# Vinay & Ors v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2026) 3 ILRA 202
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-03-26
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 2845 of 2023
- **Bench:** Rajesh Singh Chauhan, Indrajeet Shukla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/vinay-ors-v-state-of-u-p-54319
- **Pages:** 9

## Text

202 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2026) 3 ILRA 202
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED:LUCKNOW 26.03.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN, J.
THE HON'BLE INDRAJEET SHUKLA, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 2845 of 2023

Vinay & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Issue for consideration
Matter pertains to legality of judgment and order convicting u/s 302 IPC despite disbelieving the dying
declaration.

Headnotes
Indian Penal Code-sec. 302- a part of dying declaration -with respect to demand of dowry and cruelty -
been disbelieved by the learned trial court -principle of severability-be applied at the stage of final hearing of
appeal-deceased was admitted to the hospital by the appellants-applicants- the appellants-convict have not
been confronted with respect to dying declaration at the stage of 313 CrPC-the applicant is a lady- undergone
more than 6 years incarceration -fit case for suspension of sentence and grant of bail to the appellantapplicant-Bail Application allowed. (E-9)

Case Law Cited
1. Jumni and others Vs. State of Haryana, (2014) 3 SCC 386
2. Prem Nath and another Vs. State of Haryana reported in 2014 CRI.L.J. 1936
3. Aejaz Ahmad Sheikh Versus State of U.P. and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 913
4. Shahrukh Khan and another Versus State of U.P. reported in 2025 (130) ACC 159

List of Acts
1. Indian Penal Code, 1860
2. Dowry Prohibition Act,1961

List of Keywords
Dying declaration; dowry and cruelty; disbelieved; principle of severability; long incarceration.

Appearances of parties
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Keshav Prasad, Anju Tripathi, Ashutosh Tiwari, Jyoti Rajpoot, Shailesh Kumar
Pathak Counsel for Respondent(s) : G.A.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Indrajeet Shukla, J.)

Order on CMA No. 3 of 2023

1. Heard Sri Shailesh Kumar Pathak, learned counsel for the appellant-applicant and Sri
Umesh Verma, learned AGA for the State respondent.
3 All. Vinay & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
203

2. At the outset, learned counsel for appellant placed death certificate of appellant Ramdas,
which has been taken on record. Learned counsel for the appellant restricts prayer for bail qua
applicant Rambeti alone, thus the same is being considered and heard.

3. This is the first application for bail and suspension of sentence preferred by appellantconvict namely Rambeti, challenging impugned judgment of conviction dated July 18, 2023
rendered by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 3, Hardoi in Session Trial No. 344 of 2019 arises
out of Case Crime No. 271 of 2019, under Sections 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code having been sentenced for life imprisonment and fine with default stipulation and under
Section 316 read with Section 34 IPC for maximum term of 10 years rigorous imprisonment and
fine with default stipulation, registered at Police Station Sandila, District Hardoi.

4. The prosecution story, succinctly stated relevant and essential for disposal of instant
application is, the first informant Krishna Kumar lodged an FIR on 20th May, 2019 with the
imputation that he had solemnized the marriage of his daughter four years back to one Vinay but
in-laws were not satisfied with the dowry received, as such Vinay (husband), Ram Das (father-inlaw), Rambeti (mother-in-law), Sarvan and Ashish (brother-in-law/devar) and Meena (aunt/mausi)
were demanding additional dowry and a gold chain. Owing to non-fulfillment of dowry demand,
his daughter Pinki was set to ablaze by pouring kerosene oil on 06.05.2019. Upon inquiry, first
informant came to know that the injured was taken to hospital/CHC Sandila by accused, from
where she was referred to Civil Hospital, Lucknow. The daughter of the first informant died on
14.05.2019 and thereafter her body was subsequently subjected to post mortem.

