# Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Regional Joint Director of Education, Agra and others

- **Citation:** (2001) 2 ILRA 232
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2001
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/vishnu-dutt-sharma-v-regional-joint-director-of-education-agra-and-others-39865
- **Pages:** 6

## Text

INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2001
232
disturbed by entertaining a writ petition
after a long delay.

13. In the present case the appellants
have not impleaded those persons as party
to the writ petitioners or in the present
special appeal who according to them had
been illegally given preference over them
and had been appointed prior to them in
1988. If the contention of the appellants is
entertained, it would result in disturbing
the seniority list prepared in 1988-89.
Valuable rights have accrued in favour of
such
persons
who
were
given
appointment prior to the appellants in
1988. It is also pertinent to mention that
the appellants are not illiterate rustic
villagers living in some remote area who
may not be having any idea of court
proceedings. The appellants were working
as
Routine
Grade
Assistant
and,
thereafter, as Lower Division Assistant in
the High Court, and it can be safely
presumed that they have some knowledge
of court proceedings. As against a
common man, it was very easy and
convenient for them to take appropriate
legal proceedings for redress of their
alleged grievance that they should have
been appointed in 1988. But they chose to
remain silent and contended. In these
circumstances, there is absolutely no
ground
to
entertain
any
challenge
regarding their initial appointment in the
present writ petition which has been filed
after more than 10 years in the year 1999.

14. For the reasons mentioned
above, we find no merit in the present
special appeal, which is hereby dismissed.

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2All] Vishnu Dutt Sharma V. Regional Joint Director of Education, Agra and others
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By the Court

1. The questions that arise for
consideration is whether an application
for extension of time-bound stay orders is
necessary and whether it must be heard by
the same Judge or it could be heard by
another Judge who is ceased of the
jurisdiction as a result of rotation of
bench?

2. Sri Anil Bhushan, learned counsel
for the petitioner has urged that once a
time bound interim order is passed by the
court after application of mind, then
unless the stay order is vacated by this
court till then the interim order will
continue to be operative and it cannot
exhaust or automatically stand vacated on
the expiry of the period or date mentioned
in the interim order.

3. On the other hand, Sri Vinod
Sinha
the
learned
counsel
for
the
respondent no. 3 has vehemently urged
that while passing a time bound interim
order, the court has not concluded the
hearing of the stay application and the
learned judge was in the process of
hearing the matter and the stay application
has to be decided by the same Judge as
provided by Chapter V Rule 13 of the
Allahabad High Court Rules 1952 (in
brief 'Rules of the Court') and only he
can extend the stay order as the stay
application on which the interim order
was passed remained pending. He further
urged that even if a stay extension
application is moved, it is for the same
object and purpose for which the initial
stay application was filed, therefore, it can
only be heard by the same Judge who has
passed the interim order and not by
another Judge who is ceased of the
jurisdiction by rotation of bench. He
urged that after the expiry of the period
mentioned in the time bound stay order,
the stay order exhausted and unless the
stay order is extended before the expiry of
the period fixed in the order or it is
extended or a fresh order is passed, it
cannot be revived. He urged that it will
depend upon the language of the interim
order whether the stay order will exhaust
on a particular date fixed by the court or it
will be deemed to be continuing. Sri S.N.
Srivastava the learned standing counsel
appearing for the respondents nos. 1 and 2
has supported the argument of the learned
counsel for the respondent no. 3.

4. An interim order is generally
passed to preserve the state of affairs
obtaining on the date of institution of
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2001
234
proceedings. The Constitution Bench of
the apex court in Shri Kihota Hallohon
Vs. Mr. Zachillu and others AIR 1993
SC 412 in paragraph 51 held as below :-

"The purpose of interlocutory orders
is to preserve in status quo the rights of
parties, so that, the proceedings do not
become infructuous by any unilateral
overt acts by one side or the other during
its pendency."

