# Vinod Kumar Revisionist v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 1933
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-09
- **Case number:** Criminal Revision No. 131 of 2023
- **Bench:** Saurabh Lavania
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/vinod-kumar-revisionist-v-state-of-u-p-anr-54445
- **Pages:** 10

## Text

4 All. Vinod Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1933
insignificance and do not merit adjudication. It is well settled that where the substantive
action itself is contrary to the governing statute, this Court would be loath to exercise its
discretionary writ jurisdiction to grant relief on technical or procedural grounds.

44. Ultimately, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appointments of the
petitioners have been made under the provisions of the Rules of 1978, which are wholly
inapplicable to the institution in question. Upon its upgradation, the institution is governed by the
provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 read with the Rules of 1982, and any
appointment was required to be made strictly in accordance therewith.

45. This position stands settled by the judgment of this Court in Manju Awasthi v. State
of U.P. reported in 2013 (3) ADJ 64 (DB), wherein it has been categorically held that the
applicability of recruitment rules is dependent upon the status of the institution on the date of
appointment.

46. Thus, in light of the settled proposition of law, the entire proceedings culminating in
the appointments of the petitioners stand vitiated in the eyes of law, being dehors the applicable
statutory framework.

47. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that no
illegality or infirmity can be said to exist in the impugned orders warranting interference under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

48. Accordingly, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, is liable to be and is hereby
dismissed. No order as to costs.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 1933
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 09.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH LAVANIA, J.

Criminal Revision No. 131 of 2023

Vinod Kumar ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Issues for Consideration
(i) Whether a criminal revision under Section 102 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2015 is maintainable against an order of the Juvenile Justice Board when the statutory remedy of appeal
under Section 101 of the Act has not been availed?
(ii) Whether the decision of the Supreme Court in Child in Conflict with Law through his Mother v. State of
Karnataka permits bypassing the appellate remedy under Section 101 of the Act in every case?
1934 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(iii) Whether the order impugned in the revision was a non est order so as to justify direct invocation of
revisional jurisdiction under Section 102 of the Act?

Headnotes
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 - Ss. 101 and 102 - Criminal
Revision - Maintainability - Statutory remedy of appeal - Bypassing appellate remedy -
Permissibility.

HELD: Where the Act of 2015 provides a statutory remedy of appeal under Section 101 against an order
passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, the revisional jurisdiction under Section 102 ordinarily cannot be invoked
by bypassing such remedy. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, a revision filed directly before the
High Court without exhausting the statutory appellate remedy is not maintainable. The impugned order ought
to have been challenged before the appellate authority constituted under Section 101 of the Act. [Paras 9, 10,
14 and 15]
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 - Ss. 101 and 102 - Revision -
Exception carved out by Supreme Court - Non est order - Scope.

HELD: The observations of the Supreme Court in Child in Conflict with Law through his Mother v. State of
Karnataka do not lay down that a revision under Section 102 is maintainable in every case notwithstanding
the availability of an appeal. The exception recognised therein was confined to a situation where the
impugned order was non est in law. Unless the order sought to be challenged is shown to be non est, the
statutory remedy of appeal cannot be bypassed by directly invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the High
Court. [Paras 6 to 8 and 11]

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 - Ss. 101 and 102 - Non est order
- Distinction between void order and illegal or erroneous order - Effect.

HELD: A non est order is one passed without inherent jurisdiction and can be ignored or challenged at any
stage. However, an order which is merely erroneous, irregular, illegal or passed in an improper exercise of
jurisdiction cannot be equated with a non est order. Such defects are capable of correction by the appellate
authority provided under the statute. Since the impugned order had been passed by the Juvenile Justice
Board in exercise of jurisdiction vested in it under the Act of 2015, it could not be treated as a non est order
merely because its correctness was disputed. [Paras 11 to 15]

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 - Ss. 101 and
102 - Revision - Alternative statutory remedy available - Merits not examined.

