# 1,. V. K. A. RANGANATHA KONAR v. \. THE TIRUCHIRAPPALLI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, BY ITS cor.mnSSIONER, AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1965] 2 S.C.R. 645
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964-12-18
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 675 of 1963
- **Bench:** P. B. Ga.Jendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, J. C. Shah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1-v-k-a-ranganatha-konar-v-the-tiruchirappalli-municipal-council-by-its-cor-3431
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

The Madras City Tenants' Protection Act, 1921 (Mad. Act 3 of
1922), ss. 4Q) and 4(4)-Land/ord to pay
compensation
to
evicted
tenant for improvements on land-Decree in favour of landlord und.tr 1.
4( 1) not specifying time within which payment to be made-Payment not
made within three months-Provisions of 1., 4(4) whether attracte~
Suit whether liable to be dismissed.
'
The appellant was the tenant of respondent No. 1 on·. a piece of
land and had built a cinema home thereon. On the expiry of the leaoe,
respondent No. 1 filed a suit for rent and eviction against the appellant
and his sub-lessee. The suit was decreed. Under s. 4(1) of the Madras
City Tenants' Protection Act, 1921, the court determined the value of
the superstructures made by the appellant, and the decree said that posse1sion of the suit properties was to be delivered to ·respondent No. 1 on th•
latter making payment of the compensation for the
superstrucrures
u
determined by the court.
The decree did not specify the time durinz
which the payment was to be made.
According to •. 4(4) of the Act
the compen,.tion money had to be paid within three months of
the passing of the decree in the landlord's favour, otherwise the landlord's
suit would stand dismissed. Respondent No. 1 paid
the
compensation
money into court after the said period of three months had expired and
prayed to the court that the decree be amended by specifying the tim•
during which the payment was to be made.
The court amended th•
decree by inserting therein that the payment was to be made within three
months from the passing of the original decree. Thu• respondent No. 1
remained in ·default under s. 4(4) and the court dismissed the suit. Respondent No. 1 appealed to the High Court which held that s. 4(4) did
not come into play when the decree under s. 4(1) did not specify tho
period within which payment was to be made and its decision , went in
fayour of respondent No. I. The appellant then applied for a certificato
of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court which was grant-ed.
It was urged on behalf of the appellant that the provision prescribed
by s. 4(4) is mandatory and any defect in the decree which is passed
under s. 4(1) cannot help the plaintiff-landlord to circumvent the effect
of the said provision.
On behalf of the respondent No. 1 it was urged
thats. 4(1) should be read as controlling s. 4(4), first a decree must be
properly passed under s. 4(1) specifying the period of three month• within
which the amount should be paid and then only s. 4(4) could be invoked.
HELD : The Hig!J. Court was in error in reversing the order passwed -
by the trial court.
H
(i) The controversy had to be decided in the light of the object of
the Act. The object was clearly to give protection to tenants who had
taken open land on lease and had built superstructure• on it in the hope
that as long as they paid rent they would not be evicted. (649 H]
/
646
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REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R
(ii) Having regard to the mandatory terms in which s.
4(4)
is . A
couched it would not be reasonable to construe s. 4(1) as controlling
1. 4 ( 4). The relevant clause provides that the decree should direct that
on payment by the landlord into court, within
three months, of the
amount found- due, the tenant shall put the landlord into possession. The
clause in respect of the payment by the landlord into court within three
months amount to a condition which has to be satisfied by the landlord
before the tenant is' required to deliver to him possession of the property
in question.
In other words, reference to the payment by the landlord
of the amount found due within the specific period in s. 4(1) is not w
much, a direction issued by the court as specification of a condition expres.
sly and independently provided by s. 4(4). (651 D-F]
(iii) In s. 4(4) the expression "the decree passed under sub-s. (!)"
merely describes the sub-section under which the decree is passed, the
emphasis in the context being on the date of the said decree

## Text

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645
,1,.
V. K. A. RANGANATHA KONAR
v.
\.
THE TIRUCHIRAPPALLI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, BY ITS
cor.mnSSIONER, AND ANOTHER
December 18, 1964
[P. B. GA.JENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO AND
J. C. SHAH, JJ.]
The Madras City Tenants' Protection Act, 1921 (Mad. Act 3 of
1922), ss. 4Q) and 4(4)-Land/ord to pay
compensation
to
evicted
tenant for improvements on land-Decree in favour of landlord und.tr 1.
4( 1) not specifying time within which payment to be made-Payment not
made within three months-Provisions of 1., 4(4) whether attracte~
Suit whether liable to be dismissed.
