# Vishwanath Singh Rathaur & Ors v. The State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2023) 11 ILRA 649
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-07-10
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482. No. 24169 of 2023
- **Bench:** Gajendra Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/vishwanath-singh-rathaur-ors-v-the-state-of-u-p-anr-49385
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973Section 482 - Indian Penal Code,1860-Sections 323,
342, 379, 504 & 506-Challenge to-entire criminal
proceedings- the applicants were complying with the
order issued by the court below, for which a
complaint came to be filed and was registered as a
complaint case under the aforesaid sections;
mandatory
provisions
of
sanction
by
the
competent authority under Section 197 CrPC could
not have been ignored by the learned Chief
Judicial
Magistrate,
Varanasi
before
taking
cognizance and summoning the applicants as
accused. In the present case, it is not in dispute
that the applicants, along with other police
personnel were complying the order of the court
below, as such, it cannot be said that the police
officers were not acting in discharge of their official
duty. Even if the police official had exceeded to
some extent their authority in discharge of their
official/public duty, then also sanction would be
required for their prosecution. In absence of
sanction, the criminal proceedings against the
applicants would be non-est and void and the
same are liable to be quashed. (Para 1 to 20)

B. The intention behind protection under Section
197 CrPC is to protect the public servant from
being unnecessarily harassed by launching a
criminal proceeding against him for an offence
allegedly
committed
while
performing
official/public duty. If the offence is in respect of
an act done or purported to be done in discharge
of official/public duty, the public servant has
protection under Section 197 CrPC. This protection
under Section 197 CrPC has salutary object to
prevent harassment of public servants and protect
them for mala fide and motivated criminal
prosecution. However, if the competent authority
finds that the act of commission/omission done by
public servant was not in performance of his public
duty, he would sanction prosecution of the public
servant.(Para 16,17)

The application is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

11 All. Vishwanath Singh Rathaur & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Anr.
649

17. It is indeed regrettable that the
learned trial court failed to grasp the
objective of the enactment of the Act, 2002,
along with its purpose.

18. In terms of the directions issued
by
the
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
as
mentioned above and considering the
provisions of the Act1, it is hereby ordered,
with the hope and expectation, that the trial
court comprehends the implications of noncompliance with the directions issued by
the Supreme Court, to expeditiously
dispose of the pending criminal complaint
before the Court of the learned Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, VIth, Meerut.
This
petition
is
thus
disposed
of
accordingly.
----------
(2023) 11 ILRA 649
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.07.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE GAJENDRA KUMAR, J.

Application U/S 482. No. 24169 of 2023

Vishwanath Singh Rathaur & Ors.
 ...Applicants
Versus
The State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Sri Mukesh Kumar

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

A. Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973Section 482 - Indian Penal Code,1860-Sections 323,
342, 379, 504 & 506-Challenge to-entire criminal
proceedings- the applicants were complying with the
order issued by the court below, for which a
complaint came to be filed and was registered as a
complaint case under the aforesaid sections;
mandatory
provisions
of
sanction
by
the
competent authority under Section 197 CrPC could
not have been ignored by the learned Chief
Judicial
Magistrate,
Varanasi
before
taking
cognizance and summoning the applicants as
accused. In the present case, it is not in dispute
that the applicants, along with other police
personnel were complying the order of the court
below, as such, it cannot be said that the police
officers were not acting in discharge of their official
duty. Even if the police official had exceeded to
some extent their authority in discharge of their
official/public duty, then also sanction would be
required for their prosecution. In absence of
sanction, the criminal proceedings against the
applicants would be non-est and void and the
same are liable to be quashed. (Para 1 to 20)

B. The intention behind protection under Section
197 CrPC is to protect the public servant from
being unnecessarily harassed by launching a
criminal proceeding against him for an offence
allegedly
committed
while
performing
official/public duty. If the offence is in respect of
an act done or purported to be done in discharge
of official/public duty, the public servant has
protection under Section 197 CrPC. This protection
under Section 197 CrPC has salutary object to
prevent harassment of public servants and protect
them for mala fide and motivated criminal
prosecution. However, if the competent authority
finds that the act of commission/omission done by
public servant was not in performance of his public
duty, he would sanction prosecution of the public
servant.(Para 16,17)

