# Yogendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors

- **Citation:** (2013) 2 ILRA 855
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2013-05-09
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 25990 of 2013
- **Bench:** A.P. Sahi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/yogendra-pratap-singh-v-state-of-u-p-and-ors-42631
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921-
Chapter III Regulation 105, 106-Senioritypetitioner as well as private respondent were
appointed on compassionate ground on
supernumerary
post-petitioner
got
appointed on 17.07.1998 while Respondent
no. 6 on 18.11.2002-both were absorbed on
16.02.2006-for promotion on class III post
respondent no. 6 claimed to be senior as one
month prior to the petitioner had joined-in
absence of specific provision fortuous joining
can not be taken into account-petitioner
being senior in age-entitled to be promoted
stay granted-accordingly

Held: Para-35
In view of what has been indicated
above and the fact that the petitioner is
senior in age and there is no material to
indicate that he had himself defaulted by
not joining the institution, the petitioner
is also entitled for an interim relief.

## Text

2 All] Yogendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.
855
the post that was occupied by the
petitioner.

19. List on 30.05.2013.

20. Copy of this order be provided
to the learned Standing Counsel Sri
Upendra Singh or Sri J.S. Tomar or to Sri
A.K. Yadav, within three days.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.05.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE A.P. SAHI, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 25990 of 2013

Yogendra Pratap Singh
.. .Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Shri Ashwani Kujmar Mishra
Sri Bramhanand Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Mahendra Singh

U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921-
Chapter III Regulation 105, 106-Senioritypetitioner as well as private respondent were
appointed on compassionate ground on
supernumerary
post-petitioner
got
appointed on 17.07.1998 while Respondent
no. 6 on 18.11.2002-both were absorbed on
16.02.2006-for promotion on class III post
respondent no. 6 claimed to be senior as one
month prior to the petitioner had joined-in
absence of specific provision fortuous joining
can not be taken into account-petitioner
being senior in age-entitled to be promoted
stay granted-accordingly

Held: Para-35
In view of what has been indicated
above and the fact that the petitioner is
senior in age and there is no material to
indicate that he had himself defaulted by
not joining the institution, the petitioner
is also entitled for an interim relief.

(Delivered by Hon'ble A.P. Sahi, J.)

1. Heard Sri Ashwani Kumar
Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner
and
Sri
Mahendra
Singh
for
the
respondent no. 6. Learned Standing
Counsel has accepted notice for the
respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3.

2. Issue notice to the respondent nos.
4 and 5, returnable at an early date.

3. All the respondents shall file a
counter affidavit by the next date fixed.
The matter shall be taken up again on
30th of May, 2013.

4. The dispute in the present writ
petition relates to the inter-se seniority
between the petitioner and the respondent
no.
6
who
were
appointed
on
compassionate
basis
in
different
institutions against a supernumerary post.
It is undisputed that the petitioner was
appointed on 27th July, 1998 and the
respondent no. 6 was appointed on 18th
November, 2002.

5. It is also undisputed that the date
of birth of the petitioner is 19th January,
1970 and that of the respondent no. 6 is
7th July, 1981.

6. Thus the petitioner was appointed
earlier to the respondent no. 6 on
compassionate basis and he is also senior in
age. Both of them continued to work against
supernumerary
posts
awaiting
their
absorption against a permanent substantive
vacancy in any institution as per Regulations
105 and 106 of the Regulations framed under
the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921
under Chapter III thereof.
856 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013

7. It is also undisputed that both of
them were absorbed in Shri Gandhi
Smarak Inter College, Hata, Kushinagar
by an identical order issued on 16th
February, 2006. Consequently, both of
them had to join in the same institution
against substantive posts. The petitioner
joined in the institution on 1st of April,
2006 whereas the respondent no. 6
admittedly joined a month earlier on 1st
of March, 2006. Both of them continued
to function against Class IV posts on
permanent basis and the dispute that has
now
arisen
is
in connection
with
promotion to a Class III post for which
both are claimants.

8. Promotion to a Class III post is
made on the basis of seniority subject to
the possession of a satisfactory service
record. The Principal wrote a letter to the
Manager on 29.8.2012 reflecting the
interse claim of seniority between the
petitioner
and
respondent
no.
6
recommending that the respondent no. 6
would be senior as he has joined earlier
than
the
petitioner.
The
petitioner
represented
the
matter
before
the
management on 24.9.2012 and before the
District
Inspector
of
Schools
on
30.10.2012. Thus the dispute of seniority
came to the forefront for the first time
between the petitioner and the respondent
no. 6 on the issue of promotion against a
Class III post as is now sought to be
raised before this Court.