'
The appellant was the tenant of respondent No. 1 on·. a piece of
land and had built a cinema home thereon. On the expiry of the leaoe,
respondent No. 1 filed a suit for rent and eviction against the appellant
and his sub-lessee. The suit was decreed. Under s. 4(1) of the Madras
City Tenants' Protection Act, 1921, the court determined the value of
the superstructures made by the appellant, and the decree said that posse1sion of the suit properties was to be delivered to ·respondent No. 1 on th•
latter making payment of the compensation for the
superstrucrures
u
determined by the court.
The decree did not specify the time durinz
which the payment was to be made.
According to •. 4(4) of the Act
the compen,.tion money had to be paid within three months of
the passing of the decree in the landlord's favour, otherwise the landlord's
suit would stand dismissed. Respondent No. 1 paid
the
compensation
money into court after the said period of three months had expired and
prayed to the court that the decree be amended by specifying the tim•
during which the payment was to be made.
The court amended th•
decree by inserting therein that the payment was to be made within three
months from the passing of the original decree. Thu• respondent No. 1
remained in ·default under s. 4(4) and the court dismissed the suit. Respondent No. 1 appealed to the High Court which held that s. 4(4) did
not come into play when the decree under s. 4(1) did not specify tho
period within which payment was to be made and its decision , went in
fayour of respondent No. I. The appellant then applied for a certificato
of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court which was grant-ed.
It was urged on behalf of the appellant that the provision prescribed
by s. 4(4) is mandatory and any defect in the decree which is passed
under s. 4(1) cannot help the plaintiff-landlord to circumvent the effect
of the said provision.
On behalf of the respondent No. 1 it was urged
thats. 4(1) should be read as controlling s. 4(4), first a decree must be
properly passed under s. 4(1) specifying the period of three month• within
which the amount should be paid and then only s. 4(4) could be invoked.
HELD : The Hig!J. Court was in error in reversing the order passwed -
by the trial court.
H
(i) The controversy had to be decided in the light of the object of
the Act. The object was clearly to give protection to tenants who had
taken open land on lease and had built superstructure• on it in the hope
that as long as they paid rent they would not be evicted. (649 H]
/
646
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R
(ii) Having regard to the mandatory terms in which s.
4(4)
is . A
couched it would not be reasonable to construe s. 4(1) as controlling
1. 4 ( 4). The relevant clause provides that the decree should direct that
on payment by the landlord into court, within
three months, of the
amount found- due, the tenant shall put the landlord into possession. The
clause in respect of the payment by the landlord into court within three
months amount to a condition which has to be satisfied by the landlord
before the tenant is' required to deliver to him possession of the property
in question.
In other words, reference to the payment by the landlord
of the amount found due within the specific period in s. 4(1) is not w
much, a direction issued by the court as specification of a condition expres.
sly and independently provided by s. 4(4). (651 D-F]
(iii) In s. 4(4) the expression "the decree passed under sub-s. (!)"
merely describes the sub-section under which the decree is passed, the
emphasis in the context being on the date of the said decree and not so
much on the strict compliance with the form prescribed in s. 4( 1). The
logical way to reconcile s. 4(1) and s. 4( 4) would be to treat the provision prescribed by s. 4( 4) as mandatory and paramount and read in the
relevant portion of s. 4(1) accordingly. Even if the decree does not
mention that the amount has to be paid within three months, the landlord's obligation to make the payment within three months is still enforceable under s. 4(4); otherwise defective decrees would deprive the tenant&
of the benefit intended to be conferred on them by s. 4(4).
(651 0652 El
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 675 of
1963.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated August 17, 1960
of the Madras High Court in Appeal Suit No. 92 of 1957.
T. V. R. Tatachari, for the appellant.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and S. Venkatakrishnan, for respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Gajendragadkar, C.J.. The short question which this appeal
raises before us relates to the construction of s. 4 ( 1 ) read with
s. 4 ( 4) of the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act, 1921 (Madras
Act III of 1922) (hereinafter called 'the Act').
This question
arises in this way.
On September 1,
1944, respondent No. 1,
Tiruchirappalli Municipal Council, leased T.S. No. 3283/1-A/2 to
the appellant, V. K. A. Ranganatha Konar, for a term of three
years at a rent of Rs. 100 /- per month. On the premises thus let
out to him, the appellant erected a building for the purpose of
exhibiting cinematographic films.