HELD: Once the Court found that the revision itself was not maintainable in view of the availability of the
statutory remedy of appeal, there was no occasion to examine the merits of the order passed by the Juvenile
Justice Board. Liberty was granted to the revisionist to avail the remedy of appeal under Section 101 of the
Act of 2015 in accordance with law. [Paras 14 and 15]

Revision dismissed with liberty to the revisionist to avail the statutory remedy of appeal under
Section 101 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. (E-14)

Case Law Cited
Child in Conflict with Law through his Mother v. State of Karnataka and Another, (2024) 8 SCC
473 - relied on; Smt. Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad and Others, (1990) 1 SCC 207 - relied on;
Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 535 - referred to.; Ningawwa v. Byrappa,
(1968) 2 SCR 797 : AIR 1968 SC 956 - referred to; Foster v. Mackinnon, (1869) LR 4 CP 704 -
referred to; Saunders v. Anglia Building Society, (1971) AC 1004 - referred to.

List of Acts / Statutes
4 All. Vinod Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1935
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Indian Penal Code, 1860; Protection of Children
from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

List of Keywords
Juvenile Justice Board; Appeal; Criminal Revision; Alternative remedy; Maintainability; Non est order; Illegal
order; Erroneous order; Revisional jurisdiction; Statutory appeal; Juvenile Justice Act.

Case Arising From
Judgment and decree dated 15.11.2025 passed by the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division)/FTC, Bulandshahr
in O.S. No. 863 of 2020, Rajesh Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar and Others.

Appearance for Parties
For Appellant: Sri Madhulika Yadav and Sri Balkeshwar Srivastava
For Respondent: Sri S.P. Tiwari, learned A.G.A. and Sri Adarsh Kumar Maurya..

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania, J.)

1. Heard Sri Balkeshwar Srivastava, learned Counsel for the revisionist, Sri Adarsh Kumar
Maurya, learned Counsel for the side opposite, whose name inadvertently could not be mentioned
when the order dated 12.03.2026 was reserved, Sri S.P.Tiwari, learned A.G.A. appearing for the
State and perused the records.

2. This criminal revision under Section 102 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015 (in short "Act of 2015") has been filed against the order dated 25.01.2023,
passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, Lakhimpur Kheri (in short 'JJB'), arising out of Case Crime
No. 139 of 2014 under Sections 302, 201, 377 IPC and 3/4 POCSO Act, Police Station-Paliya,
District-Kheri.

3. Learned A.G.A. has raised preliminary objections regarding maintainability/entertainability
of the present 'Revision' by stating that revisionist has bypassed the remedy of 'Appeal' provided
under Section 101 of the Act of 2015 and as such the present revision be dismissed with liberty to
the revisionist to avail, the statutory remedy of 'Appeal' provided under Section 101 of the Act of
2015.

4. The availability of statutory remedy i.e filing of an 'Appeal' against the order under
challenge dated 25.01.2023 passed by JJB Kheri, arising out of Case Crime No. 139 of 2014, under
Sections 302, 201, 377 IPC and 3/4 POCSO Act, Police Station-Paliya, District-Kheri, has not been
refuted.

5. It is stated that instant 'Revision' under Section 102 of the Act of 2015 is entertainable and
maintainable, therefore, the order be passed on merits.

6.On the issue of entertainability and maintainability of the instant 'Revision', the reference has
been made to paragraph no(s). 46 to 48 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Child in Conflict with Law through his mother Versus State of Karnataka and another,
reported in (2024) 8 SCC 473. Paragraphs, referred, are extracted hereunder:-
1936 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"46. Another argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant was that there being
remedy of appeal available with the complainant against the order dated 12-4-2024 vide which two
members of the Board had directed inquiry into the offence allegedly committed by CCL by the
Board. In our opinion, even though such a remedy may be available to the complainant which
should normally be availed, but what is evident from the facts of the case is that there was an
earlier order passed by the Principal Magistrate on 5-4-2022, which was final regarding conduct of
trial of CCL by the Children's Court, still subsequently two members of the Board without the
Principal Magistrate being there passed an order on 12-4-2022 directing inquiry into the offence by
the Board. In fact, the subsequent order was totally non est. Even if in such a situation the aforesaid
order was not challenged by availing the remedy of appeal, in our opinion the revision under
Section 102 of the Act cannot be said to be not maintainable.

47. Firstly, there is no time-limit provided for filing a revision therein, and secondly it could
be on an application filed by any of the parties. The High Court can exercise its revisional powers
for satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any such order and may pass such order in
relation thereto as it thinks fit. Besides the legality of the order dated 12-4-2022, the case in hand is
such where even the propriety of the proceeding was also in question. The proceedings before the
Board could not continue after the passing of the order dated 5-4-2022, in terms of Section 7(4) of
the Act.