5. The first and foremost contention raised by counsel for the applicant is that the appellantapplicant is a lady having suffered total incarceration of 6 years, 7 months and 5 days including
remission, as evident from custody certificate dated 09.02.2026 issued by the Superintendent of
Nari Bandi Niketan, Lucknow, which has been taken on record.

6. The counsel for the applicant has invited attention of this Court that the learned trial court
after framing charges under Sections 498-A, 304B, 316/34 IPC and 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act found that the charges under Sections 498A, 304-B IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act were
not established. Thus, the learned trial court acquitted the appellant-applicant and other co-accused
under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

7. Counsel for the applicant further submitted that none of the witnesses of fact, viz P.W. 1
Krishna Kumar (first informant-father of deceased), P.W.2 Kanti Devi (mother of deceased) and
P.W.3 Deepak Kumar (uncle of deceased) are ocular account of the occurrence and the only
incriminating material, which has been relied upon against the applicant, is the dying declaration of
deceased which states that the in-laws were demanding dowry and it was mother-in-law and fatherin-law who set the deceased to ablaze. It is further submitted that the brother-in-law also used to
quarrel who is still not married. The dying declaration further states that the deceased (then injured)
was admitted to the hospital by the mother-in-law (appellant), father in law and husband
(appellants). The counsel for the applicant while impeaching the dying declaration has submitted
that if the applicant had any intention to kill the deceased, she would not have admitted the
deceased (then injured) to the hospital.
204 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

8. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the part of dying declaration with respect to
demand of dowry and cruelty has already been disbelieved by the learned trial court, consequently
the applicant and other co-accused have been acquitted under Sections 498A, 304B IPC and 3/4 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act. Thus, the principle of severability cannot be applied while appreciating
the dying declaration and in this regard, he has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court
rendered in the case of Jumni and others Vs. State of Haryana and Prem Nath and another Vs.
State of Haryana reported in 2014 CRI.L.J. 1936 by laying emphasis on paragraph nos. 35 to 37
of the said judgment, which are extracted as under :-

"35. Although at law there is no difficulty in segregating the role of two sets of the
accused persons if the dying declaration is severable, the present case indicates that the role of the
accused persons cannot be segregated. This is because Asha Devi's dying declaration mentions all
the accused persons as being involved in all the events that had taken place on 4-4-1996 and 5-41996. There is no distinction made in the role of any of the accused persons and they have all been
clubbed together with regard to the harassment of Asha Devi; making plans to eliminate her; Asha
Devi being beaten up on 4-4-1996; all the accused persons preventing her from lodging a
complaint with the police; all the accused persons tying up Asha Devi with her chunni and pouring
kerosene on her and then setting her on fire. Asha Devi has referred to each one of them as being
involved in every incident on 4-4-1996 and 5-4-1996. If somewhat different roles were assigned to
at least some of the accused persons, segregation or severance could have been possible. But with
everybody being roped in for every event, it is not possible in this case to segregate or sever the
actions of one from the other.

36. Notwithstanding this, as we have seen, it is not possible to accept the involvement of
Prem Nath and Raj Bala in the events that took place on the two fateful days. Nevertheless, it is
quite possible that the other four accused were involved in beating up Asha Devi on 4-4-1996 and
setting her on fire on 5-4-1996. But, what is of equal importance is that neither the trial court nor
the High Court adverted to the crucial evidence of Puran Chand (DW 8) who stated that he saw
smoke coming out of Jagdish's tenement and children were making a noise. When he reached there,
he saw flames and smoke coming out from the ventilator of Jagdish's tenement and along with
Gurbachan, he had to break down the door of the tenement which was locked from inside and they
found Asha Devi on fire. If this statement of Puran Chand is correct, and there does not seem any
reason to doubt it since nothing was put to him in this regard in cross-examination, a case of
suicide by Asha Devi is a possibility. At this stage, it may be noted that the investigating officer
Gurdial Singh (PW 10) could not say if the bolt of the tenement was broken or not.