The interim order is granted where the
court is satisfied that prima facie case,
balance of convenience and irreparable
loss is in favour of a person claiming
interim order. Such order may assume
different forms depending upon exigency
of circumstances. But the usual interim
orders granted are either until further
orders or time bound that is for specific
period mentioned in the order or till the
next date of listing or till the next date of
hearing. The time bound interim orders,
appear to me to be granted, because the
Judge is not satisfied to grant complete or
unlimited order or till further orders of the
Court. Yet the order is granted to protect
the interest of the petitioner for a short
while to enable the petitioner to furnish
further details or information as required
by the court till the respondents, in the
meanwhile, files its counter affidavit. It
also avoids injustice which may be caused
by the interim order to the respondent for
long as the case comes up again for
consideration after short time or till either
the respondent appears or the petitioner is
able to make out a case for such order
which may last till it is vacated or till the
petition is heard. Further it manifests
anxiety of the Judge to decide the dispute
at the earliest. The object of time bound
interim orders are defeated at times, by
the change of jurisdiction of the Judge
who granted the order. To take an
example, before a Judge 'X' a matter is
argued on three points a, b and c. The
Judge 'X' is of the opinion that points a
and c have no substance but on point b it
calls for a counter within three weeks and
rejoinder affidavits within two weeks and
fixes the matter after five weeks and for a
period of five weeks grants interim order.
Before the expiry of period of five weeks
the jurisdiction due to rotation of benches
changes and is vested in Judge 'Y'.
Before Judge 'Y' the arguments start
afresh and he hears the entire matter de
novo and even points a and c are pressed
before him as it is not known to him as to
on what point Judge 'X' had granted
interim order. This results in colossal
waste of time of the Court. If ten matters
in which there is time bound stay orders
have been passed are listed for stay
extension, which is normally taken up
after lunch, Judge 'Y' may either extend
the interim order without adjudicating on
the matter or if he tries to adjudicate, all
the points a, b and c may be pressed
before him. The result is that entire time
of the court after lunch is consumed in
hearing matters in which time bound
interim orders have been passed and the
matters placed in the cause list by the
order of Hon'ble The Chief Justice
remains usually untouched. To avoid this
the learned counsel for the respondents
argued that if the matter is taken up by the
Judge 'X' who had granted the time
bound interim order the matter can be
disposed of early by him as he is well
aware of the case and the case would be
argued before him on point b only. And
even if other points are argued it can be
decided without much loss of time.
Reliance is placed by the learned standing
counsel on Chapter V Rule 13 of the rules
of the court and it is argued that this court
2All] Vishnu Dutt Sharma V. Regional Joint Director of Education, Agra and others
235
has held that such orders do not exhaust
or cease to operate after expiry of time.
Once application for extension of time
bound order is moved since the effect of
such extension would be the same as
interim order itself, therefore, extension
of the interim order can, only be done by
the same Hon'ble Judge who passed the
time bound interim order, if he is
available.

5. The argument cannot be accepted
as it overlooks Chapter V Rule 14 which
specifically provides that a case shall not
be treated as tied-up to the bench which
granted the ex-parte order. Therefore, it is
not possible to accept the request of the
learned counsel for the respondent to
direct such applications for extension of
interim order to be listed before the
learned Judge who granted the interim
order. At the same time this court is
reeling
under
mounting
pressure
of
arrears. The efficacy of time bound
interim orders may be there but it has
added to the burden. The benches are
normally rotated after two or three
months. The petition is heard by other
Judge. He has to hear the matter afresh.
The result is that when jurisdiction is
changed after two months he is faced with
such a situation that he is left with no time
to devote to the cases listed before him
and there is pressure for extending the
stay order. The Court cannot afford to
loose valuable time everyday in hearing
and disposing of such applications. This
court has held that such orders do not
exhaust or cease to operate after expiry of
time mentioned in the order. In Shiksha
Prasar Samiti, Allahabad and another Vs.
Registrar, Societies, Chits and Firms, U.P.
Lucknow and others (1998) 1 UPLBEC
599 the Division Bench held in paragraph
12 as under :-
"...Limited interim order are passed
by the Court to prevent misuse of the
same. Quite often it does happen that
limited interim orders are not extended on
the date of expiry by this Court for want
of time or for various other reasons. But
normally whenever the case is next taken
up, the interim orders are extended unless
the matter is decided on the same day or
the interim order is vacated by the
specific order after hearing the parties.
During such gap the authorities must wait
for reasonable time and should refrain
from passing order advantageous to one
party. We have no hesitation in saying
that these two petitions have come before
us on account of the undue haste and
unreasonable
attitude
adopted
by
respondent no. 2. He ought to have
watched at least for a reasonable time and
must have waited to see as to whether this
Court extended the stay order further or
vacated the same or decided the writ
petition finally..."

