Himanshu Singh,
Yash Joshi

Counsel for the Respondents:
Shishir Chandra, Vishnu Pratap Singh

Civil
Law
-
U.P.
Urban
Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972 - Section 21(1)(a) - Bonafide
Need - Eviction - Comparative Hardship -
Cross-Examination
-
Compensation:
Petitioner, a tenant running a machine parts
business for 37 years, challenged the Rent
Controller's order dated 13.12.2022 allowing
eviction under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act for
572 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the landlord's bonafide need to establish a
furniture business for his unemployed son, and
the District Judge's order dated 24.04.2023
dismissing the appeal. The High Court held that
the landlord's need was bonafide, supported by
evidence of the son's unemployment and the
requirement of a larger space for the proposed
business. The petitioner failed to disprove the
landlord's
need
or
establish
alternative
accommodation
availability.
The
plea
of
comparative
hardship
was
adequately
considered by the Rent Controller, finding the
petitioner's business relocatable with minimal
hardship compared to the landlord's need. The
rejection of the petitioner's application for crossexamination was upheld, as cross-examination
is discretionary and unnecessary where facts
can be proved by documentary evidence. The
writ petition was dismissed, but considering the
petitioner's long tenancy, the landlord was
directed to pay Rs. 25,000/- as compensation
under the second proviso of Section 21(1) of the
Act.

Held: The landlord's bonafide need for the
premises to establish a furniture business for his
unemployed
son
was
established.
The
petitioner's objections regarding alternative
accommodation and comparative hardship were
unsustainable.
The
rejection
of
crossexamination was justified as no necessity was
shown. Writ petition dismissed with Rs. 25,000/-
compensation to the petitioner for long tenancy.

Writ petition dismissed.

Case Law Discussed:

1. Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs Dr Mahesh Chand
Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222

2. B.C. Bhutada Vs G.R. Mundada, AIR 2003 SC
2713

3. Harish Kumar (Since Deceased) Through: Lrs.
Vs Pankaj Kumar Garg, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 239

4. R.C. Tamrakar Vs Nidi Lekha, AIR 2001 SC
3806

5. K.C. Kapoor Vs Additional District Judge,
Kanpur, 2003(2) ARC 70

6. Mahesh Kumar Vs Swami Dayal Katiyar, Writ
A No. 5387 of 2018

7. Radha Kishan Vs IVth Additional District
Judge, Jalaun at Orai, 1985 (1) ARC 427

8. Khushi Ram Dedwal Vs Additional Judge,
Small Cause Court, Meerut, 1997 (2) ARC 674
(D.B)

9. Sanjay Kumar Katyal Vs Smt. Kamlesh Gupta,
2007 (67) ALR 250

10. Mahesh Chand Vs Additional Civil Judge
(S.D.), Bulandshahar, 2005 ARC 558

11. Satnam Singh Vs Rakesh Kumar, 2011 (89)
ALR 560

(Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Mathur, J.)

1.

Heard
learned counsel
for
petitioner as well as learned counsel for
respondents.

2. By means of present writ petition,
the petitioner has challenged the order
dated 13.12.2022 passed by Rent Controller
and also the order dated 24.04.2023 passed
by District Judge Kheri rejecting the appeal
preferred by the petitioner against the order
of Rent Controller.

3. The facts in brief are that the
petitioner entered into a tenancy in respect
of a shop measuring 18 sq. meter situated at
Mela Road - Dwarikapuri, Lakhimpur,
Pargana & District - Kheri by way of
oral agreement with one Chandrachud
Singh
Rathore.
In
the
tenanted
premises, the petitioner has a small
machine
parts
business,
selling
machine ware, oil, lubricant and auto
parts for pump, diesel generator sets
vehicles form the shop in question
continuously since 1986 i.e. since last
37 years.
11 All. Vijay Kumar Banswar Vs. Awadhesh Kumar Jaisawal
573

4. The respondent had purchased the
said property from the original landlord on
02.03.2013 and subsequently the petitioner
paid rent to the respondent. On 08.01.2020,
the respondent has filed an application
under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Urban
Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972 on the ground that the
said shop was required for the bonafide
need of his son who is unemployed and
wanted that shop for starting a business. It
was further stated that the other shops
owned by the respondent were not
available for running of the business as
they have been let out on temporary basis.

