# Vishwanath Singh v. Commissioner Lucknow Mandal Lko. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2015) 2 ILRA 805
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2015-07-22
- **Case number:** Misc Singh No. 735 of 2010
- **Bench:** Dr. Devendra Kumar Arora
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/vishwanath-singh-v-commissioner-lucknow-mandal-lko-anr-43194
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Arms Act, 1959-Section 17 (3)-Cancellation
of fire arms license-on ground number of
FIR lodged-without considering effect on
public peace or safety-ignored by District
Magistrate as well as appellate authority
held-unsustainable-quashed.
Held: Para-13, 14 and 15

## Text

2 All] Vishwanath Singh Vs. Commissioner Lucknow Mandal Lko & Anr.
805
claim will not be entertained. For
example, if the issue relates to payment or
re-fixation of pay or pension, relief may
be granted in spite of delay as it does not
affect the rights of third parties. But if the
claim involved issues relating to seniority
or promotion etc., affecting others, delay
would render the claim stale and doctrine
of laches/limitation will be applied. In so
far as the consequential relief of recovery
of arrears for a past period, the principles
relating to recurring/successive wrongs
will apply. As a consequence, High
Courts will restrict the consequential
relief relating to arrears normally to a
period of three years prior to the date of
filing of the writ petition."
6. We are of the view that the
learned Single Judge was manifestly in
error in dismissing the writ petition on the
ground of laches. The appropriate remedy
would be to direct that the claim of the
appellant be duly verified in accordance
with law. We clarify that authorities shall
duly scrutinize the basis of the claim on
merits and if the appellant is entitled to
the payment of family pension, such
payment, for a period of three years prior
to the filing the writ petition, shall be
effected in favour of the appellant. We
clarify that this would be subject to due
verification of each and every factual
averment which is contained in the
petition by the competent authority. This
exercise shall be completed within a
period of four months from the date of
receipt of a certified copy of this order.
The appellant would be entitled to simple
interest at the rate of 6% per annum.
7. By way of abundant caution, we
clarify that the direction for the payment
of family pension and interest would
operate only if, upon due verification of
the factual averments on the basis of
which the claim was set up, the claim is
found
to
be
substantiated
by
the
competent authority.
8.

The
special
appeal
is,
accordingly, allowed.
9. There shall be no order as to
costs.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 22.07.2015
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. DEVENDRA KUMAR ARORA, J.
Misc Singh No. 735 of 2010
Vishwanath Singh
...Petitioner
Versus
Commissioner Lucknow Mandal Lko. &
Anr.
...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Anurag Srivastava
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
Arms Act, 1959-Section 17 (3)-Cancellation
of fire arms license-on ground number of
FIR lodged-without considering effect on
public peace or safety-ignored by District
Magistrate as well as appellate authority
held-unsustainable-quashed.
Held: Para-13, 14 and 15
13. As averred above, in the case at hand,
the District Magistrate, has not recorded
any finding that it was necessary to cancel
the licence for the security of public peace
or for public safety. All that he has done is,
have referred to some applications and
reports lodged against the petitioner. The
mere fact that some reports had been
lodged against the petitioner could not form
basis of cancelling the licence. The order
806
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
passed by the District Magistrate and that
passed
by
the
Commissioner
cannot,
therefore, be upheld on the basis of
anything contained in Section 17(3) of the
Act.
14. Having considered the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the
parties and the case laws, referred to
above, I am of the view that the
Appellate Court has committed an error
in not considering the facts in its correct
prospective
and
has
also
failed
to
appreciate the grounds mentioned in
Section 17(3) of the Arms Act regarding
revocation or for suspending a licence.
In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts,
the order passed by the Appellate
Authority cannot be legally sustained.
15.
For the reasons stated herein-above,
the writ petition is allowed and the order
dated
07.01.2010
passed
by
the
Commissioner as also the order dated
26.06.2009
passed
by
the
District
Magistrate, Raebareli are hereby set aside.
The District Magistrate shall pass a fresh
order after taking into account all relevant
aspects and the prescription provided under
Section 17 of the Arms Act.
Case Law discussed:
[2013 (31) LCD 1313]; [2014 (4) ADJ 744
(LB)], 2011 (29) LCD 1045; 2011 (29) LCD
829; 2011 (29) LCD 1041; [2009 (67) ACC
157]; [2013 (31) LCD 1460]; [2006 (24) LCD
114].