9. The District Inspector of Schools
has approved the resolution of the
Committee
of
Management
dated
11.11.2012 promoting the respondent no.
6. The petitioner filed writ petition no.
1013 of 2013 in which a direction was
issued to the District Inspector of Schools
to decide the said dispute. Consequently,
the District Inspector of Schools by the
impugned order dated 11th February,
2013 has proceeded to hold that since the
respondent no. 6 Shamshad Ahmad had
joined one month earlier, on 1st of March,
2006, therefore, the respondent no. 6
would be senior as against the petitioner
for the purpose of such consideration of
promotion, and has accordingly accepted
the proposal of promotion in favour of
respondent no. 6.

10. Aggrieved, the petitioner is
before this Court.

11. Sri Ashwani Kumar Mishra
contends that the criteria adopted by the
District Inspector of Schools from the
date of joining is nowhere to be found
under the rules relating to the service
conditions of Class IV and Class III
employees contained in the regulations
framed under Chapter III of the U.P.
Intermediate Education Act, 1921. He
therefore submits that since the petitioner
is senior in age, the date of joining would
not be relevant. He further submits that
the petitioner had taken a clear case that
he was prevented from joining in the
institution earlier on account of the fact
that he had not been relieved from his
earlier institution. He therefore submits
that the act of the petitioner in not joining
earlier was involuntary, and in such a
situation, the same cannot go to the
disadvantage of the petitioner. Had the
management of the earlier institution
relieved the petitioner he would have
immediately joined in the institution to
which he was appointed. Thus his joining
was not on account of any default on the
part of the petitioner, and the same being
an inglorious uncertainty, the same cannot
be taken to be the criteria for determining
seniority.
2 All] Yogendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.
857

12. Sri Mishra further points out that
the District Inspector of Schools has
relied on the Uttar Pradesh Government
Servants Seniority (Third Amendment)
Rules, 2007 to conclude that the date of
joining would be relevant which is a
wrong application of law ignoring the
proviso to Rule 5 of the U.P. Government
Servant Seniority Rules, 1991.

13. Sri Mishra submits that the said
rules having been framed under Article
309 of the Constitution of India, and the
Government Order having been issued
under Article 162 of the Constitution,
would not apply in the case of a Class IV
employee of an Intermediate College
whose service conditions are governed by
the regulations framed under the U.P.
Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and is
not a government service. He therefore
submits that applying a Government
Service Rule for the said purpose was an
erroneous approach adopted by the
District Inspector of Schools. Even
otherwise
the
District
Inspector
of
Schools and the Management have
overlooked Rule 5 (proviso) of the U.P.
Government Servant Seniority Rules,
1991.

14. Sri Mishra then has proceeded to
invite the attention of the Court to the law as
existing on this subject and the decisions of
this Court and of the apex court. To begin
with Sri Mishra has invited the attention of
the court to the proviso to Regulation 106 of
the regulations framed under Chapter III of
the 1921 Act which provides that where a
candidate appointed on compassionate basis
is occupying a supernumerary post, he shall
continue to do so till a vacancy becomes
available on permanent basis in any
institution of the District, and upon
availability of such a vacancy he shall be
absorbed against the same. In such a case the
service rendered by the incumbent of the
supernumerary post shall be counted for the
fixation of pay and retirement benefits. He
submits that thus it is only the benefit of
fixation of pay and retiral benefits that is
available and not any other benefit like
seniority in service by virtue of such
occupation. He therefore contends that the
rules specifically do not provide for getting
the benefit of seniority while being appointed
against a supernumerary post.

15. Advancing his submissions, he
contends that a supernumerary post is an
ex-cadre post and unless an employee
falls within a cadre he cannot claim any
such benefit of seniority. He therefore
submits that the rule also gives an
indicator that the seniority with regard to
the
period
of
occupation
of
a
supernumerary
post
would
not
be
available.

