# Vinod Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 8 ILRA 1063
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-08-01
- **Case number:** Writ - C No. 22679 of 2013
- **Bench:** Siddhartha Varma
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/vinod-kumar-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-52384
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Jurisdiction - Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 10(1)(d) r/w
2(a) - Court or Tribunal would have the
jurisdiction if the parties resided within its
1064 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
jurisdiction or if the subject matter of the
dispute substantially arose within its
jurisdiction. (Para 6)

The jurisdiction of a Tribunal would lie at
the place where the cause of action had
arisen and if a particular workman had
been transferred to a particular place then
the
jurisdiction
would
be
at
the
transferred place. (Para 8)

When the petitioner was transferred out from
Agra to Bedar (Karnataka) on 5.9.2002 and
when his services were terminated for his deeds
at Bedar (Karnataka) then definitely, even if the
termination order was served in Uttar Pradesh,
no cause of action would arise in Uttar Pradesh.
The territorial jurisdiction would lie with the
Industrial Tribunal at Karnataka. In the instant
case, the Court finds that the Tribunal had
found that the termination had taken place in
Karnataka and just because the order was
served in Uttar Pradesh the jurisdiction would
not lie with the Tribunal at Uttar Pradesh. So far
as the argument raised by the petitioner that
the Tribunal could not go behind the
reference is concerned, suffice it to say
that
definitely
a
Tribunal
had
no
power/authority/jurisdiction to go behind
the reference but when the matter went
to the root of the case i.e. whether the
reference itself was not made by the
appropriate government then the Tribunal
could have very well looked into the
question of jurisdiction. (Para 15)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

## Text

8 All. Vinod Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1063
tenders and make every small mistake
appear like a big blunder. In fact, the
Courts must give "fair play in the joints" to
the
Government
and
Public
Sector
Undertakings in matters of contract. The
Courts must also not interfere where such
interference would cause unnecessary loss
to
the
public
exchequer
and
while
entertaining
the
writ
petition
and/or
granting the stay which may ultimately
delay the execution of public projects, it
must be remembered that it might seriously
impede the execution of the projects and
disable
the
State
and
or
its
agencies/instrumentalities from discharging
their Constitutional and legal obligation
towards the citizens. It was observed by the
Supreme Court that the High Court should
be extremely careful and circumspect in
exercise of the discretion while entertaining
such petitions and/or while granting stay in
such matters. The Writ Court should refrain
itself from imposing its decision over the
decision of the employer as to whether or
not to accept the bid of a tender. The Court
does not have the expertise to examine the
terms and conditions of the present
economic activities of the State and this
limitation should be kept in view. The
Courts should be even more reluctant in
interfering with the contracts involving
technical issues as there is a requirement of
the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon
such issues. The Court should only
examine as to whether the decision making
process is after complying with the
procedure contemplated by the tender
conditions. If the Court finds that there is a
total arbitrariness or that the tender has
been granted in a malafide manner, the
Court should relegate the parties to seek
damages for the wrongful exclusion rather
than to injunct the execution of the
contract. The injunction or interference in
the tender leads to additional cost on the
State and is also against public interest.
Any contract of public service should not
be interfered with lightly and in any case,
there should not be any interim order
derailing the entire process of the services
meant for the larger public good."

7. In the present case, we are unable
to assist the petitioner as we do not find any
malafide intention by the authorities.
Further more, the interpretation being taken
by the respondent authorities appears to be
a reasonable one, and therefore, this Court
would not replace the said interpretation
with its own opinion.

8. In view of above, we do not find
any reason to interfere in the orders passed
by the Authorities.

9. The writ petition is dismissed.
----------
(2024) 8 ILRA 1063
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.08.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTHA VARMA, J.

Writ - C No. 22679 of 2013

Vinod Kumar Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Smt. Anita Tripathi, Miss Bushra Maryam,
Ms. Sufia Saba

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Ms. Seema Agarwal

A. Service Law - Jurisdiction - Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 10(1)(d) r/w
2(a) - Court or Tribunal would have the
jurisdiction if the parties resided within its
1064 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
jurisdiction or if the subject matter of the
dispute substantially arose within its
jurisdiction. (Para 6)

The jurisdiction of a Tribunal would lie at
the place where the cause of action had
arisen and if a particular workman had
been transferred to a particular place then
the
jurisdiction
would
be
at
the
transferred place. (Para 8)