37. On a reading of the dying declaration it is quite clear that Asha Devi was very
disturbed on the morning of 5-4-1996 and that is why she broke her bangles in the presence of
Jumni. This may be because of the events of the previous day or her being a victim of continuous
harassment. This, coupled with a lack of response from Jumni on the morning of 5-4-1996 may
have completely frustrated Asha Devi leading her to commit suicide. Whatever be the cause of
Asha Devi being upset, the evidence of Puran Chand has not been challenged and so it cannot be
glossed over. In the face of this, it is not possible to discount the theory suggested by the learned
counsel that the case was possibly one of the suicide out of extreme frustration and not of murder."

9. Further submission advanced by counsel for the applicant is that if a dying declaration is to
be read as evidence against the applicant, it must be read in its entirety and not in parts of it, as with
3 All. Vinay & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
205
respect to demand of dowry and cruelty has been disbelieved, so at this stage hardly any credence
can be given to dying declaration for sustaining continued detention.

10. Learned counsel for the appellant/applicant led us to the statement recorded under Section
313 Cr.P.C. and emphasized that the only alleged incriminating material in the shape of alleged
dying declaration was never confronted to the convict-appellant. Non-confronting of dying
declaration at the stage of Section 313 CrPC resulted denial of an opportunity to explain the same,
hence omission caused might have prejudiced her. In support of his submission, learned counsel for
the appellant-applicant relied upon the judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of
Aejaz Ahmad Sheikh Versus State of U.P. and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 913,
the relevant paragraphs of the said judgement are quoted hereunder:-

 "21. Thus, the evidence of prosecution regarding the dying declaration was not put to the
accused in his statement under Section 313 of CrPC. The law on this aspect is well-settled. In the
case of Raj Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi)), this Court has summarised the law on his aspect.
Paragraph 22 o f the said decision reads thus:

"22. The law consistently laid down by this Court can be summarised as under:

 22.1. It is the duty of the trial court to put each material circumstance appearing in the
evidence against the accused specifically, distinctively and separately. The material circumstance
means the circumstance or the material on the basis of which the prosecution is seeking his
conviction.

22.2. The object of examination of the accused under Section 313 is to enable the
accused to explain any circumstance appearing against him in the evidence.

22.3. The Court must ordinarily eschew material circumstances not put to the accused
from consideration while dealing with the case of the particular accused.

22.4. The failure to put material circumstances to the accused amounts to a serious
irregularity. It will vitiate the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused.

22.5. If any irregularity in putting the material circumstance to the accused does not
result in failure of justice, it becomes a curable defect. However, while deciding whether the defect
can be cured, one of the considerations will be the passage of time from the date of the incident.

22.6. In case such irregularity is curable, even the appellate court can question the
accused on the material circumstance which is not put to him.

22.7. In a given case, the case can be remanded to the trial court from the stage of
recording the supplementary statement of the accused concerned under Section 313CrPC.

22.8. While deciding the question whether prejudice has been caused to the accused
because of the omission, the delay in raising the contention is only one of the several factors to be
considered." (emphasis added)
206 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

22. The prosecution has heavily relied upon the dying declarations of the two victims. As
this evidence was not put to the accused in his statement under Section 313 of the CrPC, he was
denied an opportunity to explain the same. Hence, this omission causes prejudice to him.
Therefore, the evidence of dying declaration will have to be kept out of consideration."

11. Learned counsel for the appellant/applicant in order to highlight the non-confronting of
dying declaration at the stage of recording of statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has further
relied upon the coordinate bench judgement in the case of Shahrukh Khan and another Versus
State o U.P. reported in 2025 (130) ACC 159. For ready reference relevant paragraphs of
Shahrukh Khan (supra) are quoted hereunder:-

"20. In addition to above, we also find substance in the argument of learned counsel for
the appellant, questioning the dying declaration. The following circumstances, in this regard are
noticeable.