16. A learned Single Judge in the
case of Saradar Mohammad Ansar
Khan Vs. State of U.P. & others
reported in 1993 AWC Pg. 589
borrowed the principles relating to the
seniority rules of teachers in Intermediate
Colleges for the purpose of construing
and adjudicating seniority inter-se dispute
of Class III employees. It was a dispute of
promotion to the post of Head Clerk to be
filled up from the feeder cadre of
Assistant Clerk. The two contenders
therein were Assistant Clerks who had
been selected on consideration of their
merit and were placed accordingly in the
select list. The management adopted the
criteria of merit and placement in the
select list as the basis of seniority. The
learned Single Judge relied on certain
principles of law and held that in the
absence of any specific statutory rule for
858 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
the said purpose it would be reasonable to
adopt the same criteria of seniority in age,
as is provided for teachers.

17. The said judgment of the learned
Single Judge was subjected to an appeal
before this Court reported in 1993
Allahabad Civil Journal Pg. 952. The
division bench reversed the judgment of
the learned Single Judge and held in
paragraph 7 as follows:-

"7. When there are no rules or
regulations for determining the seniority
of the employees, it is open to the
employer to adopt any fair and
reasonable criteria for this purpose.
What is fair and reasonable is for the
employer to determine. Supreme Court
in Reserve Bank of India Vs. N.C. Paliwal
and others AIR 1976 SC 2345, in this
connection has laid down as under:

"Then we come to the question of the
rule of seniority adopted by the combined
seniority scheme. Now there can be no
doubt that it is open to the State to lay
down any rule which it thinks appropriate
for determining seniority in service and it
is not competent to the courts to strike
down such rule on the ground that in its
opinion another rule would have been
better or more appropriate. The only
enquiry which the court can make is
whether the rule laid down by the State is
arbitrary and irrational so that it results in
inequality
or
opportunity
amongst
employee belonging to the same class."

On the same principle the Committee
of Management, being the employer of
clerical staff of the Institution has, in the
absence of any rule or regulation, full
power to adopt any criteria or rule for
fixing the seniority of the clerical staff of
the institution. If the criteria/rule adopted
by the managing committee is not found
to be fair and reasonable, it will be open
to the court to set aside its decision. In the
instant case learned Single Judge has not
held that the criteria adopted by the
managing
committee
was
unfair,
unreasonable or unjust. As held by the
Supreme Court in Reserve Bank of India
Vs. N.C. Paliwal (supra). It is not
competent to the court to strike down
such rule on the ground that in its opinion
another rule would have been better or
more appropriate the managing committee
declared the appellant as senior on the
basis of merit assigned to him in the merit
list prepared at the time of selection. This
is
a
criteria
adopted
in
various
Government Departments for determining
the seniority of the employees appointed
on the same date. It is a well known rule
for fixing seniority in the service
jurisprudence. Supreme Court in Dr. N.D.
Misra Vs. Union of India (JT 1994 (4) SC
206) has held that seniority of persons
promoted on the same date has to be
determined whether on the basis of length
of service in the feeder post or on the
basis of merit assigned to them by the
selection committee. Relevant extract
from the said decision of the Supreme
Court is reproduced below:

"Persons promoted and appointed as
Deputy Director Generals on the same
date can be given seniority either on the
basis of length of service in the post of
Director or on the basis of merit assigned
by the D.P.C. depending upon statutory
rules or Government instructions on the
subject."

18. Sri Mishra then invited the
attention of the Court to the apex court
decision in the case of Director of
2 All] Yogendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.
859
Education (Secondary) and another Vs.
Pushpendra Kumar and others reported in
(1998) 5 SCC 192 to support the fact that
the only limited benefits are available for
occupants of supernumerary post. He then
has cited the decision in the case of D.P.
Das Vs. Union of India and others
reported in (2011) 8 SCC 115 Paragraphs
18 to 21 to urge that in the absence of any
rule of seniority available, the District
Inspector of Schools could not have
borrowed it from the Government Service
Rules, and it was for the employer to have
proceeded to adopt any reasonable rule,
and in the absence of any such rule having
been enforced or adopted the court can fill
up the gap. For this he contends that it has
been held that a fair and just principle of
seniority has to be applied as held in the
aforesaid decision. Paragraphs 18 to 21 of
the aforesaid decision are extracted herein
under for ready reference:-

"18.The law is clear that seniority is
an incidence of service and where the
service rules prescribe the method of its
computation, it is squarely governed by
such rules. In the absence of a provision
ordinarily the length of service is taken
into account . The Supreme Court in M.B.
Joshi & others. V. Satish Kumar Pandey
& Ors., AIR 1993 SC 267 has laid down
that it is the well settled principle of
service jurisprudence then in the absence
of any specific rule the seniority amongst
persons holding similar posts in the same
cadre has to be determined on the basis of
the length of the service and not on any
other fortuitous circumstances.