When the petitioner was transferred out from
Agra to Bedar (Karnataka) on 5.9.2002 and
when his services were terminated for his deeds
at Bedar (Karnataka) then definitely, even if the
termination order was served in Uttar Pradesh,
no cause of action would arise in Uttar Pradesh.
The territorial jurisdiction would lie with the
Industrial Tribunal at Karnataka. In the instant
case, the Court finds that the Tribunal had
found that the termination had taken place in
Karnataka and just because the order was
served in Uttar Pradesh the jurisdiction would
not lie with the Tribunal at Uttar Pradesh. So far
as the argument raised by the petitioner that
the Tribunal could not go behind the
reference is concerned, suffice it to say
that
definitely
a
Tribunal
had
no
power/authority/jurisdiction to go behind
the reference but when the matter went
to the root of the case i.e. whether the
reference itself was not made by the
appropriate government then the Tribunal
could have very well looked into the
question of jurisdiction. (Para 15)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. National Engineering Industries Ltd. Vs St. of
Raj. & ors., 2000 (1) SCC 371; 1999 LawSuit
(SC) 1310 (Para 5)

2. Indian Cable Co. Ltd. Vs Its Workmen, 1962
(4) FLR 444 (Para 6)

3. Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills Ltd. Vs Dhunubhai
Motilal Vin & ors., AIR 1955 Bom 463 (Para 7)

4. Ratnesh Mishra Vs Presiding Officer Industrial
Tribunal (I), Allahabad & ors., decided on
05.08.2008, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7530 of
1996 (Para 8)

5. General Manager, North-eastern Railway,
Gorakhpur & ors. Vs Jamait Ram Khatnani &
ors., decided on 05.02.1971, Civil Misc. Writ
Petition No. 8341 of 1971 (Para 9)

6. Salora International Ltd. Vs Prescribed
Authority (Payment of Wages Act) & ors.,
decided on 03.09.2014, Writ - C No. 453331 of
2008 (Para 9)

7. Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat Vs Perfect Pottery
Co. Ltd. And another, 1979 (3) SCC 792 (Para
10)

8. Indian Cable Co. Ltd. Vs Its workmen, 1962
FLR 444 (Para 11)

9. Paritosh Kumar Pal Vs St. of Bihar & ors.,
1984 Lab. IC 1254 (FB) (Para 12)

10. Ravindra Kumar Vs D.M., Agra & ors., 2005
(1) UPLBEC 118 (Para 14)

Present petition order dated 19.11.2012,
where the respondent no. 2 i.e. the
Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-IV,
Agra, passed an order holding that it had
no jurisdiction to decide the case as the
termination had taken place in Bedar
(Karnataka).

(Delivered by Hon'ble Siddhartha Varma,
J.)

1. The petitioner was appointed on the
post of medical representative in the
company known as M/s Tamilnadu Dada
Pharmaceutical Limited. The service of the
petitioner was confirmed on the post of
Medical Representative on 28.10.1991 in
the Agra region.

2. Thereafter, the company M/s
Tamilnadu Dada Pharmaceutical Industries
Limited was merged in the company
known
as
M/s
Sun
Pharmaceutical
Industries Limited and the petitioner
8 All. Vinod Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1065
became an employee of the company into
which the employer company had merged
i.e. he became an employee of M/s Sun
Pharmaceutical Industries Limited.

3. On 5.9.2002, the petitioner was
transferred to Bedar (Karnataka). On
16.11.2002, as luck would have it, the
respondent no. 3 the Employer Company,
terminated the services of the petitioner.
Aggrieved thereafter, the petitioner raised
an industrial dispute which was referred by
the Government of Uttar Pradesh on
23.3.2006. The reference was to following
effect:

 "क्या सेवायोजकों द्वारा श्री बवनोद कुमार बसंह,
मेबडकि ररप्रेजेन्र्ेबर्व की सेवायें बदनांक 16.11.2002 से समाप्त
बकया जाना उबचत तथा/अथवा वैिाबनक है? यबद नहीं, तो संिंबित
श्रबमक क्या बहतिाि/उपर्म पाने का अबिकारी है, एवं अन्य बकन
बववरणों सबहत।"

4. The respondent no. 3 raised the
question of jurisdiction with regard to the
reference before the Tribunal at Uttar
Pradesh and on 19.11.2012, the respondent
no. 2 i.e. the Presiding Officer, Industrial
Tribunal-IV, Agra, passed an order holding
that it had no jurisdiction to decide the case
as the termination had taken place in
Bedar(Karnataka).

