# Vimal Singh v. U.O.I. & Ors - **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 1375 - **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad - **Decided:** 2026-04-10 - **Case number:** Writ C No. 14707 of 2025 - **Bench:** Siddharth Nandan - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/vimal-singh-v-u-o-i-ors-54748 - **Pages:** 5 ## Text 4 All. Vimal Singh Vs. U.O.I. & Ors. 1375 11. From the averments made in the writ petition, it appears that the petitioners are aggrieved by the illegal action of respondent Nos. 4 to 8 for illegal exercise of power. Petitioners have remedy other than writ of quo warranto as the scope of writ of quo warranto is entirely different. The illegal action of the respondents can be challenged in appropriate proceedings but not in a writ of quo warranto. 12. In view of the discussions made above, I am of the view that the writ petition is wholly misconceived and is dismissed. 13. However, it will be open for the petitioners to avail the remedy available for redressal of their grievances, and dismissal of this petition will not come in their way, in case, any proceedings are initiated by the petitioners. ---------- (2026) 4 ILRA 1375 ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.04.2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTH NANDAN, J. Writ C No. 14707 of 2025 Vimal Singh ...Petitioner Versus U.O.I. & Ors. ...Respondents ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION whether statutory birth certificate can be doubted and substituted by medical opinion. HEADNOTES Civil Law - Constitution of India - Article 226 - Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 - section - 12, 17 - Uttar Pradesh Registration of Births and Deaths Rules, 2002 - Rule - 8(3): - Writ Petition under Article 226 - filed seeking mandamus for admission in Class VI at Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya - Petitioner relied on statutory birth certificate showing date of birth - falling within eligibility criteria - respondents denied admission, based on CMO's ossification test opining i.e. age as 16 years - whether statutory birth certificate can be doubted and substituted by medical opinion - Petitioner pleaded validity of certificate under Registration of Births and Deaths Act; respondents objected citing medical report - Court finds that, ossification test is advisory with ±2 years variance, statutory certificate carries presumption of validity unless cancelled or proved forged - authorities cannot discard statutory documents on whims - denial violates Right to Education Act - held, petitioner entitled to admission - respondent no. 4 directed to admit petitioner in Class VI for session 2026-27 - respondent no. 2 is directed to circulate instructions to all Navodaya Vidyalayas to rely on statutory documents first, and medical opinion only in absence thereof - writ petition disposed of with compliance directions. (Para - 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17) WP Disposed of. (E-11) CASE LAW CITED Jaya Mala v. Home Secretary, J&K (1982) 2 SCC 538 Vishnu Alias Undrya v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 1 SCC 283 1376 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 263 LIST OF ACTS Constitution of India - Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 - Uttar Pradesh Registration of Births and Deaths Rules, 2002 LIST OF KEYWORDS Writ Petition - Birth certificate validity, ossification test, statutory presumption, school admission, Navodaya Vidyalaya, medical opinion, age determination, Class-VI Admission, PM Shri School, Gram Panchayat, Chief Medical Officer, Statutory Presumption, Right to Education. CASE ARISING FROM The denial of admission to Class-VI for the academic session 2026-27 at PM Shri School Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya, Duredi, Banda, despite the petitioner fulfilling the prospectus eligibility criteria based on his Gram Panchayat birth certificate. APPEARANCE OF PARTIES Counsel for Appellant(s): - Shri Chandra Prakash Awasthi Counsel for Respondent(s): - Shri Anant Kumar Tiwari (for respondents 1, 2 & 4), learned Standing Counsel (for respondents 3 & 5). (Delivered by Hon'ble Siddharth Nandan, J.) 1. Heard Shri Chandra Prakash Awasthi, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Anant Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1, 2 and 4 as well as learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents no. 3 and 5. 2. The present writ petition has been filed with the following prayer: "(A). Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent No.4 to admitting the petitioner in Class-VIth in PM Shri School Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya Duredi, Banda. (B) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent No.4 to keep vacant one seat in class-Vi for the petitioner in the said institution. (C). Issue any suitable writ order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case." 