# Vijay Raj & Ors v. District Magistrate/Arbiter Muzaffarnagar & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 11 ILRA 236
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-08-24
- **Case number:** Matters Under Article 227 No. 8519 of 2023
- **Bench:** Saral Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/vijay-raj-ors-v-district-magistrate-arbiter-muzaffarnagar-ors-49430
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

C.S.C.

Land acquired by the National Highway
Authority of India - competent authority
passed a final award-the rate determined by the
competent was much less than the prevalent
market rate of the land -application before the
competent authority for referring the matter to
the Arbitrator- application is vague and does not
disclose the object and purpose -application
lacks pleading as to whether these documents
are needed to furnish proof to establish the
grounds enumerated in Section 34(2)(a)(i) to
(v)- subordinate court has rightly held that it
has no power under Section 34 of the Act to
allow amendment to bring out new facts which
were not pleaded before the Tribunal-it is only
Arbitrator who is empowered under Section
23(3) to permit the amendment -no such power
is vested with the subordinate court dealing with
the proceeding u/s 34 of the Act, 1996impugned order not illegal.

W.P. dismissed. (E-9)

Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,889 of 52,081. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39889 for what follows._

236 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
could not have transferred the part of the
land in dispute on the basis of PA-11 entry
because the rights accrued to the petitioner
no.1 on the basis of the said entry stands
suspended but the petitioner no.1 has
executed the sale deed in favour of the
petitioner nos.2 to 4, therefore there is
apprehension that the petitioner no.1 may
further create third party rights on the land in
dispute, therefore the said property is required
to be protected to avoid the multiplicity of the
litigation also in future. The respondents have
also challenged the sale deed executed by the
petitioner no.1 in favour of the petitioner nos.2 to 4
by way of an amendment in the pending civil suit.
This Court is of the view that the interim
injunction has rightly and in accordance with law
has been granted by the appellate court by means
of the impugned order dated 01.09.2023.

14. In view of above and considering
the over all facts and circumstances of the
case, this Court is of the view that the
impugned order dated 01.09.2023 has
rightly and in accordance with law has been
passed by the appellate court considering
the
prima
facie
case,
balance
of
convenience and irreparable loss, which
may be caused to the respondents in case
the injunction is not granted and there is no
illegality or error in it, which may call for
any interference by this Court. This petition
is misconceived and lacks merit.

15. The petition is, accordingly,
dismissed. No order as to costs.
----------
(2023) 11 ILRA 236
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.08.2023
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.
Matters Under Article 227 No. 8519 of 2023
(Civil)
Vijay Raj & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
District Magistrate/Arbiter Muzaffarnagar
& Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Vivek Saran, Sri Atul Dayal (Sr.
Advocate)

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Land acquired by the National Highway
Authority of India - competent authority
passed a final award-the rate determined by the
competent was much less than the prevalent
market rate of the land -application before the
competent authority for referring the matter to
the Arbitrator- application is vague and does not
disclose the object and purpose -application
lacks pleading as to whether these documents
are needed to furnish proof to establish the
grounds enumerated in Section 34(2)(a)(i) to
(v)- subordinate court has rightly held that it
has no power under Section 34 of the Act to
allow amendment to bring out new facts which
were not pleaded before the Tribunal-it is only
Arbitrator who is empowered under Section
23(3) to permit the amendment -no such power
is vested with the subordinate court dealing with
the proceeding u/s 34 of the Act, 1996impugned order not illegal.

W.P. dismissed. (E-9)

Cases cited:

1. M/s Alpine Housing Development Corporation
Pvt. Ltd. Vs Ashok S. Dhariwal & ors.2023 SCC
Online SC 55

2. Fiza Developers & Inter-Trade Pvt. Ltd.Vs
AMCI (India) Pvt. Ltd.& anr. (2009) 17 SCC 796

3. Emkay Global Finance Services Ltd.Vs Girdhar
Sondhi (2018) 9 SCC 49

4. Canara Nidhi Ltd.Vs M. Shashikala &
ors.(2019) 9 SCC 462

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saral Srivastava, J.)
11 All. Vijay Raj & Ors. Vs. District Magistrate/Arbiter Muzaffarnagar & Ors.
237

1. Heard Sri Atul Dayal, learned
Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Vivek Saran,
learned counsel for the petitioners.

2. Petitioners have preferred this
petition
under
Article
227
of
the
Constitution of India challenging the order
dated 31.07.2023 passed by the Additional
District Judge/F.T.C. No.2, Muzaffar Nagar
rejecting the application no.58Ga under
Section 3(I)(b) of the National Highways
Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act,
1956') read with Order 11 Rule 12 of
C.P.C. and application 63Ka under Section
23(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act,
1996') in Arbitration Case No.779 of 2011.

3. The facts in brief are that land of
the
petitioners
being
Khasra
No.82
admeasuring 250 square meters, village
Husainpur, Bopada, Muzaffar Nagar was
acquired
by
the
National
Highway
Authority of India (hereinafter referred to
as 'NHAI') for expansion of National
Highway No.58 by issuing a notification
dated 28.11.2005 and 24.11.2006 under
Section 3A of the Act, 1956. The competent
authority notified under the Act, 1956
prepared a draft award determining the rate
of compensation at Rs.770/- per square
meter to be paid to the land owners whose
land had been acquired. The draft award
was approved by the NHAI vide letter
dated
27.02.2009.
Thereafter,
the
competent authority passed a final
award on 26.03.2009.

