# Vikash Yadav v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 4 ILRA 610
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-03-26
- **Case number:** Crl. Misc. Writ Petition No. 3192 of 2022
- **Bench:** Ashwani Kumar Mishra, Rajnish Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/vikash-yadav-v-state-of-u-p-ors-48278
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Criminal Law - Constitution of India,
1950-Article
226
-
Uttar
Pradesh
Gangsters
and
Anti-Social
activities
(Prevention) Act, 1986-Section 14(1)-
rejection of representation for release of
vehicle-writ petition filed directly against
the order of attachment and rejection of
representation
without
availing
the
remedy before the court concerned is not
maintainable-Interference by the Writ
Court would not be warranted at this
stage,
inasmuch
as
orders
of
administrative authority are yet to attain
finality under the Act, 1986-At this stage,
petition is not maintainable-petitioner can
raise all legal and factual issues during
course of inquiry u/s 17 of the Act,
1986.(Para 1 to 21)

B. Attachment of property is permissible
u/s 14 of the Act by the District
Magistrate where he has reason to believe
that such property, whether movable or
immovable, has been acquired by a
gangster as a result of commissioning of
offence. Upon conducting the inquiry the
concerned court would adjudicate the
question as to whether the property is
acquired by a Gangster by commissioning
offence triable under the Act, 1986-The
determination made by the Court is then
subjected to appeal contemplated u/s 18
of the Act, 1986.(Para 1 to 20)

The writ petition is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

610 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Prosecutor was directed to file application
and, thus,there is no illegality and infirmity
in the procedure for withdrawal of the case
under Section 321 Cr.P.C.

12. In the present case, it is admitted
on record that opposite party nos. 2 and 3
have been declared juvenile by the Court of
Juvenile Justice Board. The opposite party
no.2 was declared aged about 15 years 5
months on the date of the incident, i.e., on
11.07.2012. The purpose of Act 2015 is
very relative in the present case, wherein it
is provided that the accused children should
be given friendly atmosphere and their
future interest should be paramount. Both
the children i.e. opposite party nos. 2 and 3
were school going and their future may
have been hampered, in case, criminal
cases were to be allowed for trial.

13. The judgement cited by learned
counsel for the revisionist (supra) have no
relevance in the present case. In the case
of
V.L.S.
Finance
Limited
versus
S.P.Gupta and another, the Court has
pronounced
that while dealing with
application preferred under section 321
Cr.P.C., the Public Prosecutor is required
to act in good faith. Similar view has been
expressed in case of Bairam Muralidhar
versus State of Andhra Pradesh and Ram
Narayan Yadav versus State of U.P. &
Others, wherein it is held that Public
Prosecutor has to apply his mind to the
facts of the case independently.

14. The judgment cited by learned
counsel for the revisionist are supporting
the case of the respondent nos. 2 and 3,
because in the present case, the Public
Prosecutor has presented the detailed
application
in
pursuance
of
the
Government Order dated 25.08.2014 and
the court has observed that in the interest
of justice, children should be set free so
that they may serve the society and their
career may not be hampered. There is
nothing on record which indicates that
Public Prosecutor did not apply his mind
while presenting the application, rather he
acted in good faith and opposite party nos.
2 and 3, being children, have been
rendered liberal approach by the State
Government as well as Public Prosecutor
so that they may become good citizen of
the country.

15. The aim and object of the Act of
2015 is also very important in the present
withdrawal of criminal case because the
Act has been promulgated not to treat the
children as criminal.

16. In view of above, the order passed
by the Court of Juvenile Justice Board
dated 26.03.2019 and 24.08.2021 passed by
Session Judge are perfectly alright and
needs no interference. The revision is
accordingly dismissed. No order as to
costs.
----------
(2022)04ILR A610
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.03.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA, J.
THE HON'BLE RAJNISH KUMAR, J.

