# 1'UPRJ£ME COURT REPOR'l'S [1962] RAM CHANDRA PBASAD v. THE STATE OF BIHAR

- **Citation:** [1962] 2 S.C.R. 50
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** CRIMINAL APPELLATE Appeal No. 168 of 1959
- **Bench:** K. 8Ubba Rao, Raghubar Dayaj
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1-uprj-me-court-repor-l-s-1962-ram-chandra-pbasad-v-the-state-of-bihar-2271
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

~
Criminal Trial-Corruption -Special Judge-Territorial juris11
diction-Defect of, if curable-Presumption as to guilt-Whether
,
procedure established by law-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947
(II of 1947), ss. 4 and 5(2)--Criniinal Law Amendmeiit Act, 1952
(XLV I of 1952), ss. 7, 8 and IO-Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898 (5 of 1898), ss. 526 and 5]1-Constitution of lndia, Arts. 216
and 145(3).
The appellant accepted a sum of Rs. 10,000 from a contractor. He was chalanned before a Magistrate at Dhanbad;
but on an application by the appellant the High Court transferred the case to the Munsif-Magistrate, Patna. Subsequently,
the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, came into force
which made every offence under s. r6r Indian Penal Code and
s. 5(2) Prevention. of Corruption Act triable only by a Special
Judge for the area within which it was committed. The case
of the appellant was forwarded to the Special Judge at Patna
who convicted him both under s. r6r and s. 5(2).
The appellant contended: (1) that the Special Judge at Patna had no
jurisdiction to try the appellant as the offence was committed
within the area of the Special Judge at Dhanbad and (2) that
the provisions regarding the presumption contained in s. 4 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, offended Art. 21 of the
Constitution.
Held, that the order of conviction could not be quashed on
the ground that the Special Judge at Patna had no territorial
jurisdiction to try the case as no failure of justice had been
occasioned.
Section 531 Code of Crimin.al Procedure was appli-
;;able to trials by Special Judges. The High Court had also the
power under s. 526 of the Code to transfer a case from one
Special Judge to another, and the omission of a formal order
transferring the case to the Special Judge at Patna had i.~ot prejudiced the appellant.
Held, further that the procedure laid down bys. 4 of the
J?revention of Corruption Act, which was enacted by Parliament, laid down a procedure established by law.
The question
that s. 4 offended Art. 21 of the Constitution was not a substantial question as to the interpretation of the Constitution within
the meaning of Art. 145(3) and it was not necessary to refer it
to a Bench of five Judges.
...
A. K. Gopala11 v. The State of Madras, [r950] S.C.R. 88,
111111
followed.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
51
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
Appeal No. 168 of 1959.
J URISDWTION:
Criminal
I96I
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated September 10, 1958, of the Patna High
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 580 of 1953.
B. B. Tawakley and R. C. Pra8ad, for the appellant.
A. K. Dutt and S. P. Varma, for the respondent.
1961. April 18. The Judgment of tbn Court was
delivered by
RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-This appeal, by special
leave, is against the order of the Patna High Court
dismissing the appellant's appeal against his conviction for offences under s. 161, Indian Penal Code
and s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 194 7
(Act II of 1947), hereinafter called the Act.
The appellant was the Construction Engineer at
Sindhri. R. B. Basu was a contractor living in Calcutta and carrying on the business of the company
named and styled the Hindustan Engineering and
Construction Company. The prosecution alleged, and
the Courts below have found, that the appellant accepted the sum of Rs. 10,000 as illegal gratification from
Basu at the Kelner's Restaurant at Dhanbad Railway
Station on July 18, 1951.
The Courts disbelieved the appellant's defenoe that
he had taken the envelop0 containing this amount not
knowing that it contained this amount, but knowing
that it contained papers relating to Basu's contracts.
The contentions raised on behalf of the. appellant
are:
(i) that the provisions regarding the presumption
contained in s. 4 of the Act are unconstitutional;
(ii) that the case was tried by the Special Judge who
had no jurisdiction to try it; (iii) that there had been
no proper corroboration of the statement of Basu about
the accused demanding the bribe

## Text

A i'iril IR.