21. The victim in her dying declaration has stated that she is carrying pregnancy of eight
months, but no such pregnancy was found in the medical evidence. What has happened to the fetus
is not known. No explanation has been put forth by the prosecution as to what happened to the
fetus if at all it was in existence. It is also a circumstance which would create some doubts on the
dying declaration. The argument that chaste Hindi words are used in the dying declaration which
are not expected of an illiterate lady also has to be kept in mind while evaluating the entire
circumstances. The emergency doctor who treated the victim was not the doctor who certified the
fitness of the victim for recording her dying declaration and the doctor who certified the fitness was
otherwise not produced in evidence. These circumstances also create difficulties in accepting the
dying declaration of the deceased.

22. Moreover, the contents of the dying declaration have not been put to the accused for
recording their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The question posed to be the accused under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. have been extensively placed before us and we find that in none of the
questions the contents of dying declaration have been specifically confronted to the accused for
recording of their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Law is settled that unless the contents of
such dying declaration are confronted to the accused the prosecution cannot be allowed to place
reliance upon the contents of such dying declaration. In that regard, the learned counsel for the
appellant has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Samsul Haque
(supra), wherein the Court has observed in para-21 and 22 as under:

"21. The most vital aspect, in our view, and what drives the nail in the coffin in the case
of the prosecution is the manner in which the court put the case to Accused 9, and the statement
recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. To say the least it is perfunctory.

22. It is trite to say that, in view of the judgments referred to by the learned Senior
Counsel, aforesaid, the incriminating material is to be put to the accused so that the accused gets a
fair chance to defend himself. This is in recognition of the principles of audi alteram partem. Apart
from the judgments referred to aforesaid by the learned Senior Counsel, we may usefully refer to
the judgment of this Court in Asraf Ali v. State of Assam : (2008) 16 SCC 328. The relevant
observations are in the following paragraphs:

21. Section 313 of the Code casts a duty on the Court to put in an enquiry or trial
questions to the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any of the circumstances
appearing in the evidence against him. It follows as necessary corollary therefrom 7 (2008) 16
3 All. Vinay & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
207
SCC 328 that each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused is
required to be put to him specifically, distinctly and separately and failure to do so amounts to a
serious irregularity vitiating trial, if it is shown that the accused was prejudiced.

22. The object of Section 313 of the Code is to establish a direct dialogue between the
Court and the accused. If a point in the evidence is important against the accused, and the
conviction is intended to be based upon it, it is right and proper that the accused should be
questioned about the matter and be given an opportunity of explaining it. Where no specific
question has been put by the trial Court on an inculpatory material in the prosecution evidence, it
would vitiate the trial. Of course, all these are subject to rider whether they have caused
miscarriage of justice or prejudice. This Court also expressed similar view in S. Harnam Singh v.
The State (AIR 1976 SC 2140), while dealing with Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1898 (corresponding to Section 313 of the Code). Non- indication of inculpatory material in its
relevant facets by the trial Court to the accused adds to vulnerability of the prosecution case.
Recording of a statement of the accused under Section 313 is not a purposeless exercise."

23. While making the aforesaid observations, this Court also referred to its earlier
judgment of the three Judge Bench in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra : (1973) 2
SCC 793, which considered the fall out of the omission to put to the accused a question on a vital
circumstance appearing against him in the prosecution evidence, and the requirement that the
accused's attention should be drawn to every inculpatory material so as to enable him to explain it.
Ordinarily, in such a situation, such material as not put to the accused must be eschewed. No
doubt, it is recognised, that where there is a perfunctory examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C.,
the matter is capable of being remitted to the trial court, with the direction to retry from the stage
at which the prosecution was closed [(1973) 2 SCC 793]."

23. Reliance is also placed upon a judgment of Division Bench of this Court in
Rameshwar Lal Chauhan (supra), wherein a coordinate Bench of this Court in para-74 has
observed as under:

73. Learned AGA also referred to the judgment of Apex Court in case of Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793, which considered the fall out of the
omission to put the accused, a question on a vital circumstance appearing against him in the
prosecution evidence, and the requirement that the accused's attention should be drawn to every
inculpatory material so as to enable him to explain it. Ordinarily, in such a situation, such material
as not put to the accused must be eschewed. No doubt, it is recognized, that where there is a
perfunctory examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., 1973, the matter is capable of being
remitted to the trail court, with the direction to retry from the stage at which the prosecution was
closed.