Crl. Misc. Writ Petition No. 3192 of 2022

Vikash Yadav ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Shivam Shukla, Rahul Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A.
4 All. Vikash Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
611
A. Criminal Law - Constitution of India,
1950-Article
226
-
Uttar
Pradesh
Gangsters
and
Anti-Social
activities
(Prevention) Act, 1986-Section 14(1)-
rejection of representation for release of
vehicle-writ petition filed directly against
the order of attachment and rejection of
representation
without
availing
the
remedy before the court concerned is not
maintainable-Interference by the Writ
Court would not be warranted at this
stage,
inasmuch
as
orders
of
administrative authority are yet to attain
finality under the Act, 1986-At this stage,
petition is not maintainable-petitioner can
raise all legal and factual issues during
course of inquiry u/s 17 of the Act,
1986.(Para 1 to 21)

B. Attachment of property is permissible
u/s 14 of the Act by the District
Magistrate where he has reason to believe
that such property, whether movable or
immovable, has been acquired by a
gangster as a result of commissioning of
offence. Upon conducting the inquiry the
concerned court would adjudicate the
question as to whether the property is
acquired by a Gangster by commissioning
offence triable under the Act, 1986-The
determination made by the Court is then
subjected to appeal contemplated u/s 18
of the Act, 1986.(Para 1 to 20)

The writ petition is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:
1. Badan Singh Vs St. of U.P. & ors. (2001) 43
ACC

2. Afzal Begum Vs St. of U.P. (2012) 1 ACR 456

3. Whirlpool Corp. Vs Registrar of Trade Marks,
Mumbai (1998) 7 JT SC 243

4. L. Chandra Kumar Vs U.O.I. & ors. (1997)
AIR 3 SCC 261

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ashwani Kumar
Mishra, J. &
Hon'ble Rajnish Kumar, J.)

1. This Writ Petition has been filed
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India
challenging
the
orders
dated
10.9.2021 and 9.12.2021, passed by the
District Magistrate, Azamgarh in case No.
630
of
2021
(Computer
Case
No.
0202115090000630)
State
Vs.
Vikas
Yadav alias Guddu under Section 14 (1) of
the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti
Social Activities ( Prevention) Act, 1986 (
hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1986')
whereby petitioner's representation for
release of his vehicle ( Truck bearing
registration number UP 61AT 2942)
attached under Section 14 of the Act of
1986, has been rejected.

2. Arguments are advanced on behalf
of petitioner to submit that the District
Magistrate has failed to take note of
relevant materials on record and the
scheme of the Act has not been correctly
applied. It is also urged that application of
mind on part of the District Magistrate is
lacking which renders the orders impugned
otherwise wholly arbitrary. Reliance is
placed upon judgments of this Court in
Badan Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others,
2001 (43) ACC as also in Afzal Begum Vs.
State of U.P. 2012 (1) ACR 456 to submit
that the orders impugned are liable to be
quashed.

3. Learned A.G.A., on the other hand,
opposes the prayer made in the writ
petition, primarily on the ground that the
petition is not maintainable, at this stage,
inasmuch
as
the
factual
inquiry
contemplated by the Court is yet to be
undertaken and the petitioner has otherwise
not exhausted the remedies available to him
as per the Act of 1986. Attention of the
Court has been invited to Sections 14 to 18
of the Act of 1986 in order to submit that
after attachment of property is made and
612 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
representation against it is rejected (as is
the case here) the person aggrieved i.e.
petitioner herein, has the remedy available
under the Act of 1986 to approach the
Court hearing cases arising out of the Act
of 1986, for an appropriate order in the
matter, on the basis of enquiry conducted in
the matter on the issue as to whether the
property in question is acquired by a
gangster, from the proceeds of crime triable
under the Act of 1986, or not? The
determination by Court on the above
question remains subject to an appeal
contemplated under Section 18 of the Act
of 1986 and the writ petition filed directly
against the order of attachment and
rejection of representation without availing
the remedy before the Court concerned is
not maintainable. Submission thus is that
interference by the Writ Court would not be
warranted at this stage, inasmuch as orders
of administrative authority are yet to attain
finality under the Act of 1986.

4. We have heard Sri Rahul
Srivastava, advocate for the petitioner and
learned A.G.A. for the respondents and
perused the materials brought on record.

