# ·" - \ 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS MST. JADAO BAHUJI v. MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, KHANDW A AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1962] 1 S.C.R. 633
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** Civil Appe!11 No. 180 of 1959
- **Bench:** S. K. Das, J. L. Kapur, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah, T. L. VENKATARAMA ArYAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1-s-c-r-supreme-court-reports-mst-jadao-bahuji-v-municipal-committee-khandw-a-2155
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Tax on Trade-Maximum limit imposed by Constitution Act
-Validating Act fflr period prior to imposition of limit-If affected by limit-Khandwa Municipality (Validation of Tax) ,Act, r94r
(r6 of r94r)-Government of India Act, r935, s. r42·A.
In 1922, the Municipal Committee, Khandwa imposed a tax
on the trade of ginning and pressing cotton by means of steam
or mechanical process. Certain suits were filed challenging the
validity of the tax and ultimately in 1937, the Privy Council
held that the tax had not been validly imposed. In 1941, the
Governor enacted the Khandwa Municipality (Validation of Tax)
Act, 1941, which sought to validate the tax imposed in 1922. In
the meantime, s. 142-A was introduced in the Government of
India Act, 1935, sub-s. (2) of which provided that the 'total
amount payable in respect of any one person by way of taxes on
professions, trades, callings and employments shall not, after
March 31, 1939, exceed Rs. 50 per annum·. The appellant contended that the validating Act was hit bys. l42-A(2) and to the
extent that it imposed a tax above Rs. 50 per person per annum
it was invalid.
. Held, that the Validating Act was not hit by s. 142-A (2)
Government of India Act, 1935. The powers of the Indian
Legislatures included a power to pass retrospective and validating Jaws.
Section l42-A(2) which put a limit on the amount of
tax did not affect Ia ws relating to a period prior to March 3 r,
1939, but affected only those relatrng to periods after that date.
It circumscribed the legislative power by putting a date-line
after which a tax in excess of Rs. 50 for a period after the dateline could not be collected unless it came within the proviso.
The Validating Act imposed the tax in excess of Rs. 50 not
after March 31, Iy39, but before it.
The United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, [1940] F.C.R. IIO and
Piare Dusadh v. King Emperor, [1944] F.C.R. 61, referred to.
CrvrL APPELLATE JuRrsDrcTION:
Civil Appe!11 No.
180 of 1959.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated June
30, 1955 of the former Nagpur High Court in Misc.
First· Appeal No. 162 of 1949.
Bo
March 29.
634
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
z95z
N. C. Chatterjee and B. P. Maheshwari, for the
M st. J;;;:: Bahttji appellant.
v.
G. C. Mathur, for the respondents.
Municipal Committee Khandwa
1961.
March 29.
The Judgment of the Court was
& Another
delivered by
Hidayatullah J.
HmAYATULLAH, J.-This appeal,
by certificate
under Arts. 132(1) and 133(1)(c) of the Constitution,
has been filed against an order of the High Court at
Nagpur dated June 30, 1955.
Though the facts necessary to decide the appeal lio
within a comparatively narrow compass, the case
itself has had a long and somewhat unique history.
In July, 1922, the Municipal Committee, Khandwa,
resolved to impose a tax on the trade of ginning and
pressing cotton by means of steam or mechanical
process, and after sundry procedure, a notification was
published on November 25, 1922 in the Central Provinces and Berar Gazette, imposing the tax. Certain
traders including the appellant, affected by the tax,
filed suits seeking injunction against the Municipal
Committee on the ground that the tax was invalid and
illegal. Meanwhile, the Municipal Committee had
served notices on the present appellant, and demanded and recovered the tax for 1923-24. The appellant
then filed a second suit for refund of the tax paid by
her on the ground that the imposition of the tax was
illegal and ultra vires. The suits had varying fortunes
in the Courts in India, till they reached the Privy
Council. The Judicial Committee by its first decision
remitted the cases for additional evidence, while the
appeals were kept pending. The decision of the
Judicial Committee is reported in Radhakishan
Jaikishan v. Khandwa Municipal Committee (1). After
the additional evidence was received, the Judicial
Committee pronounced its decision, which is reported
in Radhakishan Jaikishan v. ~Municipal Committee,
Khandwa ('). The Judicial Committee hel4_ that the
tax was n

## Text

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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
MST. JADAO BAHUJI
v.
MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, KHANDW A
AND ANOTHER
633
(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH,
J.C. SHAH and T. L. VENKATARAMA ArYAR JJ.)
Tax on Trade-Maximum limit imposed by Constitution Act
-Validating Act fflr period prior to imposition of limit-If affected by limit-Khandwa Municipality (Validation of Tax) ,Act, r94r
(r6 of r94r)-Government of India Act, r935, s. r42·A.
In 1922, the Municipal Committee, Khandwa imposed a tax
on the trade of ginning and pressing cotton by means of steam
or mechanical process. Certain suits were filed challenging the
validity of the tax and ultimately in 1937, the Privy Council
held that the tax had not been validly imposed. In 1941, the
Governor enacted the Khandwa Municipality (Validation of Tax)
Act, 1941, which sought to validate the tax imposed in 1922. In
the meantime, s. 142-A was introduced in the Government of
India Act, 1935, sub-s. (2) of which provided that the 'total
amount payable in respect of any one person by way of taxes on
professions, trades, callings and employments shall not, after
March 31, 1939, exceed Rs. 50 per annum·. The appellant contended that the validating Act was hit bys. l42-A(2) and to the
extent that it imposed a tax above Rs. 50 per person per annum
it was invalid.
. Held, that the Validating Act was not hit by s. 142-A (2)
Government of India Act, 1935. The powers of the Indian
Legislatures included a power to pass retrospective and validating Jaws.
Section l42-A(2) which put a limit on the amount of
tax did not affect Ia ws relating to a period prior to March 3 r,
1939, but affected only those relatrng to periods after that date.
It circumscribed the legislative power by putting a date-line
after which a tax in excess of Rs. 50 for a period after the dateline could not be collected unless it came within the proviso.
The Validating Act imposed the tax in excess of Rs. 50 not
after March 31, Iy39, but before it.
The United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, [1940] F.C.R. IIO and
Piare Dusadh v. King Emperor, [1944] F.C.R. 61, referred to.
CrvrL APPELLATE JuRrsDrcTION:
Civil Appe!11 No.
180 of 1959.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated June
30, 1955 of the former Nagpur High Court in Misc.
First· Appeal No. 162 of 1949.
Bo
March 29.
634
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
z95z
N. C. Chatterjee and B. P. Maheshwari, for the
M st. J;;;:: Bahttji appellant.
v.
G. C. Mathur, for the respondents.
Municipal Committee Khandwa
1961.
March 29.
The Judgment of the Court was
& Another
delivered by
Hidayatullah J.
HmAYATULLAH, J.-This appeal,
by certificate
under Arts. 132(1) and 133(1)(c) of the Constitution,
has been filed against an order of the High Court at
Nagpur dated June 30, 1955.
Though the facts necessary to decide the appeal lio
within a comparatively narrow compass, the case
itself has had a long and somewhat unique history.
In July, 1922, the Municipal Committee, Khandwa,
resolved to impose a tax on the trade of ginning and
pressing cotton by means of steam or mechanical
process, and after sundry procedure, a notification was
published on November 25, 1922 in the Central Provinces and Berar Gazette, imposing the tax. Certain
traders including the appellant, affected by the tax,
filed suits seeking injunction against the Municipal
Committee on the ground that the tax was invalid and
illegal. Meanwhile, the Municipal Committee had
served notices on the present appellant, and demanded and recovered the tax for 1923-24. The appellant
then filed a second suit for refund of the tax paid by
her on the ground that the imposition of the tax was
illegal and ultra vires. The suits had varying fortunes
in the Courts in India, till they reached the Privy
Council. The Judicial Committee by its first decision
remitted the cases for additional evidence, while the
appeals were kept pending. The decision of the
Judicial Committee is reported in Radhakishan
Jaikishan v. Khandwa Municipal Committee (1). After
the additional evidence was received, the Judicial
Committee pronounced its decision, which is reported
in Radhakishan Jaikishan v. ~Municipal Committee,
Khandwa ('). The Judicial Committee hel4_ that the
tax was not validly imposed by the Municipal Committee, and reversing the decree of the Judicial Commissioner, decreed the suits.
(>) (1933) L.R. 61 I.A. 125.
(2) (1937) L.R. 64 I.A. n8.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
635
The Provincial
Legislature
then
passed the
I96I
Khandwa Ginning and Pressing Cotton Tax Validating M 1 1 -a-B h ..
