# 10 S.C.R. 1051 MIS MUTHA ASSOCIATES AND ORS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2013] 10 S.C.R. 1051
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2013-07-04
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2853 of 2002
- **Bench:** T.S. Thakur, M.Y. Eqbal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/10-s-c-r-1051-mis-mutha-associates-and-ors-v-state-of-maharashtra-and-ors-28586
- **Pages:** 40

## Headnote

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
A
B
s.6 rlw. s.126(2) of Maharashtra Regional and Town c
Planning Act, 1966 - Acquisition of land - By Municipal
authorities - For extention of 'Bamboo Trade and Flea·Market'
by Agricultural Produce Market Committee - Under
development plan for the city - Acquisition proceedings
challenged - High Court upheld the proceedings - Held: The
D
High Court rightly upheld the acquisition proceedings on the
grounds of delayllaches as well as on merits - There was no
dichotomy between the purpose notified and the purpose for
which the reservation was made.
s.48 - Withdrawal of land acquisition proceedings - By the
Minister of Revenue - Withdrawal challenged - High Court set
aside the withdrawal order on the grounds that the same was
not notified in official Gazette, it was violative of principles of
natural justice and the reasons for withdrawal were not
sustainable - Held: Withdrawal order was rightly set aside by
the High Court - Withdrawal order was arbitrary, lacked
objectivity, it was passed by ignoring material on record and
was violative of principles of natural justice.
E
F
Administrative Law - Administrative decision - Malafide
G
- A/legation of - Standard of proof - Held: Merely because
action by public authority is found untenable, it cannot be
called malafide - An action may continue to be bonafide and
in good faith, even if the public authority has committed
1051
H
1052
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 10 S.C.R.
A mistakes or irregularities or breached principles of natural
justice - Suspicion however strong, cannot be proof of charge
of malafide - In the facts of the case, malafide not proved
against the public authority.
8
Delayllaches - Challenge to acquisition proceedings u/
Art. 226 of the Constitution - Held: The Court can decline to
invoke its power of judicial review under Art.226 to interfere
with acquisition proceedings, if the challenge to such
proceedings is belated and the delay is unexplained -
C Constitution of India, 1950 - Art.226.
Pune Municipal Corporation i.e. the planning
authority under Maharashtra Regional and Town
Planning Act (MRTP Act) published the draft of its revised
Development Plan for the city of Pune in the official
D Gazette. The area in question was reserved for the
extention of the Agricultural Produce Market Committee
(APMC) market yard. The plan was sanctioned by the
State wherein the land in question was shown as
reserved for APMC for the purpose of 'Bamboo Trade and
E Flea Market' and authorised APMC for acquisition of the
land in question for the development.
Notification was issued in November 1987 u/s. 126(2)
of MRTP Act r/w. s.6 of Land Acquisition Act. No
objections were filed by the owners of the land or the
F builders-appellant. However, they filed application before
Chief Minister of the State praying for deletion of the land
under acquisition from reservation. In the meantime
award was passed in the acquisition proceedings. The
request made to the Chief Minister was rejected. After the
G notice for possession of the land was issued, the land
owners filed civil suit against the award. During pendency
of the proceedings, the owners as well the builderappellant filed writ petition No.670 of 1996, which was
entertained on the condition that they would withdraw the
H suit.
M/S MUTHA ASSOCIATES AND ORS. v. STATE OF 1-0$3
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
During pendency of the writ petition, the State by
A
invoking its powers u/s.48 of the Land Acquisition Act,
directed withdrawal of proceedings qua the land in
question. Aggrieved thereby, APMC filed writ petition No.
3620/1998.
B
High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the
land owners and buiider-appellants, upholding the
acquisition proceedings. The writ petition filed by APMC
was allowed holding that the withdrawal of the
acquisition proceedings was not valid because the
withdrawal notification was not published in the official
C
Gazette; because the order was passed without hearing
the beneficiary of the acq

## Text

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(2013] 10 S.C.R. 1051
MIS MUTHA ASSOCIATES AND ORS.
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 2853 of 2002 etc.)
JULY 4, 2013
[T.S. THAKUR AND M.Y. EQBAL, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
A
B
s.6 rlw. s.126(2) of Maharashtra Regional and Town c
Planning Act, 1966 - Acquisition of land - By Municipal
authorities - For extention of 'Bamboo Trade and Flea·Market'
by Agricultural Produce Market Committee - Under
development plan for the city - Acquisition proceedings
challenged - High Court upheld the proceedings - Held: The
D
High Court rightly upheld the acquisition proceedings on the
grounds of delayllaches as well as on merits - There was no
dichotomy between the purpose notified and the purpose for
which the reservation was made.
s.48 - Withdrawal of land acquisition proceedings - By the
Minister of Revenue - Withdrawal challenged - High Court set
aside the withdrawal order on the grounds that the same was
not notified in official Gazette, it was violative of principles of
natural justice and the reasons for withdrawal were not
sustainable - Held: Withdrawal order was rightly set aside by
the High Court - Withdrawal order was arbitrary, lacked
objectivity, it was passed by ignoring material on record and
was violative of principles of natural justice.