5. In order to appreciate the
arguments advanced it would be worth
referring to the statutory scheme contained
in Sections 14 to 18 of the Act of 1986,
providing for attachment and release of
properties. Attachment of property is
permissible under Section 14 of the Act of
1986 by the District Magistrate, where he
has reason to believe that such property,
whether movable or immovable, has been
acquired by a gangster as a result of
commissioning of offence triable under the
Act of 1986. The provisions of Code of
Criminal Procedure are held applicable by
virtue of sub-section (2). Sub-section (3) of
Section 14 contemplates appointment of an
Administrator for managing the property
attached under Section 14 (1) of the Act
while sub-section (4) of Section 14
provides
for
police
help
to
the
Administrator for proper and effective
administration of such property. Any
person aggrieved by attachment of property
under Section 14 is entitled to make a
representation
against
the
order
of
attachment, under sub Section (1) of
Section 15 of the Act of 1986, showing the
circumstances and the sources by which
such property was acquired to dislodge the
opinion formed by the administrative
authority that the property has been
acquired from the proceeds of crime triable
under the Act of 1986.

6. Sub-Section (2) of Section 15
provides that if the District Magistrate is
satisfied with the genuineness of the claim
made under sub Section (1), he shall
release the property from attachment to the
claimant.
However,
where
such
a
representation is not accepted or if no
representation is made, the matter is
referred
by
the
District
Magistrate
alongwith his report to the Court, having
jurisdiction to try an offence under Section
16(1) of the Act of 1986. Sub Section (2) of
section 16 of the Act of 1986 also provides
that where the District Magistrate refuses to
attach any property or has ordered for
release
of
such
property,
the
State
Government or any person aggrieved by
such refusal or release shall also have
remedy of approaching the Court for an
inquiry on the question as to whether
property, which is the subject matter of
attachment, has been acquired by proceeds
of crime, as a result of commissioning of
any offence triable under the Act of 1986.
On receipt of such reference or application,
the Court is required to fix a date for
inquiry after giving notice and for such
4 All. Vikash Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
613
purposes the Court, while conducting
inquiry will have the power of Civil Court.
Based upon the inquiry so conducted, the
concerned Court would adjudicate the
question as to whether the property is
acquired by a Gangster by commissioning
offence triable under the Act of 1986. The
determination made by the Court is then
subjected to appeal contemplated under
Section 18 of the Act of 1986.

7. The statutory scheme, noticed above,
has a specific purpose to achieve inasmuch as
the determination made by administrative
authorities about property in question having
been acquired by a gangster from proceeds of
crime, triable under the Act of 1986, is made
subject to a judicial enquiry by the competent
court, which is entrusted with the powers of
civil court to determine the factual and legal
issues, finally, subject to an appeal under
Section 18 of the Act of 1986. The object of
conferring such power upon the court is to
check arbitrary exercise of power by the
administrative authorities and to ensure that
none is deprived of his property except in
accordance with law. Since the powers of
court for undertaking such enquiry is wide
and
comprehensive
and
is
otherwise
efficacious and effective, we find no reason
not to allow the issues to be determined in the
manner stipulated in the Act of 1986 and
refrain from entertaining a petition for
judicial review under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.

8. In light of the above deliberations,
we would not be inclined to entertain the
present writ petition, at this juncture,
directly against the order of District
Magistrate and to embark upon a factual and
legal inquiry in the matter, which is yet to be
undertaken by the Court authorised to do so,
at the first instance and thereafter by the
appellate court.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has relied upon the judgment of learned
Single Judge of this Court in Badan Singh
(supra), wherein the Court proceeded to
observe as under in para-18:-