4. Since the rate determined by the
competent authority in respect of land
was much less than the prevalent
market rate of the land in the area, the
petitioners preferred an application
before the competent authority for
referring the matter to the Arbitrator.
The application of the petitioners was
registered as Land Reference Case
No.55 of 2011.

5. The petitioners challenged the
award mainly on the ground that the
acquired land have been declared by the
Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jansath as
non-agricultural land. It is further
averred
that
acquired
lands
are
commercial land, and therefore, the rate
determined under the award is much
less than the market rate of the land in
the area which is about Rs.12,000
square per meter.

6. It would be apt to reproduce the
relevant paragraph of the reference
application of petitioners:-

"3- यह जक अजजषत की जाने वाली िूजम राष्रीय
राज मागष पर जस्थत ह जजसके अजजषत िसरा नम्बरान में जो 84
ह , जद० 07.08.1978 में अकृर्क घोजर्त जकया जा चुका
ह इसी प्रकार ि०नं० 82 में िी जद० 07.08.1978 को
सक्षम अजधकारी एस०र्ी०एम० जानराठ द्वारा अजजषत नम्बरान
को अकृर्षक िूजम घोजर्त जकया जा चुका ह जजसमें स्थल पर िी
आबादी ह । जबजक उपरोक्त अजिजनणषय के अनुसार याची की
कृजर् िूजम का मूल्यांकन कर अजधजनणषय के अनुसार प्रजतकर
जदया जा रहा ह । जजससे प्राथीगण को अत्यजधक क्षजत हुई ह ।
उपरोक्त अजजषत िूजम के ि०नं० 83 में मौके पर बाग ह जो
कार्ी साल पुराना ह उसको िी बाग ना मानकर कृजर्िूजम
मानते हुये, प्रजतकर का जनधरण जकया जा रहा ह जो स्थल की
वास्तजवकता से परे ह ।

4. यह जक जहां-जहां आबादी ह वहां सडक के मध्य
जबन्दु से दोनों ओर बरावर 22-22 मीटर की सडक बनाने हेतु
अजधकृत जकया जाता ह जबजक प्रस्तुत मामले में प्राथीगण याची की
ओर सडक के मध्य से कही अजधक दूरी तक अजजषत क्षेत्रर्ल जलया
जा रहा ह और सिी िूजम का मूल्यांकन बाजार िाव दर पर जनधाषररत
नहीं जकया जा रहा ह अजजषत िूजम काजमषजशयल(वाजणजययक) ह
जजसकी वास्तजवकता को मौके पर इस बात से पिाष जा सकता ह
जक अजजषत िं०नं० 82 में िूस्वाजमयों का गोदाम/वेयर हाऊस जस्थत
ह जो जक काजमषजशयल की श्रेणी में आता ह उपरोक्त िसरा नं० का
प्रजतकर िी वाजणजययक दर से जनधाषररत जकया जाना चाजहए था जो
238 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
जविाग द्वारा नहीं जकया गया िसरा नं० 82 के सामने िसरा नं०
216 में आबादी दुकान एवं वाजणजययक गजतजवजधयां ह । इस आधार
पर िसरा नं० 82 को िी वाजणययक माना जाना चाजहए था।

5- यह जक अजजषत की जा रही िूजम का वतषमान
समय में बाजार िाव जकसी िी दशा में 12000/-रू० प्रजत वगष
मीटर से कम नहीं ह इस िम में अवगत कराना ह जक जनधाषररत
सरकारी दर िी शहर व कस्बों से बाहर सीमा में जनधाषररत सरकारी
दर स्टाम्प रेट िी 6000/-प्रजत वगष मीटर जनधाषररत जकया गया ह
जजससे कम र्ीस पर िय जविय का सम्पादन होना अव ध माना गया
ह । प्राथी की अजजषत िूजम जवकजसत ग्राम घासीपुरा जहां वाजणययक
गजतजवजधयां मुजफ्र्रनगर से मन्सूरपुर शुगरजमल तक स्थाजपत ह , के
अन्तगषत िूजम को अजजषत जकया जा रहा ह जजससे स्थल के अनुरूप
प्राथीगण को अजजषत समस्त िूजम का प्रजतकर 12,000/-प्रजत वगष
मीटर इस अजिजनणषय में जनधाषररत जकया जाना चाजहए था जो नहीं
जकया गया ह । बजल्क जनधाषररत दर से बहुत कम प्रजतकर का अंकलन
कर याची को जान बूझकर हाजन पहुंचाने का प्रयास जकया जा रहा ह ।
जो असंव धाजनक ह और काजबले आपजि ह ।