50
1'UPRJ£ME COURT REPOR'l'S
[1962]
RAM CHANDRA PBASAD
v.
THE STATE OF BIHAR
(K. 8UBBA RAO and RAGHUBAR DAYAJ,, JJ.)
~
Criminal Trial-Corruption -Special Judge-Territorial juris11
diction-Defect of, if curable-Presumption as to guilt-Whether
,
procedure established by law-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947
(II of 1947), ss. 4 and 5(2)--Criniinal Law Amendmeiit Act, 1952
(XLV I of 1952), ss. 7, 8 and IO-Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898 (5 of 1898), ss. 526 and 5]1-Constitution of lndia, Arts. 216
and 145(3).
The appellant accepted a sum of Rs. 10,000 from a contractor. He was chalanned before a Magistrate at Dhanbad;
but on an application by the appellant the High Court transferred the case to the Munsif-Magistrate, Patna. Subsequently,
the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, came into force
which made every offence under s. r6r Indian Penal Code and
s. 5(2) Prevention. of Corruption Act triable only by a Special
Judge for the area within which it was committed. The case
of the appellant was forwarded to the Special Judge at Patna
who convicted him both under s. r6r and s. 5(2).
The appellant contended: (1) that the Special Judge at Patna had no
jurisdiction to try the appellant as the offence was committed
within the area of the Special Judge at Dhanbad and (2) that
the provisions regarding the presumption contained in s. 4 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, offended Art. 21 of the
Constitution.
Held, that the order of conviction could not be quashed on
the ground that the Special Judge at Patna had no territorial
jurisdiction to try the case as no failure of justice had been
occasioned.
Section 531 Code of Crimin.al Procedure was appli-
;;able to trials by Special Judges. The High Court had also the
power under s. 526 of the Code to transfer a case from one
Special Judge to another, and the omission of a formal order
transferring the case to the Special Judge at Patna had i.~ot prejudiced the appellant.
Held, further that the procedure laid down bys. 4 of the
J?revention of Corruption Act, which was enacted by Parliament, laid down a procedure established by law.
The question
that s. 4 offended Art. 21 of the Constitution was not a substantial question as to the interpretation of the Constitution within
the meaning of Art. 145(3) and it was not necessary to refer it
to a Bench of five Judges.
...
A. K. Gopala11 v. The State of Madras, [r950] S.C.R. 88,
111111
followed.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
51
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
Appeal No. 168 of 1959.
J URISDWTION:
Criminal
I96I
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated September 10, 1958, of the Patna High
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 580 of 1953.
B. B. Tawakley and R. C. Pra8ad, for the appellant.
A. K. Dutt and S. P. Varma, for the respondent.
1961. April 18. The Judgment of tbn Court was
delivered by
RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-This appeal, by special
leave, is against the order of the Patna High Court
dismissing the appellant's appeal against his conviction for offences under s. 161, Indian Penal Code
and s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 194 7
(Act II of 1947), hereinafter called the Act.
The appellant was the Construction Engineer at
Sindhri. R. B. Basu was a contractor living in Calcutta and carrying on the business of the company
named and styled the Hindustan Engineering and
Construction Company. The prosecution alleged, and
the Courts below have found, that the appellant accepted the sum of Rs. 10,000 as illegal gratification from
Basu at the Kelner's Restaurant at Dhanbad Railway
Station on July 18, 1951.
The Courts disbelieved the appellant's defenoe that
he had taken the envelop0 containing this amount not
knowing that it contained this amount, but knowing
that it contained papers relating to Basu's contracts.
The contentions raised on behalf of the. appellant
are:
(i) that the provisions regarding the presumption
contained in s. 4 of the Act are unconstitutional;
(ii) that the case was tried by the Special Judge who
had no jurisdiction to try it; (iii) that there had been
no proper corroboration of the statement of Basu about
the accused demanding the bribe and accepting the
amount as illegal gratification.
The Constitutionality of s. 4 of the Act was sought
to be questioned on the ground that it went against
Ram Chandra
Prasad
v.
St11te of Bihar
Raghubar
Dayal J
Ram Chandra
Prasad
v.
Slate of Bihar
Raghubar
Dayal ].
