# Vijaypal & Ors v. Union of India & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 1 ILRA 273
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-09-18
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 14045 of 2020
- **Bench:** Surya Prakash Kesarwani, Jayant Banerji
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/vijaypal-ors-v-union-of-india-ors-45998
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

(A) Civil Law - Railways Act, 1989 -
Section 20A - Power to acqure land,
Section
20E
-
Declaration
of
acquisition - burden of establishing
mala fide lies very heavily on the
person who alleges it - Allegations of
mala fide are serious in nature and
they essentially raise a question of
fact - person making such allegations
to
supply
full
particulars
in the
petition - If sufficient averments and
requisite materials are not on record -
court would not make fishing or
roving inquiry - Mere assertion, vague
averment or bald statement is not
enough to hold the action to be mala
fide - must be demonstrated by facts.
(Para - 12,14)

Railways acquired land for "Eastern Dedicated
Freight Corridor in District Gautam Buddh
Nagar" by notification dated 24.08.2009 - issued
under Section 20A and 20E of the Act, 1989 -
Amendment Act 11 of 2008 has been repealed
by Act 23 of 2016 - provisions of Section 20A
and Section 20E not available - impugned
notifications suffers from mala fide - issued
without authority of law - deserve to be
quashed - land in question has been acquired
for a public purpose - all those persons whose
land or houses are affected by acquisition shall
get compensation in accordance with the
provisions
of
Chapter-IV-A
of
the
Act,
1989.(Para - 3, 4)

HELD:- Submission that Section 20A and
20E are not available after the Repealing
Amending Act, 2016, is legally incorrect and
baseless. The allegation of mala fide made
by the petitioners is wholly vague and
without proof. The petitioners have failed to
discharge the burden of proving mala fide.
The impugned notification does not suffer
from any error of law or mala fide.(Para -
9,15)

Writ Petition dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited :-

## Text

1 All. Vijaypal & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
273

45. In view of the foregoing
discussions, and keeping in view the facts
of the case at hand, we are not inclined to
exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution.

46. The writ petitions are accordingly
dismissed.
----------
(2021)01ILR A273
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.09.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SURYA PRAKASH
KESARWANI, J.
THE HON'BLE JAYANT BANERJI, J.

Writ C No. 14045 of 2020

Vijaypal & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Kaushal Kumar Singh, Sri N.P. Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Rajnish Kumar Rai

(A) Civil Law - Railways Act, 1989 -
Section 20A - Power to acqure land,
Section
20E
-
Declaration
of
acquisition - burden of establishing
mala fide lies very heavily on the
person who alleges it - Allegations of
mala fide are serious in nature and
they essentially raise a question of
fact - person making such allegations
to
supply
full
particulars
in the
petition - If sufficient averments and
requisite materials are not on record -
court would not make fishing or
roving inquiry - Mere assertion, vague
averment or bald statement is not
enough to hold the action to be mala
fide - must be demonstrated by facts.
(Para - 12,14)

Railways acquired land for "Eastern Dedicated
Freight Corridor in District Gautam Buddh
Nagar" by notification dated 24.08.2009 - issued
under Section 20A and 20E of the Act, 1989 -
Amendment Act 11 of 2008 has been repealed
by Act 23 of 2016 - provisions of Section 20A
and Section 20E not available - impugned
notifications suffers from mala fide - issued
without authority of law - deserve to be
quashed - land in question has been acquired
for a public purpose - all those persons whose
land or houses are affected by acquisition shall
get compensation in accordance with the
provisions
of
Chapter-IV-A
of
the
Act,
1989.(Para - 3, 4)

HELD:- Submission that Section 20A and
20E are not available after the Repealing
Amending Act, 2016, is legally incorrect and
baseless. The allegation of mala fide made
by the petitioners is wholly vague and
without proof. The petitioners have failed to
discharge the burden of proving mala fide.
The impugned notification does not suffer
from any error of law or mala fide.(Para -
9,15)