48. Hence, non-availment of the remedy of appeal by the complainant in such a situation
cannot be held to be fatal. We may also add here that even the appellant could have availed the
remedy of appeal against the order dated 5-4-2022, but he thought of continuing before the Board
in a non est proceeding."

7. In response of aforesaid, it is stated that a perusal of paragraphs referred i.e. paragraph
no(s). 46 to 48 of the report, would indicate that the Hon'ble Apex Court declined to interfere in the
order dated 15.11.2023 passed by High Court in exercise of power under Section 102 of the Act of
2015, on the ground to the effect that without availing the statutory remedy of 'Appeal' available
under Section 101 of the Act of 2015 against the order dated 12.04.2022 passed by JJB Kheri, the
'Revision' in terms of Section 102 of the Act of 2015 was filed, for the reason that the order dated
12.04.2022 was a 'Non-est' order.

8. It is also stated that instant case the order dated 25.01.2023 passed by JJB, challenged in the
instant 'Revision' is not a 'Non-est' order and therefore, the judgment on which reliance has been
placed would not apply in the present case.

9. Considered the aforesaid and perused the record.

10. The order impugned dated 25.01.2025 ought to have been impeached by way of an
'Appeal' provided under Section 101 of the Act of 2015 and without availing the remedy of 'Appeal'
the instant 'Revision' has been filed under Section 102 of the Act of 2015 challenging the order
dated 25.01.2023.
4 All. Vinod Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1937

11. It is settled principle of law that a 'Non-est' order can be ignored and can be
questioned/impeached at any stage or/and in any proceedings.

12. On the aforesaid aspects of the case, this Court finds it appropriate to refer the relevant
paragraphs of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Smt. Bismillah Versus
Janeshwar Prasad and Others, (1990) 1 SCC 207, which reads as under:-

"7. It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily
inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. The
provisions of a law which seek to oust the jurisdiction of civil court need to be strictly construed.
Section 331 of the Act has been the subject of series of pronouncements of the High Court as to the
circumstances and the nature of the suits in which its exclusionary effect operates. Distinction was
sought to be drawn between the class of cases where the binding effect of a deed had had to be got
rid of by an appropriate adjudication on the one hand and the class of cases in which a transaction
could be said to be void in law where what the law holds to be void, there is nothing to cancel or set
aside on the other. In the former case, it was held, a suit was cognisable by the civil court while in
the latter, it was not, it being open to the statutory authority to take note of the legal incidents of
what was non est.

8. In the instant case, the High Court has construed, in our opinion not quite correctly,
appellant's pleadings to amount to a plea of nullity of the sales and has held that the prayer for
cancellation of the sale deeds was 'simply illusory' and that such a relief was neither necessary nor
appropriate in the context of a plea of nullity. The High Court has further held that the relief of
possession, though appearing to be a consequential relief, was really the main relief and would fall
within the statutory jurisdiction.

9. It is true that the question of jurisdiction depends upon the allegations in the plaint and not
the merits or the result of the suit. However, in order to determine the precise nature of the action,
the pleadings should be taken as a whole. If as, indeed, is done by the High Court the expression
'void' occurring in the plaint as descriptive of the legal status of the sales is made the constant and
determinate and what is implicit in the need for cancellation as the variable and as inappropriate to
a plea of nullity, equally, converse could be the position. The real point is not the stray or loose
expressions which abound in inartistically drafted plaints, but the real substance of the case
gathered by construing pleadings as a whole. It is said "Parties do not have the farsight of prophets
and their lawyers the draftsmanship of a Chalmers".

10. Indeed in Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 535 : (1974) 1 SCR 339]
this Court, dealing with the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of the Holdings Act, 1954 where
the provision excluding the civil court's jurisdiction is even wider, has had occasion to observe:
(SCR p.342 : SCC p.538, para 5)

'....but, where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting
it aside or its cancellation, it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have no power to
cancel the deed, and, therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled
by a court having the power to cancel it...."
1938 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(emphasis supplied)

11. The assumption underlying the reasoning of the High Court is that if the action had really
been one based on the need for the cancellation of the deeds, without which possession could not
be granted, the civil court would have had jurisdiction. The cause of action in the appellant's suit
does admit of being brought within this class of cases.