The application is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

1. D. Devraja Vs Owais Sabeer Hussain (2020) 7 SCC
695

2. Matajog Dobey Vs H.C. Bhari (1955) SC 44 :
(1955) 2 SCR 925 : 1956 Cri LJ 140

3. Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava Vs N.P. Misra
(1970) 2 SCC 56 : (1971) 1 SCR 317

4. Pukhraj Vs St. of Raj. & anr. (1973) 2 SCC
701
650 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
5. Mahendra Pal Singh Lekhpal & anr. Vs St. of
UP & anr.. Appl. u/s 482 No.15266 of 2007

6. Ajeet Shukla & ors. Vs St. of U.P. & ors. Appl.
u/s 482 No.5776 of 2017

(Delivered by Hon'ble Gajendra Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Sri Mukesh Kumar, learned
counsel for the applicants, learned AGA for
the State-respondent (O.P. No.1) and
perused the material available on record.
As legal point is involved in the matter, no
notice is required to be issued to the
opposite party no.2.

2. By way of this application under
Section 482 CrPC, the applicants have
prayed for quashing of the order dated
15.03.2023
passed
by
the
learned
Additional
Civil
Judge,
Jr.
Division/Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1,
Varanasi in Complaint Case No.2803 of
2018 (Lalchand Vs. Vishwanath Singh
Rathour and others), under Sections 323,
342, 379, 504 and 506 IPC, Police StationBhelpur, District-Varanasi as well as
summoning order dated 16.01.1998.

3. By means of the impugned order
the learned Additional Civil Judge, Jr.
Division/Judicial
Magistrate,
Varanasi
Complaint
Case
No.2803
of
2018
(Lalchand Vs. Vishwanath Singh Rathour
and others), under Sections 323, 342, 379,
504 and 506 IPC, Police Station-Bhelpur,
District-Varanasi rejected the application of
the applicant under Section 197 of Cr.P.C.,
against which, the present application has
been filed. A further prayer has been made
for staying the entire proceedings of
Complaint
Case
No.2803
of
2018
(Lalchand Vs. Vishwanath Singh Rathour
and others), under Sections 323, 342, 379,
504 and 506 IPC, Police Station-Bhelpur,
District-Varanasi.

4. On the date of incident i.e.
24.10.1997 all the applicants were posted
in the District Police Varasnsi. Applicant
no. 1 was posted as Chowki In-charge at
Police Station Bhelpur, District Varanasi.
Applicant no.2 was posted as Constable
and applicant no.3 was posted as Head
Constable at Police Station Bhelpur,
District-Varanasi.

5. District Court, Varanasi comes
within the jurisdiction of Police StationBhelpur, District Varanasi.

6. Brief facts of the case reads as
follows:

7. During the posting of applicant
No.1 (Vishwanath Singh Rathaur) as a
Chawki In-charge, he received a direction
issued by the learned court below vide
order dated 18.10.1997 in respect of arrest
of the opposite party no.2 pursuant to Case
Crime No.383 of 1994, under the Motor
Vehicles Act, which has been complied
with by the applicant no.1 and arrested the
opposite no.2 on 24.10.1997. In this regard,
a compliance report has also been sent by
the applicant no.1 to the learned court
below, a copy of which has been annexed
as Annexure 2 to the Application. In
retaliation to the same, opposite party no.2
became annoyed with the applicants and
made a false application to the Higher
Authority, but the concerned Higher
Authority after investigating the matter,
found the complaint to be false and
fabricated
against
the
applicants.
Thereafter, opposite party no.2 with a mala
fide intention filed a complaint before the
court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi
on 07.11.1997 for mentioning therein that
complainant was arrested by the applicants
by way of summoning order, whereas, no
warrant in pursuance of the arrest of the
11 All. Vishwanath Singh Rathaur & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Anr.
651
complainant was issued by the court below,
under Sections 323, 342, 379, 504 and 506
IPC, which was later on registered as
Complaint Case No.1358 of 1997 against
the applicants.