52
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
the provisions of Art. 21 of the Constitution which
reads:
"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."
We do not consider this question to be a substantial
question of law for the purpose of Art. 145(3), which
lays down that the minimum number of Judges who
are to sit for the purpose of deciding any case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution shall be five, in view of it
being held that the word 'law' in Art. 21 refers to law
made by the State and not to positive law. It has
been held in A. K. Gopalan v. The State of 211adras (')
that in Art. 21, the word 'law' has been used in the
sense of State-made law and not as an equivalent of
law in the abstract or general sense embodying the
principles of natural justice, and 'procedure established by law' means procedure established by law made
by the State, that is to say, by the Union Parliament
or the Legislatures of the States. Section 4 has been
enacted by Parliament and therefore it must be held
that what it lays down is a procedure established by
law.
The appellant was tried by the Special Judge of
Patna. The offence was committed at Dhanbad, in
Manbhum District. The case was chalanned to the
Magistrate at Dhanbad. On an applica.tion by the
accused, the High Court transferred it to the Court of
the l\Iunsif-Magistrate at Patna. Subsequent to this
order of transfer, the Criminal Law Amendment Act,
1952 (Act XLVI of 1952) came into force on July 28,
1952. The case, thereafter, was forwarded to the Special Judge at Patna in view of s. 10 of the Criminal
Law Amendment Act. The contention for the appellant is that there was the Special Judge at Manbhum
and that he alone could have tried this case.
Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, reads:
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, or in any other
law the offences specified in sub-section (1) of section 6 shall be triable by special Judges only.
(t) [1950] $,C.R. 88.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
53
(2) Every offence specified in sub-section (1) of
section 6 shall be tried by the special Judge for
the area wit,hin which it was committed, or where
there are more special Judges than one for such
area, by such one of them as may be specified in
this behalf by the State Government.
(3) When trying any case, a special Judge ma,y
also try any offence other than an offence specified
in section 6 with which the accused may, under the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be charged at the
same trial."
Sub-section (1) makes the offences under s. 161,
Indian Penal Code and s. 5(2) of the Act triable by a
special Judge only.
The appellant has been tried by
a special Judge appointed under the Act. His grievance is not with respect to the competency of the
Court which tried him, but is with respect to the trial
Court having no territorial jurisdiction to try him, as
sub-s. (2) of s. 7 provides that such offences would be
tried by the special Judge for the area in which they
were committed. The offences were committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of the special Judge at
Manbhum and therefore could have been tried by
him alone. It would therefore appear that the special Judge at Patna had no jurisdiction to try this
case.
Sub-section (3) of s. 8 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act reads:
"Save as provided in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act, apply to the proceedings before
a special Judge; and for the purposes of the said
provisions, the Court of the special Judge shall be
deemed to be a Court of SoRsion trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors and the
person conducting a prosecution before a special
Judge shall be deemed to be a public prosecutor."
It follows that the provisions of s. 526 of the Criminal
Procedure Code empowering the High Conrt to ti-ansfer any case from a criminal Court subordinate to it
(I) [1950] S.C.!<. 88,
Ra1n Chandra
Prasad
v.
State of Biltat
Raghubar
Dayal ].
ry61
Ram Chandra
Prasad
\".
State of Bihar
Raghubar
Da-yal j.
54
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
to any other Court competent to try it, apply to the case
before any special J ndge. If this case had been transferred to Lhe Court of the Special Judge, Manhhum,
on the wming into force of the Criminal Law Amendment Act., it would have been open to the High Court
to transfer the case from that Court to the Court of
the Speci1'1 Judge, Pe,tna. The case had been transferred from Dhan bad to Patna at the request of the
appellant. The trial at Patna cannot be said to have
prejudiced the appellant in any way. The mere omission of a, formal forwarding of this case to the Special
Judge at l\fanbhum and of a formal order of the High
Court to transfer it to the Court of the Special Judge
at Patna, have not., in our opinion, prejudiced the
appellant in any way.
