# 01\t: PRABHA JAIN v. ABNASH CHAND & ANR

- **Citation:** [1968] 3 S.C.R. 111
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-02-01
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1862 of 1967
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/01-t-prabha-jain-v-abnash-chand-anr-4265
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

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01\t: PRABHA JAIN
v.
ABNASH CHAND & ANR.
February 1, 1968
[M. HIDAYATULLAH AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JI.)
Election-Minister makiv discretionary grant-When
amounts to
corrupt practice.
The State of Haryaoa came nto existence on 1st November 1966.
The Cabinet placed certain sums of money at the disposal of the ministeis, one of whom was the appellant to be used at their discretion for
purposes of public utility, for the benefit Of the general public and for
the uplift of backward communities. The money had to be disbursed
before 31st March 1967 through Pancbayat, Municipal or Government
agencies. The appellant sanctioned cetlain
payments for building twO
dharnwshakls in two wards of a Municipality. Long after the sanction,
her candidature for election to the Vidban Sabha of the State was recognised by her party and she stood for election from a constituency
which included these two wards. She was elected, and some time later,
the money was made available to the wards though the recipients were
writing that the money should be made available at once. The first respondent challenged the election alleging corrupt practices and later amend,.
ed the petition giving better particulars.
The pleas- in the petition COD·
tradicted each. other, the evidence tendered at the trial of the petition
contradicted the pleas, and the witnesses were found to be thoroughly unreliable. In spite of this the petition was allowed on the ground that the
circumstances showed that the sums were in
fact paid to bargain for
votes and to influence the voters in favour of the appellant.
In ··appeal to this Court,
HELD : The action Of the appellant could not be construed against
her.
It was done in the ordinah' course of her duties as Minister and
there was no evidence that it was, directly or indirectly, part of a bargain
with the voters. No hurry to make the money available to the recipients emanated from the appellant. It was only the persons who were
to benefit by the discretionary grant that were anxious t.o lay hands on
the money, as soon as possible, so that the grant might not be. cancelJed
later by a change of attitude caused by the election going against tb.e
particular party, [117 H; 118 A-C] .
·
Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh & Ors. f1968] 3 S.C.R. 102 followed.
Bhagwan Dutta Shastri v. Ram Ratanji Gupta, A.I.R. 1960 S.C.
200 and Kandaswami v. Adiryan, 19 E.L.R. 260, referred to.

## Text

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01\t: PRABHA JAIN
v.
ABNASH CHAND & ANR.
February 1, 1968
[M. HIDAYATULLAH AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JI.)
Election-Minister makiv discretionary grant-When
amounts to
corrupt practice.
The State of Haryaoa came nto existence on 1st November 1966.
The Cabinet placed certain sums of money at the disposal of the ministeis, one of whom was the appellant to be used at their discretion for
purposes of public utility, for the benefit Of the general public and for
the uplift of backward communities. The money had to be disbursed
before 31st March 1967 through Pancbayat, Municipal or Government
agencies. The appellant sanctioned cetlain
payments for building twO
dharnwshakls in two wards of a Municipality. Long after the sanction,
her candidature for election to the Vidban Sabha of the State was recognised by her party and she stood for election from a constituency
which included these two wards. She was elected, and some time later,
the money was made available to the wards though the recipients were
writing that the money should be made available at once. The first respondent challenged the election alleging corrupt practices and later amend,.
ed the petition giving better particulars.
The pleas- in the petition COD·
tradicted each. other, the evidence tendered at the trial of the petition
contradicted the pleas, and the witnesses were found to be thoroughly unreliable. In spite of this the petition was allowed on the ground that the
circumstances showed that the sums were in
fact paid to bargain for
votes and to influence the voters in favour of the appellant.
In ··appeal to this Court,
HELD : The action Of the appellant could not be construed against
her.
It was done in the ordinah' course of her duties as Minister and
there was no evidence that it was, directly or indirectly, part of a bargain
with the voters. No hurry to make the money available to the recipients emanated from the appellant. It was only the persons who were
to benefit by the discretionary grant that were anxious t.o lay hands on
the money, as soon as possible, so that the grant might not be. cancelJed
later by a change of attitude caused by the election going against tb.e
particular party, [117 H; 118 A-C] .