8- यह जक प्राथीगण के अजजषत िसरा नम्बर 83
84/1 में बाग व आबादी ह तथा िसरा नं० 216 में दुकाने ह जो
अजजषत की जा रही िूजम के नक्शे में यथास्थल दशाषयी नहीं गयी ह
जविाग द्वारा जकये जा रहे इस अजषन कायष से प्राथीगण याचीगण का
गोदाम/वेयर हाऊस िी प्रिाजवत हो रहा ह । और साथ ही गोदाम के
सामने बना गार्ष रूम िी पूरी तरह से अजषन रेिा के अन्दर ह
गोदाम/वेयर हाऊस का जनमाषण िी प्रिाजवत हो रहा ह इसकी क्षजत
का आकलन जविाग द्वारा नहीं जकया गया ह । जजससे प्राथीगण को
अत्यजधक हाजन हो रही ह । गोदाम/वेयर हाऊस गार्ष रूम से हुई क्षजत
अंकन 15 लाि रूपये प्रजतकर का अजषन से पूवष याचीगण को
जविाग द्वारा जदया जाना चाजहए था जो न देकर जविाग ने जवजध
जवरूद्ध कायष जकया ह जो असंव धाजनक ह ।

9- यह जक अजजषत नम्बर में आबादी मौके पर कायम
ह जजसकी जविाग द्वारा अनदेिी कर अजिजनणषय बनाया गया ह । जो
पूरी तरह से गलत ह । मौके पर आबादी के साथ वाजणजययक क्षमताये
अजजषत िूजम में मौजूद ह अजजषत िूजम का समस्त प्रजतकर वाजणजययक
दर से ही जदलाया जाना आवश्यक ह । साथ ही मध्य जबन्दु को अन्यंत्र
स्थान से नापकर सडक के दोनों ओर बराबर िूजम को अजजषत कराया
जाना िी न्याय संगत ह । जर्र िी जजतनी िूजम याचीगण की प्रिाजवत
ह , उसका प्रजतकर वाजणजययक दर से अंकन 12,000/-रू० प्रजत
वगष मीटर की दर से जदलाया जाना जवजध संगत ह ।

10- यह जक अजिजनणषय के अनुसार अजजषत िूजम
का प्रजतकर 770/-रू० प्रजत मीटर जनधाषररत जकया गया जो पूरी तरह
बाजार िाव के जवपररत ह क्योंजक अजिजनणषय के साथ संलग्न
अनेक्चर-3 के अनुसार अजजषत िूजम में जद० 13.01.05 को जकये
गये जविय पत्र मंजुला जवश्वास बहक सुशील कुमार के अनुसार
2322.67 प से प्रजत वगष मीटर जविय मूल्य दशाषया गया ह । इसके
अनुरूप िी अजजषत िूजम का प्रजतकर 770/-रू० जदया जाना न्याय
संगत नहीं ह । क्योंजक अजजषत िूजम के पूवषप्रकाशन 28.11.05 को
ही जकया गया ह । और वर्ष 2005 के जविय पत्र के अनुसार
अजजषत िूजम का िाव 2322.67 प्रजत वगष मीटर संलग्न सूची के
अनुसार होता ह । उल्लेिनीय ह जक जवजधक व्यवस्थाओं में माननीय
उच्चतम न्यायालय द्वारा दी गई व्यवस्थ के अनुसार जकसी वर्ष के
सवाषजधक मूल्य को आधार मानकर 15 प्रजतशत वर्ष का मूल्यांकन
अजतररक्त करने के उपरान्त प्रजतकर की गणना की जा सकती ह और
अजषन से प्रिाजवत जकसानो को प्रजतकर जदया जा सकता ह जो नहीं
जदया गया ह और बनाया गया अजिजनणषय अव धाजनक होने के कारण
संशोजधत होकर पुनैः अवार्ष घोजर्त जकये जाने योग्य ह ।"

7. On the basis of pleadings in the
reference, the petitioners prayed for the
following relief in the reference case:-

अतैः श्रीमान जी से प्राथषना ह जक उपरोक्त तथ्यों के
आधार पर याचीकताष की याजचका स्वीकार की जाकर बाजार िाव
के अनुसार प्रजतकर याची को जदलाये जाने की कृपा करें।"

8. The reference was decided by the
Arbitrator under Section 3H (5) of the Act,
1956 by order dated 01.09.2011 enhancing
the land rate to Rs.1000/- per square meter
by a common award.

9. The petitioners being aggrieved by
the award of the Arbitrator, filed an
application under Section 34 of the Act,
1996 before the District Judge, Muzaffar
Nagar which was registered as Arbitration
Case No.779 of 2011.

10. In the aforesaid arbitration case,
the petitioners filed an application 58Ga
under Section 3-I(b) of the Act, 1956 read
with Order 11 Rule 12 of C.P.C. praying for
a direction that respondents be directed to
produce documents detailed in paragraph
nos.1 to 8 of the said application on record
before disposal of the case.
11 All. Vijay Raj & Ors. Vs. District Magistrate/Arbiter Muzaffarnagar & Ors.
239

11. For better appreciation of facts,
the relevant paragraphs of the application
58Ga which refer to documents in respect
of which the petitioners have prayed for a
direction to respondents by the court are
reproduced herein below:-

1. यह जक जवपक्षी संख्या 1 को जजस नोजटजर्केशन
के माध्यम से र र्रेन्सकताष के वाद की सुनवाई हेतु आबीरेटर जनयुक्त
जकया। इस नोजटजर्केशन की प्रजतजलजप।