Writ Petition dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited :-

1. Jethanand Betab Vs The State Of
Delhi(Now Delhi Administration) , AIR 1960
SC 89

2. Mohd. Junaid Ajaz & ors. Vs U.O.I. & ors.
, (2016) 116 ALR 380

3. Ajit Kumar Nag Vs . General Manager
(PJ), Indial Oil Corpn. Ltd (Para-56) ,
(2005) 7 SCC 764

4. E.P. Royappa Vs St. of T.N. & anr. para92) , (1974) 4 SCC 3

5. Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. Vs State
of Uttaranchal & ors. , (para-83), (2007) 8
SCC 418
274 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
6. Chandra Prakash Singh & ors. Chairman,
Purvanchal Gramin Bank & ors., (paras-15 and
16) , 2008 (2) ESC 177 (SC)

7. Tara Chand Khatri Vs Municipal Corporation
of Delhi & ors., (para-27) , AIR 1977 SC 567

(Delivered by Hon'ble Surya Prakash
Kesharwani, J. &
Hon'ble Jayant Banerji, J.)

1. Heard Sri N.P. Singh, learned
counsel for the petitioners, Sri Rajnish
Kumar Rai, learned counsel for the
respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4 and Sri B.P.
Singh
Kachhawah,
learned
standing
counsel for the State-respondent No.3.

2. This writ petition has been filed
praying for the following relief:

"(i) issue a writ, order or
direction in nature of certiorari, thereby
quashing the impugned notification i.e. the
notification dated 11th February, 2019
(Annexure P-1) and the notification dated
6th November, 2019 under Section 20E of
the Act of 1989s (Annexure P-2), being
illegal, arbitrary and is void in law.

(ii) issue a writ, order or
direction in nature of mandamus thereby
restraining the Respondents, its officers,
agents, servants etc from interfering with
the possession of the petitioners from their
existing Abadi in village - ChamravaliBoraki
and
land
falling
in
village
Hazratpur;

(iii) issue a writ or order or
direction in the nature of mandamus
thereby directing the Respondents, its
officers, agents, servants etc to carry out
the development of the "Eastern Dedicated
Freight Corridor in District Gautam-budh
Nagar in State of Uttar Pradesh" over the
acquired land, as approved by the Central
Government
in
terms
of
which
the
acquisition of land was made in terms of
Annexure P-5 (colly);

(iv) issue a writ order or
direction in the nature of mandamus
thereby directing the Respondents, its
officers,
agents,
servants
etc
from
producing the entire record pertaining to
the special railway project of "Eastern
Dedicated Freight Corridor in District
Gautam-budh Nagar in State of Uttar
Pradesh" as approved by the Central
Government for issuance of the acquisition
notification being annexed as Annexure P-5
(colly);"

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners
submits as under:

(i) By the Railways (Amendment)
Act, 2008 (Act 11 of 2008), the provisions
of Chapter-IV-A (Section 20A to 20P)
were incorporated in the principal Act, i.e.
Railways
Act,
1989.
The
aforesaid
Amendment Act has been repealed by the
Repealing Amendment Act, 2016 (No.23 of
2016) dated 09.05.2016. The impugned
notifications have been issued under
Section 20A and 20E of the Act, 1989.
Since the Amendment Act 11 of 2008 has
been repealed by Act 23 of 2016, therefore,
the provisions of Section 20A and Section
20E were not available. Consequently, the
impugned notifications have been issued
without authority of law and, therefore,
they deserve to be quashed.

(ii)
Initially,
the
railways
acquired land for "Eastern Dedicated
Freight Corridor in District Gautam Buddh
Nagar" by notification dated 24.08.2009.
At that time, the respondents left the abadi
area of the petitioners' villages ChamravaliBoraki
and
Hazaratpur
but
by
the
impugned notification some area of the
petitioners' villages has been acquired. This
cannot be done since the respondents have
1 All. Vijaypal & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
275
earlier not acquired the land in question
while issuing acquisition notification dated
24.08.2009.
Therefore,
the
impugned
notification suffers from mala fide.

4. Sri Rajnish Kumar Rai, learned
counsel for the respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4
submits as under:

(i) The land in question has been
acquired for a public purpose, i.e. Eastern
Dedicated Freight Corridor and all those
persons whose land or houses are affected
by acquisition shall get compensation in
accordance with the provisions of ChapterIV-A of the Act, 1989.

