# Vinay Kumar Singh v. Suresh Chandra & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 11 ILRA 1055
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-11-28
- **Case number:** Contempt Application (Civil) No. 2555 of 2017
- **Bench:** Salil Kumar Rai
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/vinay-kumar-singh-v-suresh-chandra-ors-52612
- **Pages:** 24

## Headnote

C.S.C., S.C.

Issue for Consideration
Whether
overruling
of
Pune
Municipal
Corporation by Manoharlal only overrules the
precedential
value
of
Pune
Municipal
Corporation and does not reopen the dispute
between
the
applicant
and
the
Staterespondents and the State respondents are still
liable
to
comply
with
the
order
dated
27.07.2016 passed by this Court in Writ-C No.
62677 of 2015

Head Notes
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971-Section
12- When a case is overruled, it is only its
binding nature as a precedent that is
taken away but the lis between the
parties is still deemed to have been
settled by the overruled case. Further, an
order or decree of a Court, even if wrong,
is binding on the parties until it is set
aside by an appellate court or through
other remedies provided in law- In the
present case the special leave petition
filed against the order dated 27.07.2016
passed by this Court in Writ-C No. 62677
of 2015 was dismissed by the Supreme
Court vide its order dated 12.09.2017. No
review or recall application was filed
either for review or for recall of the order
passed by the Supreme Court. The list
between the petitioner/applicant on one
hand and the State and its authorities on
the other hand had already attained
finality- One month further time to comply
with the order dated 27.07.2016.

Held- The failure of the State-respondents in
complying with the order dated 27.07.2016
passed by this Court in Writ-C No. 62677 of
2015 amounts to willful disobedience of the
Court and amounts to contempt for which they
1056 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
may
be
liable
to
be
prosecuted
and
punished.(Para 34, 35, 36 & 40) (E-15)

Case Law Cited
Kapildeo Prasad Sah and Others Vs. State of
Bihar and Others, (1999) 7 SCC 569; Ram
Kishan Vs. Tarun Bajaj and Others, (2014) 16
SCC 204; Delhi Development Authority Vs.
Tejpal and Others, (2024) 7 SCC 433;
Government of N.C.T. of Delhi Vs. K.L. Rathi
Steels Limited and Others, (2024) 7 SCC 315;
Pune Municipal Corporation And Another Vs.
Harakchand Misirimal Solanki And Others,
(2020)
SCC
Online
SC
1471.;
Indore
Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and
Others, (2020) 8 SCC 129; Indore Development
Authority Vs. Shailendra (dead) through legal
representative and Others, (2018) 3 SCC 412;
Government of N.C.T. of Delhi and Others Vs.
Kartar Singh and Others, (2016) SCC Online SC
1525; Yogesh Neema and Others Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh and Others, (2016) 6 SCC 387;
Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association Vs.
State of Tamil Nadu and Others, (2015) 3 SCC
353; Delhi Development Authority Vs. Tejpal
and Others, (2024) 7 SCC 433; State of (NCT of
Delhi) Vs. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd., (2024) 7 SCC
315; Government of N.C.T. of Delhi and Another
Vs. BSK Realtors LLP and Another, (2024) 3 SCC
370; Pune Municipal Corporation And Another
Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki And Others,
(2014) 2 SCC 183

List of Acts
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

List of Keywords
Over ruled case; Only binding nature as
precedent taken away; lis between the parties is
still deemed to have been settled by the
overruled case; an order or decree of a Court,
even if wrong, is binding; until set aside

Case Arising From
The order dated 27.07.2016 passed by this
Court
was
not
complied
by
the
Staterespondents
and
the
plots
of
the
petitioner/applicant
were
not
released,
therefore,
the
petitioner
filed
Contempt
Application (Civil) No. 528 of 2017 before this
Court wherein this Court vide its order dated
03.02.2017 granted further time to the Staterespondents to comply with the order passed by
this Court. The State and its officers again failed
to comply with the order passed by this Court
and
did
not
release
the
land
of
the
petitioner/applicant,
hence
the
present
contempt
application
was
filed
by
the
petitioner/applicant on 27.05.2017

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for Applicant(s) : Dharmendra Kumar
Pandey, Pankaj Dubey
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : C.S.C., S.C.

## Text

_Characters 0–39,784 of 81,154. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39784 for what follows._

11 All. Vinay Kumar Singh Vs. Suresh Chandra & Ors.
1055
wreaking vengeance out of private or
personal grudge as alleged."

26. Thus, even though the offences
under Sections 504, 506 IPC may be
disclosed in the complaint, this Court can
always go behind the allegations and look
at all attending circumstances including
reading between the lines to conclude that a
genuine allegation has been made or one
which has been made only to suit the
prosecution version and enhance the
gravity of the offence.

27.
From
the
entire
facts
and
circumstances discussed above, I find that
the allegations under Sections 504 and 506
IPC have been made only to increase the
gravity of the offence.