12. The common law defence of non est factum to actions on specialities in its origin was
available where an illiterate person, to whom the contents of a deed had been wrongly read,
executed it under a mistake as to its nature and contents, he could say that it was not his deed at all.
In its modern application, the doctrine has been extended to cases other than those of illiteracy and
to other contracts in writing. In most of the cases in which this defence was pleaded the mistake
was induced by fraud; but that was not, perhaps, a necessary factor, as the transaction is "invalid
not merely on the ground of fraud, where fraud exists, but on the ground that the mind of the signor
did not accompany the signature; in other words, that he never intended to sign, and therefore, in
contemplation of law never did sign, the contract to which his name is appended" [ Chitty on
Contracts, 25th edn., p. 341].

13. Authorities drew a distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of
the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. It was held that the
defence was available only if the mistake was as to the very nature or character of the transaction.

14. In Foster v. Mackinnon [(1869) LR 4 CP 704 : 38 LJCP 310] , Mackinnon, the defendant
was induced to endorse a bill of exchange on the false representation that it was a guarantee similar
to one he had signed on a previous occasion. He was held not liable when sued even by an innocent
endorsee of the bill. Byles, J. said:

"... The defendant never intended to sign that contract or any such contract. He never intended
to put his name to any instrument that then was or thereafter might become negotiable. He was
deceived, not merely as to the legal effect, but as to the 'actual contents' of the instrument."

15. This decision was referred to with approval by this Court in Ningawwa v. Byrappa [(1968)
2 SCR 797 : AIR 1968 SC 956] . It was observed: (SCR pp. 800-01)

"It is well established that a contract or other transaction induced or tainted by fraud is not
void, but only voidable at the option of the party defrauded. Until it is avoided, the transaction is
valid, so that third parties without notice of the fraud may in the meantime acquire rights and
interests in the matter which they may enforce against the party defrauded."

This would be a voidable transaction. But the position was held to be different if the fraud or
misrepresentation related to the character of the document. This court held: (SCR p. 801)

"The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to
the contents of the document but as to its character. The authorities make a clear distinction
between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent
4 All. Vinod Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1939
misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. With reference to the former, it has been held that the
transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable."

(emphasis supplied)

However the House of Lords in Saunders v. Anglia Building Society [1971 AC 1004 : (1970)
3 All ER 961] reviewed the law and held that the essential features of the doctrine, as expressed by
Byles, J. in Foster v. Mackinnon [ Chitty on Contracts, 25th edn., p. 341] , had been correctly
stated. Lord Reid, however, observed: (AC headnote at p. 1005)

"The plea of non est factum could not be available to anyone who signed without taking the
trouble to find out at least the general effect of the document. Nor could it be available to a person
whose mistake was really a mistake as to the legal effect of the document. There must be a radical
or fundamental difference between what he signed and what he thought he was signing."

16. However the distinction based on the character of the document and the contents of the
document was considered unsatisfactory. The distinction based on the character and contents of a
document is not without its difficulties in its practical application; for, in conceivable cases the
'character' of the document may itself depend on its contents. The difficulty is to be resolved on a
case by case basis on the facts of each case and not by appealing to any principle of general validity
applicable to all cases. Chitty on Contracts ["General Principles" 25th edn, para 343, page 194] has
this observation to make on Saunders decision [(1968) 2 SCR 797 : AIR 1968 SC 956] :

"....It was stressed that the defence of non est factum was not lightly to be allowed where a
person of full age and capacity had signed a written document embodying contractual terms. But it
was nevertheless held that in exceptional circumstances the plea was available so long as the person
signing the document had made a fundamental mistake as to the character or effect of the
document. Their Lordships appear to have concentrated on the disparity between the effect of the
document actually signed, and the document as it was believed to be (rather than on the nature of
the mistake) stressing that the disparity must be "radical", "essential", "fundamental", or "very
substantial."

In the instant case, prima facie appellant seems to proceed on the premises that she cannot
ignore the sales but that the sales require to be set aside before she is entitled to possession and
other consequential reliefs.