(ii) The provisions of Chapter IVA of the Act, 1989 are not affected by
repeal of the Amending Act, 2008 by the
Repealing and Amending Act, 2016, which
fact is also evident from Section 4 of the
Repealing and Amending Act, 2016.

(iii) The acquisition notification
dated 11.02.2019 was issued under Section
20A. As per provisions of Section 20B of
the Act, 1989, the petitioners or the persons
affected by acquisition notification, had
liberty to make an objection within 30 days
from the date of publication of the
notification but neither there is any
pleading in the writ petition nor any
material has been brought on record to
show that the petitioners have submitted
any objection under Section 20B. The other
impugned notification dated 06.11.2019
has been issued under Section 20E of the
Act, 1989 whereby acquisition has been
made.

(iv) The entire acquisition has
been made well in accordance with law and
only for a public purpose i.e. for
construction of Eastern Dedicated Freight
Corridor.

(v) Neither there is any mala fide
in issuing the impugned notification nor the
petitioners have placed any material on
record to establish even prima facie that
there is any mala fide on the part of the
respondents. The submission of mala fide is
wholly
baseless
and
without
any
foundation.

Discussion and Findings:-

5. We have carefully considered the
submissions of learned counsels for the
parties.

6. In Jethanand Betab vs The State
Of Delhi(Now Delhi Administration),
Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

"(5)............................................................
............................................
...........
........................
...........................................................................
.....

The substance of the aforesaid
provisions may be stated thus: The Act of
1949 inserted S. 6 (1 -A) in the Act of 1933.
The 1949 Act was repealed by the 1952 Act,
but the latter Act saved the operation of
other enactments in which the repealed
enactment has been applied, incorporated or
referred to. The first question that arises for
consideration is whether the amendments
inserted by the 1949 Act in the 1933 Act were
saved by reason of S.4 of the 1952 Act.

(6) The general object of a
repealing and amending Act is stated in
Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edition,
Vol. 31, at p. 563, thus:

"A statute Law Revision Act does
not alter the law, but simply strikes out
certain enactments which have become
unnecessary.
It
invariably
contains
elaborate provisos."

In Khuda Bux v. Manager,
Caledonian Press, A.I.R. 1954 Cal. 484,
276 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Chakravartti, C.J., neatly brings out the
purpose and scope of such Acts. The
learned Chief Justice says, at p.486:

"Such Acts have no Legislative
effect, but are designed for editorial
revision, being intended only to excise
dead matter from the statute book and to
reduce its volume. Mostly, they expurgate
amending Acts, because having imparted
the amendments to the main Acts, those
Acts have served their purpose and have
no further reason for their existence. At
times inconsistencies are also removed by
repealing and 'amending Acts. The only
object of such Acts, which in England are
called Statute Law Revision Acts, is
legislative spring-cleaning and they are not
intended to make any change in the law.
Even so, they are guarded by saving
clauses drawn with elaborate care,. . .".

It is, therefore, clear that the
main object of the 1952 Act was only to
strike out the unnecessary Acts and excise
dead matter from the statute book in order
to lighten the burden of ever increasing
spate of legislation and to remove
confusion from the public mind. The
object of the Repealing and Amending Act
of 1952 was only to expurgate the
amending Act of 1949, along with similar
Acts, which had served its purpose.

(7) The next question is whether
S.4 of the Act of 1952 saved the operation
of the amendments that had been inserted
in the Act of 1933 by the repealed Act. The
relevant part of S.4 only saved other
enactments
in
which
the
repealed
enactments
have
been
applied,
incorporated or referred to. Can it be said
that the amendments are covered by the
language of the crucial words in S.4 of the
Act
of
1952,
namely,
"applied,
incorporated or referred to". We think not.
Section 4 of the said Act is designed to
provide for a different situation, namely,
the repeal of an earlier Act which has
been applied, incorporated or referred to
in a later Act. Under that section the
repeal of the earlier Act does not affect the
subsequent Act. The said principle has
been succinctly stated in Maxwell on
Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition,
page 406:

"Where the provisions of one
statute are, by reference, incorporated in
another
and
the
earlier
statute
is
afterwards repealed the provisions so in-
corporated obviously continue in force so
far as they form part of the second
enactment."