28. Considering all the circumstances,
the material on the record and the law as
discussed above, I find that the entire
proceedings ofCriminal Case No.1837 of
2015 (State vs. Manth Lal and others),
including the Chargesheet No.106/2015
dated 30.06.2015 and cognizance order
dated 07.08.2015 passed by the Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.6,
Varanasi in Case Crime No.103/2015 under
Sections 420, 406, 504, 506 IPC, P.S.
Shivpur, District Varanasi, deserve to be
quashed and are hereby quashed.

29. The Application is allowed.
---------
(2025) 11 ILRA 1055
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 28.11.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SALIL KUMAR RAI, J.

Contempt Application (Civil) No. 2555 of 2017
Vinay Kumar Singh ...Applicant
Versus
Suresh Chandra & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Dharmendra Kumar Pandey, Pankaj Dubey

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
C.S.C., S.C.

Issue for Consideration
Whether
overruling
of
Pune
Municipal
Corporation by Manoharlal only overrules the
precedential
value
of
Pune
Municipal
Corporation and does not reopen the dispute
between
the
applicant
and
the
Staterespondents and the State respondents are still
liable
to
comply
with
the
order
dated
27.07.2016 passed by this Court in Writ-C No.
62677 of 2015

Head Notes
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971-Section
12- When a case is overruled, it is only its
binding nature as a precedent that is
taken away but the lis between the
parties is still deemed to have been
settled by the overruled case. Further, an
order or decree of a Court, even if wrong,
is binding on the parties until it is set
aside by an appellate court or through
other remedies provided in law- In the
present case the special leave petition
filed against the order dated 27.07.2016
passed by this Court in Writ-C No. 62677
of 2015 was dismissed by the Supreme
Court vide its order dated 12.09.2017. No
review or recall application was filed
either for review or for recall of the order
passed by the Supreme Court. The list
between the petitioner/applicant on one
hand and the State and its authorities on
the other hand had already attained
finality- One month further time to comply
with the order dated 27.07.2016.

Held- The failure of the State-respondents in
complying with the order dated 27.07.2016
passed by this Court in Writ-C No. 62677 of
2015 amounts to willful disobedience of the
Court and amounts to contempt for which they
1056 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
may
be
liable
to
be
prosecuted
and
punished.(Para 34, 35, 36 & 40) (E-15)

Case Law Cited
Kapildeo Prasad Sah and Others Vs. State of
Bihar and Others, (1999) 7 SCC 569; Ram
Kishan Vs. Tarun Bajaj and Others, (2014) 16
SCC 204; Delhi Development Authority Vs.
Tejpal and Others, (2024) 7 SCC 433;
Government of N.C.T. of Delhi Vs. K.L. Rathi
Steels Limited and Others, (2024) 7 SCC 315;
Pune Municipal Corporation And Another Vs.
Harakchand Misirimal Solanki And Others,
(2020)
SCC
Online
SC
1471.;
Indore
Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and
Others, (2020) 8 SCC 129; Indore Development
Authority Vs. Shailendra (dead) through legal
representative and Others, (2018) 3 SCC 412;
Government of N.C.T. of Delhi and Others Vs.
Kartar Singh and Others, (2016) SCC Online SC
1525; Yogesh Neema and Others Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh and Others, (2016) 6 SCC 387;
Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association Vs.
State of Tamil Nadu and Others, (2015) 3 SCC
353; Delhi Development Authority Vs. Tejpal
and Others, (2024) 7 SCC 433; State of (NCT of
Delhi) Vs. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd., (2024) 7 SCC
315; Government of N.C.T. of Delhi and Another
Vs. BSK Realtors LLP and Another, (2024) 3 SCC
370; Pune Municipal Corporation And Another
Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki And Others,
(2014) 2 SCC 183

List of Acts
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

List of Keywords
Over ruled case; Only binding nature as
precedent taken away; lis between the parties is
still deemed to have been settled by the
overruled case; an order or decree of a Court,
even if wrong, is binding; until set aside

Case Arising From
The order dated 27.07.2016 passed by this
Court
was
not
complied
by
the
Staterespondents
and
the
plots
of
the
petitioner/applicant
were
not
released,
therefore,
the
petitioner
filed
Contempt
Application (Civil) No. 528 of 2017 before this
Court wherein this Court vide its order dated
03.02.2017 granted further time to the Staterespondents to comply with the order passed by
this Court. The State and its officers again failed
to comply with the order passed by this Court
and
did
not
release
the
land
of
the
petitioner/applicant,
hence
the
present
contempt
application
was
filed
by
the
petitioner/applicant on 27.05.2017

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for Applicant(s) : Dharmendra Kumar
Pandey, Pankaj Dubey
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : C.S.C., S.C.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Salil Kumar Rai, J.)