Act 8 of 1938, validating the tax. The Act contained ' · a :,
0
a UJ'
only one operative section, which read as follows:
Municipal com-
"2. Notwithstanding anything contained in the mittee, Khandwa
Central Provinces Municipal Act, 1903, or the Oen-
& Another
tral Province Municipalities Act, 1922, or any decree H. -u 1
or order of a civil court, the tax on the trade of
•dayatu ah
·
ginning and pressing cotton by means of steam or
mechanical
process
within the limits of the
Khandwa municipality which was imposed by
Notification No. 2639-1298-VIII, dated the 21st
November, 1922, shall be deemed to h11.ve been
legally imposed from the date of its imposition to
the date on which this Act comes into force.
Explanation.-All decrees or orders of a civil
court directing a refund of the tax already recovered by the committee of the said municipality or
restraining the committee from recovering the tax
shall be deemed to have no legal effect."
The appellant had, in the meanwhile, applied for the
execution of the decrees, and the Validating Act was
pleaded in bar. This plea was upheld by the executing Court, but the High Court at Nagpur, on appeal,
rejected it and ordered the executions to proceed.
The decision of the High Court is reported in Firm
Radhakishan v. Municipal Gornmittee, Khandwa(1).
The reason given by the High Court was that the
Explanation, though not the operative part of the
Validating Act, conflicted with 0. 45 R. 15 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, and that the assent of the Governor-General had not been obtained, as required by
s. 107(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935.
Meantime, the Provincial Legislature had been dissolved, and the Governor had assumed all the powers
of the Provincial Legislature under s. 93 of the
Government of India Act, 1935. The Governor, with
the assent of the Governor-General, enacted the second
Validating Act intituled the Khandwa Municipality
(Validation of Tax) Act, 1941, (16 of 1941), which
received the assent of the Governor-General on June
(1) (1940) N.L.J. 638.
636
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
z96z
30, 1941, and was published in the C. P. and Berar
M
] -a-ah .. Gazette on July 11, 1941. That Act, omitting parts
st. a ao a u;i
J
t h
d
f ll
v.
not re evan
ere, rea as o ows:
Municipal Com-
"2. The tax the imposition of which purported to
mittee, Khandwa
be s::mctioned in the Notification of the Local
& Another
Government (Ministry of Local Self-Government)
Hidayatullah ].
No. 2639-1298-VIII, dated the 21st November 1922,
shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been,
validly recoverable by the Municipal Committee of
Khandwa in respect of the period from the 21st
November 1922 to the 31st March 1938 (both dates
inclusive).
3. 'Vhere the net sum recovered from any person
before the commencement of this Act on account of
the said tax is less than the aggregate of the sum
recoverable from such person, the balance shall be
payable to the said Municipal Committee on demand
made at any time after the commencement of this
Act and, if not paid within fifteen days from the
date of the demand, shall be recoverable by any
method available under the Central Provinces
Municipalities Act, 1922, for the recovery of a tax
imposed thereunder or by such other method as the
Provincial Government may by rule prescribe."
4. For the purposes of section 3 the net sum
recovered from any person means the aggregate sum
recovered from such person less any sum refunded
to him and less so much of the amount of any decree
or order for the payment of money executed by him
against the said Municipal Committee as represents
an amount previously paid by him on account of
the said tax.
5. Nothing in this Act shall preclude the execution
against the said Municipal Committee of any decree
or order for the payment of money arising out of a
payment on account of the said tax but upon the
execution of such decree or order so much of the
amount thereof as represents a sum previously paid
on account of the said tax shall be paya'ble to and
recoverable by the said Municipal Committee in
accordance with section 3.
6. The Khandwa Ginning and Pressing Cotton
Tax Validating Act, 1938, is hereby repealed."
...
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I S.0.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
637
The Provincial Government framed a rule, which,
'96'
shortly stated, provided for the recovery of the M 1 J-d B hu ·•
..
d
h
s.aaoa;1
amount by way of execution apphcat10n ma e tot e
v.
very Court, which executed the decree.
Municipal ComThe Municipal Committee deposited the decretal mittee, I(hanawa
amount in Court, which was withdrawn by the appel-
& Another
lant on furnishing security. On August 7, 1947, the Hiday-;;;-;;llah J.
