# ~01 MAHABIR PRASAD SANTOSH KUMAR v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1971] 1 S.C.R. 201
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1970-04-02
- **Case number:** "Civil Appeal No. 457 of 1970
- **Bench:** J.C. Shah, K. S. Hegde
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/01-mahabir-prasad-santosh-kumar-v-state-of-u-p-and-ors-4988
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Sugar Dealers' Liccnsi11g Order, 1962-Power of District Magistrate
to cancel licence-if q1111sl·jud,iclal.
State Govtrn111ent de<1/i11g with. statutor~ apptG·ls-Necesslty to rive
fla&0'1$,
.
The appellants, who were holders of n licence under tho U.P. Suaar
Dealers' Lfcen1ln.11 Order, 1962, to deal in 1u1ar and were also llcenced
to deal In fl.our, wore called upon by a letter dated June 5, 1967 to explalll
certain lmaularltles detected on Inspection of their 1hop. The next day
they were directed to hand over thelr 1tock1 of 1u1ar and fl.our to a Cooperative Marketln.11 Society. Their representatlon1 a.111!n1t this direction
to the District MaiJstrate were not attended to and they were therefore
obliged to surrender their stock1.
By a letter dated June 28, 1967, tho
appellants were informed that the District Magistrate had cancelled their
licences as dealers in sugar and flour but no reasons were given for this
order. An appeal under clause 8 of the Order of 1962 to the State Gov·
ernment was rejected but no reasons were communicated to the appellants
for this rejection.
A writ petition challenging the orde'rs of the District
Magistrate and the State Government in appeal was dismissed by the
High Court. On appeal to this Coμrt,
HELD : The orders passed by the District Magistrate and the State
Government cancelling the licences of the appellants must be quashed.
The authorities had disclosed by their conduct a reckless disregard of
the rights of the appellants. The order passed bv the District Magistrate
cancelling the licences was quasi·judicial; it could be made only on a
consideration of the charges and the explanation given by the appellants.
That necessarily implied that the District Magistrate had to give some
reasons why he held the charges proved, and the explanation unacceptable.
The appellants had a right to carry on their business and they could be
deprived of their right only by an order supported by good and adequate
reasons.
Under the rules appellant had a right of appeal to the State
Government. Unless reasons were given in the District Magistrate's Order
the aggrieved party had no opportunity to convince the State Government
that the order was erroneous.
If the aggrieved party was not supplied
the reasons the right of appeal was an empty formality. [203 H-204 D]
There was niching on the record to show that the representations made
by the appellants to the State Government were even considered. The fact
that cl. 7 of the Sugar Dealers' Licensing Order to which the High Court
had referred does not "require the State Government to pa~ a reasoned
order" is wholly irrelevant.
The nature of the proceedin~ requires that
the State Government must give adequate reasons which disclose that an
attempt was made to reach a conclusion, which was according to law and
just. [205 HJ
Opportunity to a party interested in the jjispute to present bis case
on questions of law as well as fact, ascertainment of facts from materials
L 11'.Sup.C 1-14
----------
202
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l 971] 1 S.C.R.
b:-forc the Tribunal after disclosing the mate'rials Jo" the pj\rty against whom
it
i·~ intended to use them: and adjudication by a reasoned judgment upon
a finding of the facts found, are attributes of"even a quasi-judicial determination.
It must appear not Jllerely that the authority entrusted with
quasi-judicial authority has reached a conclusion on the problem before
•him : it !llU~t appear that he has reached a conclusion which is accdrding
to la\v and just, and for ensuring that he must record the ultimate mental
process leading from the dispute to its 5olution. [204 HJ ,
Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India & Others (per
Subba Rao, J.) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 466; Bhagat Raja v. 'Union of India and
Ors. [1967] 3 S.C.R. 302; State of Mqdhya Pradesh and Anr. v: Seth
Narsingh'tias !ankidai Mehta, C.A. Np. 621 of 1966 decided on April 29,
1969: The SflJte of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha o-nd Ors., C.A. No .. -723
of 1966 decided'

## Text

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~01
MAHABIR PRASAD SANTOSH KUMAR
v.
STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
April 2, 1970
[J.C. SHAH AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.)
Sugar Dealers' Liccnsi11g Order, 1962-Power of District Magistrate
to cancel licence-if q1111sl·jud,iclal.