E
F
Administrative Law - Administrative decision - Malafide
G
- A/legation of - Standard of proof - Held: Merely because
action by public authority is found untenable, it cannot be
called malafide - An action may continue to be bonafide and
in good faith, even if the public authority has committed
1051
H
1052
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 10 S.C.R.
A mistakes or irregularities or breached principles of natural
justice - Suspicion however strong, cannot be proof of charge
of malafide - In the facts of the case, malafide not proved
against the public authority.
8
Delayllaches - Challenge to acquisition proceedings u/
Art. 226 of the Constitution - Held: The Court can decline to
invoke its power of judicial review under Art.226 to interfere
with acquisition proceedings, if the challenge to such
proceedings is belated and the delay is unexplained -
C Constitution of India, 1950 - Art.226.
Pune Municipal Corporation i.e. the planning
authority under Maharashtra Regional and Town
Planning Act (MRTP Act) published the draft of its revised
Development Plan for the city of Pune in the official
D Gazette. The area in question was reserved for the
extention of the Agricultural Produce Market Committee
(APMC) market yard. The plan was sanctioned by the
State wherein the land in question was shown as
reserved for APMC for the purpose of 'Bamboo Trade and
E Flea Market' and authorised APMC for acquisition of the
land in question for the development.
Notification was issued in November 1987 u/s. 126(2)
of MRTP Act r/w. s.6 of Land Acquisition Act. No
objections were filed by the owners of the land or the
F builders-appellant. However, they filed application before
Chief Minister of the State praying for deletion of the land
under acquisition from reservation. In the meantime
award was passed in the acquisition proceedings. The
request made to the Chief Minister was rejected. After the
G notice for possession of the land was issued, the land
owners filed civil suit against the award. During pendency
of the proceedings, the owners as well the builderappellant filed writ petition No.670 of 1996, which was
entertained on the condition that they would withdraw the
H suit.
M/S MUTHA ASSOCIATES AND ORS. v. STATE OF 1-0$3
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
During pendency of the writ petition, the State by
A
invoking its powers u/s.48 of the Land Acquisition Act,
directed withdrawal of proceedings qua the land in
question. Aggrieved thereby, APMC filed writ petition No.
3620/1998.
B
High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the
land owners and buiider-appellants, upholding the
acquisition proceedings. The writ petition filed by APMC
was allowed holding that the withdrawal of the
acquisition proceedings was not valid because the
withdrawal notification was not published in the official
C
Gazette; because the order was passed without hearing
the beneficiary of the acquisition i.e. APMC; and because
the reasons given by the Minister of Revenue for
withdrawal were unsustainable. The Court also held that
the withdrawal order passed by the Minister was
malafide. Hence the present appeals were filed by the
land-owners and developer and also by the Minister of
Revenue.
D
Dismissing the appeals filed by the land-owners and
E
the builder with cost assessed at Rs.5 lakhs, and partly
allowing the appeal filed by the Minister, the Court,
HELD: 1.1. In the present case, the appellant owners
or the Builders did not file any objections or move their
little finger till the making of the award by the Collector.
Instead of filing of the objections, opposing the proposed
acquisition before tile Collector and seeking redress at
F
the appropriate stage, they remained content with making
representations to the minister which w~ not a remedy
recognised by the statute. It was only after the Collector G
had made his award and after notice foLtaking over
possession was issued by the appellants that they
rushed to the civil court with a suit in which too they did
not assail the validity of the declaration under Section
26(2) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning
H
1054
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 10 S.C.R.
A Act, 1966 (MRTP) Act read with Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act. The remedy by way of a suit was clearly
misconceived. [Para 17] [1074-C-E]
State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar and Ors. (1995) 4
B SCC 229: 1995 (3) SCR 857; Municipal Corporation of
Greater Bombay v. l.D. I. Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. (1996) 11 SCC
501: 1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 551; Ramjas Foundation and Ors.
v. Union of India and Ors. 1993 Supp (2) SCC 20: 1992 (2)
Suppl. SCR 426; Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat
C and Ors. (1998) 4 sec 387: 1998 (2) SCR 339 - relied on.
D
Af/atoon and Ors. v. Lt. Govemorof Delhi and Ors. (1975)
4 SCC 285: 1975 (1) SCR 802; lndrapuri Griha Nirman
Sahakari Samiti ·ud. v. The State of Rajasthan and Ors.
(1973) 4 sec 296 - followed.