Municipal Committee filed its application under the
rule for execution of the decree. Objections were
raised by the appellant, but were disallowed, and the
Municipal Committee realised the amount of the tax
from t,he surety. The appellant had raised many
objections, but we are concerned with one only, viz.,
that the Act was ultra vires the Provincial Legislature
and consequently the Governor, being repugnant to
s. 142-A, which was introduced in the Government of
India Act, 1935, and which imposed a limit of Rs. 50
on taxes on professions, trades and callings after
March 31, 1939.
On November 16, 1949, an appeal was taken by the
present appellant to the High Court at Nagpur. This
appeal was heard by Sinha, C. J., and Mudholkar, J.
(as they then were).
Mudholkar, J. held that by the
second Validating Act which was passed after March
31, 1939, the limit of Rs. 50 per annum imposed by
the second sub-section of s. 142-A was· exceeded, and
that the Act was thus ultra vires, the Governor.
Sinha, C. J., was of the contrary opinion. The case
was then laid before Deo, J., who agreed with
Sinha, C. J., and the appeal was dismissed. The
appellant then obtained the certificate, and filed this
appeal.
Section 142-A of ,the Government of India Act,
1935, is as follows:
"142-A. (1) Notwithstanding anything in section
one hundred of this Act, no Provincial Law relating
to taxes for the benefit of a Province or of a municipality, district board, local board or other local
authority therein in respect of professions, trades,
callings or employments shall be invalid on the
ground that it relates to a tax on income.
(2) The total amount payable in respect of any
Mst. ]adao Bahuji
v.
Municipal Conimittee, Khandwa
& Another
Hidayatullah J.
638
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
one person to the Province or to any one municipality, district board, local board, or other local authority in the Province by way of taxes on professions,
trades, callings, and employments shall not, after
the thirty-first day of March nineteen hundred and
thirty-nine, exceed fifty rupees per annum:
Provided that if in the financial year ending with
that date there was in force in the case of any Province or any such municipality, board or authority
a tax on professions, trades, callings, or employments the rate, or the maximum rate, of which
exceeded fifty rupees per annum, the preceding
provisions of this sub-section shall, unless for the
time being provision to the contrary is made by a
law of the Federal Legislature, have effect in relation to that Province, municipality, board or authority as if for the reference to fifty rupees per annum
there were substituted a reference to the rate or
maximum rate, or such lower rate, if any, (being
a rate greater than fifty rupees per annum) as may
for the time being be fixed by a law of the Federal
Legislature; and any law of the Federal Legislature made for any of the purposes of this proviso
may be made either generally or in relation to
any specified Provinces, municipalities, boards or
authorities.
(3) The fact that the Provincial Legislature has
power to make laws as aforesaid with respect to
taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments, shall not be construed as limiting, in relation
to professions, trades, callings and employments,
the generality of the entry in the Federal Legislative List relating to taxes on income."
Simultaneously with the introduction of s. 142,A,
Entry No. 46 in the Provincial Legislative List, which
had till then stood as "Taxes on professions, trades,
callings and employments" was amended by the addition of the words "subject, however, to the provisions
of section 142-A of this Act".
The impugned Act was passed by the Governor under
s. 90 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Under
sub-s. (3) of that section, it had the same force and
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l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
639
effect and was subject to disallowance in the same
x96x
manner as an Act of the Provincia~ Legislature assent- Mst. Jadao Bahu ·;
ed to by the Governor.
The impugned Act was
v.
J
enacted with the concurrence and assent of the Municipal comGovernor-General and thus complied with all the mitfre, Khandwa
formalities required for such enactment.
& Another
The powers of the Provincial Legislatures under the
Legislative Lists have been the subject of numerous Hidayatullah f.
decisions by the Federal Court and also by this Court.
It has been pointed out that these powers are as large
and plenary as those of Parliament itRelf.
These
powers, it has been held, include wit.hin themselves
the power to make retrospective laws; and as pointed
out by Gwyer, C.J. in The United Provinces v. Atiqa
Begum('), the burden of proving that Indian Legislatures "were subject to a strange and unusual prohibition against retrospective legislation lay upon those
who asserted it". This has not been asserted in this
case, as, indeed, it could not be, after the decision of
the case cited by us. In the case before the Allahabad
High Court, out of which the appeal before the
Federal Court had arisen [sub nom Mst. Atiqa Begum
v. U. P. (2)], it was held that retrospective legislation
was not possible in view of the provisions of s. 292 of
the Government of India Act, 1935, which continued
all law in force in British India immediately before
the commencement of Part III of the Act, until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature
or other competent authority. This view was not
accepted by the Federal Court., which held that s. 292
of the Act did not prevent Legislatures in India from
giving retrospective effect to measures passed by them.