8. Thereafter on the basis of
statements of the complainants under
Section 200 CrPC and witness under
Section 202 CrPC, the learned Chief
Judicial
Magistrate,
Varanasi
issued
summons against the applicants for the
offences under Sections 323, 342, 379, 504
and 506 IPC vide order dated 16.01.1998.

9. On behalf of the applicants, it has
been submitted that the applicants were
complying with the order issued by the
court below, for which a complaint came to
be filed and was registered as a complaint
case
under
the
aforesaid
sections;
mandatory provisions of sanction by the
competent authority under Section 197
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short
'CrPC') could not have been ignored by the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi
before taking cognizance and summoning
the applicants as accused.

10. On behalf of the applicants, it has
also been submitted that if the police
personnel, including the applicants, would
not have complied with the order of the
learned court below, the same would attract
disobeyance of the court's order; the
impugned proceedings, in absence of
sanction by the competent authority for
prosecution of the applicants, are nonest
and, are liable to be quashed as the same
are without jurisdiction. It is further
submitted
that
In
support
of
his
submissions, learned counsel for the
applicant has placed reliance upon the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
D. Devaraja Vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain;
2020 (0) AIR (SC) as well as the
judgments
of
this
Court
passed
in
Application U/S 482 No.15266 of 2007
(Mahendra Pal Singh Lekhpal and
another Vs. State of U.P. and another)
dated 10.01.2022 and Application U/S 482
No.5776 of 2017 (Ajeet Shukla and
others Vs. The State of U.P. and others)
dated 10.08.2022 and submits that present
criminal proceedings against the applicant
is nothing but an abuse of process of law,
which is liable to be quashed.

11. On behalf of the respondent, it has
been
submitted
that
applicants
were
involved in committing the aforesaid
offences and the offence committed by the
applicants cannot be said to be a part of the
official duty and, therefore, no sanction
was required for prosecuting them for the
offences committed by them and the same
did not come within the performance of the
public/official duty and, therefore, their
action was wholly illegal and not in
performance of public/official duty. Their
acts/crimes are not protected by the
provision of Section 197 CrPC. It has been
further
submitted
that
the
present
application has no merit and is liable to be
dismissed.

12. I have considered the submissions
advanced by the learned counsel for the
parties and gone through the record.

13. Section 197 in The Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 is extracted
herein below for convenience:-

"197. Prosecution of Judges and
public servants.-(1) When any person who
is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public
servant not removable from his office save
by or with the sanction of the Government
is accused of any offence alleged to have
652 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
been committed by him while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his
official
duty,
no
Court
shall
take
cognizance of such offence except with the
previous sanction-

(a) in the case of a person who is
employed or, as the case may be, was at the
time of commission of the alleged offence
employed, in connection with the affairs of
the Union, of the Central Government;

(b) in the case of a person who is
employed or, as the case may be, was at the
time of commission of the alleged offence
employed, in connection with the affairs of
a State, of the State Government."

Notification No. 1841 (3)/VI538-71 dated 30th January, 1975 reads as
under:

"Grih
Vibhag
(Police),
Anubhag-9, Notification No. 1841 (3)/VI538-71, dated January 30, 1975:-

In
exercise
of
the
powers
conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 197
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(Act No. 2 of 1974), the Governor is
pleased to direct that the provisions of subsection (2) of the aforesaid section shall
apply to all members of the following
forces of the State, charged with the
maintenance of public order wherever they
may be serving, namely :

(i) U.P. Police Force

(ii)
U.P.
Pradeshik
Armed
Constabulary"

14. The object of sanction for
prosecution under Section 197 CrPC is to
protect the public servants discharging
official/public functions from harassment
by
initiation
of
malafide/frivolous/retaliatory
criminal
proceedings. A Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court in the case of Matajog
Dobey Vs. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44,
delineating importance of sanction for
prosecution of public servants held as
under:-