(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Devendra
Kumar Arora, J.)
1.
By means of the instant writ
petition, the petitioner has sought for
quashing of the impugned order dated
07.01.2010
passed by the appellate
authority/Commissioner and the order
dated 29.06.2009 passed by opposite
party no.2/District Magistrate, Raibareli,
by which fire arm license of the petitioner
has been cancelled.
2. Submission of learned counsel for
petitioner is that petitioner is a law
abiding person of District Raebareli,
where he is engaged in business and is
also a Center Incharge of Dariyapur Sugar
Mill. In the village the family of petitioner
and Sri Shiv Narain Singh, due to political
rivalry, is on inimical terms. It is said that
in the by-election of the year 2000, the
family members of Sri Shiv Narain Singh
with the help of anti-social elements
grievously assaulted the brother of the
petitioner, namely, Sri Dal Bahadur Singh
for which an FIR at Case Crime No. 88 of
2000 was registered against the accused
persons. In the year 2005, during election
when the wife of the petitioner was
contesting, the family members of Sri
Shiv Narain Singh with the help of antisocial elements badly assaulted the
petitioner on 16.10.2005, FIR of which
was registered at Case crime No. 64 of
2005. It is said that on the very same day
i.e. 16.10.2005 another FIR has again
been registered at Case Crime No. 66 of
2005 against Sri Vinod Singh and other
persons, who were the family members of
Sri Shiv Narain Singh in respect to
Marpeat took place in the night of
16.10.2005 with the family members of
the
petitioner.
Learned
counsel
for
petitioner also submitted that as a counter
blast, a false FIR was lodged at Case
Crime No. 6431 of 2005 against the
petitioner by the wife of Sri Shiv Narain
Singh. In the meantime also another false
FIR has been lodged against the petitioner
on account of murder of the son of Sri
Shiv Narain Singh.
3. Learned counsel for petitioner
further submits that Superintendent of
police Raebareli-opposite party no.3,
wrote a letter dated 30.10.2007 to the
Station Incharge, Police Station Jagatpur,
2 All] Vishwanath Singh Vs. Commissioner Lucknow Mandal Lko & Anr.
807
District Raebareli-opposite party no.4
seeking information in respect of the
matter relating to cancellation of arm
licenses of the petitioner on the basis of
some parameters given therein as per
Section 17 of the Arms Act and in reply
thereto the opposite party no.4 on
10.12.2007 submitted incorrect report in
contravention to the provisions of Section
17(3)(b) of the Arms Act, 1959 and
recommended for cancellation of license
of the petitioner under the influence and
pressure exerted by the rival group.
4. According to petitioner's counsel
the petitioner challenged the order dated
29.06.2009 by filing an appeal (Appeal
No. 603 of 2009-10 Vishwanath Singh vs.
District Magistrate Raebareli) before the
appellate authority i.e. the Commissioner,
Lucknow Division, Lucknow-opposite
party no.1, but the same was rejected vide
order
dated
07.01.2010
without
appreciating
the
material
documents
available on record in an erroneous and
unjustified manner.
5. It has been vehemently contended
by the learned counsel for petitioner that
under Section 17(3)(b) of the Act, power
has been conferred upon the licensing
authority to suspend or revoke a license of
fire-arm, if he deems necessary to do so
for the security of public peace, but in the
present case the opposite party no.2 while
passing
the
impugned
order
dated
29.06.2009 failed to show at least, primafacie, that as to how the possession of the
arms by the petitioner would endanger the
public peace. Thus, it is clear that the
same has been passed only on the basis of
recommendations
submitted
by
the
opposite party no.3, who was influenced
with political motivation of Sri Shiv
Narain Singh.
6. Sri Badrul Hasan, learned
Additional Chief Standing counsel, while
opposing the writ petition, submitted that
the impugned orders dated 29.06.2009
and 07.01.2010 have been passed in
consonance with provisions of the Act as
the licensing authority after considering
the material facts on record has given a
categorical finding of fact that the
petitioner has violated the terms and
conditions of arms license. It is submitted
that the impugned orders are absolutely
valid and the same are legal, valid and
justified as the same have been passed
after affording due opportunity to the
petitioner. Therefore, the writ petition is
liable to be dismissed.