State Govtrn111ent de<1/i11g with. statutor~ apptG·ls-Necesslty to rive
fla&0'1$,
.
The appellants, who were holders of n licence under tho U.P. Suaar
Dealers' Lfcen1ln.11 Order, 1962, to deal in 1u1ar and were also llcenced
to deal In fl.our, wore called upon by a letter dated June 5, 1967 to explalll
certain lmaularltles detected on Inspection of their 1hop. The next day
they were directed to hand over thelr 1tock1 of 1u1ar and fl.our to a Cooperative Marketln.11 Society. Their representatlon1 a.111!n1t this direction
to the District MaiJstrate were not attended to and they were therefore
obliged to surrender their stock1.
By a letter dated June 28, 1967, tho
appellants were informed that the District Magistrate had cancelled their
licences as dealers in sugar and flour but no reasons were given for this
order. An appeal under clause 8 of the Order of 1962 to the State Gov·
ernment was rejected but no reasons were communicated to the appellants
for this rejection.
A writ petition challenging the orde'rs of the District
Magistrate and the State Government in appeal was dismissed by the
High Court. On appeal to this Coμrt,
HELD : The orders passed by the District Magistrate and the State
Government cancelling the licences of the appellants must be quashed.
The authorities had disclosed by their conduct a reckless disregard of
the rights of the appellants. The order passed bv the District Magistrate
cancelling the licences was quasi·judicial; it could be made only on a
consideration of the charges and the explanation given by the appellants.
That necessarily implied that the District Magistrate had to give some
reasons why he held the charges proved, and the explanation unacceptable.
The appellants had a right to carry on their business and they could be
deprived of their right only by an order supported by good and adequate
reasons.
Under the rules appellant had a right of appeal to the State
Government. Unless reasons were given in the District Magistrate's Order
the aggrieved party had no opportunity to convince the State Government
that the order was erroneous.
If the aggrieved party was not supplied
the reasons the right of appeal was an empty formality. [203 H-204 D]
There was niching on the record to show that the representations made
by the appellants to the State Government were even considered. The fact
that cl. 7 of the Sugar Dealers' Licensing Order to which the High Court
had referred does not "require the State Government to pa~ a reasoned
order" is wholly irrelevant.
The nature of the proceedin~ requires that
the State Government must give adequate reasons which disclose that an
attempt was made to reach a conclusion, which was according to law and
just. [205 HJ
Opportunity to a party interested in the jjispute to present bis case
on questions of law as well as fact, ascertainment of facts from materials
L 11'.Sup.C 1-14
----------
202
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l 971] 1 S.C.R.
b:-forc the Tribunal after disclosing the mate'rials Jo" the pj\rty against whom
it
i·~ intended to use them: and adjudication by a reasoned judgment upon
a finding of the facts found, are attributes of"even a quasi-judicial determination.
It must appear not Jllerely that the authority entrusted with
quasi-judicial authority has reached a conclusion on the problem before
•him : it !llU~t appear that he has reached a conclusion which is accdrding
to la\v and just, and for ensuring that he must record the ultimate mental
process leading from the dispute to its 5olution. [204 HJ ,
Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India & Others (per
Subba Rao, J.) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 466; Bhagat Raja v. 'Union of India and
Ors. [1967] 3 S.C.R. 302; State of Mqdhya Pradesh and Anr. v: Seth
Narsingh'tias !ankidai Mehta, C.A. Np. 621 of 1966 decided on April 29,
1969: The SflJte of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha o-nd Ors., C.A. No .. -723
of 1966 decided' on April 21,1969 and' Prag Das Umar Vaishya v. The
Union of India and Ors., !='.A, No. 657 of 1965 decided on Aug. 11, 1967;
referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : "Civil Appeal No. 457 of
1970.
-
(
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated
April 24, 1968 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ
N.:r. 1401 of 1968.
J. P. Goyal and V. C. Prashar, for the appellant.
C. B. Agarwilla and 0. P. Rana, for the respondent.
The .Judgment of the Court .was deliverec;l by
Shah, J.
The appellants held a licence under the U.P. Sugar
Dealers' Licensing Order, 1962, to deal in sugar as "wholesale
distributors" they also held a licence under the U.P. Foodgrains·
Dealers' Licensing Order, 1964. By letter dated June 5',
1967
the appellants were called· upon to explain certain irregularities
detected on inspection of their shop by the Assistant Commissioner
of Food and Civil Supplie§ on April 24, 1967. On the following
day the appellants were directed to hand ov9'. all their slocks of
sugar and flour to the Bindki Co-operative· Marketing Society.