2. यह जक जवपक्षी संख्या 3 को नेशनल हाईवे
अथोरटी आर् इजडर्या द्वारा जजस नोजटजर्केशन के द्वारा सक्षम
प्राजधकारी जनयुक्त जकया गया। इस नोजटजर्केशन की प्रजतजलजप।

3. यह जक जवपक्षी नम्बर 3 द्वारा र र्रेन्सकताष के
जवरूद्ध अपने प्रस्ताजवत अजिजनणषय जदनांजकत 20.1.2009 जो
जदनांक 26.3.2009 को जवपक्षी नम्बर 3 द्वारा पाररत जकया गया
में
प्रस्ताजवत
अवार्ष
को
अपने
पत्र
संख्या
101/NHAI/MZN/Camp जदनांजकत 20.1.2009 के
द्वारा जी०एम० न शनल हाईवे अथोरटी आर् इजडर्या के पास
प्रीएग्जाजमनेशन हेतु िेजा। इस पत्र की प्रजतजलजप।

4. यह जक र र्रेन्सकताष की अजधग्रजहत की गई िूजम
के संबंध में पाररत एवार्ष के संबंध में िारतीय राष्रीय राज मागष
प्राजधकरण द्वारा प्रेजर्त अप्रूवल ल टर (APPROVAL
LETTER) संख्या D 2153 जदनांजकत 27.2.2009 तथा
उसके साथ फ्रेश मेजर मेन्ट ररपोटष मय नक्शा को अवार्ष के साथ
संलग्न नहीं जकया गया ह । उक्त पत्र एवं र र्रेन्सकताष की िूजम के
संबंध में फ्रेश मेजर मेन्ट ररपोटष मय नक्शा की प्रजतजलजप।

5- यह जक र र्रेन्सकताष की अजधग्रजहत सम्पजि में
िर्े वृक्षों एवं िवन की मूल्यांकन ररपोटष की प्रजतजलजप।

6- यह जक र र्रेन्सकताष की अजधग्रजहत सम्पजि का
जो प्रजतकर जनधाषररत जकया गया उक्त प्रजतकर की धनराजश राष्रीय
राजमागष प्राजधकरण द्वारा सक्षम प्राजधकारी के िाते में जमा कराये
जाने से सम्बजन्धत अजिलेि की प्रजतजलजप।

7- यह जक रप र्रेन्सकताष की वास्तजवक रूप से
अजधग्रजहत की गयी िूजम का क्षेत्रर्ल और उससे सम्बजन्धत
अजिलेि की प्रजतजलजप।

8- यह जक यजद सक्षम प्राजधकारी द्वारा या राष्रीय
राजमागष प्राजधकरण द्वारा र र्रेन्सकताष की अजधग्रजहत िूजम का
िौजतक कब्जा जलया गया ह । इस सबंध में सक्षम प्राजधकारी द्वारा
पंचनामा त यार जकया गया ह , उक्त पंचनामे की र र्रेन्स उपरोक्त के
अजन्तम रूप से प्रिावी जनस्तारण हेतु आवश्यकता ह । इस पंचनामे
की प्रजतजलजप।"

12. The said application was opposed
by the respondents by filing an objection
dated 02.07.2022 contending interalia that
said application is not maintainable.

13. The petitioners also filed an
application 63Ka under Section 23(3) of
the Act, 1996 seeking certain amendments
in the application under Section 34 of the
Act, 1996.

14. The said application was also
opposed by the respondents by filing
objection 65Ga stating therein that said
application is not maintainable since there
is no subsequent development which has
taken place, and therefore, the amendment
application is misconceived and is liable to
be rejected.

15. The subordinate court in rejecting
the application 58Ga under Section 3-I(b)
of the Act, 1956 read with Order 11 Rule
12 of C.P.C. held that proceedings under
Section 34 of the Act, 1996 are summary in
nature. It further held that the jurisdiction
of the court in considering the application
under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 is limited
and restricted as the court can set aside
the award only on the existence of any
of the grounds mentioned under Section
34(2)(a) & (b) of the Act, 1996. Thus,
the question of calling interrogatories
does not arise in considering the
objections under Section 34 since the
purpose of calling interrogatories is to
ascertain the stand of the party in
respect of the disputed question of
facts. It further held that as the court is
not required to decide the disputed
question of facts under Section 34 of
the Act, 1996 based upon oral and
documentary
evidence
on
record,
therefore,
application
58Ga
is
misconceived.
240 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

16. The subordinate court took note of
the judgement of Apex Court in the case of
M/s
Alpine
Housing
Development
Corporation Private Ltd. Vs. Ashok S.
Dhariwal and Others 2023 SCC Online
SC 55 and held that the court in a
proceeding under Section 34 of the Act,
1996 has to consider the record of Arbitral
Tribunal before it. It further held that in
such a proceeding it does not call for any
additional evidence unless in exceptional
circumstances it is necessary. It further
recorded a finding that petitioners have
failed to make out any exceptional
circumstance so as to warrant acceptance of
additional evidence in present proceedings.
It held that though petitioners had ample
opportunity before the Tribunal to lead the
aforesaid evidence, they sat quiet for about
12 years, and now by filing the said
application, they are trying to make out
entirely a
new
case which is not
permissible in law. By recording the
aforesaid finding, the subordinate court
dismissed the application 58Ga.