"15.The minor contentions may
be disposed of at the outset. Even if there
was anything sound and substantial in the
constitutional point about the vires of
Section 5(1) of the Act, we declined to go
into it as it was not raised before the High
Court or in the grounds of the petition for
special leave to appeal. Article 14 does not
render Section 197 of the Criminal
Procedure
Code ultra
vires
as the
discrimination is based upon a rational
classification. Public servants have to be
protected from harassment in the discharge
of official duties while ordinary citizens not
so engaged do not require this safeguard. It
was argued that Section 197 of the
Criminal Procedure Code vested an
absolutely
arbitrary
power
in
the
Government to grant or withhold sanction
at their sweet-will and pleasure, and the
legislature did not lay down or even
indicate any guiding principles to control
the exercise of the discretion. There is no
question of any discrimination between one
person and another in the matter of taking
proceedings against a public servant for an
act done or purporting to be done by the
public servant in the discharge of his
official duties. No one can take such
proceedings without such sanction. If the
Government gives sanction against one
public servant but declines to do so against
another, then the government servant
against whom sanction is given may
possibly complain of discrimination. But
11 All. Vishwanath Singh Rathaur & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Anr.
653
the petitioners who are complainants
cannot be heard to say so, for there is no
discrimination as against any complainant.
It has to be borne in mind that a
discretionary power is not necessarily a
discriminatory power and that abuse of
power is not to be easily assumed where
the discretion is vested in the government
and not in a minor official. Further, we are
not now concerned with any such question.
We have merely to see whether the court
could take cognisance of the case without
previous sanction and for this purpose the
court has to find out if the act complained
against was committed by the accused
while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of official duty. Once this is
settled, the case proceeds or is thrown out.
Whether sanction is to be accorded or not
is a matter for the government to consider.
The absolute power to accord or withhold
sanction conferred on the government is
irrelevant and foreign to the duty cast on
the court, which is the ascertainment of the
true nature of the act."

15. The intention behind protection
under Section 197 CrPC is to protect the
public servant from being unnecessarily
harassed
by
launching
a
criminal
proceeding against him for an offence
allegedly committed while performing
official/public duty. If the offence is in
respect of an act done or purported to be
done in discharge of official/public duty,
the public servant has protection under
Section 197 CrPC. This protection under
Section 197 CrPC has salutary object to
prevent harassment of public servants and
protect them for mala fide and motivated
criminal prosecution. However, if the
competent authority finds that the act of
commission/omission
done
by
public
servant was not in performance of his
public duty, he would sanction prosecution
of the public servant.

16. In 1973 (2) SCC 701 (Pukhraj
Vs. State of Rajasthan and another) the
Supreme
Court
has
held
that
the
requirement of sanction cannot be confined
to only such an act done or purporting to be
done directly in discharge of his public
office. This protection would be available
in cases where the act complained of is in
excess of the duty or under a mistaken
belief as to the existence of such duty.
Paragraph-2 of Pukhraj Vs. State of
Rajasthan and another case (supra) is
extracted hereinunder:-