When the case was taken up
by the Special Judge, Patna, on October 23, 1952, the
accused as well as the Public Prosecutor desired de
nova trial. No objection to the jurisdiction of the
Court to try the case was taken at that time. Such
an objection appears to have been taken at the time
of the arguments before the Special Judge and was
repelled by him. Such an objection was not raised
before the High Court when the appellant's appeal
was first heard in 1955 or in this Court when the
State of Bihar appealed against the order of the High
Court. . All this indicates that the appellant did not
feel prejudiced by the trial at Patna.
In view of s. 531 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the order of the Special Judge, Patna, is not to
be set aside on the ground of his having no territorial
jurisdiction to try this case, when no failure of justice has actually taken place. It is contended for the
appellant the.t s. 531 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to this case in view of sub-s. (1)
of s. 7 and s. 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act.
We do not agree. ThB former provision simply lays
down that such offences shall be triable by special
Judges and this provision has not been offended
against. Section 10 simply provides that the cases
triable by a special Judge under s. 7 and pending before a Magistrate immediately before the commencement of the Act shall be forwarded for trial to the
I
~
2 8.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
55
special ,Tudge having jurisdiction over such cases.
There iti nothing in this section which leads to tho
non-applica,tion of s. 531 of the Criminal Procedure
Code.
\Ve are therefore of opinion that the order of tho
special Judge convicting the appellant cannot be quashed merely on the ground that he had no territorial
jurisdicti9n to try this case.
The last contention for consideration is whether
there had been proper corroboration of the statement
of Basu about the accused demanding the bribe of
l{s. 10,000 and accepting it on July 18, 1951, at the
Kelner Refreshment Room, Dhanbad Railway Station.
We may briefly indicate the salient facts deposed
to by Basu in this connection. The appellant is said
to have visited Calcutta in December 1950, to have
gone to Basu's house and to have asked him to pay
a bribe of Rs. 10,000.
There is no direct corroboration of this statement by the testimony of any other
witness. Kanjilal, an employee of Basu, under instructions of his master, met the appellant in May,
1951, enquired of him whether he would accept the
amount he had demanded in December and had not
been so far paid, and got the reply that the amount
would be acceptable. He conveyed this information
to Basu. Nothing was done till over a month and
then too, not to make the payment, but to inform the
authorities.
In June 1951, Basu informed Mr. K. N. Mookerjee,
P. W. 3, the then Superintendent of Police, Special
Police Establishment, about the accused's demanding
bribe and at his request delivered the letter, Exhibit
11/1, dated June 18, to him. He made mention in this
letter about the demand made in December 1950, but
made no reference to the appellant's expression of
readiness to accept the amount in the month of May.
Mr. Mookerjee took steps for laying the trap and
deputed Mr. S. P. Mookerjee, P.W. 1.
Kanjilal met the appellant on July 14 and arranged
with him that he would go to Dhanba\f railway station when Basu would also be reaching there and
that the money would be paid there and thaL the date
Ram Chand1a
Pra$a,l
v.
State of Bihar
Raghubar
Dayal J.
Rarn Chand1a
l'rasad
v.
·.'-tale of Bihar
Raghubar
Dayal .f.
56
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
.
of that meeting would be communicated later. Basu
was told of this arrangement a.t Calcutta,.
He, in his
turn, informed the authorities. July 18 was fixed for
the purpose. Kanjilal informed the appellaut by telephone on July 16 that the meeting wonld be on the
18th and that Basu would be reaching Dhanbad by
the Toofan Express at about 5 p.m. The tnp armngements were completed and the trap-purty rcuched
Dhanbad by the Toofan Express on July 18. Kanji·
Jal himself went to Sindhri on the morning of July 18
and confirmed the arrangement to the appellant. The
appellant also reached Dhanbad railway station at
about 5 p.m.
The members of the trap party took their seats at
different tables in the corners of the Refreshment
Room of Kellner's Restaurant. Basu, with the appellant, reached there and occupied another tuble. Refreshments were taken. Thereafter, Basu talked over
matters about the contract with the appellant, moved
near him, took out the file from his satchel and then,
after some conversation, took out the envelope containing the currency notes of the value of Rs. 10,000
and having its one long edge slit. This envelope was
passed on to the appellant. Basu states that he made
a statement at the time that there were Rs. 10,000,
which he could not pay to the appellant so far.