74. The trial court, though recorded the statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., omitted
to put questions regarding a vital circumstance to the accused during his statement. The trial court,
while convicting the accused mainly relied upon the written dying declaration Ex.Ka.-8. However,
the contents of written dying declaration were not put to the accused during his statement. It is
really a matter of concern that the trial court did not frame the question specifically putting the
incriminating material stated by deceased in her statement. Thereby, a very important
circumstance was lost. The deceased in her statement (dying declaration) stated that the accused
had poured Kerosene on her person and set her on fire. Particularly, this incriminating part of
dying declaration has not been put to the accused to get his explanation. Although, the dying
declaration Ex.Ka-8 was treated as the basis to convict the accused, the same was not put to the
208 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
accused in her statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Apparently, the accused was not
given opportunity to explain this vital circumstance. Recording of statement under Section 313 of
the Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality during trial. Section 313 Cr.P.C. prescribes the procedure to
safeguard the interest of the accused. Obviously, in the absence of seeking explanation on this vital
point, prejudice is caused to the accused.

24. Reliance is also placed upon yet another judgment of this Court in Radhey Lal
Jaiswal and others (supra), wherein a Division Bench of this Court has observed in para-72 to 74
as under:

"72. The sessions court, though recorded the statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.,
omitted to put questions regarding a vital circumstance to the accused during his statement. The
sessions court, while convicting the accused mainly relied upon the written dying declaration
Ex.Ka.-7 and Ex. Ka.6/16. However, the contents of written dying declaration were not put to the
accused during his statement. It is really a matter of concern that the sessions court did not frame
the question specifically putting the incriminating material stated by deceased in her statement.
Thereby, a very important circumstance was lost. The deceased in her statement (dying
declaration) stated that the appellants had poured Kerosene on her person and set her on fire.
Particularly, this incriminating part of dying declaration was not put to the accused to get his
explanation. Although, the dying declaration Ex.Ka-6/16 and Ex. Ka.7 were treated as the basis to
convict the accused, the same was not put to the accused in her statement recorded under Section
313 Cr.P.C. Apparently, the accused was not given opportunity to explain this vital circumstance.
Recording of statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality during trial.

73. We may note that considering the importance of statement under Section 313 of
Cr.P.C., Sub-clause (5) has been added in Section 313 by amendment which permits the court to
take help of prosecution and defence in preparing relevant questions which are put to the accused.
One of the reasons for such amendment was to see that Court should not miss putting any
incriminating circumstance to the accused while recording his statement.

74. In the result, the finding of guilt based on the written dying declaration for this
reason alone would not sustain apart from the other reasons which we have recorded above. In the
result, we hold that the dying declaration was not trustworthy and reliable."

12. The counsel for the applicant strenuously submitted that the appellant-applicant could not
have been convicted under Section 316 IPC as the prosecution had not come with any positive
evidence to establish that applicant had knowledge of the fetus/pregnancy which deceased was
carrying and in absence of any imputation with respect to knowledge of applicant, the conviction
recorded under Section 316 IPC is without any legal foundation.

13. The counsel for the applicant lastly submitted that the applicant being a lady having
suffered long incarceration and was on bail during the trial, which she did not misuse. Thus,
applicant may be admitted to bail and the sentence awarded may also be suspended.