7. Thus, the trivial question involved
in this writ petition is as to whether
licensing authority is vested with the
power
under
the
Arms
Act
to
revoke/cancel the license of a public
person mere on involvement in a criminal
case or pendency of a criminal case.
8. To answer the aforesaid question,
it would be apt to refer relevant
paragraphs of Rakesh Kumar Vs. District
Magistrate,
Raebareli
and
others;
[2013(31) LCD 1313], wherein it has
been held that merely because of
pendency of a criminal case, the armslicenses of the petitioner cannot be
cancelled. Relevant paras 12, 13, 14 and
15 read as under:
"12. Further, this Court in the case
of Sahab Singh Vs. Commissioner Agra
Region, Agra and others, 2006 (24) LCD
374 , in paragraph No. 3 held as under:-
The submission of the petitioner is
That merely because of pendency of a
criminal case, the arms licence of the
808
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
petitioner cannot be cancelled. in support
of the said submission, learned counsel
for the petitioner has placed reliance on
two decisions of this Court in the case of
Hausla Prasad Tiwari v. State of U.P. and
Ishwar @ Bhuri v. State of U.P. . It has
further been submitted that in view of the
Full Bench decision of this Court in the
cases of Balaram Singh v. State of U.P.
and Ors. Kailash Nath v. State of U.P.
1985 A.W.C. 493 as well as the Division
Bench decision of this Court in the case of
Sadri
Ram
v.
District
Magistrate,
Azamgarh and Ors. , the arms licence of
the petitioner cannot be placed under
suspension pending enquiry."
13. In the case of Mulayam Singh v.
State of U.P., 2013 (80) ACC 786 in
paragraph Nos. 11 and 12 held as under:-
"Para No. 11 - The question as to
whether mere involvement in a criminal
case or pendency of a criminal case can
be a ground for revocation of licence
under the Arms Act, has been dealt with
by a Division Bench of this Court
reported in 1978 AWC, 122 (Sheo Prasad
Mishra vs. District Magistrate). The
division Bench relied upon the earlier
decision of another Division Bench of this
Court in the case of Masi Uddin vs.
Commissioner, Allahabad, 1972 ALJ 573
wherein it has been held:-
"A licence may be cancelled, interalia, on the ground that it is "necessary
for the security of public peace or for
public safety, to do so. The District
Magistrate has not recorded a finding
that it was necessary for the security of
the public peace or for public safety to
revoke the licence. The mere existence of
enmity between a licencee and another
person
would
not
establish
the
"necessary" connection with security of
the public peace or public safety.
In the case before us also the District
Magistrate has not recorded any finding
that it was necessary to cancel the licence
for the security of public peace or for
public safety. All that he has done is to
have referred to some applications and
reports lodged against the petitioner. The
mere fact that some reports had been
lodged against the petitioner could not
form basis for cancelling the licence. The
order passed by the District Magistrate
and that passed by the Commissioner
cannot, therefore, be upheld on the basis
of anything contained in Section 17(3)(b)
of the Act."
Para No. 12 - Similar view has been
taken by this Court in various decisions
relying upon the Division Bench judgment
passed in Sheo Prasad Mishra( supra).
There is no doubt that the District
Magistrate and the Commissioner i.e.
administrative authorities are bound to
take appropriate action in the matter of
grant of licence and also its cancellation
for the purpose of maintaining peace and
harmony in the society. The assessment of
administrative authorities with regard to
grant or cancellation of licence should
not be interfered in usual course by the
Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction
unless there is illegality or arbitrariness."
14. In the case of Raj Kumar Verma
Vs. State of U.P. , 2013 (80) ACC 231 this
Court in paragraph No. 3 held as under:-
"The ground for issue of show-cause
notice,
suspension
and
ultimately
cancellation of the licence is that one and
precisely
one
criminal
case
was
registered against the petitioner. The
2 All] Vishwanath Singh Vs. Commissioner Lucknow Mandal Lko & Anr.
809
District Magistrate has also held that the
petitioner has been enlarged on bail. He
has gone further to observe that if the
licence remained intact, the petitioner,
may disturb public peace and tranquility.