17. The subordinate court while
rejecting the application 63Ka under
Section 23(3) of the Act, 1996 held that
under Section 23(3) of the Act, 1996,
the relief of amendment of either the
claim or the defence is available to the
parties only during the pendency of
arbitral
proceedings
before
the
Arbitrator and not before any other
forum or court of law. It further held
that arbitral proceedings have been
terminated with the passing of the
award, and proceedings under Section
34 of the Act, 1996 cannot be deemed
to be proceedings before the Arbitral
Tribunal by any stretch of imagination.
Consequently,
it
held
that
the
application under Section 23(3) of the
Act, 1996 is not maintainable and
rejected the same.

18. Challenging the aforesaid order,
the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioners submits that the subordinate
court has committed a manifest error of law
apparent on the face of the record in
rejecting the application 58Ga. He submits
that an application to bring additional
evidence on record is maintainable if
documents which are sought to be brought
on record are necessary and germane to the
issue involved in the case for correct and
proper adjudication.

19.

To
buttress
the
aforesaid
submission, he has laid emphasis upon the
word 'furnishes proof' mentioned in Section
34(2) before the substitution of the said
words by Act No.33 of 2019 and submits
that petitioners are entitled to produce
additional evidence in proceeding under
Section 34 of the Act, 1996. He further
submits that courts are not devoid of
powers to allow said application in
exceptional circumstances in view of the
judgement of Apex Court in the case of M/s
Alpine Housing Development (supra), and
as the petitioners have made out an
exceptional
circumstance
which
necessitated to bring on record the
documents mentioned in application 58Ga
in the interest of justice, therefore, the
subordinate court has erred in law in
rejecting the aforesaid application.

20.

He
further
submits
that
observation by the subordinate court that
by filing application 58Ga petitioners are
trying to make out an entirely new case in
the present proceeding is erroneous and not
based upon correct appreciation of the
record.
11 All. Vijay Raj & Ors. Vs. District Magistrate/Arbiter Muzaffarnagar & Ors.
241

21. He further submits that the
subordinate
court
has
misinterpreted
Section 23(3) of the Act, 1996 in holding
that
application
63Ka
was
not
maintainable. He further submits that as the
amendments sought in the application 63Ka
under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 are
formal in nature and do not change the
nature
of
the
case,
therefore,
the
subordinate court has committed an error
apparent on the face of record in rejecting
the application 63Ka of the petitioners.

22. I have considered the argument
advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for
the petitioners and perused the record.

23. The Court first deals with the
argument of learned counsel for the
petitioners in respect of the order of the
subordinate court rejecting application
58Ga.

24. In the instant case, the land of the
petitioners
bearing
Khasra
No.82
admeasuring 250 square meters village
Husainpur, Bopada, Muzaffar Nagar was
acquired by NHAI for expansion of
National Highway No.58 by notification
dated 28.11.2005 and 24.11.2006. The
Special Land Acquisition Officer prepared
a draft award fixing land rate @ Rs.770 per
square meter. The said draft award was
approved by NHAI vide letter dated
27.02.2009 and based on it, the competent
authority passed the final award on
26.03.2009.

25. The petitioners being aggrieved
by the final award dated 26.03.2009
preferred a reference under Section 3G (5)
of the act 1956 before the competent
authority mainly on the ground that the
acquired land was abadi land and a lot of
commercial activities were going around
the land, therefore, the land had potential
for commercial use and award should have
been given as per the market rate applicable
to commercial land i.e. Rs.12,000/- per
square meter. The relevant extract of the
paragraph of the reference application
assailing the award has already been
extracted above.

26. The competent authority partly
allowed the reference application and
enhanced the land rate from Rs.770 to Rs.
1000 per square meter by order dated
01.09.2011. The petitioners being not
satisfied with the award passed by the
arbitrator preferred an application under
Section 34 of the Act, 1996 registered as
reference Case No.55 of 2011.

27. In the said case, the petitioners
preferred an application under Section 3-I
of the Act, 1956 read with Order 11 Rule
12 of C.P.C to take on record the
documents/inventories detailed in the said
application.

28. Now the question that arises for
consideration is whether the court in
considering the application under Section
34 of the Act, 1996 can allow such
application when the power to accept such
application is vested with the competent
authority under Section 3-I (b) of the Act,
1956.

29. To answer the aforesaid question,
it would be apposite to reproduce Section
3G and Section 3-I of the Act, 1956:-

"[3G. Determination of amount
payable as compensation.- (1) Where any
land is acquired under this Act, there shall
be paid an amount which shall be
determined by an order of the competent
authority.
242 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(2) Where the right of user or any
right in the nature of an easement on, any
land is acquired under this Act, there shall
be paid an amount to the owner and any
other person whose right of enjoyment in
that land has been affected in any manner
whatsoever by reason of such acquisition
an amount calculated at ten per cent, of the
amount determined under sub-section (1),
for that land.