"18. Chapter XXIX of the Code of
Crimi nal Procedure, 1973 under caption
"Appeal" contains twenty three sections
running from Ss. 372 to 394. Section 372
provides that no appeal shall lie from any
judgment or order of a Criminal Court
except as provided for by this Code or by
any other law for the time being in force.
Section 373 makes provision for appeal
against order passed under S. 117 and 121,
Cr. P.C. Under S. 374 appeal lies to the
Supreme Court and the High Court against
the order of conviction. Section 375 bars
appeal against the order of conviction on
the accused admitting his guilt. Section 376
provides that no appeal shall lie in petty
cases, Under S. 377 right has been
conferred on the State Government to move
in appeal against inadequacy of sentence.
Section 378 provides for filing appeal
against the order of acquittal. Section 379
makes provision for appeal to the Supreme
Court aginst the order of the High Court
reversing acquittal to conviction. Special
right to appeal in certain cases is provided
under S. 380. Section 381 and 382
prescribe the procedure for filing of appeal
in the Court of Sesions and the manner of
hearing. The Act is a penal Statute and
Section 3 thereof prescribes punishment to
be awarded to a gangster as well as public
servant redering illegal help or support to a
gangster.
No
separate
procedure
is
prescribed to challenge the order of
conviction or acquittal passed by the
Special Judge in exercise of power
conferred by the Act. So on a conspectus of
Chapter XXIX, Cr. P.C. and Ss. 3 and 18 of
the Act what appears is that appeal would
614 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
lie against the order of conviction or
acquittal under the Act and not against the
order
of
attachment
of
the
District
Magistrate or the order of the Special Court
on the reference made by the District
Magistrate. Even assuming that Section 18
has the application and orders of the
District Magistrate and the Special Court
can be challenged by way of appeal yet I
would hold that the writ petition under Art.
226 of the Constitution is maintainable
when the very order of attachment passed
by the District Magistrate is illegal,
arbitrary and without jurisdiction. For
arriving at such conclusion, I derive
support from the decision of the Apex
Court
in Whirlpool
Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks,
Mumbai, (1998) 7 JT (SC) 243 : ((1998) 8
SCC 1 : AIR 1999 SC 22) where it is laid
down that availability of effective and
efficacious remedy will not operate as bar
to approach the High Court under Art. 226
of the Constitution in at least three
contingencies, namely where writ petition
has
been
filed
for
enforcement
of
fundamental rights, or where there has been
violation of principle of natural justice or
where the order or proceedings are without
jurisdiction
or
vires
of
an
Act
is
challenged."

10. The observations contained in the
aforesaid paragraph proceeds on two
premises; firstly, the Court has opined that
the appeal stipulated under Section 18 of
the Act of 1986 since refers to the
applicability of the provisions of ChapterXXIX of the Criminal Procedure Code,
which is limited to an order of acquittal or
conviction, therefore, no appeal would lie
against the determination made by the
judicial forum on the question as to
whether
the
property
subjected
to
attachment has been acquired by a
Gangster as a result of commissioning of an
offence triable under the Act and secondly,
the Court has observed that even if such a
remedy of appeal lies, yet the remedy
before the Writ Court would not be ousted
in view of the law laid down by the
Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation
Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai
(1998) 7 JT (SC) 243.

11. The question, in our opinion, is
not with regard to ouster of jurisdiction of
writ Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India inasmuch as it has
already been held that judicial review
therein is a basic feature of Constitution of
India and, the constitutional remedy, in that
regard, cannot be ousted under a statute
(See:- L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of
India and others, AIR (1997) 3 SCC 261).

12. The question, herein, rather is as
to whether jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India is required to be
invoked against the order of District
Magistrate, directly, when a detailed
procedure otherwise is contemplated under
the Special Act to determine issues that
arise for consideration in the present
petition?

13. Section 18 of the Act, which has
been referred to in Badan Singh (supra),
reads as under:-

"The provisions of Chapter XXIX of
the Code shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to
an appeal against any judgement or order of
a Court passed under the provisions of this
Act."

Provisions of Chapter XXIX of the
Code
are
made
applicable,
mutatis
mutandis, to an appeal against any
judgment or order of a Court passed under
the provisions of the Act of 1986. The
4 All. Vikash Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
615
applicability of Chapter XXIX primarily
refers
to
the
procedural
part
while
stipulation of appeal in the substantive part
refers to appeal being against any judgment
or order of a Court passed under the
provisions of the Act of 1986.

14. It is well settled that appeal is a
creature of statute. The statute, herein,
clearly provides for an appeal against any
judgment or order of a Court passed under
the provisions of the Act of 1986. There is
no exclusion clause in Section 18 and,
therefore, the plain language of the statute
leaves no ambiguity that appeal shall lie
against all orders or judgments of a Court
passed under the provisions of the Act of
1986.