14. Per contra, learned AGA submitted that the dying declaration has rightly been given
credence by learned trial court and an active role has been attributed to the applicant in the dying
declaration, as such despite being lady, she does not deserve any sympathy and considering the
overall fabric of the crime, the instant bail application deserves to be rejected."
3 All. Vinay & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
209

15. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, it comes out
that a part of dying declaration with respect to demand of dowry and cruelty has been
disbelieved by the learned trial court as such even if principle of severability is to be
applied that would be done at the stage of final hearing of appeal while entire evidence
would be reappreciated and considering the fact that the deceased was admitted to the
hospital by the appellants-applicants, the appellants-convict have not been confronted with
respect to dying declaration at the stage of 313 CrPC, the applicant is a lady and was
admitted on bail which she did not misuse, she has undergone more than 6 years
incarceration and the demand of dowry and cruelty have not been established as projected
in dying declaration, this Court finds it is a fit case for suspension of sentence and grant of
bail to the appellant-applicant.

16. Accordingly, the instant bail application filed on behalf of the appellant-applicant Rambeti
is allowed.

17. Let the appellant-applicant Rambeti be released on bail in the aforesaid case crime number
during the pendency of the appeal on her furnishing a personal bond and two reliable sureties each
in the like amount to the satisfaction of the court concerned subject to the following conditions :-

(i) The appellant-applicant shall cooperate in the early disposal of appeal without seeking
unnecessary adjournment.

(ii) The appellant-applicant shall not indulge in any criminal activity or commission of any
crime after being released on bail.

18. It is made clear that during bail, if the appellant-applicant commit any offence, the
prosecution will be at liberty to file an application for cancellation of bail.

19. As soon as personal bond is furnished, photocopy of the same is directed to be transmitted
to this Court forthwith by the Trial Court concerned to be kept on record of this appeal.

20. The jail sentence of the appellant-applicant shall remain suspended. 50% of the amount of
fine awarded shall be deposited by the appellant-applicant within four weeks from the date of
release and remaining 50% shall remain stayed.

Order on Appeal :-

21. List in the month of July, 2026.

22. In the meantime, Office is directed to prepare the paper book and copies thereof be
provided to the parties counsel on payment of usual charges.

23. Let a report be submitted by learned C.J.M., Hardoi, in respect of the factum of the death
of Ramdas, the accused/appellant in the present appeal on or before the next date of listing.
----------
210 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2026) 3 ILRA 210
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD-11.03.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AVNISH SAXENA, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 2868 of 1986

Rajendra Kumar ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Issue for consideration
Matter pertains to legality of judgment and order convicting the Appellant for offence under Sections 332 and
333 IPC.

Headnotes
U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 ; The U.P. State Road Transport Corporation
Rules, 1972; Indian Penal Code-Admitted fact not taken into consideration by the trial court- that the
three witnesses of fact have not produced any authority (per Rule 23) that they were authorized to stop and
check the roadways UPSRTC Bus No.UST5238- wherein the accused was the conductor.- trial court has
presumed that the informants are the public servants and therefore it is obvious that they were discharging
their duties- entire evidence on this point is presumptive in nature- assuming the informants were discharging
their duties- the Rule of 1972 provides the phrase 'authorized employee' in Rules 23 and 24-the prosecution
has failed to prove that the public servants, the three traffic inspectors, were discharging their official duty as
such- the accused-appellant cannot be held responsible for causing the injuries on the person of Nathu Ram
and Budhi Mal-the medical and ocular testimonies are inconsistent in nature- the appellant is held not guilty
for offence -liable to be acquitted. Appeal allowed. (E-9)

Case Law Cited
1. D. Chattaiah and another Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1979) 1 SCC 128
2. Nathi Lal Vs. State of U.P., 1990 Supp SCC 145
3. Jitendra Kumar Mishra alias Jittu Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2024) 2 SCC 666

List of Acts
1. Indian Penal Code, 1860
2. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950
3. The U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Rules, 1972

List of Keywords
Public servants; presumptive in nature; grievous hurt to a public servant to deter him from discharging his
duty.

Appearances of parties
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Counsel for Appellant(s) : Anurag Upadhyay, G.S Saxena, Ravinath Tiwari
Counsel for Respondent(s) : A.G.A.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Avnish Saxena, J.)