(3)
Before
proceeding
to
determine the amount under sub-section (1)
or sub-section (2), the competent authority
shall give a public notice published in two
local newspapers, one of which will be in a
vernacular language inviting claims from
all persons interested in the land to be
acquired.

(4) Such notice shall state the
particulars of the land and shall require all
persons interested in such land to appear in
person or by an agent or by a legal
practitioner referred to in sub-section (2)
of section 3C, before the competent
authority, at a time and place and to
state the nature of their respective
interest in such land.

(5) If the amount determined
by the competent authority under subsection (1) or sub-section (2) is not
acceptable to either of the parties, the
amount shall, on an application by
either of the parties, be determined by
the arbitrator to be appointed by the
Central Government.

(6) Subject to the provisions of
this
Act,
the
provisions
of
the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(26 of 1996) shall apply to every
arbitration under this Act.

(7) The competent authority or
the arbitrator while determining the
amount under sub-section (1) or subsection (5), as the case may be, shall take
into consideration-

(a) the market value of the land
on
the
date
of
publication
of the
notification under section 3A;

(b) the damage, if any, sustained
by the person interested at the time of
taking possession of the land, by reason of
the severing of such land from other land;

(c) the damage, if any, sustained
by the person interested at the time of
taking possession of the land, by reason of
the acquisition injuriously affecting his
other immovable property in any manner,
or his earnings;

d) if, in consequences of the
acquisition of the land, the person
interested is compelled to change his
residence or place of business, the
reasonable expenses, if any, incidental to

3-I. Competent authority to have
certain
powers
of
civil
court.-The
competent authority shall have, for the
purposes of this Act, all the powers of a
civil court while trying a suit under the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908),
in respect of the following matters,
namely:-

(a) summoning and enforcing the
attendance of any person and examining
him on oath;

(b) requiring the discovery and
production of any document;

(c) reception of evidence on
affidavits;

(d) requisitioning any public
record from any court or office;

(e)
issuing
commission
for
examination of witnesses.]"

30. Section 34 of the Act, 1996 as it
stood before amendment by Act, No.33 of
2019 is reproduced herein below:-

"34. Application for setting aside
arbitral award.-(1) Recourse to a Court
against an arbitral award may be made
11 All. Vijay Raj & Ors. Vs. District Magistrate/Arbiter Muzaffarnagar & Ors.
243
only by an application for setting aside
such award in accordance with sub-section
(2) and sub-section (3).

(2) An arbitral award may be set
aside by the Court only if-

(a)
the
party
making
the
application furnishes proof that-

(i) a party was under some
incapacity, or

(ii) the arbitration agreement is
not valid under the law to which the parties
have subjected it or, failing any indication
thereon under the law for the time being in
force; or

(iii)
the
party
making
the
application was not given proper notice of
the appointment of an arbitrator or of the
arbitral proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present his case; or

(iv) the arbitral award deals with
a dispute not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to
arbitration, or it contains decisions on
matters beyond the
scope of the
submission to arbitration:

Provided that, if the decisions
on matters submitted to arbitration can
be
separated
from
those
not
so
submitted, only that part of the arbitral
award which contains decisions on
matters not submitted to arbitration
may be set aside, or

(v) the composition of the
arbitral
tribunal
or
the
arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with
the agreement of the parties, unless
such agreement was in conflict with a
provision of this Part from which the
parties cannot derogate, or, failing such
agreement, was not in accordance with
this Part; or

(b) the Court finds that-

(i) the subject-matter of the
dispute is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law for the time being
in force, or

(ii) the arbitral award is in
conflict with the public policy of India.

Explanation
1-
For
the
avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that
an award in conflict with the public policy
of India, only if,-

(i) the making of the award was
induced or affected by fraud or corruption
or was in violation of section 75 or section
81; or

(ii) it is in contravention with the
fundamental policy of Indian law; or

(iii) it is in conflict with the most
basic notions of morality or justice.]

Explanation 2.-For the avoidance
of doubt, the test as to whether there is a
contravention with the fundamental policy
of Indian law shall not entail a review on
the merits of the dispute.]....."

31. Section 3-I of the Act, 1956 vests
with the competent authority for the
purposes of this Act, all the powers of the
Civil Court for trying a suit under the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in
respect to the matters enumerated in
Section 3-I(a) to (e). Under Section 3-I(b)
of the Act, 1956, the competent authority is
vested with the power to direct the parties
in the interest of justice for the production
of any document which is necessary and
germane to the controversy for correct and
proper adjudication of the case.

32. Section 3G(6) provides that
subject to provisions of this Act, the
provisions of Act, 1996 shall apply to every
arbitration under this Act. So by virtue of
Section 3G(6) of the Act, 1956, the
provisions
of
Act,
1996
are
made
applicable to every arbitration proceedings
under the Act, 1956.
244 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

33. The power to summon or to direct
for production of any document is vested
with the competent authority under Section
3-I(b) of the Act, 1956.