1.2. In order to succeed in a challenge to the
acquisition proceedings, the interested person must
remain vigilant and watchful. If instead of doing so, the
interested person allows grass to grow under his feet, he
E cannot invoke the powers of judicial review exercisable
under Article 226 of the Constitution. The failure of the
interested persons to seek redress at the appropriate
stage and without undue delay would in such cases give
rise to an inference that they have waived of their
objections to the acquisitions. The bottom line is that the
F High Court can legitimately decline to invoke their powers
of judicial review to interfere with the acquisition
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution if the
challenge to such proceedings is belated and the
explanation offered a mere moon shine as is the position
G in the present case. The High Court has in the fact
situation of this case rightly exercised its discretion in
refusing to interfere with the acquisition proceedings.
[Para 18] (1075-B-E]
H
2.1. The High Court has even on merits found that the
M/S MUTHA ASSOCIATES AND ORS. v. STATE OF 1055
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
challenge to the acquisition proceedings was unfounded.
A
The proposed acquisition was notified with a view to
extending the APMC market yard. This extension was,
according to the APMC, meant to enable it to use the
acquired area for not only regulating bamboo trade but
also a flea market. That being so, it is difficult to see how
B
the purpose indicated in the declaration was in any way
different from the purpose for which the area was
reserved. The High Court has correctly held that both the
purposes were public purposes and that APMC had
repeatedly asserted that the acquisition will eventually c
lead to the use of the acquired area for the purpose for
which the same was reserved namely, bamboo trade and
flea market [Paras 19 and 20] [1075-E-F; 1076-A-B]
2.2. The fact that the bamboo trade was on the date
of the declaration not legally open for regulatory control
D
of the APMC would not make any material difference
having regard to the fact that flea market was at any rate
permissible at all points of time for there was no legal or
other impediment in the APMC regulating a flea market
in its market yard. The restrictions on the bamboo trade
E
were also removed on account of vacation of stay
granted by the Government. The result was that as on the
date of the judgment delivered by the High Court, the
APMC was and continues to be free to regulate bamboo
trade also. Suffice it to say that the High Court has
F
correctly analysed the issue and rightly held that there
is no dichotomy between the purpose notified and the
purpose for which the reservation was made. There is no
flaw in the reasoning of the High Court insofar it upheld
the validity of the acquisition proceedings even on merits.
G
[Para 20] [1076-B-E]
3. Withdrawal of acquisition must be notified in terms
of Section 48 of the Land Acquis.ition Act. There was
admittedly no such publication in the instant case which
H
1056
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 10 S.C.R.
A rendered the withdrawal order non-est in the eyes of law.
[Paras 23 and 26] [1077-C; 1078-E]
State of Maharashtra v. Umashankar Rajabhau (1996)
1 SCC 299: 1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 39; Mis. Larsen and
B Tourbo Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. (1998) 4 SCC 387:
1998 (2) SCR 339 - relied on.
Prakash Vasudev Deodhar and Ors. v. State of
Maharashtra and Ors. 1993 MLJ page 1768 - referred to.
C
4.1. A requirement of compliance with the principles
of natural justice and consequently a hearing to the
beneficiary affected by withdrawal of acquisition
proceedings is not incorporated in specific words in
Section 48 of the Act. That does not, however, make any
material difference because the law is well-settled that if
D a statutory provision could be read consistently with the
principles of natural justice, the Courts would prefer do
so. That is because it can be presumed that the legislature
and the statutory authorities intend to act in accordance
with such principles. In case, however, the statutory
E provisions either specifically or by necessary implication
exclude the application of the principles of natural justice,
the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature
and read into any such provision the principles of natural
justice. [Para 27] [1078-F-H; 1079-A-B]
F
4.2. In the present case, the obligation to hear existed
but was not satisfactorily discharged by the Minister
while taking a decision in the matter, which is, by itself
sufficient to vitiate the action taken by him independent
of the fact that any order directing withdrawal of
G acquisition ought to have culminated into a proper
notification and published in the official Gazette. [Para 31]
[1081-B-C]
Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha (1970) 2 SCC 458: 1971
H (1) SCR 791 - relied on.
M/S MUTHA ASSOCIATES AND ORS. v. STATE OF 1057
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
5.1. The High Court found that the reasons given in A
the order of withdrawal passed by the Minister were
wholly unsustainable. One of the r_easons for withdrawal
was that the APMC was not authorised to deal in bamboo
and fire wood from 1977 till 1995 and that even though
notification dated 6th February, 1995 included bamboo
B
and fire wood in the coverage of the APMC, the
implementation of the said order had been stayed by the
State Government. The High Court found that the stay
granted by the State Government stood vacated and a
specific mention of this fact was made in para 6 of the c
representation of the APMC filed before the Minister. Not
only that a copy of the notification vacating the stay
against bamboo trade was enclosed. Even the developer
on whose representation the withdrawal was ordered had
conceded that the stay granted by the State Government D
had been vacated. Ignoring these facts the Minister
appears to have taken a stance that was . contrary to the
admitted position on record; implying complete nonapplication of mind on his part. [Paras 32 and 33] [1081C-E, F-H; 1082-A]
5.2. The other reason given for withdrawal of the
acquisition proceedings was that the APMC has used
land otherwise available to it for activities like a beer bar,
E
a hotel and a restaurant. The High Court found that the
representation of the developers and owners made no
F
such referer:ice to any such activity. No other material
was placed before the Minister at the hearing which could
possibly justify the Minister's oral observations made in
the course of hearing regarding mis-utilisation of the land
or justify the withdrawal of the acquisition proceedings. G
The High Court also found fault with the Minister making
use of the report received from the Collector after the
closure of the hearing and behind the back of the APMC
without any notice or opportunity to it to file objections
to the same. The APMC sought to justify the facilities of H
1058
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 10 S.C.R.