1. The petitioner/applicant claims
himself to be a co-sharer and Bhumidhar
with transferable rights in Plot Nos. 240
(area 0.3880 hectare), 242M (area 0.5530
hectare), 243 (area 0.0260 hectare) and 245
(area 0.0500 hectare) in the revenue village
Bhairopur, Pargana Kewai, Tehsil Handia,
District-Allahabad.
Notification
under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (hereinafter referred to as, 'Act,
1894') for acquisition of the aforesaid plots
was
published
on
20.7.1977.
The
notification under Section 6 of the Act,
1894 was published on 03.10.1977. The
award and the supplementary award
regarding compensation for land acquired
were declared on 21.08.1982 and 22.2.1984
respectively.

2. The applicant/petitioner claims that
he has not yet been paid compensation for
the aforesaid plots and the State or its
agencies were not in actual physical
possession of the acquired plots. It is
claimed by the petitioner/applicant that he
has always been in actual and physical
possession of the acquired plots. It appears
from the pleadings and the documents
annexed with the affidavit of the parties,
and also from the previous orders of this
Court, that the plots were initially acquired
for use by the Irrigation Department. The
Irrigation Department could not utilize the
11 All. Vinay Kumar Singh Vs. Suresh Chandra & Ors.
1057
plots,
therefore,
the
plots
were
subsequently
transferred
to
Urban
Development Department for construction
of residences under Shri Kanshiram Ji
Shahri Garib Awas Yojana. It is the claim
of the petitioner/applicant that the plots
remained unutilized and compensation
was not paid to the petitioner/applicant
till the date Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013 (hereinafter referred to as, 'Act,
2013') was promulgated. The Act, 2013
came in force from 01.01.2014. It
transpires from the records and appears to
be an admitted case of the parties that
compensation due to the applicant was
deposited by the State Government in the
Government
Treasury
when
the
petitioner/applicant
refused
to
take
compensation under the Act, 1894.

3. Section 24 of the Act, 2013
provides as follows :-

"24. Land acquisition process
under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed
to have lapsed in certain cases:-(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Act, in any case of land acquisition
proceedings initiated under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894:-

(a) where no award under section
11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has
been made, then, all provisions of this Act
relating
to
the
determination
of
compensation shall apply; or

(b) where an award under said
section 11 has been made, then such
proceedings shall continue under the
provisions of the said Land Acquisition
Act, as if the said Act has not been
repealed.

(2)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in sub-section (1), in case of land
acquisition proceedings initiated under the
Land
Acquisition
Act,
1894
(1
of
1894),where an award under the said
section 11 has been made five years or
more prior to the commencement of this
Act but the physical possession of the land
has not been taken or the compensation has
not been paid the said proceedings shall be
deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate
Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate
the proceedings of such land acquisition
afresh in accordance with the provisions of
this Act: 22

Provided that where an award has
been made and compensation in respect of
a majority of land holdings has not been
deposited
in
the
account
of
the
beneficiaries,
then,
all
beneficiaries
specified in the notification for acquisition
under
section 4 of
the
said
Land
Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to
compensation in accordance with the
provisions of this Act."

4. The effect of Section 24(2) of the
Act, 2013 and when compensation can be
said to have been paid to landowners was
considered by the Supreme Court in Pune
Municipal Corporation And Another Vs.
Harakchand
Misirimal
Solanki
And
Others, (2014) 2 SCC 183. The Supreme
Court held that Section 31(2) of the Act,
1894 did not conceive revenue deposits as
valid deposits and that compensation can
be said to have been 'paid' within the
meaning of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013
when the Collector had discharged his
obligation and deposited the compensation
amount in court and made that amount
available to the interested person to be dealt
with as provided in Sections 32 and 33. The
judgement in Pune Municipal Corporation
1058 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(Supra) was delivered on 24.1.2014. The
relevant observations of the Supreme Court
are reproduced below :-

"15. Simply put, Section 31 of
the 1894 Act makes provision for
payment of compensation or deposit of
the same in the court. This provision
requires that the Collector should tender
payment of compensation as awarded by
him to the persons interested who are
entitled to compensation. If due to
happening
of
any
contingency
as
contemplated in Section 31(2), the
compensation has not been paid, the
Collector should deposit the amount of
compensation in the court to which
reference can be made under Section 18.

16. The mandatory nature of the
provision in Section 31(2) with regard to
deposit of the compensation in the court is
further fortified by the provisions contained
in Sections 32, 33 and 34. As a matter of
fact, Section 33 gives power to the court,
on an application by a person interested or
claiming an interest in such money, to pass
an order to invest the amount so deposited
in such government or other approved
securities and may direct the interest or
other proceeds of any such investment to be
accumulated and paid in such manner as it
may consider proper so that the parties
interested therein may have the benefit
therefrom as they might have had from the
land in respect whereof such money shall
have been deposited or as near thereto as
may be.