There have been numerous occasions on which retrospective laws were passed, which were upheld by the
Federal Court and also by this Court. It is not necessary to cite instances, but we refer only to the decision in M. P. V. Sundararamier & Co. v. The State of
Andhra Pradesh('), where this Court approved the
dictum of the Federal Court.
Retrospective legislation being thus open to the
(1) [1940) F.C.R, IIO.
(2) A.I.R. (19401 All, 272.
(3) [1958] S.C.R. 1422.
640
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
I96I
Provincial Legislatures, the Act of the Governor had
M
J -d B h .. the same force.
Retrospective laws, it has been held,
st. a ao
a UJ>
l"d t
A t
h" h
t .
d c
• "t
v.
can va I a e an c , w JC con ams some e,ect m r s
Municipal Com- enactment. Examples of Validating Acts which renmittee, Khandwa dered inoperative, decrees or orders of the Court or
& Another
alternatively made them valid and effective, are
. --
many, In Atiqa Begum's case (1), the power of validaHidayatullah f. ting defective laws was held to be ancillary and subsidiary to the powers conferred by the Entries and to
be included in those powers. Later, the Federal Court
in Piare Dusadh, v. King Emperor(') considered the matter fully, and held that the powers of the GovernorGeneral which were conterminous with those of the
Central Legislature included the power of validation.
The same can be said of the Provincial Legislatures
and also of the Governor acting as a Legislature.
The only question thus is whether the power to
pass a retrospective and validating law was taken
away by the enactment of s. 142-A and the amendment of the Entry in the Government of India Act.
It is on this point that the difference in the High
Court arose. The amendment of the Entry is of no
special significance, because it only subjects the
otherwise plenary powers to the provisions of s, 142-A.
Apart from the implications arising from that section,
the supremacy of the Legislature to pass retrospective
and validating laws was unaffected. We have thus to
see whats. 142-A enacted and to what extent it trenched upon the powers of the Provincial Legislature
and the Governor.
Ylr. N. C. Chatterjee, in arguing the case, adopted
the line of reasoning of the minority view in the High
Court. He pointed out that s. 142-A was enacted to
achieve three purposes. The first was that it remov,jd
doubts whether the charge of tax on professions, etc.,
would be regarded as income-tax. The second was
that it put a limit upon the powers of the Provincial
Legislature to enact a law imposing a tax in excess of
rupees fifty after March 31, 1939; and thirdly it preserved only existing valid laws already in force, which
imposed a tax in excess of the amount indicated. He
(1) [z940] F.C.R. no.
(2).[1944) F.C.R. 61.
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I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
641
contended that the second sub.section and the proviso
c96r
covered the entire field, and a law passed after March M 1 1 --;- B h ..
31, 1939, could not freshly impose a tax in excess of s · a vao
a UJ•
the limit and this was such a law.
Municipal Com·
Under the scheme of the Government of India Act, mittee, Khandwa
1935, income-tax, though a Central levy, was, under
s. 138 (1), distributable among the Provinces and for
which an elaborate scheme prepared by Sir Otto
Niemyer was accepted and embodied in the Government of India (Distribution of Revenues) Order in
Council, 1936. The Centre could levy a surcharge for
federal purposes. Taxes on trades, professions and
callings, which were taxes already leviable by the
Provinces under Schdule II of the Rules made by the
Governor-General in Council under s. 80A(3)(a) of the
Government of India Act, were also in cl uded in the
Provincial Legislative List as a source of revenue for
the Provinces. It was, however, felt that these taxes
might come into clash with tax on income in the
Federal List, and also if unlimited in amount, might
become a second tax on income to be levied by the
Provinces. It was to remove these contingencies that
s. 142-A was enacted. Sub-section (1) provided that
a tax on professions, etc., would not be invalid on the
ground that it related to a tax on income. Sub-section (3) was a counter-part of sub-s. (1), and provided
that the generality of the Entry in the Federal Legislative List relating to taxes on income would not be
construed as in any way limited by the power of the
Provincial Legislature to levy a tax on professions,
etc. The fields of the two taxes were thus demarcated. No other implication arises from these two
sub-sections.