17. Even in cases where the transaction was assailed as void, the High Court of Allahabad in
Indra Dev v. Ram Pyari [1982 All LJ 1308 : 1982 (8) ALR 517 (All HC)] held the civil court's
jurisdiction not barred. The facts in that case were that: (All LJ p. 1309)

"... plaintiff-appellants claimed a decree for cancellation of the sale deed dated July 10, 1969
executed by Smt. Ram Pyari Devi, mother of appellant 1 Indra Deo, minor, in favour of Bramha
Nand respondent 1 in respect of certain agricultural plots. The cancellation was sought on the
ground that Smt. Ram Pyari had no interest in the property in suit and, therefore, she was not
entitled to execute the sale deed."
1940 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

In that case the learned District Judge had held that the allegations made in the plaint
amounted to saying that the sale deed was a void document. The civil court was held to have no
jurisdiction.

18. The High Court, allowing the plaintiff's appeal and reversing the finding of the District
Judge, held: (All LJ pp. 1313 and 1314)

"A survey of the above decisions shows that the consistent view of this Court is that the cause
of action in a suit for cancellation of sale deed is not the denial of plaintiff's title which may be said
to be implicit in the execution of the sale deed by the defendant but is the execution of the deed
itself."

.... Therefore, under the provisions of the Act itself, the jurisdiction of the civil court would
not be barred when declaration is sought against a person who has transferred agricultural property
which the plaintiff claims to be his. Section 229-B does not contemplate all kinds of declaratory
suits. It deals with declaratory suits of the specific type hereinbefore mentioned."

This case has since been approved by a Full Bench of that Court in Ram Padarath v. Second
ADJ, Sultanpur [(1989) RD 21 (All) (FB)] . The Full Bench held:

"We are of the view that the case of Indra Dev v. Smt. Ram Pyari [1971 AC 1004 : (1970) 3
All ER 961] , has been correctly decided and the said decision requires no consideration, while the
Division Bench case, Dr. Ayodhya Prasad v. Gangotri Prasad [1981 AWC 469 (DB)] is regarding
the jurisdiction of consolidation authorities, but so far as it holds that suit in respect of void
document will lie in the revenue court it does not lay down a good law. Suit or action for
cancellation of void document will generally lie in the civil court and a party cannot be deprived of
his right getting this relief permissible under law except when a declaration of right or status and a
tenure holder is necessarily needed in which event relief for cancellation will be surplusage and
redundant. A recorded tenure holder having prima facie title in his favour can hardly be directed to
approach the revenue court in respect of seeking relief for cancellation of a void document which
made him to approach the court of law and in such case he can also claim ancillary relief even
though the same can be granted by the revenue court."

In any view of the matter, the present action would be covered by the pronouncement of the
Full Bench. It is not necessary to go into the correctness of the view of the Full Bench as its
correctness was not assailed before us."

13. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Deepak Agro Foods Versus State of Rajasthan and others reported in (2008) 7SCC 748.

"17. All irregular or erroneous or even illegal orders cannot be held to be null and void as
there is a fine distinction between the orders which are null and void and orders which are irregular,
wrong or illegal. Where an authority making order lacks inherent jurisdiction, such order would be
without jurisdiction, null,non est and void ab initio as defect of jurisdiction of an authority goes to
the root of the matter and strikes at its very authority to pass any order and such a defect cannot be
4 All. Vinod Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1941
cured even by consent of the parties. (See Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [AIR 1954 SC 340] .)
However, exercise of jurisdiction in a wrongful manner cannot result in a nullity?it is an illegality,
capable of being cured in a duly constituted legal proceedings.

18. Proceedings for assessment under a fiscal statute are not in the nature of judicial
proceedings, like proceedings in a suit inasmuch as the assessing officer does not adjudicate on a lis
between an assessee and the State and, therefore, the law on the issue laid down under the civil law
may not stricto sensu apply to assessment proceedings. Nevertheless, in order to appreciate the
distinction between a null and void order and an illegal or irregular order, it would be profitable to
notice a few decisions of this Court on the point.