In 1945, he sub-leased the
property to the second respondent, A. Muthukumaran. In 1947,
the lease was renewed for a period of three years, and so, it expired
on March 31, 1950. Nevertheless, the appellant and respondent
No. 2 continued in possession.
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RANGANATHA v. MUNC. COUNCIL (Gajendragadkar, C./.)647
A
On December 23, 1954, respondent No. 1 instituted a suit for
the eviction of the appellant and respondent No. 2 and for arrears
of rent. While the suit was pending, the Act was extended to the
Municipal Town of Tiruchirappalli. Accordingly, the value of the
improvements made by the appellant and respondent No. 2 was
determined by the learned trial Judge and declared to be
B
Rs. 64,661-13-5 under s. 4(1) of the Act. On March 26, 1956,
the trial Court passed a decree which, inter alia, provided "that tho
defendants do put the plaintiff in possession of the suit properties
described hereunder on payment of Rs. 64,661-13-5 by the plaintiff to the first defendant being the compensation for the superstructure belonging to the first defendant." The appellant was the first
C defendant in the said proceedings. This decree did not in terms
direct respondent No. 1 to pay the said amount within three months
from its date, and it is the omission to issue this direction which
has caused the present controversy between the parties.
On October 1, 1956, the appellant filed an application I.A; No.
D 301 of 1956 inviting the attention of the Court to the fact that
respondent No. 1 had not made the deposit within three months
from the date of the decree, and claiming that by virtue of the
provision prescribed by s. 4( 4) of the Act, the Court was bound
to dismiss the suit filed by respondent No. 1 for ejecting him and
respondent No. 2. On November 5, 1956, respondent No. 1 filed
I: a counter to this interlocutory application.
On the -same date,
respondent No. 1 filed another interlocutory application praying
that the decree in question should be amended so as to specify the
time within which the deposit should be made.
Pending these
applications, on November 15, 1956, respondent No. 1 sent a
f
cheque to the Court in regard to the said amount. The said cheque
was duly cashed and the amount realised credited in the accounts
of the Court on November 20, 1956. On that date, the trial Judge
pas~ed an order directing that the decree should be amended by
inserting a direction to the effect that the deposit should be made
before June 23, 1956, that is to say, within three months from
6
March 26, 1956 on which date the original decree had been
passed. Since this amendment could not help respondent No. 1,
the learned trial Judge proceeded to pass an order dismissing the
suit under the provisions of s. 4(4).
This order of dismissal was challenged by respondent No. 1
by an appeal preferred before the Madras High Court. It was
H
urged before the High Court on behalf of respondent No. 1 that
since the original decree did not give a specific direction that the
amount of compensation should be paid within three months, the
648
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REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
provisions of s. 4( 4) could not be invoked until the decree Wllll
A
suitably amended.
The argument was that it is only when the
decree makes a direction calling upon the plaintiff to deposit a
certain amount by way of compensation to the defendant-tenant
within three months, that the requirements of s. 4(1) are complied
with, and it is only where a decree has been properly drawn in
B
accordance with the requirements of s. 4( 1) that the mandatory
provisions of s. 4( 4) could be invoked.
In substance, the High
Court has accepted this plea, with the result that the appeal preferred by respondent No. 1 has been allowed and the original decree
passed on March 26, 1956, has been confirmed.
The result of
this decision is that respondent No. 1 is at liberty to take out c
execution for obtaining possession of the property. The appellant
then applied for and obtained a certificate from the High Court and
it is with this certificate that he has brought this appeal before us.
On behalf of the appellant, Mr. Tatachari has urged that the High
Court's decision under appeal proceeds on a misconstruction of
the provisions contained ins. 4(4) read withs. 4(1) of the Act. He D
argues that the provision prescribed by s. 4( 4) is mandatory and
any defect in the decree which is passed under s. 4(1) cannot help
respondent No. 1 to circumvent the effect of the said provision.
Before dealing with this point, it is necessary to read s. 4(1) &:
(4). Section 4(1) reads thus:-
"In a suit for ejectment against a tenant in which the
landlord succeeds, the court shall ascertain the amount
of compensation, if any, payable under section 3 and the
decree in the suit shall declare the amount so found due
and direct that, on payment by the landlord into court,
within three months from the date of the decree, of the
amount so found due, the tenant shall put the landlord
into possession of the land with the building and trees
thereon."
Section 4( 4) provides :-
"If the amount found due is not paid into court within three months from the date of the decree under subsection (1) or of the interim order under sub-section (2),
or if no application is made under section 6, the suit or
application, as the case may be, shall stand dismissed,
alld the landlord shall not be entitled to institute a fresh
suit for_ ejectment, or present a fresh application for recovery of possession for a period of five years from the
date of such dismissal."