19. Determination of seniority is a vital
aspect in the service career of an employee.
His future promotion is dependent on this.
Therefore, the determination of seniority
must be based on some principles, which are
just and fair. This is the mandate of Articles
14 and 16.

20. In Government Branch Press and
another v. D.B. Belliappa a three-Judge
Bench of this Court construing Articles 14
and 16 interpreted the equality clause of
the Constitution as follows: (SCC pp.
485-86, para 24)

"24...The executive, no less than the
judiciary, is under a general duty to act
fairly. Indeed, fairness founded on reason
is the essence of the guarantee epitomized
in Articles 14 & 16(1)." (see AIR para 24
at page 434)

21. Another three-Judge Bench of
this Court in Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of
Haryana & other,(2003) 5 SCC 604, while
dealing with the question of absence of a
rule governing seniority held that an
executive order may be issued to fill up
the gap. Only in the absence of a rule or
executive instructions, the court may have
to evolve a fair and just principle of
seniority, which could be applied in the
facts and circumstances of the case. (see
para 47 at page 619) "

19. He has then cited another decision
of the apex court in the case of Shiba
Shankar Mohapatra & others Vs. State of
Orissa & others reported in (2010) 12 SCC
Pg. 471 to advance his submission that in
the event such a question relating to
seniority where a person has been treated to
be senior for a long time is raised then a
long standing seniority should not be
disturbed. He submits that the petitioner and
the respondent no. 6 having been appointed
in the institution after absorption were
continuing since 2006 and the petitioner
was undisputedly always shown senior in
the documents of the institution over and
above the respondent no. 6. He has further
relied on the Full Bench decision in the case
860 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
of Dr. Asha Saxena Vs. Smt. S. K.
Chaudhary and others 1991 (2) U.P.
Local Bodies and Education Cases 1202
to further substantiate that a long standing
seniority cannot be altered.

20. Sri Mahendra Singh, learned
counsel for the respondent no. 6 on the
other hand contends that even assuming
though not admitting that the arguments
advanced on behalf of the petitioner and
the decisions relied upon by the learned
counsel are correct, then too also the
criteria as evolved by the District
Inspector of Schools cannot be said to be
either perverse or unlawful or even
unreasonable, inasmuch as, the petitioner
had failed to join the institution and had
arrived at a much later point of time for
which there is no valid explanation. He
further submits that the voluntary act of
the petitioner in coming to join the
institution later than the respondent no. 6,
definitely makes him junior, and therefore
the conclusion drawn by the District
Inspector of Schools cannot be faulted
with. He therefore submits that the criteria
so adopted does not in any way violate
Article 14 or is ultra vires or contrary to
any such rule which may be available for
such services in the education department.
He contends that reference to the
Government Servants Amended Seniority
Rules, 2007 would therefore not be
foreign or alien to the controversy.

21. Having heard learned counsel
for the contesting parties and having
perused the aforesaid entire position of
law as placed before the court, it is
evident that the regulations do not make
any provision for determination of interse seniority of Class IV employees.
Appointment to class IV posts are by
direct recruitment only. Thus in the
absence of any such rules, the decisions
that have been relied upon do not indicate
any fixed criteria that can be adopted for
the purpose of determining such seniority.
The division bench judgment in the case
of Sardar Mohammad Ansar Khan (supra)
in paragraph 7 thereof clearly indicates
that it is for the employer to adopt a
reasonable rule and in the event the rule
adopted is not reasonable it can be
subjected to challenge before a court of
law. It was further held that the court
could not have borrowed the rule of
teachers for applying the same in the case
of non teaching staff of the institution.