A a hotel and a restaurant and ancillary services without
which heavy turnover of business and economic activity
as was being seen and managed by the APMC was not
possible. [Paras 34 and 35) [1082-C-F]
5.3. The High Court was perfectly justified in holding
8 that the order passed by the Minister lacked objectivity
and was hasty without due and proper consideration of
the relevant circumstances and the material on record.
There is no infirmity in the said findings. Thus, the order
passed by the Minister directing withdrawal of the
C acquisition proceedings was bad not only because it was
arbitrary, lacked objectivity and ignored the material on
record but also because the said order was passed
without offering to the APMC a fair and reasonable
opportunity of being heard in the matter. That the order
D was not notified was only an additional reason that
rendered the order legally unsupportable which the High
Court rightly quashed. [Para 36) [1083-A, C-0)
6.1. The allegations suggesting "malice in fact"
should be specific and supported by necessary
E particulars. Vague and general averments to the effect
that the action under review was taken malafide would
not therefore suffice. The burden to establish that the
action under challenge was indeed malafide rests heavily
upon the person making the charge; which is taken as
F quasi criminal in nature and can lead to adverse
consequence for the person who is proved to have acted
malafide. There is in fact a presumption that the public
authority acted bonafide and in good faith. That
presumption can no doubt be rebutted by the person
G making the charge but only on cogent and satisfactory
proof whether direct or circumstantial or on admitted facts
that may support an inference that the action lacked
bonafides and was for that reason vitiated. The third
principle is that the person against whom the charge is
H made must be impleaded as a party to the proceedings
MIS MUTHA ASSOCIATES AND ORS. v. STATE OF 1059
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
and given an opportunity to refute the charge against him.
A
[Para 39] (1085-D-G]
·
State of M.P. and Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and Ors. (1986)
4 sec 566: 1987 (1) SCR 1 - relied on.
6.2. The charge of malafides levelled against the then
Minister was not supported by any particulars. The writ
petition filed by APMC did not provide specific particulars
B
or details of how the decision taken by minister was
influenced by the builder or by any other person for that
matter. The averments made in the writ petition in that
C
regard appeared to be general and inferential in nature.
Such allegations were insufficient to hold the charge of
'malice in fact' levelled against the minister proved. [Para
45] [1089-E-G]
6.3. Though High Court has enumerated certain stark
irregularities in the decision making process or the use
D
of material obtained on behalf of the back of the
beneficiary of the acquisition as also the denial of fair
opportunity to the beneficiary to present its case before
E
the minister yet those irregularities do not inevitably lead
F
to the conclusion that the minister had acted malafide.
Failure to abide by the principles of natural justice are
consideration of material not disclose to a party or nonapplication of mind, to the material available on record
may vitiate the decision taken by ttie authority concerned
and may even constitute malice in law but the action may
still remain bonafide and in good faith. It is trite that every
action taken by a public authority even found untenable
cannot be dubbed as malafide simply because it has
fallen short of the legal standards and requirements for G
an action may continue to be bonafide and in good faith
no matter the public authority .passing the order has
committed mistakes or irregularities in procedures or
even breached the minimal requirements of the principles
of natural justice. [Para 46] [1089-G-H; 1090-A-C]
H
1060
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 10 S.C.R.
A
6.4. The High Court has attributed to the Minister
malafides simply because the order passed by him was
found to be untenable in law. Such an inference was not
justified, no matter the circumstances enumerated by the
High Court may have given rise to a strong suspicion that
s the minister acted out of extraneous considerations.
Suspicion, however, strong cannot be proof of the
charge of malafide. It is only on clear proof of high degree
that the court could strike down an action on the ground
of malafide which standard of proof was not satisfied in
c the instant case. To the extent the High Court held the
action of the minister to be malafide, the impugned order
would require correction. [Para 46) (1090-D-F]
State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 222:
D
1991 (2) SCR 1;
Smt. Swaran Lata v. Union of India & Ors. (1979) 3 SCC
165; Minor A Paeeiakaruppan v. Sobha Joseph (1971) 1
SCC 38: 1971 (2) SCR 430; E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N.