"2.
The
law
regarding
the
circumstances under which sanction under
Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is necessary is by now well
settled as a result of the decisions from
Hori Ram Singh's case [AIR 1939 FC 43 :
1939 FCR 159 : 40 Cri LJ 468] to the
latest decision of this Court in Bhagwan
Prasad Srivastava v. N.P. Misra [(1970) 2
SCC 56 : (1971) 1 SCR 317] . While the
law is well settled the difficulty really
arises in applying the law to the facts of
any particular case. The intention behind
the section is to prevent public servants
from being unnecessarily harassed. The
section is not restricted only to cases of
anything purported to be done in good
faith, for a person who ostensibly acts in
execution of his duty still purports so to act,
although he
may
have
a
dishonest
intention. Nor is it confined to cases where
the act, which constitutes the offence, is the
official duty of the official concerned. Such
an
interpretation
would
involve
a
contradiction in terms, because an offence
can never be an official duty. The offence
should have been committed when an act is
done in the execution of duty or when an
654 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
act purports to be done in execution of
duty. The test appears to be not that the
offence is capable of being committed only
by a public servant and not by anyone else,
but that it is committed by a public servant
in an act done or purporting to be done in
the execution of duty. The section cannot be
confined to only such acts as are done by a
public servant directly in pursuance of his
public office, though in excess of the duty
or under a mistaken belief as to the
existence of such duty. Nor need the act
constituting the offence be so inseparably
connected with the official duty as to form
part and parcel of the same transaction.
What is necessary is that the offence must
be in respect of an act done or purported to
be done in the discharge of an official duty.
It does not apply to acts done purely in a
private capacity by a public servant.
Expressions such as the "capacity in which
the act is performed", "cloak of office" and
"professed exercise of the office" may not
always be appropriate to describe or
delimit the scope of section. An act merely
because it was done negligently does not
cease to be one done or purporting to be
done in execution of a duty. In Hori Ram
Singh case Sulaiman, J. observed:

"The section cannot be confined
to only such acts as are done by a public
servant directly in pursuance of his public
office, though in excess of the duty or under
a mistaken belief as to the existence of such
duty. Nor is it necessary to go to the length
of saying that the act constituting the
offence should be so inseparably connected
with the official duty as to form part and
parcel of the same transaction."

In the same case Varadachariar,
J. observed: "there must be something in
the nature of the act complained of that
attaches it to the official character of the
person doing it". In affirming this view, the
Judicial Committee ofthe Privy Council
observed in Gill [AIR 1948 PC 128 : 1948
LR 75 IA 41 : 49 Cri LJ 503] case:

"A public servant can only be
said to act or purport to act in the
discharge of his official duty, if his act is
such as to lie within the scope of his official
duty.... The test may well be whether the
public
servant,
if
challenged,
can
reasonably claim that, what he does in
virtue of his office."

In Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari
[AIR 1955 SC 44 : (1955) 2 SCR 925 :
1956 Cri LJ 140] the Court was of the view
that the test laid down that it must be
established that the act complained of was
an official act unduly narrowed down the
scope of the protection afforded by Section
197. After referring to the earlier cases the
Court summed up the results as follows:

"There must be a reasonable
connection between the act and the
discharge of official duty; the act must bear
such relation to the duty that the accused
could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended
or fanciful claim, that he did it in the
course of the performance of his duty."

Applying this test it is difficult to
say that the acts complained of i.e. of
kicking the complainant and of abusing
him, could be said to have been done in the
course
of
performance
of
the
2nd
respondent's duty. At this stage all that we
are concerned with is whether on the facts
alleged in the complaint it could be said
that what the 2nd respondent is alleged to
have done could be said to be in purported
exercise of his duty. Very clearly it is not.
We must make it clear, however, that we
11 All. Vishwanath Singh Rathaur & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Anr.
655
express no opinion as to the truth or falsity
of the allegations."

17. In (2020) 7 SCC 695 (D. Devraja
Vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain) the Supreme
Court, after making survey of the case law
on the question of sanction in paragraphs66, 67, 68, 69, 70 and 71 has held as
under:-

66. Sanction of the Government,
to prosecute a police officer, for any act
related to the discharge of an official duty,
is imperative to protect the police officer
from
facing
harassive,
retaliatory,
revengeful and frivolous proceedings. The
requirement
of
sanction
from
the
Government, to prosecute would give an
upright police officer the confidence to
discharge his official duties efficiently,
without fear of vindictive retaliation by
initiation of criminal action, from which he
would be protected under Section 197 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, read with
Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act. At
the same time, if the policeman has
committed a wrong, which constitutes a
criminal offence and renders him liable for
prosecution, he can be prosecuted with
sanction from the appropriate Government.