So too, in Craies on Statute Law,
3rd Edition, the same idea is expressed in
the following words, at p. 349:

"Sometimes an Act of Parliament,
instead of expressly repeating the words of
a section contained in a former Act, merely
refers to it, and by relation applies its
provisions to some new state of things
created by the subsequent Act. In such a
case the "rule of construction is that where
a statute is incorporated by reference into a
second statute, the repeal of the first statute
by a third does not affect the second ".

The Judicial Committee in Secy.
of
State
v. Hindusthan Co-operative
Insurance Society, Ltd. 58 Ind App. 259:
(AIR 1931 PC 149), endorsed the said
principle and restated the same, at p. 267
(of Ind App): (at p.152 of AIR), thus:

"This doctrine finds expression in
a common-form section which regularly
appears in the amending and repealing
Acts which are passed from time to time in
India. The section runs: " The repeal by
this Act of any enactment shall not affect
any Act.............. in which such enactment
has been applied, incorporated or referred
to." The independent existence of the two
Acts is therefore recognized; despite the
death of the parent Act, its offspring
1 All. Vijaypal & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
277
survives in the incorporating Act. Though
no such saving clause appears in the
General Clauses Act, their Lordships think
that the principle involved is as applicable
in India as it is in this country."

It is, therefore, manifest that S.4
of the 1952 Act has no application to a
case of a later amending Act inserting new
provisions in an earlier Act, for, where an
earlier Act is amended by a later Act, it
cannot be said that the earlier Act applies,
incorporates or refers to the amending
Act. The earlier Act cannot incorporate
the later Act, but can only be amended by
it. We cannot, therefore, agree with the
view expressed by the Punjab High Court
in Mohinder Singh v. Mst. Harbhajan
Kaur, ILR (1955) Punj 625; ((S) AIR 1955
Punj 141) and in Darbara Singh v. Karnail
Kaur, 61 Pun LR 702 that S.4 of the
Repealing and Amending Act of 1952
applies to a case of repeal of an amending
Act.

11. For the aforesaid reasons,
we hold that S.6 (1 -A) of the Act
continued to be on the statute book even
after the amending Act of 1949 was
repealed by Act XLVIII of 1952, and that
it was in force when the offence was
committed by the appellant."

7. In Mohd. Junaid Ajaz and others
vs. Union of India and others, a Division
Bench of this court held as under:.

"6. The effect of these provisions
is that where any enactment has been
applied, incorporated or referred to in any
Act, the repealing provisions shall not
affect the Act in which such enactment
has been applied, incorporated or referred
to. As a result of the provisions of
Amending Act No.27 of 2013 with effect
from 1 November 2013, sub-sections (1)
and (4) of Section 83 were substituted. Subsection (1) expanded the jurisdiction of the
Waqf Tribunal. Prior to the amendment,
the jurisdiction of the Waqf Tribunal was to
determine any dispute, question or other
matter relating to a waqf or waqf property
under the Act. In addition to this, the
substituted provisions of sub-section (1)
also empower the Waqf Tribunal to
determine matters relating to eviction of
tenants or determination of rights and
obligations of a lessor and lessee in respect
of property under the Act. Moreover, under
sub-section (4), the Tribunal is, in terms of
the substituted provisions, to consist of
three members. Earlier, the Act had
contemplated a one member Tribunal
consisting of a judicial officer. Once the
amendment was notified and came into
force
on
1
November
2013,
the
amendment was incorporated into the
provisions of the parent Act. Hence, the
provisions of Section 4 of the Repealing
and Amending (Second) Act, 2015 (Act
No.19 of 2015) would stand attracted and
the repeal of the Amending Act would
have no effect on the incorporation of the
provisions of the Amending Act which had
already been effected prior to the repeal.