(1974) 4 sec 3: 1974 (2) SCR 348 - relied on.
E
Case Law Reference:
1975 (1) SCR 802
followed
Para 16
1995 (3) SCR 857
relied on
Para 17
F
(1973) 4 sec 296
followed
Para 18
1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 551
relied on
Para 18
1992 (2) Suppl. SCR 426 relied on
Para 18
G
1998 (2) SCR 339
relied on
Para 18
1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 39
relied on
Para 23
1998 (2) SCR 339
relied on
Para 23, 25
1993 MLJ page 1768
referred to
Para 26
H
MIS MUTHA ASSOCIATES AND ORS. v. STATE OF 1061
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
1971 (1) SCR 791
relied on
Para 28
1991 (2) SCR 1
relied on
Para 40
1987 (1) SCR 1
relied on
Pa·ra 42
(1979) 3 sec 1 ss
relied on
Para 43
1971 (2) SCR 430
relied on
Para 43
1974 (2) SCR 348
relied on
Para 43
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2853 of 2002.
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.04.2001 of the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 670
of 1996.
WITH
C.A. Nos. 2854, 2855 & 2856-2857 of 2002.
A
B
c
D
Ranjit Kumar, V. A. Bobde, Sidharth Bhatnagar, Prasenjit
Keswani, Satyajit Saha, V.D. Khanna, Krishnamurthi, Swami,
Aniruddha P. Mayee, Sanjeev Kumar Choudhary, Kamna
E
Sagar for the Appellants.
C.U. Singh, Gurukrishna Prasad, M.L. Patil, Shivaji M.
Jadhav, Rahul Jain, Jayashree Wad, Ashish Wad, Tamali Wad,
Kanika Bhutani, Aditya Gupte, Sanjay Kharde, Asha Gopalan
Nair, S.K. Jain, Abhishek Singh, Chandan Ramamurthi for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. These appeals by special leave arise
G
out of a common Judgment and Order dated 9th April, 2001
passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay whereby the High Court has dismissed Writ Petition
No.670 of 1996 and upheld a notification dated 13th November,
1987 issued under Section 126 (2) of the MRTP Act read with
H
1062
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2013) 10 S.C.R.
A
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and published in the
Official Gazette on 3rd December, 1987. The High Court has
by the same judgment and order quashed order dated 20th
May, 1998 issued under Section 40 of the Land Regulation Act
directing withdrawal of the acquisition proceedings, and
B allowed Writ Petitions No. 3620 and 3874 of 1998. Facts
leading to the filing of the writ petitions and the present appeals
may be summarised as under:-
2. Pune Municipal Corporation which is also the Planning
Authority under the MRTP Act published a notification on 13th
C May, 1976 declaring its intention to revise the development plan
for the Pune city and inviting suggestions and objections to the
proposed revision. The Draft Revised Development Plan inter
alia covered site No.M-145 comprising Survey No.559/28
admeasuring 1 hectare 20 acres (approximately) which was
D under the orders of Director, Town Planning shown as reserved
for the extension of the APMC market yard. The Draft
Development Plan published in the Official Gazette on 7th
October, 1982 in terms of Section 26 of the MRTP Act clearly
reflected the reservation aforementioned.
E
3. The Revised Development Plan was eventually
sanctioned by the State Government in which the parcel of the
land aforementioned owned by late Pralhad Lokram Dodeja and
his brother late Bansidhar Dodeja, appellants in Civil Appeal
F
No.2854 of 2002 continued to be shown as reserved for APMC
with the only change that instead of extension of the APMC
market yard the designated purpose shown was "Bamboo
Trade and Flea Market". The sanctioned Revised Development
Plan further declared APMC to be the appropriate authority for
acquisition and development of the said parcel of land. What
G is important is that although the Planning Authority had declared
its intention to prepare a Revised Development Plan as early
as in May 1976 and invited objections and suggestions from
the public and although the Revised Draft Plan was published
under Section 26 of the Act in the Official Gazette on 7th
H
MIS MUTHAASSOCIATES AND ORS. v. STATE OF 1063
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
October, 1982, no objections were filed to the same by the land
A
0~1mers aforementioned at any point of time. It is in that
backdrop that the appellant-Mutha Associates, for the first time,
came on the scene on 8th March, 1984 when they acquired
what was described as development rights over the disputed
parcel of land upon payment of the earnest money of
B
Rs.50,000/- only.