67. Every offence committed by a
police officer does not attract Section 197
of the Code of Criminal Procedure read
with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police
Act. The protection given under Section
197 of the Criminal Procedure Code read
with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police
Act has its limitations. The protection is
available only when the alleged act done by
the public servant is reasonably connected
with the discharge of his official duty and
official duty is not merely a cloak for the
objectionable act. An offence committed
entirely outside the scope of the duty of the
police officer, would certainly not require
sanction. To cite an example, a policeman
assaulting a domestic help or indulging in
domestic violence would certainly not be
entitled to protection. However, if an act is
connected to the discharge of official duty
of investigation of a recorded criminal
case, the act is certainly under colour of
duty, no matter how illegal the act may be.

68. If in doing an official duty a
policeman has acted in excess of duty, but
there is a reasonable connection between
the act and the performance of the official
duty, the fact that the act alleged is in
excess of duty will not be ground enough to
deprive the policeman of the protection of
the government sanction for initiation of
criminal action against him.

69. The language and tenor of
Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure
and
Section
170
of
the
Karnataka Police Act makes it absolutely
clear that sanction is required not only for
acts done in discharge of official duty, it is
also required for an act purported to be
done in discharge of official duty and/or
act done under colour of or in excess of
such duty or authority.

70. To decide whether sanction is
necessary, the test is whether the act is
totally unconnected with official duty or
whether there is a reasonable connection
with the official duty. In the case of an act
of a policeman or any other public servant
unconnected with the official duty there can
be no question of sanction. However, if the
act alleged against a policeman is
reasonably connected with discharge of his
official duty, it does not matter if the
policeman has exceeded the scope of his
powers and/or acted beyond the four
corners of law.
656 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

71. If the act alleged in a
complaint purported to be filed against the
policeman is reasonably connected to
discharge of some official duty, cognizance
thereof cannot be taken unless requisite
sanction of the appropriate Government is
obtained under Section 197 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and/or Section 170 of
the Karnataka Police Act."

18. It is also well settled that an
application under Section 482 CrPC is
maintainable to quash the proceedings for
want of sanction or if same are frivolous or
in abuse of process of the Court. If there is
no
reasonable
relationship
with
the
official/public duty the protection under
Section 197 CrPC will not be available to
such a public servant. However, for the
alleged offence committed by the police
personnel, which may be in excess of his
official/public duty, without sanction the
Court is barred to take cognizance of the
offence.

19. In the present case, it is not in
dispute that the applicants, along with other
police personnel were complying the order
of the court below, as such, it cannot be
said that the police officers were not acting
in discharge of their official duty. Even if
the police official had exceeded to some
extent their authority in discharge of their
official/public duty, then also sanction
would be required for their prosecution. In
absence
of
sanction,
the
criminal
proceedings against the applicants would
be non-est and void and the same are liable
to be quashed.

20. In view thereof, the application is
hereby
allowed.
Consequently,
the
impugned proceedings of Complaint Case
No.2803
of
2018
(Lalchand
Vs.
Vishwanath Singh Rathour and others),
under Sections 323, 342, 379, 504 and 506
IPC,
Police
Station-Bhelpur,
DistrictVaranasi against the applicants are, hereby,
quashed.
----------
(2023) 11 ILRA 656
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.09.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAM MANOHAR NARAYAN
MISHRA, J.

Criminal Revision No. 395 of 2023
With
Application U/S 482. No.5071 of 2023

Parmeshwar Srivastava @ Pappi
 ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Prakash Chandra Srivastava, Sri Amit
Kumar Srivasatva, Sri Rishab Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A., Sri Rajendra Singh, Sri Shiv Bahadur
Singh

(A)
Criminal
Law
-
Revision
-
The
Negotiable
instruments
Act,
1981
-
Section 138 - Dishonour of cheque for
insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account,
Section 141 - Offences by companies - for
maintaining the prosecution under Section
141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as
an
accused
is
imperative
-
liability
under Section 138 of the NI Act - Section
itself makes the drawer liable and no
other person - An action in respect of a
criminal or a quasi-criminal provision has
to be strictly construed in keeping with
the provisions alleged to have been
violated - proceedings in such matters are
in personam and cannot be used to foist
an offence on some other person, who