The same findings have been given by the
Commissioner, Unmindful of the fact that
this Court is repeating the law of the land,
but the deaf ears of the administrative
officers do not ready to succumb the law
of the land. The settled law is that mere
involvement in a criminal case without
any finding that involvement in such
criminal case shall be detrimental to
public peace and tranquility shall not
create the ground for the cancellation of
Armed Licence. In Ram Suchi vs.
Commissioner,
Devipatan
Division
reported in 2004 (22) LCD 1643, it was
held that this law was relied upon in
Balram Singh vs. State of UP 2006 (24)
LCD 1359. Mere apprehension without
substance is simply an opinion which has
no legs to stand. Personal whims are not
allowed to be reflected while acting as a
public servant. "
15. Further, in the case of C.P. Sahu
v. State, 1984 AWC 145, this Court while
interpreting the provisions of Section
17(3) of the Act held as under:-
"The object of the enquiry that a
licensing authority may, while proceeding
to consider the question as to whether or
not an arms licence should be revoked or
suspended, like to make, clearly is to
enable the licensing authority to come to
a conclusion as to whether or not the facts
stated in clauses (a) to (e) of Section
17(3) exist and as already explained, it is
not obliged to before considering that a
case for revocation/suspension of license
has been made out, associate the licensee
in such enquiry, in this view of the matter
it can safely be taken that where a
licensing authority embarks upon such an
enquiry it is, till then not convinced about
existence of the conditions mentioned in
clauses (a) to (e) of Section 17(3) , of the
Act. So long as it is not so convinced no
case to make an order either revoking or
suspending
an
arms
licence
as
contemplated by the section will be made
out."
9. The aforesaid view has been
reiterated in Hridaya Narain Tiwari v.
State of U.P. and others; [2014 (4) ADJ
744 (LB)], Rama Kushwaha vs. State of
U.P. & others, reported in 2011 (29) LCD
1045, Hiramani Singh vs. State of U.P. &
others, reported in 2011(29)LCD 829 and
Rajendra
Singh
vs.
Commissioner,
Lucknow Division, Lucknow and others,
reported in 2011 (29) LCD 1041, wherein
it has been propounded that involvement
in criminal case or pendency of criminal
case
cannot
be
a
ground
for
cancellation/revocation of firearm license.
10. In the case of Jageshwar Vs.
State of U.P. and others; [2009 (67) ACC
157], it has been held that mere
involvement in criminal case cannot in
any way affect the public Security or
public interest.
11. In Thakur Prasad Vs. State of
U.P. and others reported in [2013 (31)
LCD 1460], this court propounded that
"Public Peace" or "Public Safety" do not
mean ordinary disturbance of law and
order, but the public safety means safety
of the public at large and not safety of few
persons only. Relevant paras 9, 10 and 11
of the said case read as under:
"9. Further, while passing the
impugned
order
also
the
licensing
810
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
authority has not given any adequate
finding that if petitioner holds the arms
license then the same shall be against the
public peace or public safety.
"10. Public peace" or "public safety"
do not mean ordinary disturbance of law
and order public safety means safety of
the public at large and not safety of few
persons only and before passing of the
order of cancellation of arm license as
per Section 17(3) of the Act the Licensing
Authority is under an obligation to apply
his mind to the question as to whether
there was eminent danger to public peace
and safety involved in the case in view of
the judgment given by this Court in the
case of Ram Murli Madhukar Vs. District
Magistrate, Sitapur [1998(16) LCD 905],
wherein it has been held that license can
not be suspended or revoked on the
ground of public interest (Jan-hit) merely
on the registration of an F.I.R. and
pending of a criminal case.
11. Further , this Court in the case of
Habib Vs. State of U.P., 2002 ACC 783,
held as under:-
"The question as to whether mere
Involvement in a criminal case or
pendency of a criminal case can be a
ground for revocation of the licence under
Arms Act, has been dealt with by a
Division Bench of this Court in Sheo
Prasad Misra Vs. District Magistrate,
Basti and Ors,. 1978 AWC 122, wherein
the Division Bench relying upon the
earlier decision in Masi Uddin v.