The appellant took the envelope and put it in his
trouser pocket. The trap party, after getting the
signal that the bribe money had been paid, surrounded
the appellant and got the envelope from him. It was
found to contain the very currency notes whose numbers had previously been noted by the Magistrate,
Mr. Mahadevan.
There is no verbal corroboration of Kanjilal's statement about the message he conveyed to the appellant
either in May or on the telephone or on the morning
of the 18th of July.
The Courts below have found corroboration of the
statements of Basu from the circumstances that the
demand of money in December 1950 was mentioned
in June, 1951, to Mr. K. N. Mookerjee, that the trap
must huve been laid when Basu must have been
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS
57
certain that the appellant would turn up at Dhanbad
at the appointed time and thatthe appellant's presence
at Dhanbad railway station could not have been
accidental but must have been the result of previous
1irrangement. No infirmity can be found in this reasoning. The appellant gave an explanation for his
presence at the railway station that day. It has not
been accepted by the Courts below. In fact, the
learned counsel for the appellant did not press it for
consideration at the second hearing of the appeal, on
remand by this Court.
No doubt, the kap arrangements must have been made when there was a practical certainty that the appellant would turn up at
Dhanbad railway station.
Basu is not expected to
mention falsely in the month of June that the appelhrnt mado a demand of Rs. 10,000 in December 1950.
Ordinarily, one is not expected to make a complaint
of such a demand after such a long period of time.
The interval of time seems to have been due possibly
to a hope that matters may straighten out or that a
lower sum might be acceptable as bribe to pass the
pending bills of Basu. The omission of the trap witnesses to corroborate Basu's statement at the time of
the passing on of the envelope to the appellant, informing the appellant of the envelope containing
Rs. 10,000, is really surprising when the party consisted of four persons who had gone there for the purpose of being witnesses of the appellant's accepting
the bribe and who could therefore be expected to be
alert to hear what passed on between the appellant
and llasu. The question here is: what did the appellant expect the envelope to contain? It was no occasion
for Basu to personally deliver any bills or papers concerning the contract business.
Such papers could
have been sent in the regular course of business to the
appellant's office.
The appellant does not appear to
have questioned Basu as to what the envelope contained, as he would have donA, if he did not know for
certain what it contained. The appellant's statement
that he understood the enYelope to contain bills etc.,
is not consistent with his putting the envelope in his
8
Ram Cha11dra
F'ra5a,d
v,
State of B,ihar
Raghubar
Dayal ].
Ram Chandra
l'rasad
v.
State of Bihar
Raghubar
Dayal]•
58
SUPHEME COURT HEPOR'I'S
[ HHi:l J
pocket. The env0lope is exp0cted to be a fat one as
it contained one hundred Rs. 100 currency notes.
An
envelope containing business papers i>; "not expeclcd
to be put in the trouser pocket. One usually canies
it in hand, or in one of the pockets of the coat or
bush-shirt one may be putting on.
When it is held
that the appellant must have gone to Dhanbad railway station by arrangement, it becomes a moot point,
what thfl purpose of the arrangement was. Surely,
it could not ha.ve been a mere delivering of certain
bills ftnd papers. As already mentioned, it could have
been sent to Sindhri by post or through Kanjilal or
any other messenger. The purpose of the meeting at
Dhanbad railw1tv station must have been different.
The appellant l1as failed to mention any purpose
which could be accepted as correct.
It is true th'1t the appellant was not spccific~dls
questioned, when examined under s. 342, Crimin1tl Procedure Code, with respect to his demanding Rs. 10,000
at Calcutta, Kanjilal's visit to him in J\fay and July
and his tclcphonio call and the 1t1Tangement fHHi abont.
Basu's statement at the time th.- envelope was pa~:wd
on to him. But we 1tre of opinion that this omission
has not occasioned any failure of justice. The appellant
fully knew what had been deposed to by witnesses
and what had been the cn,se against him. He denied
the correctness of the main allegation that he received
Rs. 10,000 as bribe.
We are therefore of opinion that the appellant
knew when he took the envelope from Basu that he
was getting Rs. 10,000 as bribe, which amount he had
demanded, and that therefore the conviction of the
appellant is correct. 'l'he 1tppe>il fa therefore dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.