5. The petitioner had appeared and
filed his objections before the Rent
controller and resisted the application for
eviction. It was stated that there were no
bonafide need of the respondent or his son
and it has not been stated as to what kind of
business would be commenced in the
disputed property and it is also stated that
respondent had several other vacant shops
to start his independent business and
consequently prayed for setting aside the
application filed by the respondent under
Section 21(1)(a) of the Act.

6. The Rent Controller by means of
order
dated
13.12.2022
allowed
the
application preferred by the respondent and
directed the petitioner to vacate the shop in
question within 30 days from the date of
order. The Rent Controller came to a
finding that the petitioner has admitted the
relationship of landlord and tenant between
him and the respondent. He also considered
the bonafide need of the respondent and
also considered the comparative hardship.
He considered the fact that the said shop
was required by the landlord for the
purpose of establishing a business for his
son and that he had no other place apart
from the said shop to start the said
business. With regard to the claim of the
petitioner goodwill of running the said shop
from the particular place, the said plea was
rejected on the ground that it was always
open for the petitioner to establish his
business elsewhere and the goodwill would
be created at the new place of business and,
accordingly allowed the application.

7. In appeal, the District Judge went
through the entire evidence at the behest of
the petitioner. He considered the fact that
six months notice was given to the
petitioner by the respondent for vacating
the said shop and on expiry of the said
period on 03.01.2020 the suit for eviction
was filed. He also considered the objection
of the petitioner against the application for
eviction filed by the respondent.

8. With regard to the objection of the
petitioner that the respondent had not given
adequate opportunity and the reasons for
the bonafide requirement, it was concluded
that the respondent in his statement has
stated that two shops which are owned by
him are not vacant and are occupied by
tenant and are accordingly not available for
starting the business of his son. He also
considered the fact that petitioner had not
sought or made any effort to find an
alternate accommodation. He considered
the fact that from the material on record, it
is clear that son of the respondent, namely,
Himanshu Banswar is an unemployed
youth and the respondent requires the
tenanted premises for establishing his
business. He has further considered that the
next shop, namely, Verma Loha Bhandar is
established, will also be got vacated by the
petitioner as the said premises is also
required along with tenanted premises of
the petitioner to establish the business of
his son.
574 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

9. It has further been considered that a
furniture
business
shop
would
be
established in the premises so vacated by
the petitioner and accordingly it cannot be
said that the respondent had not given any
nature of business sought to be established.

10. It has also been recorded that
though the petitioner had stated that the son
of the respondent is not unemployed, he
has not been able to show any evidence or
any material or documents to show as to
how the son of the respondent was
employed and accordingly he was not able
to demonstrate that the son of the
respondent is employed. He has also
considered the fact that in order to establish
and run a furniture shop, a large area is
required and the same cannot be run from a
small shop. A big showroom is required for
which purpose the disputed premises as
well as adjacent shops owned by the
respondent would be required.

11. After reconsidering the entire
evidence on record, it was concluded that a
case for eviction is made out and the
premises were required for establishment of
a business by the son of the respondent and
no infirmity was found in the findings
recorded by the Rent Controller and
consequently the appeal was dismissed.

12. Before this Court, it was again
urged that respondent had adequate space
and consequently it cannot be said that he
requires the disputed property for bonafide
need of establishing a business for his son.
This Court has also looked into the
evidence led by the respondent and his son
as P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 from which it is clear
that
the
son
of
the
respondent
is
unemployed and in order to establish a
furniture business a large floor or area is
required for which the disputed premises is
required to establish the business. The
petitioner could not establish that the son of
the respondent is already employed and
consequently there was no evidence on
record to dispute the claim made by the
respondent. Accordingly, no ground is
made out for interference with regard to the
said issue.