4. Pursuant to the sanction granted by the State
Government under Section 31 of the MRTP Act, the
Commissioner of Pune Division issued a declaration on 13th
C
November, 1987 under Section 126 (2) of the MRTP Act read
with Section 6 of the Land Acquisition declaring that the parcel
of land aforementioned was needed for the public purpose of
extension of market yard. This notification was published in the
Official Gazette on 3rd December, 1987. The Special Land
Acquisition Officer appointed for the purpose in due course
D
issued notices to the owners as also to the appellant-Mutha
Associates on 15th October, 1988, 31st December, 1988, 11th
April, 1989 and 21st April, 1989. No objections were filed either
by the owners or by· Mutha Associates-their agent/Builder
despite the said notices. Instead they moved two applications
E
before the Chief Minister of the State of Maharashtra one on
11th September, 1989 and the other on 13th October, 1989
praying for deletion of the land under acquisition from
reservation. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, however,
·went ahead with the acquisition proceedings and made an
F
award on 9th November, 1989, pursuant whereto the
respondent-APMC deposited a sum of Rs.26,29,872/- towards
the cost of acquisition on 16th October, 1990. The request of
the appellants for deletion of the land from acquisition
proceedings was finally rejected by the Government on 5th
G
November, 1990 thereby clearing the decks for completing the
acquisition proceedings.
5. The Land Acquisition Officer accordingly issued a notice
under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act for taking over
H
1064
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2013] 10 S.C.R.
A the possession of the land which was received by the land
owners on 24th November, 199Q. The possession was
scheduled to be taken over on 26th November, 1990 at which
stage the land owners filed Regular Civil Suit No.2194of1990
before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pune against the State
B of Maharashtra and the Land Acquisition Officer challenging the
award made by the Collector. In the suit the Civil Judge, Pune
passed an interlocutory order directing the parties to maintain
status quo which order was challenged by the defendants
before the High Court in a Civil Revision that was allowed with
c a direction to the trial Court to decide the application for interim
relief without reference to the application for appointment of a
Local Commissioner made by the owners. The Civil Judge
accordingly heard and dismissed the application of the owners
for interim relief, aggrieved whereof the landowners filed an
0 appeal before the High Court.
6. It was during the pendency of the said appeal that the
owners and Mutha Associates filed Writ Petition No.670 of
1996 challenging the acquisition proceedings. The writ petition
was entertained by the High Court on an assurance given by
E the appellants that the appeal filed by them against the refusal
of the interim order and so also Original Suit No.2194 of 1990
shall be withdrawn by them.
7. While Writ Petition No.670 of 1996 was pending
F disposal, the State Government passed an order dated 20th
May, 1998 whereby the Government purported to invoke their
power under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act to direct
withdrawal of the acquisition proceedings qua the land in
question. Aggrieved by the said order, the APMC filed Writ
G Petition No.3620of1998 challenging the withdrawal on several
grounds including the ground that the APMC was not given a
hearing before the acquisition proceedings were withdrawn
and that the withdrawal order was at any rate arbitrary and
malafide hence unsustainable. Writ Petition No.3874 of 1998
was also filed by a few agriculturists who apprehended that the
H
MIS MUTHA ASSOCIATES AND ORS. v. STATE OF 1065
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
APMC may withdraw writ petition No.3620 of 1998 and,
A
thereby, allow the withdrawal of acquisition to attain finality.
8. The High Court has, as mentioned earlier, heard and
disposed of all the three writ petitions together. It has while
doing so dismissed Writ Petition No.3620 of 1998 and upheld
the acquisition proceedings not only· on the ground that the
challenge to the said proceedings was highly belated but also
B
on the ground that there was no merit in the grounds of
challenge. The High court held that the reservation for Bamboo
Trade and Flea Market was in no way different from extension
C
of the market yard - the purpose for which acquisition
proceedings had been started and that both the purposes were
public purposes apart from the authority designated for
acquiring the land in dispute being one and the same. The High
Court also relied upon a specific assertion made by the APMC
that the land in question shall be used for Bamboo Trade and
D
Flea Market only. In particular, High Court referred to Para 3
of the writ petition in which the petitioners had themselves
stated as under:
"the petitioner's thus state that the additional land was
E
sought for by the respondent No.3 to extend the market
yard to enable them to accommodate the activities of
bambaoo trade which was incorporated in entries 5 and
6 under the heading No.XV forest products in the
Schedule to the said Act. "
F
9. The High Court repelled the contention that the
provisions of Section 37 of the Act were applicable to the case
at hand and distinguished the decisions that were relied upon
by the writ petitioners-appellants in support of that contention
and dismissed Writ Petition No.670 of 1996.
G
10. In Writ Petitions No.3620 of 1998 and 3874 of 1998
the High Court found that the withdrawal of the acquisition
proceedings was not valid not only because the withdrawal
notification was not published in the Official Gazette but also
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 10 S.C.R.
A because the APMC-the beneficiary of the acquisition
proceedings had not been given an opportunity of being heard
by the Minister concerned before directing withdrawal of the
said proceedings. The High Court went a step further and held
that Shri Rane, the then Minister, not only acted in violation of
B the principles of natural justice but made one sided
observations during the proceedings and used the Collector's
report at the back of APMC and finally passed an orqer ignoring
the legal provisions and the pendency of an earlier writ petition
from which one could infer that the Minister had acted under
c the influence of Shri Mutha and directed withdrawal of the
acquisition proceedings for his benefit.