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the birth certificate issued by the Gram Panchayat, Bantharee, Banda specifically records the date of birth of the petitioner to be 01.07.2013. He has also relied on the prospectus for admission to Class-VI in PM Shri School Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya, wherein under the eligibility clause, more particularly in Clause 4.2, it has been mentioned that a candidate seeking admission must not be born before 01.05.2013 or after 30.07.2015. In view of the aforesaid, he submits that the date of birth of the petitioner is 01.07.2013 and the birth certificate issued by the Government has a presumption of its validity and unless the same is cancelled or the presumption is dislodged, the date of birth of the petitioner could not have been doubted. 4 All. Vimal Singh Vs. U.O.I. & Ors. 1377 4. Per contra, Shri Anant Kumar Tiwari, Advocate, relying upon Para-29 of the counter affidavit, has submitted that the Chief Medical Officer, Banda, through his letter dated 16.04.2025 though indicated that the age could be in variance of six months to one year, in the medical verification of the age of a candidate, he has given a report that the petitioner's age is about 16 year (wrongly transcribed as 15 year in Para-29). In view of the aforesaid, the petitioner could not have been given the admission. 5. On a pointed query to the learned counsel for the respondent, as to whether the birth certificate issued by the Gram Panchayat, Bantharee, as annexed with the affidavit filed along with aforesaid writ petition (Annexure-2), has been controverted, he submits on the basis of the counter affidavit that the same has not been contradicted. 6. The issue which arises for consideration before this Court is that once a document which has been issued under a statutory provision and the same being admitted, whether under the scheme which is beneficial in nature, is it open to the authorities to doubt the age of a student and seek for a medical report from the Chief Medical Officer. 7. It is trite law that the ossification test, based on which the CMO submits his report, cannot be said to be accurate and it has been considered to be having an accuracy of 2 years (Ref: Jaya Mala Vs. Home Secretary, Government of Jammu & Kashmir and Others; reported in (1982) 2 SCC 538 and Vishnu Alias Undrya Vs. State of Maharashtra; reported in (2006) 1 SCC 283). 8. In the case of Vishnu Alias Undrya (supra), while the date of birth was being determined on the basis of the available evidences, the Apex Court had opined that the date of birth registered in the municipal corporation coupled with the statement of the parents is a determining factor. The correct date of birth, where unimpeachable document, is corroborated by even an oral statement, the ossification test based opinion of medical officer, which is really of an advisory character cannot take precedence over the date of birth recorded in the municipal corporation. Even as per the doctor's opinion in the ossification test for determination of age, the age varies. 9. The Apex Court in the case of Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 263, also examined the issued and held that in Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of a child concerned is a highest rated option, in the scheme of Rule, 12(3); and in case said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon, and only in absence of such a certificate other records of date of birth can be looked into i.e. the date of birth entered into the school first attended by the child; and thereafter in absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a Corporation or a municipal authority or a Panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available then no other material whatsoever, is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child; and only in absence of any of the aforesaid document, the determination of age of a child concerned, can be on the basis of "medical opinion". 1378 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES 10. It is noteworthy that the birth certificate is issued under Section 12/17 of the Registration of Births and Deaths, Act, 1969 read with Rule 8(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Registration of Births and Deaths Rules, 2002; and as such it has the presumption of its validity under law; and at no point of time the said presumption has been dislodged by the respondent and the certificate admittedly has not been cancelled. 11. In view of the aforesaid fact, this Court is of the opinion that unless and until, a document which has been issued under a statutory provision, is either cancelled or an element of forgery is proved, it shall have a binding effect on the authorities; and it is not within the domain of the authorities concerned, to doubt the certificate issued under a statutory provision, on its own whims and fancies. 