6. This Court has been facing this
problem of time bound interim order since
long. In Ashiq Ali Vs. Mohd. Shakeel and
other 1985 (3) Lucknow Civil Decisions
362 it has been held by this court that a
time bound stay order till the next date of
listing of the case would not automatically
exhaust or come to an end on the date the
case is listed in the cause list. If the matter
is not taken up the stay order would
continue till the next date of listing. This
court in an another decision in Shambhoo
Nath Singh Yadav Vs. State of U.P.
1994(1) ALR 32 has held as under :-

"It has been submitted at the bar that
the court below will proceed with the case
until the order is extended today. In my
opinion the order passed by this Court on
28.05.1993 is amply clear and it means
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2001
236
that further proceedings in the case shall
remain stayed untill the order is modified
or vacated by some subsequent order. The
words "till the next date of listing"
implies that the case is listed and some
further order is passed. I do not agree that
the words "till next date of listing" should
be interpreted literally. If a narrow and
literal interpretation is given to the above
words it will lead to uncertainty and make
the High Court's order obscure. Judicial
orders are to be certain in the meaning so
that subordinate courts or other authorities
may not be in any confusion and starts
acting according to their own choice and
whim. The next date of listing is neither
known to the subordinate courts or other
authorities. A case may be listed in the
very next week while another case may
not be listed for a year and hence the
subordinate courts or other authorities
who are bound by the stay order will
never know how long the stay order has to
continue. Listing of a case in the cause list
has no magic in itself. Even if a case is
listed on a particular day, it may not be
taken up on account of a variety of
reasons; there may be no sitting of the
Court on the day of listing or due to
pressure of other work the case may not
be taken up for further orders. If listing
alone determines the length of time during
which the order has to survive the office
of the High Court will become the real
arbiter and it may or may not list a case at
its choice. It is for the court to mention a
clear date if it chooses to pass a timebound stay order and not for the office to
shorten or to give a long rope to the
operation of a stay order.

The words "till the next date of
listing" are, therefore, to be interpreted in
a reasonable manner and not in a manner
which may lead to absurdity or created
confusion. Thus the words "till the next
day of listing" are quite clear and certain
in their meaning that the stay order has to
continue till any subsequent order is
passed by the Court."

7. This court in Ram Abhilakh Misra
Vs.
Cane
Commissioner
and
other
1998(1) ARC 526 has held that a judicial
order continues until and unless the same
is vacated or not extended on the case
being taken up. It shall not lapse
automatically on its own when though the
matter is listed in the cause list but is not
taken up by the court due to lack of time.
In Cold Storage Association, U.P. having
its office at Fazalganj, Kanpur Vs. State
of Uttar Pradesh and others 1992 AWC
(Supplementary) 43 it has been held in
paragraph 12 as below :-

"...The interim stay order dated
23.06.1992 which was a time bound
order, exhausted on 17th August, 1992 in
the absence of any extension. Under these
circumstances, what this Court is seized
of presently, is the final disposal of the
application for interim relief on merits.
Even if it may be assumed that the interim
order
dated
23.06.1992
stood
automatically vacated on 7th August 1992
on account of non disposal of the stay
vacation application dated 24.07.1992,
there is no reason to hold that the interim
relief application itself stood exhausted.
The same is available for disposal on
merits."

8. The law thus appears to be settled,
so far this court is concerned, that time
bound stay orders do not cease to be
effective by efflux of time. The result in
law is that a time bound order has the
same effect as an order till further orders
of the court. In other words it continues to
2All] Hari Shankar Mishra V. Vice Chairman/ K.D.A., Kanpur and another
237
operate till it is recalled, vacated or
modified. The rules also do not provide
for time bound stay orders. Yet the
confusion prevails and every day large
numbers of applications are filed for
extension of such orders consuming lot of
Court's time. In the circumstances it has
become necessary not only to dispose of
this application but also to issue following
directions to the office.

1.
The request for extension of
interim order is disposed of by saying that
no order is necessary as the time bound
interim orders do not exhaust after expiry
of time mentioned in the order.

2.
The Registrar General of the
Court is directed to issue necessary
directions to the office within one week
that in view of the decisions of this Court
the applications for extension of time
bound interim orders need not be listed.
But if the petitioner applies for question -
answer from the office to find out whether
his application was pending and interim
order was continuing even after expiry of
time mentioned in the order the answer by
given by the office in the affirmative.

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