34. Section 34(2)(a) & (b) of the Act,
1996 enumerates the grounds on the
existence of which the court is empowered
to set aside an arbitral award. If the grounds
enumerated in Section 34(2)(a) & (b) are
not made out by the applicant assailing the
legality of the arbitral award under Section
34, the court cannot set aside the award. In
the scheme of the Act, 1996 limited
grounds for setting aside an arbitral award
under Section 34(2)(a) & (b) of the Act,
1996 are set out mainly for the reason that
there should be least judicial intervention in
the arbitral award and there should not be
any delay in culminating the arbitration
proceedings. Now in the light of the
scheme of the Act, 1996, this Court
proceeds to consider the aforesaid question
posed before it in the instant case.

35. In the case of Fiza Developers
and Inter-Trade Private Limited Vs. AMCI
(India) Private Limited and Another
(2009) 17 SCC 796, a question arose as to
whether 'issues' as contemplated under
Order 14 Rule 1 of C.P.C. should be framed
in the application under Section 34 of the
Act, 1996, the Apex Court considering the
scheme of the Act 1996 and also the scope
of proceedings under Section 34 of the Act,
1996, answered the said question in
negative. In this respect, it would the apt to
reproduce paragraphs 20 to 24 of the said
judgment:-

"20. Section 36 provides that an
award shall be enforced in the same
manner as if it were a decree of the court,
but only on the expiry of the time for
making an application to set aside the
arbitral award under Section 34, or such
application having been made, only after it
has been refused. Thus, until the disposal of
the application under Section 34 of the Act,
there
is
an
implied
prohibition
of
enforcement of the arbitral award. The very
filing and pendency of an application under
Section 34, in effect, operates as a stay of
the enforcement of the award.

21. We may therefore examine the
question for consideration by bearing three
factors in mind. The first is that the Act is a
special enactment and Section 34 provides
for a special remedy. The second is that an
arbitration award can be set aside only
upon one of the grounds mentioned in subsection (2) of Section 34 exists. The third is
that proceedings under Section 34 requires
to be dealt with expeditiously.

22. The scope of enquiry in a
proceeding under Section 34 is restricted to
consideration whether any one of the
grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of
Section 34 exists for setting aside the
award. We may approvingly extract the
analysis relating to "grounds of challenge"
from The Law & Practice of Arbitration
and Conciliation by Shri O. P. Malhotra
[1st Edn., p.768, Para (I) 34-14]:

"Section
5
regulates
court
intervention in arbitral process. It provides
that notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law for the time being in force in
India, in matters governed by Part I of this
Act, the court will not intervene except
where so provided in this Part. Pursuant to
this policy, Section 34 imposes certain
restrictions on the right of the court to set
aside an arbitral award. It provides, in all,
seven grounds for setting aside an award.
In other words, an arbitral award can be
set aside only if one or more of these seven
grounds exists.

The first five grounds have been
set forth in Section 34(2)(a). In order to
11 All. Vijay Raj & Ors. Vs. District Magistrate/Arbiter Muzaffarnagar & Ors.
245
successfully invoke any of these grounds, a
party has to plead and prove the existence
of one or more of such grounds. That is to
say, the party challenging the award has to
discharge the burden of poof by adducing
sufficient credible evidence to show the
existence of any one of such grounds. The
rest two grounds are contained in Section
34(2)(b) which provides that an award may
be set aside by the court on its own
initiative if the subject- matter of the
dispute is not arbitrable or the impugned
award is in conflict with the public policy
of India."

The grounds for setting aside the
award are specific. Therefore, necessarily a
petitioner who files an application will
have to plead the facts necessary to make
out the ingredients of any of the grounds
mentioned in sub-section (2) and prove the
same. Therefore, the only question that
arises in an application under Section 34 of
the Act is whether the award requires to be
set aside on any of the specified grounds in
sub-section (2) thereof. Sub-section (2) also
clearly places the burden of proof on the
person
who
makes
the
application.
Therefore,
the
question
arising
for
adjudication as also the person on whom
the burden of proof is placed is statutorily
specified. Therefore, the need for issues is
obviated.

23.
Framing
of
issues
is
necessary only where different types of
material propositions of fact or law are
affirmed by one party and are denied by the
other and it is therefore necessary for the
court to identify the issues and specify the
party on whom the burden to prove the
same lies. When this exercise has already
been done by the statute, there is no need
for framing the issues.

24. In other words, an application
under Section 34 of the Act is a single issue
proceeding,
 where the very fact that the application has
been instituted under that particular
provision declares the issue involved. Any
further exercise to frame issues will only
delay the proceedings. It is thus clear that
issues need not be framed in applications
under Section 34 of the Act."

36. In the case of Emkay Global
Finance Services Limited Vs. Girdhar
Sondhi (2018) 9 SCC 49, the Apex Court
considered two judgments of the Delhi
High Court wherein Delhi High Court
refused to grant permission to the judgment
debtor to lead oral evidence at the stage of
objections raised against an arbitral award
on the ground that if it is permitted, that
will defeat the very object of the Act, 1996
i.e. the expeditious disposal of objection
and minimal interference by the court
which is manifest from the statement of
objects and reasons of the Act, 1996.
Paragraph 21 of the said judgment is
reproduced herein below:-