·
Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh & Ors. f1968] 3 S.C.R. 102 followed.
Bhagwan Dutta Shastri v. Ram Ratanji Gupta, A.I.R. 1960 S.C.
200 and Kandaswami v. Adiryan, 19 E.L.R. 260, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1862 of
1967.
Appeal under s. 116-A of the Representation of the People Act
1951 from the judgment and order dated November 16, 1967 of
the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Election Petition No. 19
of 1967.
112
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 3 s.c.R.
A. K. Sen, B. Dutta, P. C. Bhartari, M. L. Aggarwal and
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J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant.
S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hidayatullah, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment
of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, November 16, 1967 by which the election of tb.e appellant to the Vidhan
Sabha of Haryana State from the Kai~al constitu~!lCY has been
~Jared to be void. The election was held on February 19, 1967
and the result of the pool was declared on February 22, 1967.
The appellant had a margin of nearly 2000 votes over the fust
r~pondent who was the closest rival. One other candidate had
also stood but we are not concerned with him in the present appeal
since he has not shown any interest in it. He secured less than
1000 votes and forfeited his security.
The election petition was based upon allegations of corrupt
practice against the successful candidate. The gravamen of
the· charge was that she as a minister in the Government of
Mr. Bhagwat Dayal Sharma used certain discretionary grants to
bribe the voters of her constituency and in particular by paying
two sums of Rs. 2,000 for the construction of two dharamsa/as
for the Kumhar and the Sweeper Colonies at Kaithal. There were
other allegations also against her but as they have been found
against the election petitioner and have not been brought to oilr
notice we need not say anything about them.. The learned Judge
who tried the election petition did not accept the evidence tendered
by the election petitioner to prove the corrupt practice outlined
above but held on a general appraisal of the circumstances of the
case that these sums were in fact paid to bargain for votes and to
influence the voters in favour of the appellant. We shall now give a
few facts of the case before stating our conclusion.
The election petition was filed on April 7, 1967. It was later
amended and.better particulars were supplied on July 29, 1967.
In the original election petition as filed by the election petitioner
it was stated that a sum of Rs. 2,000 from the discretionary grant
of the appellant· was paid to the Harijans of Keorak Gate, Kaithal
for the construction of a dharamsala.
The allegation then was
that in the beginning of January 1967 the Harijans were approached by the appellant and were asked to vote for her.
They flatly
refused to vote for her.
Thereupon she promised to provide funds
for the crnstruction of a dharamsala in their' basti and tempted by
this offer they agreed to vote for her. In regard to the other
discretionary grant it was stated in the original petition that the
Kumhar voters who reside in Do1ifan Gate. Kaithal, were also
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approached by the appellant in the beginning of January 1967 and
were asked to vote for her. When they refused to vote she promised them a sum of Rs. 2,000 for building the dharamia/a in
their locality. It was further pointed out that the first sum of
Rs. 2,000 was paid through the Deputy Commissioner, Kamal.
vide his Memo No. 78-BP-III/67 /335 of January 12, 1967. The
second payment was also made on the same <!_ate through the' Deputy Commissioner, Kamal, vide Development Department Memo
No. 47-BAP-III-67 /326.
The affidavit in support of the election petition was sworn by
the election petitioner on information supplied by others and bee lieved to be true. It was stated in the verification clause that thi>
information was received "from my workers and believed to be
true".
On an objection being raised that the particulars of the corrupt
practice were not adequate and on the other hand vague and that
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the affidavit did not disclose the persons from whom the information was derived the Court ordered that better particulars be supplied and a fresh affidavit filed.