11. The High Court also noted the fact that in Writ Petition
No.3874 of 1998, there was a clear assertion that because of
the influence of Shri Mutha the Minister-Shri Rane had moved
D to supersede the APMC in July, 1998 within two months of the
date of withdrawal order dated 20th May, 1998. This
supersession was according to the writ-petitioners aimed at
ensuring that the challenge to the order of withdrawal was
withdrawn by the officer who took over the reins of the APMC
E by withdrawing Writ Petition No.3620 of 1998. The High Court
also found the supersession of APMC to be a strong
circumstance that could not be brushed aside no matter Shri
Rane had chosen to deny the allegations made against him.
F
G
The High Court eventually concluded:
"This clearly showed his malafides. In the circumstances,
we cannot but hold that the order passed by Shri Naryan
Rane, the then Revenue Minister is in gross violation of
principles of natural justice, is a perverse order, without
any supporting material, and is actuated by malafides and
is nothing short of misuse of powers to favour the land
developers. By looking to the totality of the material on
record that is the conclusion which is inescapable. "
12. The present appeals assail the correctness of the
H findings recorded by the High Court, not only, insofar as the
M/S MUTHA ASSOCIATES AND ORS. v. STATE OF 1067
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
same deal with the validity of the acquisition proceedings, but
A
also, insofar as the High Court has held the withdrawal of the
acquisition proceedings to be bad on account of nonpublication of the withdrawal notification, the non-observance
of principles of natural justice and the malafide exercise of
power vested in the Minister under Section 48 of the Land
B
Acquisition Act.
13. We may before adverting to the submissions made at
the bar, first deal with a matter of some significance especially
because, the appeals have abated on account of the death of
the owners-appellants 2 & 3 as no application for substitution
C
of the legal representatives was moved by the appellant-Mutha
Associates or the legal heirs of the deceased appellants.
Interlocutory Application No.6 filed after considerable delay,
however, seeks condonation of delay, setting aside of
abatement and for substitution of the legal heirs in place of the
D
deceased appellants. This application has been stoutly
opposed by the respondents who have filed objections
asserting inter alia that the application does not, explain the
inordinate delay nor does it show that the applicants or even
Mutha Associates acted diligently in the matter. The opposition
E
is not without basis. We say so because appellant No.2Pralhad Lokhram Dodeja died on 3rd December, 2006, while
appellant No.3-Bansidhar Lokram Dodeja passed away much
earlier on 22.11.2003. Interlocutory Application No.6 seeking
condonation, setting aside of abatement and substitution was,
F
however, filed only on 14th October, 2011 which implied that
there is a delay of nearly five years in the filing of the application
qua Appellant No.2 and nearly eight years qua appellant No.3.
Keeping in view the limitation prescribed for making such an
application, the delay is inordinate to say the least. There is no
G
explanation worth the name, leave alone a cogent one for the
said delay. It is not the case of the legal heirs of the deceased
that they were unaware of the pendency of the appeal in which
their predecessors in interest were appellants. It is also not the
case of Appellant No.1-Mutha Associates that it was unaware
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 10 S.C.R.
A of the death of the two appellants from whom it had acquired
development rights and a power of attorney. No such plea could
even otherwise be taken by appellant-Mutha Associates, having
regard to the fact that in the reply to the contempt petition filed
on its behalf a specific, averment had ·been made by the
B respondents that both appellants 2 and 3 had passed away.
c
D
E
As a matter of fact in paras 6 and 7 of the Interlocutory
Application No.6, the appellant Mutha Associates has clearly
admitted this fact, in the following words:
"6. The Appel/ant/Petitioner No. 1 further states that
Appel/ant/Petitioner No.2 and Appellant/Petitioner No.3
died during the pendency of the Appeal on 3rd
December, 2006 and 22nd November, 2003 respectively.
The Appellant/Petitioner No. 1 states that it is true that the
Respondents had mentioned about the death of original
Appellants Nos.2 and 3 in their affidavit-in-reply filed in
August 2010 in this Hon'ble court in Contempt Petition
No.108 of 2010 in Civil Appeal No.2853 of 2002.
7. The Appellant/Petitioner No. 1 however states that the
Appellants/Petitioner No. 1 inadvertently missed this
aspect, which was taken in the contempt proceedings.