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner
Ms. Bushra Maryam has submitted that the
respondent no. 2, the Presiding Officer,
Industrial Tribunal - IV, Agra, could not
have gone behind the reference and for this
purpose, learned counsel for the petitioner,
has relied upon a judgement of the
Supreme
Court
reported
in
1999
LawSuit(SC)
1310
:
National
Engineering Industries Ltd. vs. State of
Rajasthan and others. This citation can
also be found in 2000 (1) SCC 371. In this
judgement, she has specifically relied upon
paragraphs no. 26 and 28 and, therefore
they are being reproduced here as under:

"26. There can be many splinter
groups each forming a separate trade union.
Under Section 4 of the Trade Unions Act,
1926 any seven or more members of a trade
union can get the trade union registered
under that Act. If every trade union having
few members is to go on raising a dispute
and
the
State
Government
making
reference again and again the very purpose
of settlement is defeated. Once there is a
representative union, which in the present
case, is the Labour Union, it is difficult to
see the role of the Workers' Union. If there
are number of trade unions registered under
the Trade Unions Act, 1926 not entitled to
be registered as representative unions and
they raise disputes, industrial peace would
be a far cry. Under Section 2(0000)9 of the
Rajasthan Act 'representative union' means
a union for the time being registered as a
representative union under the Rajasthan
Act (Rajasthan Act XXXIV of 1950).
Under Section 9-D1010 of the aforesaid
Rajasthan Act any Union which has for the
whole of the period of at least three months
during
the
period
of
six
months
immediately preceding the calendar month
in which it so applies under this section a
membership of not less than fifteen per cent
of the total number of workmen employed
in unit of an industry may apply in the
prescribed form to the Registrar for
registration as a Representative Union.
Then under Section 9-FI111 registration of
a representative union can be cancelled on
various grounds mentioned therein and one
of such grounds is if, after holding such an
inquiry, if any, as the Registrar deems fit he
is satisfied that the registered union is being
conducted not bona fide in the interest of
the workmen but in the interest of the
1066 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
employers to the prejudice of the interest of
the workmen. We have already quoted
Section 9-E as to how a representative
union is to be registered. Proviso to that
Section makes it clear that if there are two
or more unions fulfilling the criteria laid
down in Section 9-D and apply for
registration then the union having the
largest membership of the employees has to
be registered. As to what is representative
union is not defined in the Act but in
common parlance it would mean that it
represents all the workers. It is not the case
of the Workers' Union that registration of
the Labour Union is liable to be cancelled
on any ground whatsoever. Notice given by
Workers' Union under sub-section (2) of
Section 19 of the Act is obviously invalid
as it did not represent majority of the
persons bound by the settlement nor it is a
representative union. In this view of the
matter it is not necessary for us to consider
what were the demands raised by the
Workers' Union in its character which were
not covered by the tripartite settlement.

9. 2(0000) 'Representative Union'
means a Union for the time being registered
as a representative Union under the Act.

10.
9-D.
Application
for
registration- Any Union which has for the
whole of the period of at least three months
during
the
period
of
six
months
immediately preceding the calendar month
in which it so applies under this section a
membership of not less than fifteen per cent
of the total number of workmen employed
in unit of an industry may apply in the
prescribed form to the Registrar of
registration as Representative Union.

11.
"9-F.
Cancellation
of
registration- The Registrar shall cancel the
registration of a Union-

(a) if, after holding such an
inquiry, if any, as he deems fit he is
satisfied-

(i)....

(ii)....

(iii) that the registered Union is
being conducted not bona fide in the
interests of the workmen but in the interest
of employers to the prejudice of the
interests of workmen; or
 (iv)....
(b) If its registration under
the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926
(Central Act XVI of 1926) is
cancelled.
 28. Industrial Tribunal is the
creation statute and it gets jurisdiction on
the basis of reference. It cannot go into the
question on validity of the reference.
Question before the High Court was one of
jurisdiction which it failed to consider. A
tripartite settlement has been arrived at
among the management, Labour Union and
the Staff Union. When such a settlement is
arrived at it is a package deal. In such a
deal some demands may be left out. It is
not that demands, which are left out, should
be specifically mentioned in the settlement.
It is not the contention of Workers' Union
that tripartite settlement is in any way mala
fide. lt has been contended by the Workers'
Union that the settlement was not arrived at
during the conciliation proceedings under
Section 12 of the Act and as such not
binding on the members of the Workers'
Union. This contention is without any basis
as the recitals to the tripartite settlement
clearly show that the settlement was arrived
at during the conciliation proceedings.