The amended election petition
was then filed in July, 1967. In this election petition a change
was iritroduced. It was stated that on December 22, 1966 the
Harijans were called to a Canal Rest House through one Om PraE
kash Shorewala. President of the Municipal Committee, KaithaL
Other members of the Municipal Staff including the Executive
Officer Bhalla were also present. Among those who came were
one Khaki Ram, Banwari Lal and one Harijan Lamberdar whose
name was not given, In the presence of these persons request was
made to the Harijans to vote for the appellant, and when they
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refused to do a sum of Rs. 2,000 was promised from the discretionary grant, and on this offer the Harijan voters consented to
vote for the appellant.
It was further alleged that this. amo11J1t
was ultimately paid to Khaki Ram and Banwari Lal through Shri
Om Parkash Shorewala (R.W. 4). As regards the second charge
it was stated that on December 29. 1966 the Kumhar voters w«e
summoned t~ the Canal Rest House and three persons, Thakru,
Altra and. Lilloo came as the representatives of the Kumhar community.
The same procedure, viz., asking them to vote for her
candidature waS followed by the appellant and on their refusal to
do so a sum of Rs. 2,000 was promised to them for the construction
of a dharamsala in their bastr at Dogran Gate. Kaithal. This induced them to change their views.
The affidavit was also corrected. It was stated that the allegation was based upon information
received from Pandit Kailash Chander, s/o Pandit Harl.Ram of
Kaithal and Cb. Inder Raj, ex-Municipal Commissioner, Chandena
Gate Gamri, Kaithal. ·
114
SUPREME COURT REPOllTS
(1968] 3 s.c.ll.
In auswer to the amended election petition the written statement adued that the allegation was a pure concoction. The appellant pointed out that the grant for the construction of the
dharamsa/as was made by the appellant as far tiack as December
19, 1966 and that the allegation that it was the result of a bargain
either on December 22 or December 29, was a pure fiction.
The election petitioner examined fourteen witnesses.
We are,
however, not concerned with all of them because· they are eonnected with the other allegations in the election petition.
Witnesses
bearing upon this case were only four. They were Gurbax Singh
(P.W. 1), who only proved certain documents, P. N. Bhalla (P.W.
3), the Executive Officer of the Municipality, Thakru (P.W. 8),
whose name has already been mentioned by us and Abnash Chander, the election petitioner .. In the evidence a change was again
introduced. It was attempted to be proved that the bargain which
had been referred to in the election petitions actualiy took place
on December 3, 1966. This time it was affirmed that the Kumhars
and the Sweepers were called together. An objection was taken
before the learned Judge that this evidence could not be considered because the plea was 'CjUite different. The learned Judge ruled
that the objection would be decided later.
It appears that the
learned Judge did not put too much emphasis on the change of
pleading presumably because he found the evidence to be unsatisfactory and unreliable. On the side of the appellant were examined one R. N. Kapur (R.W. 1), the personal Secretary of the
appeJlant who proved her tour programme to give a lie to some
of the allegations in the election petition. Attroo (R.W. 3), who
was said to have been present at the conferences, Om Parkash
Shorewala (R.W. 4 ), the Municipal President, Mr. Bllagwat Dayal
Sharma (R.W. 5), the Chief Minister in whose Ministry the
appellant was working as the Finance Minister and the appellant
herself.
It is not necessary to go largely into what the witnesses said
because the learned Judge himself observed as follows :-
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"Whereas according to the respondent the fact of the
grant is not disputed, but it is denied that the grant was
made in consideration of these communities voting for
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her. If the matter had remained at this stage and the
executing agency (the Sub-Divisional Magistrate) had
disbursed these grants I would not have been prepared
. to accept the oral evidence regarding the bargain which
led to the grants. But the manner, how the money was
realised and disbursed, lends ample support to the evidence that the bargain was struck."
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It is clear that the learned Judge was of the opinion that the
evidence led to prove the conference and the bargain at the con-
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OM PRABHA V. ABNASH CHAND (Hidayatuiiah,.J.j
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ference was unacceptable. He, however, accepted it because it
was supported by circumstantial. details of the withdrawing of the
money which was sanctioned; but for this the learned Judge 'l'l"OU!d
not have accepted the election petition.