17. While enacting Section 24(2),
Parliament definitely had in its view
Section 31 of the 1894 Act. From that one
thing is clear that it did not intend to equate
the word "paid" to "offered" or "tendered".
But at the same time, we do not think that
by use of the word "paid", Parliament
intended receipt of compensation by the
landowners/persons interested. In our view,
it is not appropriate to give a literal
construction to the expression "paid" used
in this sub-section [sub-section (2) of
Section 24]. If a literal construction were to
be given, then it would amount to ignoring
procedure, mode and manner of deposit
provided in Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act
in the event of happening of any of the
contingencies contemplated therein which
may prevent the Collector from making
actual payment of compensation. We are of
the view, therefore, that for the purposes of
Section 24(2), the compensation shall be
regarded as "paid" if the compensation has
been offered to the person interested and
such compensation has been deposited in
the court where reference under Section 18
can be made on happening of any of the
contingencies contemplated under Section
31(2) of the 1894 Act. In other words, the
compensation may be said to have been
"paid" within the meaning of Section
24(2) when the Collector (or for that
matter Land Acquisition Officer) has
discharged his obligation and deposited
the amount of compensation in court and
made that amount available to the
interested person to be dealt with as
provided in Sections 32 and 33.

18. The 1894 Act being an
expropriatory legislation has to be strictly
followed. The procedure, mode and manner
for
payment
of
compensation
are
prescribed in Part V (Sections 31-34) of the
1894 Act. The Collector, with regard to the
payment of compensation, can only act in
the manner so provided. It is settled
proposition of law (classic statement of
Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad) that where a
power is given to do a certain thing in a
certain way, the thing must be done in that
11 All. Vinay Kumar Singh Vs. Suresh Chandra & Ors.
1059
way or not at all. Other methods of
performance are necessarily forbidden.

19. Now, this is admitted position
that award was made on 31.01.2008.
Notices were issued to the landowners to
receive the compensation and since they
did not receive the compensation, the
amount (Rs.27 crores) was deposited in the
government treasury. Can it be said that
deposit of the amount of compensation in
the government treasury is equivalent to
the amount of compensation paid to the
landowners/persons interested? We do
not think so. In a comparatively recent
decision, this Court in Agnelo Santimano
Fernandes, relying upon the earlier
decision in Prem Nath Kapur, has held
that the deposit of the amount of the
compensation in the State's revenue
account is of no avail and the liability of
the state to pay interest subsists till the
amount has not been deposited in court.

20. From the above, it is clear that
the award pertaining to the subject land has
been made by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer more than five years prior to the
commencement of the 2013 Act. It is also
admitted position that compensation so
awarded has neither been paid to the
landowners/persons interested nor deposited
in the court. The deposit of compensation
amount in the government treasury is of
no avail and cannot be held to be
equivalent to compensation paid to the
landowners/persons interested. We have,
therefore, no hesitation in holding that the
subject land acquisition proceedings shall
be deemed to have lapsed under Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act."

 (emphasis supplied)

5.
It
is
the
case
of
the
petitioner/applicant that in light of the
judgement
in
Pune
Municipal
Corporation
(Supra),
the
acquisition
proceedings in respect of land of the
petitioner had lapsed but despite repeated
representations to the concerned authorities
to release the plots of the petitioner as
stipulated in Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013,
no action was taken by the concerned
authorities
and
the
plots
of
the
petitioner/applicant were not released. The
petitioner/applicant, therefore, filed Writ-C
No. 62677 of 2015. The stand of the State
in the writ petition was that compensation
payable to the petitioner/applicant was
deposited in Government treasury, referred
as
revenue
deposit
because
the
petitioner/applicant had refused to receive
compensation. This Court vide its order
dated 27.07.2016 passed in the writ petition
held that the acquisition proceedings
relating to the plots of the petitioner shall
be deemed to have lapsed under Section
24(2) of the Act, 2013 and consequently
orders contrary to the aforesaid position
were quashed and the writ petition was
allowed. The operative part of the order
dated 27.07.2016 is reproduced below :-

"In the instant case admittedly the
deposit has been made in a 'revenue
deposit' which has not been deposited in a
Court as provided under Section 31(1) of
the Act. Since it is not a proper deposit and
in view of the decision of the Supreme
Court in Pune Municipal Corporation
(Supra), we have no hesitation in holding
that the acquisition proceedings shall deem
to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the
Act, 2013. The impugned order is quashed
and the writ petition is allowed."

6. The order dated 27.07.2016 passed
by this Court was not complied by the
State-respondents and the plots of the
petitioner/applicant were not released,
1060 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
therefore, the petitioner filed Contempt
Application (Civil) No. 528 of 2017 before
this Court wherein this Court vide its order
dated 03.02.2017 granted further time to
the State-respondents to comply with the
order passed by this Court. The State and
its officers again failed to comply with the
order passed by this Court and did not
release the land of the petitioner/applicant,
hence the present contempt application was
filed
by
the
petitioner/applicant
on
27.05.2017.

7. During the pendency of the present
contempt application, the State of Uttar
Pradesh
challenged
the
order
dated
27.7.2016 through Special Leave Petition
(C) No. 7116 of 2017 which was dismissed
by the Supreme Court vide its order dated
12.09.2017. In its order dated 12.09.2017,
the Supreme Court noted that it did not find
any merit in the petitions, therefore, the
petitions were being dismissed. However,
even after dismissal of the Special Leave
Petition, the opposite parties did not
comply with the order dated 27.07.2016
passed by this Court in Writ-C No. 62677
of 2015.