It was also apprehended that under the guise of
taxes on professions, etc., the Provincial Legislatures
might start their own scheme of a tax on income,
thus subjecting incomes from professions etc., to an
additional tax of the nature of income-tax. A limit
was therefore placed upon the amount which could be
collected by way of tax on professions, etc., and that
limit was Rs. 50 per annum per person. The second
81
& Another
Hidayatullah ].
642
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
I96I
sub-section achieved this result. It was, however,
Mst. Jadao Bahuji realised that the tax being an old tax, there were laws
Munici;~1 com- under which the limit of Rs. 50 was already exceeded
miltee, Khandwa in relation to a Province, municipality, board or like
Iii· Another
authority, and the imposition of such a limit might
displace their budgets after March 31, 1939. A proviso
llidayatullah J. was, therefore, added to the second sub-section that if
in the financial year ending with the thirty-first day
of March, nineteen hundred and thirty-nine there was
in force in the case of any Province, etc., a tax on
professions, trades, callings or employments the rate
or the maximum rate of which exceeded Rs. 50 per
annum, the provisions of the second sub-section shall
have effect, (unless for the time being provision to the
contrary was made by a law of the Federal Legislature) as if instead of Rs. 50 per annum there was substituted a reference to the rate or maximum rate
exceeding Rs. 50.
Where no such law was passed by
the Federal Legislature, the tax even in excess of
Rs. 50 continued to be valid.
There can be no doubt that if a law was passed
after the amendment and sought to impose taxes on
professions etc., for any period after March 31, 1939,
it had to conform to the limit prescribed by s. 142A
(2).
The prohibition in the second sub-section operated to circumscribe the legislative power by putting a
date-line after which a tax in excess of Rs. 50 per
annum per person for a period after the date-line could
not be collected unless it came within the proviso.
But neither sub-s. (2) nor the proviso speaks of a
period prior to March 31, 1939.
The sub-section
speaks only of "the total amount payable ...... after the
thirty-first day of March, nineteen hundred and thirtynine". These words are important. They create a
limit on the amount leviable as tax for a period after
that date. But if a law was. passed validating another
which imposed a tax for a period prior to the date
indicated, it would be taxing professions etc., in excess
of Rs. 50 not after March 31, 1939, but before it.
Neither the Entry nor the section either directly or
indirectly prohibited this, nor did they create any
limit for the prior period. The Validating Act, though
t
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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
643
passed in 1941, can be read only as affecting a period
r96r
for which there was no limit. If"the sub-section saidM 1-d 8 , ..
h
h II
b
bl ,
f R 50 . h
st.
a ao
aou;•
t at tax s a not e paya e m excess o
s.
wit -
v.
out indicating the period or date, the argument would Municipal Comhave some support, but it puts in a date, and the mittee, Khandwa
operation of the prohibition is confined to a period
& Another
after that date.
The Validating Act, being thus completely within
the powers of the Governor, could remove retrospectively the defect in the earlier Act.
Though it reimposed the tax from the date of the earlier Act, it
took care to impose the tax for a period ending with
March 31, 1938. The impugned Act did not need the
support of the proviso, because it did not fall within
the ban of the second sub-section. In our opinion,
the Validating Act of 1941 was within the powers of
the Governor, and was a valid piece of legislation.
The appeal fails, and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
SHEW BUX MOHATA AND ANOTHER
v.
SM. TULSIMANJARI DASI AND ANOTHER
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Practice-Security
for costs-Appeal to Supreme CourtCertificate granted by High Court-Power of High Court to extend
time-Code of Civil Procedure, r908 (Act 5 of r908), 0. 45, rr. 7,
IO, II-Supreme Court Rules, r950, 0. XII, r. 3.
On an application made by the appellant, the Calcutta High
Court granted a certificate on May r8, 1956, enabling him to
appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment and decree
of the High Court.
Under 0. 45, r. 7(r)(a), of the Code of
Civil Procedure, i908, the appellant had to deposit the security
amount for costs of the respondent within ninety days or such
further period, not exceeding sixty days, as the court may upon
cause shown allow, from the date of the decree complained of,
or within six weeks from the date of the grant of the certificate, whichever was the later date. Being unable to deposit
Hidayatullah ].
Marek 29.