13. In the present case it has been
contended by the petitioner that there was
no bona fide need of the respondent or his
son. Before going into the question whether
there was a bona fide need we need to go
into the question of what is bona fide. The
Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Sarup
Gupta v. Dr Mahesh Chand Gupta, 1
(1999) 6 SCC 222, held as under :-

"13. ..., the term bona fide or
genuinely refers to a state of mind.
Requirement is not a mere desire. The
degree
of
intensity
contemplated
by
"requires" is much more higher than in
mere desire. The phrase "required bona
fide" is suggestive of legislative intent that
a mere desire which is the outcome of whim
or fancy is not taken note of by the rent
control legislation. A requirement in the
sense of felt need which is an outcome of a
sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction
with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a
tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming
to occupy the premises for himself or for
any member of the family would entitle him
to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at
from this angle, any setting of the facts and
circumstances protruding the need of the
landlord and its bona fides would be
capable of successfully withstanding the
test of objective determination by the court.
The judge of facts should place himself in
the armchair of the landlord and then ask
the question to himself - whether in the
given facts substantiated by the landlord
11 All. Vijay Kumar Banswar Vs. Awadhesh Kumar Jaisawal
575
the need to occupy the premises can be said
to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the
answer be in the positive, the need is bona
fide. The failure on the part of the landlord
to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a
given case, positive material brought on
record by the tenant enabling the court
drawing an inference that the reality was to
the contrary and the landlord was merely
attempting at finding out a pretence or
pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would
be enough to persuade the court certainly
to deny its judicial assistance to the
landlord. Once the court is satisfied of the
bona fides of the need of the landlord for
the premises or additional premises by
applying objective standards then in the
matter of choosing out of more than one
accommodation available to the landlord
his subjective choice shall be respected by
the court. The court would permit the
landlord to satisfy the proven need by
choosing the accommodation which the
landlord feels would be most suited for
the purpose; the court would not in
such a case thrust its own wisdom upon
the choice of the landlord by holding
that
not
one
but
the
other
accommodation must be accepted by the
landlord to satisfy his such need. In
short, the concept of bona fide need or
genuine requirement needs a practical
approach instructed by the realities of
life. An approach either too liberal or
too conservative or pedantic must be
guarded against."

14. Further in B.C. Bhutada v. G.R.
Mundada, 2 AIR 2003 SC 2713 the Apex
Court held that,

"Requirement implies an element of
necessity. The necessity is a necessity
without regard to the degree of which it
may be."

15. Thus, it seems that the question of
bona fides shall be satisfied if the landlord
is able to show that they need the tenant's
premises for carrying out their business and
the same does not need to be to the extent
where no alternative is left to them. In the
present case the respondent landowner has
been able to show the need accordingly and
thus the contention of petitioner of no bona
fide ground stands denied.

16. It has also been urged by learned
counsel for petitioner that he had moved an
application for cross examination which
was rejected by the Rent Controller by
means of order dated 13.12.2022. It is
stated that in his appeal he has raised the
issues before the Appellate Court.

17. A perusal of the appellate order,
also indicates that though the said ground
was raised in the memo of appeal but it was
not urged by the petitioner nor considered
by the appellate court. Although once the
order has not been challenged before the
appellate court the same cannot be raised in
the writ proceedings, this Court has still
gone into the question of cross examination
to prove unemployment as raised by the
counsel for petitioner.

18. In this regard, a Division Bench of
the Supreme Court has observed in the case
of Harish Kumar (Since Deceased)
Through: Lrs. Versus Pankaj Kumar
Garg, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 239 as under:-

"Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, under
which the application for release was filed,
reads as under: "21. Proceedings for
release of building under occupation of
tenant.- (1) The Prescribed Authority may,
on an application of the landlord in that
behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from
the building under tenancy or any specified
576 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the
following grounds exists namely- (a) that
the building is bona fide required either in
its existing form or after demolition and
new construction by the landlord for
occupation by himself or any member of his
family, or any person for whose benefit it is
held by him, either for residential purposes
or for purposes of any profession, trade or
calling, or where the landlord is the trustee
of a public charitable trust, for the objects
of the trust ........."