15. We are of the considered view
that merely because the provisions of
Chapter-XXIX of the Code of Criminal
Procedure are made applicable in section
18 of the Act of 1986, it would not mean
that appeal would be restricted only to an
order of acquittal or conviction, as is
contemplated in the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Chapter XXIX APPEALS in the
Code of Criminal Procedure begins with
Section 372 Cr.P.C. as per which no appeal
shall lie from any judgment or order of a
criminal court except as provided for by in
the code or by any other law for the time
being in force. Even the code of criminal
procedure contemplates filing of appeal in
matters other than conviction and acquittal
[See: Section 458(2) Cr.P.C. in which an
appeal lies in respect of release of property
to the Court to which appeal ordinarily lie
from convictions by the Magistrate].
Section 18 in the Act of 1986 providing for
appeal is any other law providing for
appeal in terms of Section 372 of the Code.
The Act of 1986 is otherwise a special Act
and its provisions would prevail over
general law by virtue of Section 20 of the
Act of 1986 since its provisions would
prevail,
notwithstanding
anything
in
consistent therewith contained in any other
enactment.

16. Reference to Code of Criminal
Procedure
in
Section
18,
and
its
applicability
mutatis
mutandis,
must
therefore be restricted to the procedural
part. Any limitation on the scope of appeal
under Section 18 to conviction or acquittal,
by applying the provisions of ChapterXXIX of the Code otherwise would go
contrary to the plain language of Section 18
which permits filing of appeal against any
judgment or order of the Court and would
be hit by Section 20 of the Act of 1986.

17. Any order or judgment, referred to
in Section 18 would include an order for
release of property where the Court upon
inquiry under Section 17 finds that the
property was not acquired by a Gangster as
a result of commission of any offence
triable under the Act of 1986. The
determination by the Court, on the question
whether property is acquired by Gangster
as a result of an offence triable under the
Act, would be an order and, therefore, the
remedy of an appeal would clearly be
available in such circumstances. With
utmost respect, we therefore do not
subscribe to the view taken by learned
Single Judge in Badan Singh (supra) that an
appeal
would
not
lie
against
the
determination made by the competent court
on the question as to whether the property
subjected to attachment is a property
acquired by the Gangster, as a result of
commissioning of an offence triable under
the Act.

18. We may also note that offences
under the Act of 1986 are to be tried by
616 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
special courts constituted under Section 5
of the Act of 1986. By virtue of sub-section
(4) of Section 5 only a Sessions Judge or
Additional Sessions Judge in the State can
man the Special Court under the Act of
1986 and, therefore, an appeal against his
order would lie as per Chapter-XXIX of the
Code only to the High Court. Once that be
so, a writ otherwise would not be
entertained directly against the order passed
under Section 15 of the Act of 1986 by the
District Magistrate.

19. Petitioner, therefore, can get no
relief on the basis of judgment in Badan
Singh (supra) which otherwise was a case
arising out of an order passed under
Section 17 of the Act and does not
support the view that a writ would lie
directly against an order passed by the
District Magistrate attaching the property.
The objection of learned A.G.A. to the
maintainability of the present petition is,
therefore, sustained.

20. The other judgment relied upon
by the counsel for the petitioner in the
case of Afzal Begum (supra) was
delivered in an criminal appeal under
Section 18 of the Act of 1986 arising
from an order passed by the Court under
Section 17 of the Act of 1986. We are in
agreement with the reasoning assigned in
para -14 of the judgment in Afzal Begum
(supra), which is reproduced hereinafter:-