Thus, steps could not be taken for substitution
immediately thereafter. "
14. The above does not constitute a reasonably acceptable
F explanation for the inaction and resultant delay on the part of
the legal representatives of the deceased appellants or Mutha
Associates. The ipxit dixit of the appellant Mutha Associates
cannot be accepted as a ground for condoning delay that
spreads over years and implies complete indolence and lack
G of diligence on its part. So also the absence any worthwhile
reason for the failure of the legal heirs to come forward and
apply for substitution disentitles them to any relief by way of
condonation, setting aside abatement and substitution. The fact
that Mutha Associates has during the pendency of the
H proceedings in this Court allegedly acquired 37.5% share in
M/S MUTHA ASSOCIATES AND ORS. v. STATE OF 1069
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
the property by way of sale in their favour from persons who
A
never came forward to challenge the acquisition proceedings
at any stage and who remained content and in complete
oblivion makes little difference. Any such acquisition pendente
lite and after the land stood vested in the APMC needs to be
noticed only to be ignored. The alleged acquisition on the
B
contrary casts a cloud over the bonafides of Mutha Associates
who came to the Court for relief on the basis of a power of
attorney executed in its favour by the owners and a development
agreement that did not by itself clothe it with the locus standi
to assail the acquisition independent of the owners but now c
seeks to improve its case by setting up an acquisition post the
preliminary notification. Suffice it to say that Interlocutory
Application No.6 deserve to be and is hereby dismissed as
without merit and Appeals No.2853/2002, 2854/2002, 2855/
2002 and 2856-2857/2002 filed by the appellant owners and
D
Mutha Associates in its capacity as an attorney/agent as having
abated.
15. Having said that we do not intend to neglect the
contentions that were urged on merits at considerable length
by learned counsel for the parties. The challenge to the
E
acquisition proceedings was, as seen earlier, negatived by the
High Court not only on the ground of unexplained delay and
laches but also on merits. The High Court was in our opinion
perfectly justified in doing so. The challenge to the acquisition
proceedings was indeed highly belated having regard to the.
F
fact that Planning Authority had declared its intention to revise
the development plan for Pune city, and invited objections to
the proposal as early as in May, 1976. The Special Officer
authorized by the Government to discharge the functions of the
Planning Authority then issued a notification under Section 26(1)
G
of the MRTP Act publishing the Revised Development Plan and
inviting objections in September, 1982. It is also not disputed
that the land in question was reserved in the Revised
Development Plan for extension of Market Yard and the
Appropriate Authority for acquisition of the same was shown
H
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[2013] 10 S.C.R.
A to be the APMC. The land owners did not file any objections
to the proposed reservation of their land in the Revised
Development Plan. In April 1984 the Special Officer submitted
a revised development Plan under Section 28 of the MRTP Act
for approval. The draft plan was sanctioned and published in
B the official gazette on 29th January, .1987 in which the land in
question continued to be reserved' though the designated
purpose was shown to be "Bamboo Trade and Flea Market".
The process for acquisition of the land was then started under
Section 126(2) of the MRTP Act read with Section 6 of the
c Land Acquisition Act. This declaration was made on 13th
November, 1987. Not only that, specific notices were sent to
the land owners as well as to M/s Mutha Associates Developers
on different dates of hearing. Despite the publication and the
servic'e of notices no objections were filed by the land owners
0
or Mis Mutha Associates Developers. In the absence of any
objections or opposition to the proposed acquisition the Land
Acquisition Officer was free to make an award which he did
on 9th November, 1989. It was only after the Collector (Land
Acquisition) initiated the proceedings for taking over the
possession of the land in question that the land owners filed a
E civil suit in which they challenged the award made by the
Collector without raising any question regardi.ng the validity of
the declaration made under Section 126(2) of the MRTP Act
read with Section 6 of the Land Acqui~ition Act. That suit
remained pending for nearly six years before the same was
F withdrawn to challenge the acquisition proceedings in Writ
Petition No.670 of 1996 filed before the High Court. This
challenge was on the face of it barred by inordinate delay and
laches. The High Court was fully justified in declining to interfere
with the acquisition proceedings on that ground. The High Court
G while doing so, rightly observed:
H
'That apart, the gross delay and /aches are most fatal to
this petition. The planning process started in the year
1976. The draft development plan dated 18.9.1982 was
published on 7th October, 1982 under which this
MIS MUTHA ASSOCIATES AND ORS. v. STATE OF 1071
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
particular parcel qf land was reserved in favour of one
A
APMC for extension of market yard. It was permissible
to the petitioners to lodge their objections under Section
28 of the MRTP Act. Subsequently the plan was
sanctioned and published in the official gazette on
29.1.1987 though with one change that the designated
B
purpose was to be bamboo trade and flea market.
Thereafter when the process of acquisition started, the
declaration under Section 126(2) of the MRTP Act read
with Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was made on
13th of November 1987. Not only that but specific notices c
to the land owners as well as developers were issued on
15.10.1988 and 31.12.1988. On 15.10.1988 it was
submitted by the first two petitioners that they needed time
in view of the death of their father on 13. 10. 1988 and
hence on their request the proceedings for acquisition
D
were adjourned to 14. 11. 1988 on 14. 11.