7. The legislature adopts the
device of repealing enactments which
amend the parent legislation with a view
to ensure that they do not crowd the
statute
book.
The
principle
which
however, emerges from a provision such
as Section 4, is that the repeal of the
amending legislation will not affect the
amendments which have already been
incorporated in the parent legislation. This
principle has also been enunciated in the
judgment
of
the
Supreme
Court
in
Jethanand Betab Vs State of Delhi. In that
case, in the Indian Wireless Telegraphy
Act, 1933, as it original stood, there was no
specific provision making the possession of
a wireless transmitter an offence. By an
278 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Amending Act, Section 6 (1-A) was inserted
by which, the possession of a wireless
transmitter was constituted as a separate
offence. The Amending Act was repealed by
a Repealing and Amending Act 1952. The
submission was that as a result, on the date
of the alleged commission of the offence the
said section was not on the statute book.
The
Repealing
and
Amending
Act
contained a provision by which, the
legislature clarified that the repeal of any
enactment by the Act shall not affect any
other enactment in which the repealed
enactment has been applied, incorporated
or referred to. The Supreme Court
explained the import of Section 4 of the
Repealing and Amending Act in the
following terms:

"6. ...

It is, therefore, clear that the
main object of the 1952 Act was only to
strike out the unnecessary Acts and excise
dead matter from the statute book in order
to lighten the burden of ever increasing
spate of legislation and to remove
confusion from the public mind. The
object of the Repealing and Amending Act
of 1952 was only to expurgate the
amending Act of 1949, along with similar
Acts, which had served its purpose."

10. Following these principles, it
is clear that once the provisions of the
amending legislation, namely, Amending
Act 27 of 2013 had been brought into force
and
the
amendments
have
been
incorporated in the provisions of the Waqf
Act, 1995, the subsequent repeal of the
amending legislation would not affect the
amendments which had already been
effected."

8. The Railways (Amendment) Act,
2008 (Act 11 of 2008) incorporated
Chapter IV-A (Sections 20A to 20P) in the
principal Act, i.e. The Railways Act, 1989.
By the Repealing Amending Act, 2016
(Act 23 of 2016), the Amendment Act,
2008 has been repealed with a saving
clause in Section 4 as under:-

"4.Savings.- The repeal by this
Act of any enactment shall not affect any
other enactment in which the repealed
enactment has been applied, incorporated
or referred to;

and this Act shall not affect the
validity, invalidity, effect or consequences
of anything already done or suffered, or
any right, title, obligation or liability
already acquired, accrued or incurred, or
any remedy or proceeding in respect
thereof, or any release or discharge of or
from any debt, penalty, obligation, liability,
claim or demand, or any indemnity already
granted, or the proof of any past act or
thing;
nor shall this Act affect any principle or
rule of law, or established jurisdiction,
form or course of pleading, practice or
procedure, or existing usage, custom,
privilege, restriction, exemption, office or
appointment, notwithstanding that the same
respectively may have been in any manner
affirmed or recognized or derived by, in or
from any enactment hereby repealed;

nor shall the repeal by this Act of
any enactment revive or restore any
jurisdiction, office, custom, liability, right,
title,
privilege,
restriction,
exemption,
usage, practice, procedure or other matter
or thing not now existing or in force."

9. The principles laid down by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jethanand
Betab (supra) and by this court in Mohd.
Junaid Azad and others (supra) and
reading of the Repealing Amendment Act,
2016 make it clear that the main object of
the Repealing Amendment Act, 2016 was
only to expurgate the Amendment Act
1 All. Vijaypal & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
279
2008 along with similar Acts, which had
served its purpose. Once the provisions of
the
amending
legislation,
i.e.
the
Amendment Act, 2008 had been brought
into force and the amendments have been
incorporated in the principal Act, i.e. the
Railways Act, 1989, the subsequent repeal
of
the
amending
legislation
by
the
Repealing Amendment Act 2016 would not
affect the amendments which had already
been effected. Thus, the first submission of
learned counsel for the petitioners that
Section 20A and 20E are not available after
the Repealing Amending Act, 2016, is
legally incorrect and baseless. Therefore,
the first submission of the learned counsel
for the petitioners is rejected.

10. The second and the last
submission of learned counsel for the
petitioners is that initially the respondents
have not acquired the land in question,
therefore, the acquisition by the subsequent
notification dated 11.02.2019 under the
Railways Act, 1989, suffers from mala fide.
This submission has no force and deserves
to be rejected. Under Section 20B of the
Act, 1989, the person affected by the
acquisition notification has the right to
make an objection within 30 days from the
date of publication of the notification but
there is nothing on record to show that the
petitioners have submitted any objection.
After about one year of the acquisition
notification, the petitioners have filed the
present writ petition and made baseless
allegation of mala fide. No evidence has
been brought on record to establish that the
impugned notification suffers from mala
fide.