6. Further, learned counsel for the
petitioner has relied upon a judgement of
the Supreme Court reported in 1962 (4)
FLR 444 which was a dispute between
Indian Cable Co. Ltd and Its workmen.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has
relied upon this judgement and submitted
that a Court or Tribunal would have the
8 All. Vinod Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1067
jurisdiction if the parties resided within its
jurisdiction or if the subject matter of the
dispute substantially arose within its
jurisdiction.

7. Still further, learned counsel for
the petitioner has relied upon a judgement
passed in Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills Ltd.
vs. Dhunubhai Motilal Vin and Ors.
reported in AIR 1955 Bom 463 and has
specifically relied upon the judgement for
the proposition as to what would be the
jurisdiction of a Labour Court.

8. Learned counsel for the respondent
no. 3, in reply, has submitted that the
jurisdiction of a Tribunal would lie at the
place where the cause of action had arisen
and if a particular workman had been
transferred to a particular place then the
jurisdiction would be at the transferred
place. In this regard, learned counsel for the
petitioner has relied upon a judgement
dated 5.8.2008 passed in Civil Misc. Writ
Petition No. 7530 of 1996 (Ratnesh
Mishra vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial
Tribunal (I), Allahabad and others) and
has submitted that the law was settled with
regard to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
and that the jurisdiction would lie at the
place where the cause of action had arisen
i.e. the place where the person had been
transferred and was working.

9. Learned counsel for the respondent
has also relied upon a judgement of this High
Court dated 5.2.1971 passed in Civil Misc.
Writ No. 8341 of 1971 ( General Manager,
North-eastern Railway, Gorakhpur and
others vs. Jamait Ram Khatnani and
others)
and
has
submitted
that
the
jurisdiction would be in the Tribunal which
has jurisdiction over the territorial area in
which the workman was working. Similar is
the law which has been laid down in a
judgement of another learned Single Judge
dated 3.9.2014 passed in Writ - C No.
453331 of 2008 (Salora International Ltd.
vs. Prescribed Authority (Payment of
Wages Act) and others.

10. Still further, learned counsel for the
respondents relied upon a judgement reported
in 1979 (3) SCC 792 : (Pottery Mazdoor
Panchayat vs. Perfect Pottery Co. Ltd.
And another) and in this judgement, he
relied upon specifically paragraphs no. 11
and 16 which are being reproduced here as
under:-

"11. Having heard a closely
thought out argument made by Mr Gupta on
behalf of the appellant, we are of the opinion
that the High Court is right in its view on the
first question. The very terms of the
references show that the point of dispute
between the parties was not the fact of the
closure of its business by the respondent but
the propriety and justification of the
respondent's decision to close down the
business. That is why the references were
expressed to say whether the proposed
closure of the business was proper and
justified. In other words, by the references,
the Tribunals were not called upon by the
Government to adjudicate upon the question
as to whether there was in fact a closure of
business or whether under the pretence of
closing the business the workers were locked
out by the management. The references being
limited to the narrow question as to whether
the closure was proper and justified, the
Tribunals by the very terms of the references,
had no jurisdiction to go behind the fact of
closure and inquire into the question whether
the business was in fact closed down by the
management.

16. We are, therefore, of the view
that the High Court was right in coming to
the conclusion that the two Tribunals had
1068 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
no
jurisdiction
to
go
behind
the
references and inquire into the question
whether the closure of business, which
was in fact effected, was decided upon
for reasons which were proper and
justifiable.
The
propriety
of
or
justification for the closure of a business,
in fact and truly effected, cannot raise an
industrial dispute as contemplated by the
State and Central Acts.

11.

Learned
counsel
for
the
respondent no. 3 has relied upon 1962 FLR
444 : Indian Cable Co. Ltd vs. Its
workmen, which has also been relied upon
by the learned counsel for the petitioner,
and has submitted that a Court or Tribunal
would have the jurisdiction if the parties
reside within the jurisdiction or if the
subject matter of the dispute substantially
arose within its jurisdiction.

12.

Learned
counsel
for
the
respondent no. 3 has also relied upon a
judgement of the Full Bench of the Patna
High Court in Paritosh Kumar Pal v.
State of Bihar and Ors. reported in 1984
Lab. IC 1254 (FB) in which he specifically
relied upon paragraphs no. 24, 25, 26 and
30 and has submitted that wherever the
cause of action would arise the jurisdiction
would lie.

13.
Learned
counsel
for
the
respondent no. 3 stated that if a Company
had business all over the country then
also the cause of action to a particular
jurisdiction would arise only if the cause
of action arose within its territorial
jurisdiction and the reference in a case
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
could be made under Section 10(1)(d)
read with 2(a) by the Government which
was the proper Government under the
statute.