8. It appears from the pleadings in
the affidavits of the opposite parties and
also from the previous orders of the Court
passed in the present contempt petition
that initially the stand of the opposite
parties was that the plots were acquired
for Irrigation Department which was
responsible for payment of compensation
but
the
plots
were
subsequently
transferred to the department of Urban
Development,
Government
of
Uttar
Pradesh, Lucknow, which consequently
became responsible for compliance of the
order passed by this Court. As a result of
the aforesaid stand taken by the opposite
parties the Principal Secretary of the
Department
of
Urban
Development,
Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow
was impleaded as opposite party in the
present contempt application. In the same
context, an order dated 28.04.2022 was
passed by this Court which, after noting
the stand of the opposite parties, observed
as follows :-

"Now, the high handedness on
the part of the department is apparent
from the fact that in the affidavit filed
by the Principal Secretary, he has
stated that the compensation has to be
paid
by
the
Urban
Development
Department.

The applicant is concerned with
the compensation as per law. It is a
matter between the two departments as to
which department is liable to pay
compensation and the applicant cannot be
made to be used as a shuttle cock by two
departments and throw him to one
department to other department for
compensation.

In fact, the aforesaid conduct of
the Officers reflects mal administration
on the part of the State Government
which is not expected from the officers of
the State Government.

In such view of the fact, let opp
party no.7- Sri Turamalla Venkatesh,
Additional
Chief
Secretary,
Secretary
Irrigation Department, U.P. Government
Lucknow
and
respondent
no.8-Dr.
Rajneesh
Debey,
Additional
Chief
Secretary, Government of U.P. Urban
Development, Urban Employment and
Poverty Elimination Programme, U.P.
Lucknow
and
District
Magistrate,
Allahabad shall appear before the Court on
the next date fixed.
11 All. Vinay Kumar Singh Vs. Suresh Chandra & Ors.
1061

List this case on 6th May, 2022."

 (emphasis supplied)

9. It appears that subsequently an
assurance was given by the Chief Standing
Counsel that the dues of the applicant shall
be released within a period of one week.
The assurance was recorded in the order
dated 06.05.2022 passed by this Court. The
order dated 06.05.2022 is reproduced
below :-

"Order
on
Civil
Misc.
Impleadment Application No.9 of 2022.

The
present
impleadment
application has been filed by applicant to
implead 'Sri Anil Garg, Principal Secretary,
Irrigation Department, UP, Lucknow and
Sri Amrit Abhijat, Principal Secretary,
Urban Development, Urban Employment &
Poverty
Elimination
Programme,
UP,
Lucknow' as opposite party nos.13 & 14 in
the array of the parties.

The impleadment application is
allowed. Learned counsel for the applicant
is permitted to carry out the necessary
impleadment in the array of the parties
during the course of the day.

Order on Order-sheet.

Sri Vineet Pandey, learned Chief
Standing Counsel has informed the Court
that Sri Rajneesh Dubey, Additional Chief
Secretary, Urban Development, Urban
Employment
&
Poverty
Elimination
Programme, UP, Lucknow has talked with
the Chief Secretary, who has assured that
the entire dues of the applicant shall be
released within a period of one week from
today.

In view of the aforesaid positive
statement made by learned Chief Standing
Counsel on instructions that the entire dues
shall be released and credited in the
account of applicant within a period of one
week i.e. by 15.05.2022, the case is
adjourned.

List this case on 16.05.2022. On
which date, newly impleaded opposite
party as well as opposite parties no.7, 8 & 9
shall remain present before this Court."

10. The assurance given by the State
Council as noted in the order dated
6.5.2022 was not discharged and when the
case was again taken up by this Court, the
opposite parties changed their stand. The
opposite parties took the plea that in light
of the judgement of the Supreme Court in
Indore
Development
Authority
Vs.
Manoharlal and Others, (2020) 8 SCC 129
(hereinafter referred to as, 'Manoharlal')
which
overruled
Pune
Municipal
Corporation and held that non-deposit of
compensation in court would not result in
lapsing of land acquisition proceedings,
therefore, the order dated 27.7.2016 passed
by this Court in Writ-C No. 62677 of 2015
could not be implemented and the opposite
parties cannot be held to have disobeyed
the order passed by this Court making them
liable in contempt. The subsequent stand of
the opposite parties is contained in the
affidavit dated 25.05.2022 of the District
Magistrate, Prayagraj and the affidavit
dated 27.04.2025 filed by the Principal
Secretary, Irrigation and Water Resources
Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh,
Lucknow.