Burden of Proving Mala Fide:-

11. It is well settled that the burden of
proving mala fide is on the person making
the allegations and the burden is 'very
heavy'. There is presumption of exercise of
power bonafidely and in good faith. The
allegation of mala fide are often more
easily made than made out and the very
seriousness of such allegation demands
proof of high degree of credibility. The
allegation of mala fide made by the
petitioners is wholly vague and without
proof. The petitioners have failed to
discharge the burden of proving mala fide.
Our conclusions on principles of law as
afore-noted are also supported by the law
laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Ajit Kumar Nag vs. General Manager
(PJ), Indial Oil Corpn. Ltd (Para-56) and
E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu
and another, (para-92).

12. In the case of Dhampur Sugar
(Kashipur) Ltd. vs. State of Uttaranchal
and others, (para-83), Hon'ble Supreme
Court considered the question of mala fide
and held as under:

"83.Allegations of mala fide are
serious in nature and they essentially raise
a question of fact. It is, therefore,
necessary for the person making such
allegations to supply full particulars in the
petition. If sufficient averments and
requisite materials are not on record, the
court would not make fishing or roving
inquiry. Mere assertion, vague averment
or bald statement is not enough to hold
the action to be mala fide. It must be
demonstrated by facts. Moreover, the
burden of proving mala fide is on the
person levelling such allegations and the
burden is very heavy. The charge of mala
fide is more easily made than made out.
As stated by Krishna Iyer, J. in Gulam
Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1
SCC 800 : AIR 1977 SC 448], it is the last
refuge of a losing litigant. In the case on
280 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
hand, except alleging that the policy was
altered by the Government, to extend the
benefit to respondent No. 4, no material
whatsoever has been placed on record by
the appellant. We are, therefore, unable to
uphold the contention of the learned
counsel that the impugned action is mala
fide or malicious."

13. The principles laid down in the
aforesaid case have been reiterated by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Chandra Prakash Singh and others vs.
Chairman, Purvanchal Gramin Bank
and others, (paras-15 and 16).

14. In the case of Tara Chand
Khatri vs. Municipal Corporation of
Delhi and others, (para-27), Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that the High Court
would be justified in refusing to carry on
investigation into the allegations of mala
fides if necessary particulars of the charge
making out a prima facie case are not given
in the writ petition. The burden of
establishing mala fide lies very heavily on
the person who alleges it.

15. In view of the discussion made
above, we find that the petitioners have
completely failed to prove the allegations
of mala fide. The impugned notification
does not suffer from any error of law or
mala
fide.
Therefore,
the
second
submission made by learned counsel for the
petitioners, is rejected.

16. For all the reasons afore-stated,
the writ petition is dismissed.
----------
(2021)01ILR A280
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.11.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MUNISHWAR NATH
BHANDARI, J.
THE HON'BLE PIYUSH AGRAWAL, J.

Writ C No. 17214 of 2020

Om Prakash & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Yayadeo Sharma, Deepika Sharma

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Anuj Pratap Singh, Sri Pratik J.
Nagar

(A) Civil law - Land Acquisition Act,
1894 - Section 4 - notification ,
Section 28-A - application for Redetermination
of
the
amount
of
compensation on the basis of the
award of the Court - application
under Section 28A of the Act would be
maintainable when it is submitted
within three months from the date of
the award of the Reference Court -
application
submitted
beyond
the
period given therein, would be barred
by limitation - A direction for its
consideration can be given only when
it is maintainable and not otherwise.
(Para -13,26)

Land belonging to the petitioners was
acquired - notification - award - petitioners
accepted compensation - compensation of
other land determined on higher side -
reference under Section 18 followed by the
judgment of the Civil Court and finally by the
Apex Court - application under Section 28A
of the Act for enhancement of compensation
- question for consideration - whether a
direction for enhancement of compensation
can be given in the light of Section 28A of
the Act of 1894 and for that consideration of
the application having not preferred within
three months to the award of the Court .
(Para - 2)