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RANGANATHA v. MUNC. COUNCIL (Gajendragadkar, C.J.) 649
.A
Mr. Sastri for respondent No. 1 has strenuously contended that
in appreciating the effect of the two relevant provisions, it is necessary to bear in mind that ultimately, the direction contained in
the decree must be enforced, and if the original decree did not
require respondent No. 1 to pay the compensation amount within
three months, the right of the appellant to recover that amount
B must inevitably be enforced by execution proceedings under Article
182 of the Limitation Act. In the case of such a decree, s. 4(4)
cannot apply, because s. 4(4) postulates that a proper and valid
decree has been passed in conformity with the requirements of s.
4(1) Section 4(4) provides a period of three months "from tho
date of the decree under sub-section (1)"; it is the decree under
C sub-section (1) which starts the period of limitation, and before a
decree can be said to be a decree under sub-section (1 ), it must
comply with all the requirements prescribed by the said sub-section;
in the present case, the decree did not specify that the amount in
question should be paid within three months, and so, it is not a
D decree properly passed under sub-section (1) and as such, s. 4(4)
cannot be invoked.
Mr. Sastri has put his argument in another form.
He contends that though the original decree passed between the parties in
the present proceedings did not comply with the requirements of
s. 4(1) inasmuch as it failed to specify the period of three months
I: within which the amount of compensation should be paid, it cannoi be said to be a nullity; it is a decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction, and so, when the appellant seeks to invoke
s. 4( 4), what he is virtually asking the Court to do is to ignore tho
fact that the decree did not direct respondent No. 1 to pay the
amount within three months, and in the absence of a direction in
1
the decree, it would not be permissible to the Court to enforce the
provisions of s. 4( 4) against respondent No. 1. He would, therefore, read s. 4(1) as controlling s. 4(4); first 11 decree must he
properly passed under s. 4(1) specifying the period of three months
within which the amount should be paid, and then s. 4( 4) can be
G invoked. That is how Mr. Sastri has presented before us his solution to the problem of construing section 4(1) and (4) together.
In dealing with this question, it is necessary to bear in mind
the object which the Act is intended to achieve. As the preamble
indicates, the Act was passed to give protection to certain classes
of tenants in areas to which it was extended. The Legislature
H thought that it was necessary to give protection to tenants who had
constructed buildings on others' lands in the hope that they would
not be evicted so long as they paid a fair rent for the land. In
650
SUPREME
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REPORTS
(1965] 2 S.C.R.
·other words, the Legislature took the view that in a large majority
of cases where open plots were let out to the tenants and the
tenants, in their turn, in vested money by constructing buildings on
the said plots in the hope that they would be allowed to remain in
possession of the leased property so long as they continued to pay
a fair rent, it was necessary to protect their tenancy rights. Though
this Act was passed in 1922, it was not extended to the whole of
the State of Madras; it has been extended stage by stage to different
areas. In fact, we have already seen that the Act was extended to
the municipal area of Tiruchirnppalli while the present suit between. the parties was pending in the trial Court.
A
B
In order to carry out its object of affording protection to the
tenants, s. 3 has provided for the payment of compensation on
ejectment. It Jays down that if a tenant is ejected, he would be
entitled to compensation for the value of the building which he
might have constructed on the plot let out to him. Section 3 deals
with a question of compensation and provides how it should be
D
determined.
Section 4 then deals with the disposal of suits for
ejectment. Section 4(1) provides that if the landlord succeeds in
obtaining a decree for ejectrr:cnt, the Court shall ascertain the
amount of compensation payable to the tenant, and the decree in
the suit shall declare the amount so found due and direct that, on
payment by the landlord into court, within three months from the
date of the decree, of the amount so found due, the tenant shall
put the landlord into possession of the land with the building and
trees thereon.
Section 4( 4) contains a· mandatory provision that
if the amount found due is not paid within three months, the suit
of the landlord shall stand dismissed. We will presently deal with
E
the question of construin'S these two sub-sections. Meanwhile, we
F
may refer to s. JO.
Section 10(1) provides that sections 4, 5, 6,
8, 9 and 9-A shal!, inter alia, i:pply to suits in ejectment which
are pending or in which decrees for ejectment have been passed,
but have not been executed.
Section 10(2) deals with cases in
which decrees for ejectment have been passed, but the amount of
compensation has not been determined, and it provides that on an
application by the tenant, such amount would be determined in
accordance with s. 4.