It is quite clear that aforestated
provision seeking release of the premises
on the ground of bona fide requirement
does not strictly require the landlord to be
"unemployed" to maintain an action. All
that the provision contemplates is that the
requirement so pleaded by the landlord
must be bona fide."

19. This makes it clear that even if the
son was employed, the same would not
have made any difference. The respondent
landlord was able to make out a case for
eviction the ground that the premises were
required for establishing the business of
furniture for his unemployed son. It was
considered that the business of furniture
cannot be run from a small shop but
requires more space and consequently even
remaining shops which were tenanted by
the landlord would be got vacated for the
purposes of the establishing the said
business. The contention of the petitioner
that even if there is a change in
circumstances during the pendency of
litigation the same can be adequately
considered, would not be of much help in
facts of the present case. If during the
pendency of the litigation certain other
adjacent shops had got vacated, or had been
temporary let out by the landlord, it does
not change the circumstances requiring reappreciation of evidence in the present case
in as much as it is stated case of the
landlord that he required large space for
running a furniture shop and the same
could not be run from a small shop. It
cannot be doubted that the landlord has a
right to determine as to how and in what
manner he shall live, arranges his business
etc. He has to settle his life in his own way.
It cannot be guided, controlled or restricted
by any 3rd person including the court. A
tenant or the court cannot direct the
landlord how and in what manner he should
live arranges affairs. There is no bar which
can restrict a landlord beneficial enjoyment
of his own property.

20. In the case of R.C Tamrakar vs
Nidi Lekha AIR 2001 SC 3806 it was held
by the Supreme Court that law is well
settled that it is for the landlord to decide
how in what manner he should live and that
he is the best judge of his essential
requirement. In deciding the question of
bonfide requirement, it is unnecessary to
make and endeavour as to how else
landlord could have adjusted himself. The
petitioner had vehemently urged that the
landlord did not specify the business which
was to be started by his son. This aspect of
the matter was also considered by this court
in the case of K.C Kapoor vs Additional
district judge Kanpur 2003(2)ARC 70
and it was held that it is not necessary that
the landlord should state the nature of
business sought to be commenced by his
family. In the aforesaid discussion the said
issue is decided in favour of the landlord
and against the petitioner.

21. It was also argued by the
petitioner that provisions of section 16(2)
of act 13 of 1972 were not considered by
the prescribed authority. It was submitted
that it was mandatory for the prescribed
authority to have considered the issue of
11 All. Vijay Kumar Banswar Vs. Awadhesh Kumar Jaisawal
577
comparative hardship, and it should have
been considered that the petitioner had
been running a business in the tenanted
premises
for
nearly
37
years,
and
consequently as per the above statutory
provision no order of eviction could have
been passed.

22. This Court has perused the
impugned judgement of the prescribed
authority dated 13/12/2022. Issue No. 3
was specially framed to consider the
comparative hardship. A finding was
returned that the petitioner runs a very
small business in the tenanted premises,
and the said business can easily be shifted
to any other place. On the other hand the
respondent was the landlord and his
bonafide need for starting a business for his
son was greater than the hardship which
may be faced by the petitioner. On the
aforesaid facts he returned a finding against
the petitioner. In view of the above the
contention that the prescribed authority had
failed to consider the issue of comparative
hardship is clearly not made out. This Court
is of the considered view that the
prescribed authority has duly considered
this aspect, and in its correct perspective,
and even the finding returned could not be
assailed by the petitioner nor any material
was placed before this court which may
indicate that the finding was perverse.
Accordingly, this Court does not find any
infirmity with the finding recorded by the
prescribed Authority, and the arguments of
the petitioner accordingly rejected.