Representations against"tbe order directing the appellants to
deliver their stocks made to the District Magistrate, Fatehpur,
\\·ere not ·even attended to, and the appellants were obliged to
surrender their stocks of_ sugar and flour.
By letter dated June
28. 1967, the appellants were informed that the District Magistr:ite, Fatehpur, had cancelled their licences as dealers in sugar
and flour. The appellants applied for a copy of the order, but it
was not supplied.
Against the order of the District Magistrate, the appellants
submitted an app~al under cl. 8 of the S~gar Dealers' Licensing
Order, J962, on July 19, 1967.
By l_etter dated January 11,
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MAHABIR PRASAD V. U.P. STATE (Shah, /.)
203
1969. the Deputy Secretary to the Government of U.P., , Foo.d
and Rationing Department, intimated the appellants that . th71r ·
appe1l agaiust the cancellation of the licence by the District
Magi<;trate was rejected. The reasons for the order passed by
the State Government were also not communicated to the appellant<;.
The appellants then moved a petition in the High Court of
Allahabad for a writ quashing the orders of the District Magistrate :md the State Government in appeal.
The yetition was rejected by a Division Bench of the High Court. With special leave,
the appellants have appealed to this Court.
The proceedings of the authorities exercising power
under
the Sugar Dealers' Licensing Order, 1962, and the Foodgrain
Dealers' Licensing Order, 1964, strike at the vr.ry root of the
rule of law. The appellants have by a series of official acts which
flout the rule of law deprived of even the semblance of protection they may claim in an administration functioning under a
democratic Constitution. A day. after the date on which the
appellants were called upon to submit their explanation regarding
the irregularities alleged to be discovered at the inspection, they
were ordered to part with the stocks of sugar and flour in their
posse;sion. Objections raised by the appellants before the District Magistrate were never attended to.
No attempt is made to
disclose the source of the power and the necessity to exercise that
pow~r. By the action of the authorities, the appellants were
deprived of their right to carry on business in sugar and flour
without even an opportunity to explam the alleged irregularities.
Their protests addressed to the District Magistrate were ignored;
the District Magistrate cancelled their licences without disclosing
any reasons, and the State Government rejected the statutory
appeal also without recording any reasons.
This series of actions
and orders passed by the executive authorities require something
more than a plea of ignorance of law on the part of the authorities to explain. The appellants were entitled at least to be told
the reasons for cancelling their licences. The District Magistrate
intimated the cancellation of the licences by an official communication, giving no reasons, and the result of the appeal to the State
Government was communicated by a letter from the Deputy
Secretary to the Government of U.P .. without disclosing even the
identity of the officer who consider~d the objections and the
rea~'.Jns for rejecting the objections.
The case discloses a disturbing state of affiairs. The authorities have disclosed by their conduct a reckless disregard of the
rights of the appellants. The order passed by the District Magistrate cancelJing th~ licences was a quasi-judicial : it could be
made only on a consideration of the chal'ges and the explanation
204
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] I S.C.R.
given by the appellants. That necessanly implied that the Districi Magistrate had to give some reasons why he held the charges
proved, and the explanation unacceptable.
When the matter
was carried in appeal, the State Government could at least have
acted with some awareness that citizens have rights which must be
protected against possible arbitrary action .by
subordinate officials.
The District Magistrate is not made the final authority
in cancelling the licence.
The appellants had a right to carry
on their business, and they held a licence to carry on their business they could be deprived of their right by nn executive order
supported by good and adequate reasons.
The relevant rules
granted 11 right of appeal to the State Government against that
order, and that implied that the aggrieved party must h.ave
an
opportunity to convince the State Government that the order
passed by the District Magistrnte was
erroneous.
That light
could be effectively exercised if reasons be recorded by the Dis-
. trict Magistrate and supplied to the aggrieved party. If the
aggrieved party is not supplied the reasons, the right to appeal is
an empty formality.
From the materials on the record it cannot be determio.ed as
to who considered the appeal addressed to the State Government,
and what was considered by the authority exercising power on
behalf of the State Government. The practice of the. executive
authority dismissing statutory appeals against orders which prima
facie seriously prejudice the rights of the aggrieved party without
giving reasons is a negation of the rule of law.