Commissioner, Allahabad, 1972 ALJ 573,
found that mere involvement in criminal
case cannot, in any way, affect the public
security or public interest and the order
cancelling or revoking the licence of fire
arm has been set aside. The present
impugned orders also suffer from the
same infirmity as was pointed out by the
Division Bench in the above-mentioned
cases. I am in full agreement with the
view taken by the Division Bench that
these orders cannot be sustained and
deserve to be quashed and are hereby
quashed.
There is yet another reason that
during the pendency of the present writ
petition, the petitioner has been acquitted
from the aforesaid criminal case and at
present there is neither any case pending,
nor any conviction has been attributed to
the
petitioner,
as
is
evident
from
Annexure
SA-I
and
II
to
the
supplementary-affidavit
filed
by
the
petitioner. In this view of the matter, the
petitioner is entitled to have the fire-arm
licence. It is submitted by petitioner's
counsel that the petitioner has been
acquitted of the charges."
12. At this juncture, it would be
relevant to add that Ram Karpal Singh vs.
Commissioner,
Devi
Patan
Mandal,
Gonda and others ; [2006 (24) LCD 114]
is quite applicable in the present case as in
the present case, the District Magistrate
while cancelling the license has not
recorded any finding based on cogent
material relating to breach of public peace
or tranquility on account of continuance
of Arms license in petitioner's possession.
The mere existence of enmity between a
licensee and another person would not
establish "necessary" connection with
security of public peace or public safety.
13. As averred above, in the case at
hand, the District Magistrate, has not
recorded any finding that it was necessary
to cancel the licence for the security of
public peace or for public safety. All that
he has done is, have referred to some
2 All] Jai Prakash Singh & Ors. Vs. Additional District Judge Raebareli & Ors.
811
applications and reports lodged against
the petitioner. The mere fact that some
reports had been lodged against the
petitioner could not form basis of
cancelling the licence. The order passed
by the District Magistrate and that passed
by the Commissioner cannot, therefore,
be upheld on the basis of anything
contained in Section 17(3) of the Act.
14.

Having
considered
the
submissions made by the learned counsel
for the parties and the case laws, referred
to above, I am of the view that the
Appellate Court has committed an error in
not considering the facts in its correct
prospective and has also failed to
appreciate the grounds mentioned in
Section 17(3) of the Arms Act regarding
revocation or for suspending a licence. In
the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, the
order passed by the Appellate Authority
cannot be legally sustained.
15. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the writ petition is allowed and the
order dated 07.01.2010 passed by the
Commissioner as also the order dated
26.06.2009
passed
by
the
District
Magistrate, Raebareli are hereby set aside.
The District Magistrate shall pass a fresh
order after taking into account all relevant
aspects and the prescription provided
under Section 17 of the Arms Act.
16. Costs easy.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 02.07.2015
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. DEVENDRA KUMAR
ARORA, J.
Misc. Single No. 2159 of 2007
Jai Prakash Singh & Ors. ...Petitioner
Versus
Additional
District Judge Raebareli &
Ors.
...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Rajendra Singh Chauhan
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Mohammad Adil Khan
C.P.C-Order VI Rule 17- Amendment of
plaint-suit for declaration and possessionclaiming right of inheritance-after remand
in Second Appeal-by virtue of amendmentputting
claim
based
upon
adverse
possession-held-when not taken this plea
at earliest possible-after evidence-can not
be allowed-order passed by First Appellate
court-set-a-side.
Held: Para-20
Having examined the instant matter in
the
light
of
the
aforesaid
legal
proposition,
it
comes
out
that
respondents no. 2 and 3 filed a suit
claiming title by succession and sought a
declaration in this regard. As averred
above, earlier the matter went up to the
second appeal stage and was sent back
to the first appellate court for deciding
the appeal afresh. It may be noted that
the suit of respondent no. 2 had been
dismissed by the trial court. When the
matter
was
remanded,
the
private
respondents no. 2 and 3 filed an
application, seeking amendment in the
suit
by
taking
a
plea
of
adverse
possession on the basis of observation
made by this Court in the second appeal.
In my opinion, the learned Additional
District Judge, Court No. 1, Raebareli
committed an error in allowing the said
amendment, overlooking the fact that it
had changed the very nature of the suit
by claiming title on the basis of adverse
possession and abandoning the earlier
plea of title by succession.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 1985 SC 817; AIR 1992 SC 1604; JT 1998
(4) SC 484; [2002 (20) LCD 192]; AIR 2005