14.

Learned
counsel
for
the
respondent no. 3 has also submitted that no
cause of action could arise to a person if the
order by which he was aggrieved was
served at the place where he was residing
after termination of his services. For this
purpose, learned counsel for the respondent
relied upon 2005 (1) UPLBEC 118 :
Ravindra Kumar vs. District Magistrate,
Agra and others.

15. Having heard Ms. Bushra
Maryam, learned counsel for the petitioner
and Sri H.N. Singh, Senior Counsel,
assisted by Ms. Seema Agrawal, learned
counsel for the respondent no. 3, this Court
is of the view that when the petitioner was
transferred
out
from
Agra
to
Bedar(Karnataka) on 5.9.2002 and when
his services were terminated for his deeds
at Bedar (Karnataka) then definitely, even
if the termination order was served in Uttar
Pradesh, no cause of action would arise in
Uttar Pradesh. The territorial jurisdiction
would lie with the Industrial Tribunal at
Karnataka. In the instant case, the Court
finds that the Tribunal had found that the
termination had taken place in Karnataka
and just because the order was served in
Uttar Pradesh the jurisdiction would not lie
with the Tribunal at Uttar Pradesh. So far
as the argument raised by the learned
counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal
could not go behind the reference is
concerned, suffice it to say that definitely a
Tribunal
had
no
power/authority/
jurisdiction to go behind the reference but
when the matter went to the root of the case
i.e. whether the reference itself was not
made by the appropriate government then
the Tribunal could have very well looked
into the question of jurisdiction.

16. Under such circumstances, the
writ petition being devoid of merit is being
8 All. M/S Mishra Automobiles Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
1069
dismissed. No interference is warranted in
the order dated 19.11.2012 passed by the
respondent no. 2, the Presiding Officer,
Industrial Tribunal - IV, Agra.

17. The writ petition is, accordingly,
dismissed.
----------
(2024) 8 ILRA 1069
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 05.08.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Writ - C No. 24199 of 2020

M/S Mishra Automobiles ...Petitioner
Versus
U.O.I. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Akhilesh Kumar Kalra, Shreya Chaudhary

Counsel for the Respondent:
A.S.G., Manish Jauhari

A. Marketing and Dealership Law
-
Weights and Measures - Cancellation of
license - Marketing Dealership Guideline,
2012: Clause 5.1.4 - Mere presence of
foreign elements does not ipso facto show
intention unless there is evidence to show
that the foreign components are capable
of or in fact affecting the fair dispensation
of fuel.

Provision
5.1.4
of
MDG
Guidelines
is
substantially penal in nature and its essential
ingredients, prima facie, consist of:

1. The finding of the foreign objects in the
dispensing unit, which is only a ground for
inquiry and inspection.
2. Intention of manipulating the delivery.

In the present case, there is no evidence
w.r.t. the second necessary ingredient,
which is 'intention of manipulating the
delivery' and also the inquiry fell short of
returning any finding as to show any such
manipulation. Therefore, the petitioner
cannot be said to have violated 5.1.4. of
the MDG Guidelines. (Para 17)

Firstly, it is not the case of the respondent Oil
Company that there was any shortfall of the
delivery, coupled with the fact that even the
OEM has never reported, the result of the
foreign body attached to the pulsar card and
secondly, the benefit of doubt of the seal being
intact during the time of inspection has to be
given to the petitioner as the foreign component
cannot be inserted without breaking the seal of
the dispensing unit. Therefore, reading the
inspection report dated 05.05.2017 wherein, it
has clearly been found that the delivery was
found to be correct, coupled with the fact that
the seals were broken in the presence of the
inspecting team leads to have irrebuttable
conclusion that the seals were intact and there
was
no
short
supply
of
the
fuel
and
consequently, in the aforesaid circumstances, it
cannot be concluded that there was intention to
manipulate the delivery, and hence any violation
of Clause 5.4.1. of the MDG Guidelines. (Para
18)

Writ petition allowed. (E-4)

Present petition assails the order of the
Dispute
Resolution
Panel
dated
10.02.2020
as
well
as
order
of
cancellation dated 21.06.2017.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Mathur, J.)

1. Heard Ms. Aadya Antya, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Shri Manish
Jauhari, learned counsel on behalf of
respondents no.3 to 5.

2. The petitioner is an authorized
dealer of the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.
since 1990 and has been operating a retail
outlet. He is licensed dealer of Indian Oil
Corporation Ltd. and selling Petroleum
products from the retail outlet at Sector - G,