"14. The power of the Court to hold
an inquiry under section 16 on the
reference made by the District Magistrate
is not an empty formality, which has a
purpose behind it. The object behind
providing the power of judicial scrutiny
under section 16 of the Code is to check
arbitrary exercise of the power by the
District Magistrate in depriving a person
of his properties and to restore the rule of
law, therefore, a heavy duty lies on the
court to hold a thorough inquiry to find
out the truth with regard to the question,
whether the property was acquired by or
as a result of the commission of an
offence triable under the Act. The order
to be passed under section 17 of the Act
must disclose reasons and the evidence in
support of the finding of the court. The
Court is not expected to act as a post
office or mouthpiece of the State or the
District Magistrate. If a person has no
criminal history during the period the
property was acquired by him, how the
property can be held to be a property
acquired by or as a result of commission
of an offence triable under the Act is a
pivotal
question
which
has
to
be
answered by the Court. Besides the
aforesaid question, the other important
question to be considered by the Court is
whether the property which was acquired
prior to the registration of the case
against the accused under the Act or
prior to the registration of the first case
of the gang chart, can be attached by the
District Magistrate under section 14 of
the Act."

Above judgment also, in no way,
supports the petitioner's contention with
regard to entertainment of writ petition, at
this stage, against the order of the District
Magistrate.

21. For the reasons enumerated
above we decline to entertain the present
writ petition, at this stage, while leaving
it open for the petitioner to raise all legal
and factual issues during course of
inquiry under Section 17 of the Act of
1986. Writ petition, accordingly, is
summarily rejected without any order
passed as to costs.
4 All. Smt. Kailasho Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
617
----------
(2022)04ILR A617
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.04.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

First Appeal No. 546 of 1994

Smt. Kailasho Devi ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Bishnu Sahai, Sri Ashok Kumar Tripathi (Now
Ashok Tripathi), Sri B. Dayal, Sri P.K. Rajput, Sri
R.P. Singh Yadav, Sri R.P.S. Raghav, Sri R.P.S.
Yadav, Sri Sanjay Srivastava, Sri V. Sahai, Smt.
Anjali Rajput

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C., Sri Nipun Singh

A. Civil Law - Land Acquisition Act,1894 -
Section 23 - Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam
Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 - Section
28 - Land Acquisition - Compensation -
determination of market value - While
fixing the market value of the acquired
land, one is required to keep in mind the
following
factors
:
-(a)
Existing
geographical situation of the land (b)
Existing use of the land. (c) Already
available advantages, like proximity to
National or State Highway or road and/ or
developed area (d) Market value of other
land situated in the same locality/ village/
area or adjacent or very near the acquired
land - Market value can be determined on
the basis of price paid within a reasonable
time in bona fide transactions of purchase
of the lands adjacent to the lands acquired
and
possessing
similar
advantages
-
Exemplars - it is the general rule that the
highest of the exemplars, if it is satisfied,
that it is a bona fide transaction has to be
considered and accepted - It is not that
the lowest available rate amongst the
exemplars that is to be regarded as the
embodiment of a genuine and truthful
transaction (Para 17, 19)

Notification u/s 28 published on 29.09.1979 -
High Court found that the acquired land was in
the vicinity of a stadium and close to two
highways & a high yielding land, the acquired
land not located very far away from the village
abadi also - large number of exemplars showed
private sale of small portions of land varied
between Rs.100/- to Rs.200/- per square yard -
High
Court
held
appellant
entitled
to
compensation at the rate of Rs.99/- per square
yard - statutory entitlements, such as solatium,
additional compensation and interest to be
worked out accordingly (Para 19, 21)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs
Ganga Saran (Dead) through LR & ors., (2020)
14 SCC 238

2. Meerut Development Authority Through its
Secretary Vs Basheshwar Dayal (Dead) Through
L.Rs. & anr., 2013 SCC OnLine All 13200

3. Bhule Ram Vs U.O.I. & anr., (2014) 11 SCC
307

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This first appeal is directed against
a judgment and award of Mr. M.P.S. Tejan,
the then 7th Additional District Judge,
Bulandshahr
dated
24th
July,
1991
rejecting L.A.R. No.233 of 1987 and
affirming an award of the Special Land
Acquisition
Officer
(Second),
Uttar
Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, Kamla
Nagar, Agra (for short, 'the SLAO') dated
11.10.1984,
awarding
the
claimantappellant compensation at the rate of
Rs.29.08 per square yard for her land
acquired by the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam
Vikas Parishad (for short, 'the Parishad').

2. One Kallan son of Ganga Sahai had
agricultural land in Village Tanda, Pargana