We shall glance at this evidence which hlis been led in the
case. As. pointed out above the only witnesses from the conference are Thakru (P.W. 8) and Bhalla (P.W. 3). With regard
to Thakru it is sufficient to point out what the learned Judge himself said at the end of the deposition of Thakru : "The tei.timony
of this witness has not at all. impressed me. I will place no
reliance whatsoever on his testimony''. In view of this observation of the· learned Judge we think we are entitled to ignore his
testimony altogether. As regards Bhalla (P.W. 3), he seems to
have deposed not only in respect of these two grants but evecy
allegation made in the election petition. Mr. A. K. Sen, for the
appellant, vecy pertinently described him as an omnibus witnes~.
His evidence is not convmcing. It appears on the record of this
case (and it was in fact admitted by Bhalla) that the .appellant
had taken action against him in respect of a house which fell down
owing to the negligence of the Municipal Authorities. It appears
to us that Bhalla was hostile to the appellant. There is enough
material to show that he was tcying to get even with the appellant
for her action in putting the blame upon' him for the falling down
of a house from seepage of water from the municipal mains. The
learned Judge did not place any direct relianre upon Bhalla's
testimony.
As we have shown above, if it had not been for the
circumstances attending the grant the learned Judge himself would
have discarded his testimony. We must, therefore, proceed with
extreme caution in dealing with Bhalla's evidence in the case.
It may be pointed out here that in the election petition as well
as in the evidence it was itated that the Harijans and Kumhars
were summoned through Bhalla and the peon was ordered by Om
Prakash Shorewala to call the leaders of these two communities to
!he Canal Rest House.
Sat Prakash, the peon was not examined
m the case.
Of the persons present on the first occasion viz.,
Banwari La~ Khaki Ram, Lilloo and Attra and the Harijan 'Lamberdar who was not even named, none was examined except Aitrou
and Thakru.
Attroo was eJ!:amined by the appeliant.
We have
shown above that the learned Judge placed no 'reliance upon
Thilkru's word He made a similar remark about Attroo also so
that the case really comes to this that there is only the evidence
of the parties and such other evidence as was furnished by Shorewala and Bhalla. The persons from whom information was
derived as stated in the verification of the affidavit were not called
as witnesses.
We have shown that Bhalla's testimony must not
be taken oil its face value. Om Prakash Shorewaia was support-
116
SUPREME COURT UPORTS
[1968) 3 S.C.R.
ing !he.·election petitioner but even so his evidence goes in favour
of the appellant. The fact, however, remains· that the election
petitiol!er himself was fumbling with the facts and was not able to
state quite categorically when the conferences took place and on
what date and at which place. He changed the dates as more
infonnation came to hand. This was not information about the
conferences but the date on which ·the grant was sanctioned and
the dates on which the appellant c<>U!d be expected to have held
the conferences. In these circumstances, we are i.atisfied that in
this · case the oral evidence is practically non-existing.
Mr. ¥ehta, who lll'gue(j the case on behalf of the answering
respondent stated that it was not necessary at all .to give the facts
al;lout the coμ4lrences and that the charge of bribery wuld be
proved eyen without the details of how the bn'be came .to be given.
He relied .up<;>n ~e judgment of the Madras High Court in Kandaswami v. S .. B. Adityan(1) _for the proposition that a bribe is a
bribe altho1.1gh the date on which it is given may not be capable of
llein~ spetjlie<! if it could be" estab~jshed o~erwi$0 that th~ money
was 111,fact paid; and he further relied on a iudgment of this Court
.in Bhagwan Datta Shastri v. Ram Ratan;i O:upta & Ors. (2) that
even if the fuli part.iculars be not gi\ren evidence might still .be led
to determine whether .a corrupt practiee had in fact tak:en place
or not:
We need not decide .in. this c&Se what the pleadings and
th~:pr90f ,shoulitbe". l'he ordinary rule of. law is that evidence
is to be given olily on a plea properly raised and not in contradic•
tion <Jf the plea. Here the pleas wen; made on two different occasions and contradicted ePch other. The evidence which was
tendered contradicted both the pleas. the source of the information was not attempted to be proyed and the witnesses who were
brought were found to be thoroughly unreliabfo. In these circumstances we do not propose to refer to the evidence in this judgment
any more.