11. At this juncture, it would be
relevant
to
reproduce
the
relevant
observations of the Supreme Court in
1062 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Manoharlal overruling Pune Municipal
Corporation which are as follows :-

"365. Resultantly, the decision
rendered in Pune Municipal Corpn. is
hereby overruled and all other decisions
in which Pune Municipal Corpn. has
been followed, are also overruled. The
decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential
Assn. cannot be said to be laying down
good law, is overruled and other decisions
following the same are also overruled. In
Indore
Development
Authority
v.
Shailendra the aspect with respect to the
proviso to Section 24(2) and whether "or"
has to be read as "nor" or as "and" was not
placed for consideration. Therefore, that
decision too cannot prevail, in the light of
the discussion in the present judgment.

366. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, we answer the questions as
under:

366.1. Under the provisions of
Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not
made
as
on
1.1.2014
the
date
of
commencement of Act of 2013, there is no
lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to
be determined under the provisions of Act
of 2013.

366.2. In case the award has been
passed within the window period of five
years excluding the period covered by an
interim order of the court, then proceedings
shall continue as provided under Section
24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the Act of
1894 as if it has not been repealed.

366.3. The word "or" used in
Section 24(2) between possession and
compensation has to be read as "nor" or
as "and". The deemed lapse of land
acquisition proceedings under Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where
due to inaction of authorities for five years
or more prior to commencement of the said
Act, the possession of land has not been
taken nor compensation has been paid. In
other words, in case possession has been
taken, compensation has not been paid then
there
is
no
lapse.
Similarly,
if
compensation has been paid, possession
has not been taken then there is no lapse.

366.4. The expression "paid" in
the main part of Section 24(2) of the
2013 Act does not include a deposit of
compensation in court. The consequence
of non-deposit is provided in proviso to
Section 24(2) in case it has not been
deposited with respect to majority of land
holdings then all beneficiaries (landowners)
as on the date of notification for land
acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act
shall be entitled to compensation in
accordance with the provisions of the Act
of 2013. In case the obligation under
Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under
Section 34 of the said Act can be granted.
Non-deposit of compensation (in court)
does not result in the lapse of land
acquisition proceedings. In case of nondeposit with respect to the majority of
holdings
for
five
years
or
more,
compensation under the 2013 Act has to be
paid to the "landowners" as on the date of
notification for land acquisition under
Section 4 of the 1894 Act.

366.5. In case a person has been
tendered the compensation as provided
under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is
not open to him to claim that acquisition
has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to nonpayment or non-deposit of compensation in
court. The obligation to pay is complete by
tendering the amount under Section 31(1).
11 All. Vinay Kumar Singh Vs. Suresh Chandra & Ors.
1063
The landowners who had refused to accept
compensation or who sought reference for
higher compensation, cannot claim that the
acquisition proceedings had lapsed under
Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

366.6. The proviso to Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be treated as
part of Section 24(2), not part of Section
24(1)(b).

366.7. The mode of taking
possession under the 1894 Act and as
contemplated under Section 24(2) is by
drawing of inquest report/ memorandum.
Once award has been passed on taking
possession under Section 16 of the 1894
Act, the land vests in State there is no
divesting provided under Section 24(2) of
the 2013 Act, as once possession has been
taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).

366.8. The provisions of Section
24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of
proceedings
are
applicable
in
case
authorities have failed due to their inaction
to take possession and pay compensation
for five years or more before the 2013 Act
came into force, in a proceeding for land
acquisition
pending
with
concerned
authority as on 1-1-2014. The period of
subsistence of interim orders passed by
court has to be excluded in the computation
of five years.

366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013
Act does not give rise to new cause of
action to question the legality of concluded
proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24
applies to a proceeding pending on the date
of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-12014. It does not revive stale and timebarred claims and does not reopen
concluded
proceedings
nor
allow
landowners to question the legality of mode
of taking possession to reopen proceedings
or mode of deposit of compensation in the
treasury instead of court to invalidate
acquisition."

 (emphasis supplied)