"21. It will thus be seen that
speedy resolution of arbitral disputes has
been the reason for enacting the 1996 Act,
and continues to be the reason for adding
amendments to the said Act to strengthen
the aforesaid object. Quite obviously, if
issues are to be framed and oral evidence
taken in a summary proceeding under
Section 34, this object will be defeated. It is
also on the cards that if Bill No.100 of 2018
is passed, then evidence at the stage of a
Section 34 application will be dispensed
with altogether. Given the current state of
the law, we are of the view that the two
early Delhi High Court judgments cited by
us
hereinabove,
correctly
reflect
the
position in law as to furnishing proof under
Section 34(2)(a). So does the Calcutta High
Court judgment. We may hasten to add that
if the procedure followed by the Punjab and
246 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Haryana High Court judgment is to be
adhered to, the time-limit of one year would
only be observed in most cases in the
breach. We therefore overrule the said
decision. We are constrained to observe
that Fiza Developers (supra) was a step in
the right direction as its ultimate ratio is
that issues need not be struck at the stage
of hearing a Section 34 application, which
is a summary procedure. However, this
judgment must now be read in the light of
the amendment made in Sections 34(5) and
34(6). So read, we clarify the legal position
by stating that an application for setting
aside an arbitral award will not ordinarily
require anything beyond the record that
was before the arbitrator. However, if there
are matters not contained in such record,
and are relevant to the determination of
issues arising under Section 34(2)(a), they
may be brought to the notice of the Court
by way of affidavits filed by both parties.
Cross-examination of persons swearing to
the affidavits should not be allowed unless
absolutely necessary, as the truth will
emerge on a reading of the affidavits filed
by both parties. We, therefore, set aside the
judgment of the Delhi High Court and
reinstate that of the learned Additional
District Judge dated 22.09.2016. The
appeal is accordingly allowed with no
order as to costs."

37. In the case of Canara Nidhi
Limited Vs. M. Shashikala and Others
(2019) 9 SCC 462, the Apex Court set aside
the order of the High Court whereby the
High Court has permitted the applicant
under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 to adduce
additional evidence in the absence of any
grounds made out by the applicant as to the
necessity of adducing the evidence. The
Apex Court considered the scope of
Section 34 of the Act, 1996 and also the
object of providing one year time under
sub-Sections 5 and 6 of Section 34 of the
Act, 1996 for disposal of the application
under Section 34 of the Act, 1996.

38. A conspectus view of the reasons
elaborated by the Apex Court in the light of
the scheme of the Act, 1996 in all the
aforesaid judgments narrates that the scope
of objection against the award under
Section 34 of the Act, 1996 is limited to the
grounds mentioned in Section 34(2)(a) &
(b) of the Act, 1996, which has been
specified only with a purpose to restrict the
interference of court in the award and
expeditious
culmination
of
arbitration
proceedings. Therefore, to permit the
framing of issues or permit to lead oral
evidence as provided under Section 34 of
the Act, 1996 would completely negate the
object underlying the Act, 1996. The Apex
Court also emphasised that the legislative
intent underlying the Act, 1996 is to
minimize the supervisory role of the court
in the arbitration process and leave all
contentious issues to be urged and
reiterated before the arbitral tribunal itself.
However, to subserve the interest of justice,
the court has held that in exceptional
circumstances, the parties in proceeding
under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 may
adduce
additional
evidence
only
to
establish the grounds mentioned in Section
34(2)(a)(b) of the Act, 1996 for settingaside the arbitral award.

39.

Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioners has laid much emphasis upon
the words 'furnishes proof' in Section
34(2)(a) as it existed before amendment in
Section 34(2)(a) by Act No.33 of 2019 to
contend that the petitioners can furnish
proof before the court in proceeding under
Section 34 of the Act, 1996, and once the
petitioners have made out a case for
accepting the documents as additional
11 All. Vijay Raj & Ors. Vs. District Magistrate/Arbiter Muzaffarnagar & Ors.
247
evidence, the court should permit the
petitioners to adduce additional evidence
on record. This Court does not find merit in
the said submission of the learned counsel
for the petitioners for the reason that under
Section 34 of the Act, 1996, the Court may
set aside the arbitral award on the existence
of grounds contemplated under Section
34(2)(a)(i) to (v) or Section 34(2)(b) of the
Act, 1996, therefore, the word 'furnishes
proof' used in Section 34(2)(a)(i) to (v) has
to be interpreted in the context of Section
34(2)(a) of the Act, 1996 to achieve the
object with which the word 'furnishes
proof' has been used in Section 34(2)(a) of
the Act, 1996.

40. The Apex Court in the cases,
referred above, has held that the parties
may be allowed to adduce additional
evidence in exceptional circumstances
where documents which parties want to
bring on record were not available on
record before the Arbitral Tribunal to
demonstrate that the grounds enumerated in
Section 34(2)(a)(i) to (v) are present calling
for interference with the arbitral award to
subserve the interest of justice. In the
opinion of the Court, the word 'furnishes
proof' has been used to permit a party to
adduce additional evidence to demonstrate
the existence of any of the grounds
contemplated under Section 34(2)(a)(i) to
(v) is present which warrants setting aside
the award under Section 34 of the Act,
1996 and not beyond it. Thus, the only
inevitable conclusion which can be reached
is that the parties can bring on record or
adduce only that additional evidence which
is germane to establish the grounds
available for setting aside the award
under Section 34(2)(a)(i) to (v).