22. This court finds that subsequent
to the decision, the apex court decision in
the case of D.P. Das (supra), has held that
in the absence of a rule governing
seniority an executive order can be issued
to fill up the gap, and in the absence of
any rule or executive instructions the
court may have to evolve a fair and just
principle of seniority. The division bench
in the judgment of Sardar Mohammad
Ansar Khan (supra) did not lay down or
evolve any principle of seniority except
for leaving it open to such a rule being
adopted by the employer and its judicial
review by the court. Since the dispute was
of placement on the basis of merit being a
selection post, the court upheld the
criteria evolved by the Committee therein

23. The said decision was rendered
more than two decades ago but till date
the legislature or the rule making
authority has failed to make any attempt
to lay down a rule of seniority inspite of
the fact that such disputes keep on coming
every now and then in all the institutions
that are aided and governed by the
provisions of the 1921 Act. Thus there is
a permanent gap unfilled as on date
2 All] Yogendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.
861
awaiting guidance in order to lay down
any rule of principle of seniority.

24. Before any such pronouncement
is made what has to be seen is that the
mode of recruitment of a Class IV
employee in an aided institution is by way
of direct recruitment. One of the methods
is compassionate appointment. It is not a
case of preparation of merit and merit is
not the criteria for the purpose of such
appointment. There is no consideration
like merit for offering a compassionate
appointment.
Only
minimum
qualifications are required to be possessed
with relaxation if any under rules. There
is nothing to be compared on merits.
There
can
be
two
simultaneous
appointments, one on compassionate basis
and one by routine procedure, there can
be no comparative merit between these
two appointments. Similarly, as in the
present case, the absorption is of two
compassionate appointees. The rule of
merit as upheld in the case of Sardar
Mohammad Ansar Khan (supra) therefore
is not attracted here.

25. In such a situation, it is only
seniority by way of age which can be
reasonably pressed into service as a
rational criteria. The criteria of seniority
in age for the purpose of future promotion
subject to rejection of unfit, which is also
involved in the present case, therefore
would be a rationally just method to
determine seniority.

26.

There
are
certain
more
complications that have to be taken into
account. A supernumerary post being an
ex-cadre post, a person originally senior
as a supernumerary appointee, cannot
claim
seniority
by
virtue
of such
appointment against an ex-cadre post. The
seniority has to be determined after the
person enters into a regular cadre.

27. Yet there is another anomaly
involved as in the present case where both
the petitioner and the respondent no. 6
have been appointed on supernumerary
basis. The petitioner has been appointed
in 1998 and the respondent no. 6 has been
appointed in 2002. The petitioner who
was
appointed
much
before
the
respondent no. 6 does not get any benefit
of his seniority inspite of having worked
in an aided institution. The other side of
the coin is that a person after having been
appointed on a supernumerary post in an
institution of his choice may not like to alter
his position and may allow him himself to
continue against such a supernumerary post,
inspite of availability of a permanent post in
any other institution where he may not like to
join. In such a situation, the person holding a
supernumerary post should not be allowed to
take undue advantage of his position and for
this, it would be more appropriate that the
rule of seniority is framed from the date of
substantive appointment after absorption.
The mode of recruitment and the manner of
entry of a candidate in a particular cadre is
therefore very much essential to be taken into
account for the purpose of framing a rule of
seniority. At the same time, it would also be
relevant to again repeat that the proviso to
Regulation 106 has consciously not included
any benefit of seniority being given to a
compassionate appointee. Thus a criteria will
have to be evolved on the basis of
substantive appointment in the cadre after the
availability of a permanent vacancy duly
sanctioned under the provisions of the act
and the rules.

28. Prima facie, as per the ratio of
the decisions noted above, where there is
no prescribed rule to fix seniority, a
862 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
reasonable rule can be adopted by the
employer.
In
the
instant
case
the
appointing authority of a Class IV
employee is the Principal and the
employer
is
the
Committee
of
Management,
and
not
the
District
Inspector of Schools. The Committee is
the appointing authority of a Class III
employee (Clerk) and not of a Class IV
employee. The District Inspector of
Schools, being neither the appointing
authority nor the employer, cannot
therefore adopt any rule on his own so
long as regulations are not framed. No
order exists issued by the Government
under Section 9(4) of the 1921 Act. The
Government will therefore have to
provide for effective regulations which
have not been framed. The District
Inspector of Schools therefore cannot on
its own employ any rule. On the other
hand every aided institution is an
independent unit by itself with its own
Principal
and
a
Committee
of
Management. This does not mean that
every institution should be allowed to
frame its own rule that will lead to a
chaos throughout the State. The State will
therefore have to frame an uniform
regulation to govern such matters.