19. In Rafique Bibi v. Sayed Waliuddin [(2004) 1 SCC 287] explaining the distinction
between null and void decree and illegal decree, this Court has said that a decree can be said to be
without jurisdiction, and hence a nullity, if the court passing the decree has usurped a jurisdiction
which it did not have; a mere wrong exercise of jurisdiction does not result in a nullity. The lack of
jurisdiction in the court passing the decree must be patent on its face in order to enable the
executing court to take cognizance of such a nullity based on want of jurisdiction. The Court
further held that a distinction exists between a decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction and
consequently being a nullity and not executable and a decree of the court which is merely illegal or
not passed in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. A decree suffering from illegality or
irregularity of procedure, cannot be termed inexecutable.

20. In view of the above, in the present case, apart from the fact that on a plain reading of
Section 29(8)(b) of the Act, it is manifestly clear that fresh assessment for Assessment Year 19951996, framed pursuant to the order passed by the appellate authority on 8-6-2000, was well within
the prescribed time, even otherwise, in the light of the aforestated settled law, the assessment orders
in question could not be held to be null and void on account of the stated irregularities committed
by the assessing officer during the course of assessment proceedings. In our opinion, therefore,
despite scathing observations by the Division Bench on the conduct of the assessing officer, it was
a case of an irregularity in assessment proceedings by the officer, who was not bereft of authority
to assess the appellant. At best, it was an illegality, which defect was capable of and has been cured
by the High Court by setting aside the orders and by granting consequential relief."

14. Upon due consideration, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the order impugned in the
instant 'Revision' in exercise of revisional power provided under Section 102 of the Act of 2015,
which has been instituted without availing the statutory remedy of 'Appeal' provided under Section
101 of the Act of 2015, and therefore without entering into the merits of the case, the present
revision is dismissed with liberty to the petitioners to approach the appellate authority under
Section 101 of the Act of 2015 as per law.

15. Aforesaid is for the reason that the impugned order dated 25.01.2023 passed by Juvenile
Justice Board, Lakhimpur Kheri, in a case arising out of Case Crime No. 139 of 2014, Police
Station- Palia, District-Kheri, if established, would fall under the expression(s) 'irregular order' or
'erroneous order' or 'illegal order' or 'wrong order' but it cannot be termed as 'Non-est' order, as the
same has been passed by the Board in exercise of power provided to it under the provisions of the
1942 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Act of 2015, and therefore it can be cured by the Appellate Court/Authority created under Statute
itself i.e. the Act of 2015.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 1942
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANOJ BAJAJ, J.

Criminal Revision No. 1617 of 2011

Rishipal & Ors. ...Revisionists
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Issue for Consideration
(i) Whether the trial court was justified in exercising powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to summon the
unmarried sisters of the husband as additional accused on the basis of general allegations contained in the
F.I.R. and the depositions of prosecution witnesses?

(ii) Whether reiteration during trial of allegations already available before the Investigating Officer and found
insufficient for prosecution constitutes fresh evidence warranting exercise of powers under Section 319
Cr.P.C.?
(iii) Whether the trial court could invoke Section 319 Cr.P.C. by relying upon the F.I.R. and statements
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. instead of the evidence adduced during trial?

Headnotes
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 319 - Summoning of additional accused - Extraordinary
power - Nature and scope of jurisdiction.

HELD: The power conferred under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is extraordinary in nature and cannot be exercised
casually. Such jurisdiction can be invoked only where the evidence adduced during trial strongly indicates the
involvement of a person not already facing trial. Mere existence of allegations or suspicion does not justify
summoning an additional accused unless the evidence satisfies the higher degree of satisfaction contemplated
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. [Paras 6 and 7]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 319 - Additional accused - Persons exonerated during
investigation - General allegations in F.I.R. - Evidence merely reiterating prosecution version -
Summoning impermissible.

HELD: The unmarried sisters of the husband were exonerated during investigation as neither the F.I.R. nor the
dying declaration contained any specific allegation regarding demand of dowry or participation in the alleged
offence. The depositions of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 merely reiterated the allegations already contained in the F.I.R.
and did not disclose any fresh incriminating material emerging during trial. Such evidence, having already
been considered by the Investigating Officer while exonerating the proposed accused, could not constitute the
basis for exercising powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. [Paras 8 and 9]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Ss. 161 and 319 - Summoning of additional accused -
Reliance upon F.I.R. and statements recorded during investigation - Legality.