This brings us to the question whether the circumstances of
this case clearly demonstrated that there must have been some
kind of bargain before the grant was made aiid that this bargain
was with a view to inducing the voters to support the candidature
of th~ appellant. ~n ·Ghasi Ram v . . Dill Singh & Ors. (8 ) in which
the judgment of this Court was pronounced today, the law re'ating
to eorrupt practiee specially in· the matter of giving of discretionary grants has been considered and stated. It has been pointed
out that a Minister in the discharge of his duties may be required
to do some acts of administration including the granting of money
for the uplift of certain.communities and this action of the Minister is not to be construed against him unless it can be established
(I) 19 E.L.R. 26J.
(2) A.I.R. l96J S.C. 21JO.
(3) (1968] 3 S.C.R. I ' 2.
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that there was a bargain with the voters for getting thtjr assistance
at the election.
Since tbe oral evidence in this case is non'eXisting
we must now look a. the circumstal!Ql!S whether this conclusion
which has been drawn by the High Court can be irresistibly
reached.
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The State of Haryana came into existence on November 1,
1966. Immediately afterwards the Cabinet placed certain sums
of money at the disposal of the Chief Minister, the Cabinet Ministers, Ministers for. State and Deputy Ministers, to be used at their
discretion for the uplift of the communities. A sum of Rs. 50,000
was placed in the discretionary grant of a Minister and the appel·
c !ant as the Finance Minister in the Ministry of Shri BhagwafDayal
Sharma was required to spend this money. The money had io be
disbursed before the. end of the Financial Year, that is to say,
before March 31, 1967. It is reasonable to think that there must
have been several demands in this State from the various. community centres for their own uplift and they must have been clamouring even before for money for the establishment of schools,
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hospitals, supply of water, and so on. . The. policy
~tement
attached to the sanction of the disc~ionary grant stated the
purp<ises for which the money could be utilised. It was stated
quite clearly that the money shoulCI not be given to any private
person but should be given through the Development Commissioner for. purposes of public utjlity and for benefit of the general
I: public and that the execution of the works should be through
certain named agencies such as Zilla Pill'ishad, Piznchayat
Samit/es, the Panchayats concerned, the Public Works Department
or any other Government Agencies or Municipality as the Millister
may indicate. In the present case money was to be disbursed
through the Municipal Committee.
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It is argued that the money was withdrawn and made available
a day before the poll suggesting thereby that this was done to
assure the voters that the money had come in as a result of the
bargain. The hurry in reacbh.tg the money to these two wards · in
the Kaithal Municipality· is the main reason behind the learned
Judge's conclusion that it must have been a part of a bargain.
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Evidence, however shows that Bhalla (who was not favourable to
the appellant) himself wrote saying that the money should be mad~
available at once; and this money came to the hands of Om Prakash
Shorewala, who, as we have alreitdy pointed out, was helping the
answering respondent in his election. It appears to us that all this
hnrry which did not emanate from the 'appellant was the result of
ti an anxiety on the part of !he recipients ~
the money should be
made available as soon as possible. There is always a· risk of a
change of attitude partlcularly if the election goes against a particular party. The persons who were to benefit by the discretionary
118
SUPREME OO'VaT UPOR.TS'
[1963] 3 S.C.R.
grant !night themselves have ~n anxious to Jay hands on this
money so that the grant might not be cancelled later. This money
was actually made available not before the date of the poll but
as late as March 3, 1967. No doubt the sanction was before the
date of poll but that too was Jong before the date when even the
candidature of the appellant was recognised by her party. The
aetion of the appellant, therefore cannot be construed against her.
It must be accepted as done in the ordinary course of her duties as
Minister. Since there is no evidence to show that it was a part
of a bargain directly or indirectly the case does not satisfy the test
which we have laid down in Ghasl Ram's(') case.
The appeal must succeed. It is accordingly allowed.
There
will be no order about costs.
V.P.S.
Appeal allowed.
(I) [1968]. 3 S,C.R. 102.
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