29. The difficulty has arisen on
account of there being a purely legal gap
in this particular field which is being
experienced in almost several cases
before this Court. Accordingly, this court
may have to issue necessary instructions
in the light of Paragraph 21 of the
decision in the case of D.P. Das (supra)
for determining the inter-se seniority or
resolving any such dispute that may arise
in future.

30. Consequently, the learned Chief
Standing Counsel is directed to place a
certified copy of this order before the
respondent no. 1 who shall convene a
meeting with the Director of Education
and such other authorities that he may
find necessary for the purpose of such
determination, and framing of such a rule
so that such disputes are resolved under a
rule
which
is
statutory,
either
by
amending the rules or by issuing a
Government Order under Section 9(4) of
the U.P. Intermediate Education Act,
1921. This exercise must be done by the
next date fixed.

31. It is made clear that no further
time deserves to be given as the State has
already slept over the matter for 20 years
by not framing rules after the decision in
Sardar Mohammad Ansar Khan's case.

32. An affidavit shall be filed by the
respondent no. 1 bringing to the notice of
the Court as to what exercise has been
undertaken in this regard.

33. Coming to the present case, the
Principal has applied the concept of
absorption on the post by relating it to the
date of joining. The petitioner and the
respondent no. 6 were absorbed under a
common order dated 16.2.2006. This is not
an absorption in the same organization
against the earlier post held by the
incumbent. Here the absorption under the
regulation can be made in any of the
institutions throughout the district under
Regulation 105. In the instant case also the
petitioner and respondent no. 6 were in
different institutions before absorption in the
same institution. Their date of joining is
different. This can be for various reasons that
can be beyond the control of an employee.
The order of absorption is the same and of
one date. If the reasoning of joining as
borrowed from the Government Servant
2 All] M/s BAGSON Vs. Labour Court, II and Anr.
863
Seniority Rules is to be adopted, as in the
present case, then the proviso to Rule 5 of the
1991 Rules makes it clear that a person
would loose seniority if he fails to join
except for any valid reason, on which the
decision of the appointing authority shall be
final. The Principal or the Management or
even the District Inspector of Schools have
not cared to make any such assessment
inspite of the petitioner having taken this
stand clearly that his joining late was not
voluntary and was delayed as he was not
relieved timely by the earlier institution.
Thus on this score Sri Mishra is right in his
submission.

34. The petitioner was shown senior
in the documents since 2006.

35. In view of what has been
indicated above and the fact that the
petitioner is senior in age and there is no
material to indicate that he had himself
defaulted by not joining the institution,
the petitioner is also entitled for an
interim relief.

36. Until further orders of the court
the operation of the order dated 11th of
February, 2013 shall remain stayed.

37. A copy of the order shall be
given to the learned Standing Counsel
within five days free of charges for
compliance.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.05.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE BHARATI SAPRU, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 26924 of 2008

M/s Bagson

 ...Petitioner
Versus
Labour Court, II and Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Shakti Swarup Nigam

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Rajesh Tiwari

U.P. Industrial Dispute Act-1947-Section
6-N- Writ against award for reinstated
with full back wages-pursuant to interim
order of writ court in compliance of
provisions under section 17-B Rs. 17000/-
deposited by petitioner-workman at the
time of award was 57 years old-for
violation of the provisions of section 6-Ntribunal ought to have grant lum-sum
compensation-after death of workmanaward modified to release Rs. 17000/-
apart from compensation of Rs. 50,000/-
in favor of heirs of the workman.

Held: Para-8
Having heard learned counsel for the
parties and having perused the material on
record and in view of the law settled by the
Hon'ble Apex Court, I am of the opinion
that it would be just and fair that since the
workman is no more, a compensation of
Rs.16,000/-
which
has
already
been
deposited before the Labour Court may be
released
to
the
heirs
of
respondent
workman along with another sum of
Rs.50,000/- which have been agreed by
both the parties before this court, may be
paid to legal heirs and representative of the
workman as full and final compensation for
violation of provisions of section 6-N of the
Act. It is directed that the amount as
indicated above, shall be released to the
legal heirs and representative of the
respondent workman within a period of two
months from the date of passing of this
order.

Case Law discussed:
(2007) 9 SCC 748; (2008) 5 SCC 75

(Delivered by Hon'ble Bharti Sapru, J.)