12. It has been argued by Shri Manish
Goyal, Additional Advocate General and
Shri
A.K.
Goyal,
Additional
Chief
Standing Counsel that through Manoharlal
the Supreme Court has not only overruled
its previous judgement in Pune Municipal
Corporation but has also overruled all
other decisions which followed Pune
Municipal
Corporation.
A
judicial
decision subsequently overruled by a
Constitution Bench loses its binding effect
as the legal reasoning underpinning it is
determined to be incorrect. It has been
argued that even though the judgement of
this Court in Writ-C No. 62677 of 2015 has
not been expressly mentioned by the
Constitution
Bench,
the
order
dated
27.07.2016 stands overruled by necessary
implication
and
consequently
the
foundation of present contempt application
has been removed by the Supreme Court,
therefore, contempt proceedings cannot be
sustained on the basis of the order dated
27.07.2016 passed by this Court in Writ-C
No. 62677 of 2015. It has been further
argued that subsequent judgements of the
Supreme Court in Government of N.C.T.
of Delhi and Another Vs. BSK Realtors
LLP and Another, (2024) 3 SCC 370,
State of (NCT of Delhi) Vs. K.L. Rathi
Steels Ltd., (2024) 7 SCC 315 and Delhi
Development Authority Vs. Tejpal and
Others, (2024) 7 SCC 433 show that there
was some judicial ambiguity regarding
Section 24 of the Act, 2013 and the effect
of
overruling
Pune
Municipal
Corporation. The ambiguity creates a
situation where there can be multiple
1064 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
reasonable interpretations of the existing
law and the action of the State and its
officers in not implementing the order
passed by this Court can be justified on one
such interpretation, therefore, there is no
willful disobedience of the order passed by
this Court. It has been further argued that
contempt proceedings cannot be used for
execution or implementation of an order
passed
by
this
Court
and
the
petitioner/applicant has other remedies
available to him in law for the purpose. It
has been further argued that judicial
discipline demands that the courts and the
executive authorities follow the law laid
down by the Supreme Court and under
Article 141 of the Constitution the law
declared by the Supreme Court is binding
on all courts within the territory of India.
By virtue of Article 144 all civil and
judicial authorities in the territory of India
are obliged to act in aid of the Supreme
Court. It has been argued that the
judgement delivered by the Supreme Court
in Manoharlal is the law under Article 141
of the Constitution of India, which implies
that the law laid down in Pune Municipal
Corporation is not operative. Therefore,
under Article 144 of the Constitution of
India, the courts and the executive
authorities
are
obliged
to
act
for
enforcement of law as laid down in
Manoharlal and for the said reason the
executive or the State-authorities can not
act in compliance of the order dated
27.07.2016 passed by this Court in Writ-C
No. 62677 of 2015. It has been argued that
for the aforesaid reasons, the opposite
parties are not in contempt and the
contempt application is liable to be
dismissed. In support of their contention,
the opposite parties have relied on S.E.
Graphites (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Telangana,
(2020) 14 SCC 521, C.N. Rudramurthy
Vs. K. Barkathulla Khan, (1998) 8 SCC
275, State of Maharashtra Vs. Mana Adim
Jamat
Mandal,
(2006) 4
SCC
98,
Himangni
Enterprises
Vs.
Kamaljeet
Singh Ahluwalia, (2017) 10 SCC 706, Dr.
U.N. Bora, Ex. Chief Executive Officer
and Others Vs. Assam Roller Flour Mills
Associate and Another, (2022) 1 SCC 101,
Sushila Raje Holkar Vs. Anil Kak, (2008)
14 SCC 392, Anil Ratan Sarkar Vs. Hirak
Ghosh, (2002) 4 SCC 21, R.N. Dey Vs.
Bhgyabati Pramanik, (2000) 4 SCC 400,
Prashant Bhushan and Another in RE
(Suo Moto Contempt Petition), (2021) 3
SCC 160, Suganthi Suresh Kumar Vs.
Jagdeeshan, (2002) 2 SCC 420, Shenoy &
Co. Vs. CTO, (1985) 2 SCC 512, Director
of Settlements, A.P. Vs. M.R. Apparao,
(2002) 4 SCC 638, Union of India Vs.
Nirala Yadav, (2014) 9 SCC, Kantaru
Rajeevaru (Sabarimala Temple Review5J.)
Vs.
Indian
Young
Lawyers
Association, (2020) 2 SCC 1, Spencer and
Company
Ltd.
And
Another
Vs.
Vishwadarshan Distributors Pvt. And
Others, (1995) 1 SCC 259, Tirupati Balaji
Developers (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar,
(2004) 5 SCC 1 and Ram Kishore Vs.
State of U.P. 2012 SCC OnLine All.

13. Challenging the stand of the
opposite parties, the counsel for the
applicant has argued that the judgement of
the Supreme Court in BSK Realtors L.L.P.
(Supra) is not applicable in the present case
inasmuch as in the present case the Special
Leave Petition filed by the State against the
order of the writ Court stood dismissed on
merits and no recall or review application
either for recall or for review of the order
passed by the Supreme Court or by the
High Court had been filed nor any such
application was pending. It was further
argued that subsequent overruling of Pune
Municipal Corporation would not relieve
the State-respondents from their obligation
11 All. Vinay Kumar Singh Vs. Suresh Chandra & Ors.
1065
to comply with the order dated 27.07.2016
passed by this Court in Writ-C No. 62677
of 2015 because even an erroneous
decision by a court operates as res judicata
between the parties and the State officers
are obliged to comply with the same. It was
argued
that
when
a
judgement
is
subsequently overruled, it is only its
binding nature as a precedent that is taken
away and the lis between the parties is still
deemed to have been settled by the
overruled
case.
It
was
argued
that
overruling of Pune Municipal Corporation
by
Manoharlal
only
overrules
the
precedential value of Pune Municipal
Corporation and does not reopen the
dispute between the applicant and the
State-respondents
and
the
Staterespondents are still liable to comply with
the order dated 27.07.2016 passed by this
Court in Writ-C No. 62677 of 2015. It
was further argued that the different
orders passed by this Court (which have
been noted above) would clearly show
that
the
State-respondents
have
knowingly and willfully disobeyed the
orders of this Court and have also gone
back on their assurance given in the
Court. It was argued that for aforesaid
reasons, the State-respondents are liable
to be prosecuted and punished for
Contempt of Court. In support of his
contention the applicant/petitioner has
relied on Neelima Srivastava Vs. State of
U.P.,
(2021)
17
SCC
693,
Delhi
Development
Authority
Vs.
Tejpal,
(2024) 7 SCC 433, BSNL Vs. Union of
India,
(2006)
3
SCC
1,
Natural
Resources Allocation, In re, Special
Refernce No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1
and State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. K.L. Rathi
Steels Ltd., (2024) 7 SCC 315.