23. Lastly, it was submitted the
petitioner was not allowed to cross examine
has been considered by this Court in
various
judgments
includingMahesh
Kumar and Anr. v. Swami Dayal Katiyar
(Writ A No. 5387 of 2018) decided on
20.2.2018 wherein this Court relying upon
the judgments inRadha Kishan v. IVth
Additional District Judge, Jalaunat Orai
& Ors. 1985 (1) ARC 427,Khushi Ram
Dedwal
v.
Additional
Judge,
Small
CauseCourt/ Prescribed Authority, Meerut
& Ors. 1997 (2) ARC 674 (D.B), Sanjay
Kumar Katyal v. Smt. Kamlesh Gupta &
Anr. 2007 (67) ALR 250,Mahesh Chand v.
Additional
Civil
Judge
(S.D.),
Bulandshahar/
Prescribed
Authority(2005)/ ARC 558 andSatnam
Singh v. Rakesh Kumar2011 (89) ALR 560
held as under:-

" 20. The legal principle for allowing
the cross examination in proceedings
underSection 21(1)of the Act are absolutely
clear. The power underSection 34(1)of the
Act is discretionary which should be
exercised sparingly by the Prescribed
Authority only when he finds that crossexamination is necessary for deciding the
release application. The application for
cross-examination has to be decided in the
context of factual back drop of the case and
in the context of nature of the proceedings
under the Act. The legislature has not
provided for oral evidence to be adduced in
support of the case as contemplated under
Order XVIII Rule 4 C.P.C. but the facts are
to be proved on affidavit. If unnecessary
cross examination is permitted, that will
only hamper the expeditious disposal of the
cases and shall defeat the primary object of
the Act, i.e., the expeditious disposal of the
cases. When an application for cross
examination is filed, the Court has to
examine, in each case, as to whether on the
facts and circumstance of the case, cross
examination
is
necessary
and
the
application filed for cross examination is
bona fide. Cross examination will not be
relevant as to the fact which can be proved
by documentary evidence and which can be
annexed with the affidavit. Under the
578 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
scheme of the Act, oral examination may be
allowed only as an exception. If a party
wants to cross examine, he has to disclose
the necessary facts in his application as to
why the cross examination is necessary.
Unless it is established that the veracity of
facts as stated in the affidavit is necessary
to be tested by cross examination, the cross
examination
cannot
be
allowed
in
proceedings underSection 21of the Act. The
party moving the application must give
reasons as to which particular part of the
affidavit is incorrect and under what
circumstances and for what reasons such
cross examination is necessary in the
context of the facts and circumstances of
the case."

24. It has been submitted on behalf of
the petitioner that only to test the claim of
the landlord that the premises are required
for bonfide purposes, the petitioner wanted
to cross-examine the landlord and his
witnesses. In case the petitioner wanted to
contest the said facts, or wanted to bring on
record some material which may indicate
that the requirement of the petitioner was
not bonfide or that there was alternate
accommodation available, the same could
very well have been done by bringing on
record the evidence available with the
petitioner. No such material was placed by
him before the prescribed authority and
even if the arguments of the petitioner are
to be believed that the adjacent shop was
vacant, still the requirement of the landlord
was much more than merely the small shop
in which the petitioner was a tenant, for
him to start a furniture business for which
admittedly a large space is required. This
court does not find any valid reason for
interfering in the order of the prescribed
authority rejecting the application for cross
examination of the witnesses. The law in
this regard as stated above is also clear, and
cross-examination can be allowed only as
an exception rather than the rule as the
proceedings before the prescribed authority
are summary in nature. No satisfactory
reason could be disclosed from which it
could be gathered that cross-examination
was necessary in the facts of the present
case and consequently the arguments in this
regard are also rejected.

25. In light of the above discussion,
this Court does not find merit in the writ
petition, accordingly the same is dismissed.

26.

As
regards
compensation
considering the second proviso of Section
21(1) of the Act of 1972 and also that the
tenant has been in tenancy of the premises
for over three decades, this Court is of the
opinion that ends of justice would be met in
case the landlord / respondent is directed to
pay Rs.25,000/- as compensation to the
petitioner.
----------
(2023) 11 ILRA 578
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.10.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ-A No. 10552 of 2023

Vinod Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Siddharth Khare, Sri Ashok Khare (Sr.
Advocate), Sri Kauntey Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Abhishek Srivastava, Sri Adarsh
Bhushan, Sri Suyash Agarwal, Sri Ujjawal
Srivastava