This Court had
occasion to protest against this practice in several decisions :
s~e
Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India & 01hers( 1)
(per Subba Rao, J.,); Bhagat Raja v. Union of India and Ors(');
State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Seth Narsinghdas Jankidas
Mehta( 8 ). The State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and
Ors.('); and Prag Das Umar Vaishya v. The Union of India and
Ors.('). The power of the District Magistrate was quasi-judicial :
exercise of the power of the State Government was subject to
the supervisory power of the High Court under Art. 227 of the
Constitution and of the appellate power of this Court under Art.
136 of the Constitution. The High Court and this Court would
be placed under a great disadvantag.~ if no reasons are given, and
the appeal is dismissed without recording and
communicating
any reasons.
Opportunity to a party interested in the dispute to present his
.case on questions of Jaw as well as fact,
ascertainment of facts
(1) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 466.
(2) [1967] 3 S.C.R. 302.
(3) C.A. No. 021 of 1966 decided on April 29, 1969.
(4) C.A. No. 723 of 1966 decided on April 21, 1969.
(5) C.A. No. 657of1%5 d<eided on Aug. 17, 1967.
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MAHABIR PRASAD V. U.P. STATE (Shah,].)
!05
from materials before the Tribunal after disclosing the materials
to the party against whom it is intended to use them, and adjudication by a reasone,d judgment upon a finding of the facts in
controversy and application of the law to the facts found,
are
attributes of even a quasi-judicial determination.
It must appear
not merely that the authority entrusted with quasi-judicial authority has reached a conclusion on the problem before him : it must
appear that he has reached a conclusion which is according to
law and just, and for ensuring that end he must record the ultimate mental process leading from the dispute to ·its solution.
Satisfactory decision of a disputed claim may be reached only if it
be supported by the most cogent reasons that appeal to
the
authority.
Recording of reasons in support of a decision on a
disputed claim by a quasi-judicial authority ensures that the decision is
reached according to law and is not the result of caprice, whim or fancy or reached on grounds of policy or expediency.
A party to the dispute is ordinarily entitled to know the
grounds on which the authority has rejected his claim. If the
order is subject to appeal, the necessity to record reasons is greater, for without recorded reasons the appellate authority has no
material on which it may determine whether the facts were properly ascertained, the relevant law was correctly applied and the·
decision was just.
The High Court in rejecting the petition filed by the appellants
has observed that the District Magistrate in considering the explanation of the appellants has "considered all the materials" and
also that "the State Government in considering the appeal had
considered all the materials".
We have, however, nothing
on
the record to show what materials,
if any, were considered by
the District Magistrate and the State Government.
The High
Court has also observed that cl. 7 of the Sugar Dealers' Licensing
Order does not require "the State Government to pass a reasoned
order.
All that is required is to give an aggrieved person an
opportunity of being heard." We are of the view that the High
Court erred in so holding.
The appellants has a right not only to
have an opportunity to make a representation, but they are en- ·
titled to have their representation considered by an authority unconcerned with the dispute and to be given information which
would show the decision was reached on the merits and not on
considerations of. policy or expediency.
This is a clear implication of the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the appellate
authority : it is not required to be expressly mentioned in the
statute.
There is nothing on the record which shows that the
representations made by the appellants was even considered. The
fact that cl. 7 of the Sugar Dealers' Licensing Order to which the
High Court has referred does not "require the State Government .
to pass a reasoned order" is wholly irrelevant. The nature of
206
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971 J l S.C.R. ·
the proceeding requires that State Government must give adequate
reasons which disclose that an attempt was made to reach a conclusion according to law and just.
Counsel appearing on behalf of the State has not attempted
to support the reasons given by the High Court.
He merely
contended that there are in the files of the Government, orders
passed by the District Magistrate and also of the State Govern ..
ment which gave reasons in support of the orders. The orders
have, however, not been communicated to the appellants, ai;<l were
not even produced before the High Court. Obviously we cannot
consider those orders, if any, at this stage.
The orders passed by the District Magistrate and the State
Government cancelling the licences of the appellants are quashed.
The State will pay the costs of the appellants in this Court and
in the High Court.
R.K.P.S.
Appeal a/lowed and Orders quashed.
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