Section 10(3) deals with cases of decrees
which are pending execution; and it requires that the Court shall,
on the application of the tenant, recall execution orders, ascertain
the amount of compensation, and pass an interim order under s. 4.
It will thus be clear that wherever the Act is extended, the protection afforded by the Act and the benefits conferred by it can be
claimed not only by tenants against whom suits are pending or
G
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llANGANATHA v. MUNC, COUNCIL (Gajendragadkar, C.J.)651
A would be filed in future, but also by tenants against whom decrees
have already been passed, but have not been fully executed. Section 10 clearly brings out the fact that the policy of the legislature
was to extend ample protection to the tenants in the areas to which
the Act would be extended from time to time.
B
Reverting then to the question of construing s. 4(1) and ( 4),
it would appear that what s. 4(1) purports to do is to require that
the decree in the suit to which it applies shall, in the first instance,
declare the amount found due by way of compensation. The said
provision also requires that the decree shall declare that the tenant
shall put the landlord into possession of the land on payment by
c the landlord into court, within three months from thll date of the
decree, of the amount found due. The two operative parts of the
decree as contemplated by s. 4(1) are: the declaration of the
amount due to the tenant, and the direction to the tenant to deliver
possession of the land to the landlord in case he paid into Court
within three months of the date of the decree the amount declared
D due. It is true that the decree would state that the landlord has to
pay the amount within three months from its date; but having
regard to the specific and mandatory terms in which s. 4( 4) is
couched, it would not be reasonable to construe s. 4(1) as controlling s. 4(4). The relevant clause provides that the decree shall
direct that on payment by the landlord into Court, within three
E months, of the amount found due, the tenant shall put the landlord
into possession. ·The clause in respect of the payment by the landlord into court within three mollths amounts to a condition which
has to be satisfied by the landlord before the tenant is required to
deliver to him possession of the property in question. In other
F words, reference to the payment by the landlord of the amount
found due within the specified period in s. 4(1) is not so much a
direction issued by the Court as specification of a condition expressly and independently provided by s. 4(4).
The provision of s. 4( 4) clearly shows that if the amount found
due is not paid within three months, the suit of the landlord shall
G stand dismissed.
The opening clause of s. 4( 4) shows that the
amount has to be paid within three months from the date of the
decree passed under sub-section ( 1 ) . The expression "the decree
under sub-section ( 1 ) " merely describes the subsection under which
the decree is passed, the emphasis in the context being on the date
of the said decree and not so much on the.. strict compliance with
H
the form prescribed by s. 4 (1 ) . H the decree is passed under
s. (1), its date is material for the purpose of deciding the period
beyond which s. 4( 4) would come into operation. In other words,
652
SUPREME
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REPORTS
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
as soon as it is shown by a tenant that a decree has been passed A
under s. 4(1) declaring the amount of compensation due to him
from the landlord, he is entitled to claim that he is no longer under
obligation to deliver possession of the property to the landlord,
because three months have passed from the date of the decree and
the amount declared as compensation has not been paid to him.
U the decree happens to be defective in the sense that it does not B
reproduce the requirement of s. 4(1) expressly in its terms, that
would not take the case outside the purview of s. 4(4). We are
inclined to think that having regard to the mandatory terms used
io s. 4(4), it would be illogical and unreasonable to suggest that
a defective decree like the present enables the landlord to circumC
Yent the provisions of s. 4(4). The applicability of s. 4(4) cannot
be repelled merely on the ground that the decree passed under
11. 4 ( 1) does not specify the period of three months within which the
amount found due has to be paid.
In our opinion, the logical
way to reconciles. 4(1) ands. 4(4) would be to treat the provision
prescribed by s. 4(4) as mandatory and paramount and read the D
relevant portion of s. 4(1) accordingly. That is why even if the
decree does not mention that the amount has to be . pa.id withiri
three months, the landlord's obligation to make the payment
within three months is still enforceable under s. 4(4), otherwise
defective decrees would deprive the tenants of the benefit intended
to be conferred on them bys. 4(4). We are therefore satisfied that E
the High Court was in error in reversing the order passed by the
trial Court. Respondent No. 1 has not paid the amount within
three months from the date of the decree and the suit instituted
by it shall stand dismissed under s. 4(4).
The result is, the appeal is allowed, the decree passed by the F
High Court is set aside and that of the trial Court restored. In
the circumstances of this case, there would be no order as to cost!
throughout.
Appeal allowed.