12. The said observation is also in view of the fact that the ossification test which the CMO conducts, as per the certificate itself, records that the opinion of age is based on general appearance and the respondents also admits in their counter affidavit that, there could be a variance of six month to one year in the medical verification of the age of a candidate, i.e. in Paragraph No. 29 of the counter affidavit dated 21.11.2025. 13. In view of the aforesaid, the denial by the respondent no.4 to admit the petitioner in Class-VI in PM Shri School Javahar Navodaya Vidyalaya, Duredi, Banda is not in consonance with the mandate of Right to Education Act, 2009; and accordingly the respondent no.4 is directed to admit the student (petitioner herein) in Class-VI, for the academic session 2026-27, as it is the case of the petitioner that he is not studying anywhere, without any further delay. 14. This Court finds that a number of writ petitions are being filed, on account of the rejection of the candidature solely based on a medical opinion, discarding the documents which have been issued by the competent authorities under a statutory provision; therefore, I deem it appropriate that a direction may be issued to Respondent No.2- to circulate amongst all the schools which are governed by them i.e. "Navodaya Vidyalaya", to only seek for a medical opinion, in case the following documents are not available: (i) Matriculation certificate (or equivalent) issued by the competent authorities/Board. (ii) Documents evidencing date of birth entered into the school first attended by the child, duly attested by the Principal, of the said school. (iii) Birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or a Panchayat. 15. However, the aforesaid documents are subject to their verification, if any doubt arises regarding their genuineness, for which the concerned School authorities, may send the said documents within two weeks of application, to their issuing authorities/Board, who shall be required to respond within a maximum period of one month, from the date of receipt of such request, from the School, where the child had applied for admission. 16. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the writ petition stands disposed of. 4 All. South East U.P. Power Transmission Comp. Ltd.Vs. Prescribed Authority & Ors. 1379 17. Registrar (Compliance) is directed to send a copy of this order to Respondent No.2, for necessary compliance. ---------- (2026) 4 ILRA 1379 ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.04.2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J. THE HON'BLE MRS. SWARUPAMA CHATURVEDI, J. Writ C No. 19391 of 2023 South East U.P. Power Transmission Comp. Ltd. ...Petitioner Versus Prescribed Authority & Ors. ...Respondents ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION (i) Whether IBC overrides the electricity laws and regulations, thereby barring the respondent authorities from raising demands for the pre-resolution period after the resolution plan is duly approved and implemented. (ii) Whether the respondent authorities are entitled to receive separate notice of the CIRP and whether they had information to provide them opportunity to file their claims. (iii) Whether the respondent authorities could raise demand for their statutory dues after implementation of resolution plan, while they have neither filed their claim during CIRP nor objected to the resolution plan before NCLT HEADNOTE Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - ss. 3(6), 15, 31, 238 - Electricity Act, 2003 - ss. 173, 174 - Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - Electricity dues pertaining to pre-CIRP period - Demand notices issued after approval and implementation of resolution plans - Distribution licensees sought recovery of electricity dues pertaining to the period prior to approval of the resolution plans - Contention that electricity dues being statutory in nature could not stand extinguished and that Electricity Act would prevail - Validity: Held: Section 238 of the IBC, being a subsequent legislation, contains a clear and unambiguous non obstante clause giving it primacy over all other laws in case of inconsistency. Though the Electricity Act occupies a special field and contains its own overriding provisions, the legislative intent underlying Section 238 of the IBC ensures that, in matters of insolvency, the provisions of the IBC shall prevail notwithstanding any inconsistency with the Electricity Act, including Sections 173 and 174 thereof. Court reiterated that the objective of the IBC is to ensure that the successful resolution applicant takes over the corporate debtor on a clean slate, free from past liabilities except those specifically incorporated in the resolution plan. Consequently, all claims not forming part of the approved resolution plan stand extinguished and cannot thereafter be revived or enforced. Court held that while the respondents are not precluded from exercising their statutory powers in respect of post-resolution discoveries or continuing liabilities, they cannot be permitted to enforce claims which stand