14. I have considered the submissions
of the counsel for the parties.

15. For reasons stated hereinafter I
find that the opposite parties, i.e., the
different officers of the State Government,
have knowingly and willfully disobeyed the
order of this Court and the defense of the
opposite parties that there is judicial
ambiguity regarding Section 24 of the Act,
2013 is not acceptable.

16. In order to appreciate the defense
of the opposite parties and their claim of
having acted in bona-fide confusion, it
would be appropriate to give a short
account of the developments starting from
Pune Municipal Corporation and ending
in BSK Realtors.

17. After the Act, 2013 came in force
from 1.1.2014, the phrase 'the physical
possession of the land has not been taken or
the compensation has not been paid' used
in Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 came up
for interpretation before the Supreme Court
in Pune Municipal Corporation. In Pune
Municipal
Corporation
(Supra),
the
Supreme Court held that 'paid' in Section
24(2) of the Act, 2013 did not include
'revenue deposits' and compensation can
be considered to have been paid only when
the Collector had discharged his obligation
and deposited the amount of compensation
in court and made that amount available to
the interested person to be dealt with as
provided in Sections 32 and 33 of the Act,
1894. The observations of the Supreme
Court in Pune Municipal Corporation
have already been reproduced before. After
the Pune Municipal Corporation, the
Supreme Court in Sree Balaji Nagar
Residential Association Vs. State of Tamil
Nadu and Others, (2015) 3 SCC 353,
while
considering
whether
the
land
acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to
have lapsed if the award is five years old or
more than five years old but physical
1066 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
possession of the land has not been taken
over or compensation has not been paid but
the failure to take possession or nonpayment of compensation was because of
any stay order of a Court, held that Section
24(2) of the Act, 2013 did not exclude any
period during which the land acquisition
proceedings might have remain stayed on
account of stay or injunction granted by
any court.

18. The correctness of the view taken
by the Supreme Court in Sree Balaji was
doubted by another Bench of the Supreme
Court in Yogesh Neema and Others Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh and Others,
(2016) 6 SCC 387 and the matter was
referred for decision to a larger Bench of
the Supreme Court.

19. After the judgement of the
Supreme
Court
in
Pune
Municipal
Corporation several writ petitions were
filed in different High Courts by the
landowners claiming that the acquisition
proceedings
had
lapsed
because
compensation had not been paid to them in
the
manner
as
stipulated
in
Pune
Municipal Corporation. The writ petitions
were allowed by different orders passed by
the High Courts and consequently Special
Appeals were filed before the Supreme
Court by the acquiring authorities. Some
such Special Appeals were dismissed by
the Supreme Court through its judgement
and order dated 29.11.2016 passed in
Government of N.C.T. of Delhi and
Others Vs. Kartar Singh and Others,
(2016) SCC Online SC 1525. Through its
order dated 29.11.2016, the appellants, i.e.,
the appropriating authorities were given a
period of one year to exercise their liberty
granted under Section 24(2) of the Act,
2013 for initiation of fresh acquisition
proceedings. It was further provided that
the
appropriating
authority,
if
in
possession,
shall
return
the
physical
possession of the land to the original
landowners
if
no
fresh
acquisition
proceedings were initiated within the
period of one year from the date of order of
the Supreme Court.

20. Meanwhile, the correctness of the
decision in Pune Municipal Corporation
(Supra)
was
doubted
in
Indore
Development Authority Vs. Shailendra
(dead) through legal representative and
Others, (2018) 1 SCC 733 (hereinafter
referred to as, Shailendra-I), and the
matter was referred to a larger Bench by
order dated 7.12.2017. Subsequently, in
Indore
Development
Authority
Vs.
Shailendra
(dead)
through
legal
representative and Others, (2018) 3 SCC
412 (hereinafter referred to as, ShailendraII) the judgement in Pune Municipal
Corporation was declared as per incurriam
and it was held that the decision in Sree
Balaji (Supra) was not a good law. The
decision of the Supreme Court in Sree
Balaji (Supra) was overruled and other
decisions following the judgement of the
Supreme Court in Sree Balaji (Supra), to
the extent they were in conflict with the
decision in Shailendra-II, were also
overruled. It was observed by the Supreme
Court in paragraph No.