# 10 S.C.R. 47 MEGHMALA & ORS v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY & ORS

- **Citation:** [2010] 10 S.C.R. 47
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2010-08-16
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos.6656-57 of 2010
- **Bench:** P. Sathasivam, Dr. B.S. Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/10-s-c-r-47-meghmala-ors-v-g-narasimha-reddy-ors-26111
- **Pages:** 30

## Headnote

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982:
A
Suit land purchased by appellant/applicant by way of a c
registered sale deed - Challenge not made by anyone as to
the validity of the sale deed -
In earlier proceedings,
respondents claiming right ·over suit land - However, not
producing any document to show their right, interest or title in
the suit land - Order attaining finality to the effect that there D
was no misrepresentation or fraud or suppression of material
fact on the part of the app,ellant in respect of his claim over
suit land - Fresh proceedings by respondents raising issue
'of fraud -
Held: Wou°Jd be tantamount to malicious
prosecution as the issue had earlier been adjudicated upon
- Finding of facts. was recorded in earlier proceedings that the
E
appellant was in actual possession of land and was illegally
dispossessed by the respondents - Land grabbing.
s.10 - Allegation of land grabbing - Burden to prove
innocence - Held: Is on the accused - It is not like any other F
criminal case where accused is presumed to be innocent
unless the· guilt is proved - Criminal law - Burden of proof .
Review: Review application - Maintainability of - Held:
In case a review application is filed before filing the special G
/eave· petition and the review application remains pending till
the dismissal of the special leave petition; then the review
application deserves to be considered - However, if a review
application is filed subsequent to dismissal of the special
47
H
48
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 10 S.C.R.
A
leave petition, the process of filing review application would
amount to abuse of process of the court and such an
application is not maintainable - Administration of justice -
Abuse of process of law.
B
Judgment/order: Obtained by playing fraud on court -
Validity of - Held: An act of fraud on court is always viewed
seriously - Order obtained by making misrepresentation or
playing fraud upon the competent authority not valid in the
eyes of law - Fraud is an anathema to all equitable principles
and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or
C saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including
res judicata -:- Equity - Fraud on couff.
The suit land was purchased by the appellant/
applicant by way of registered sale deed dated 21.5.1980.
D The appellant filed a complaint under the Andhra Pradesh
Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 against the
respondents stating that they grabbed his land and
raised construction. thereon. The plea raised by the
respondents was that in respect of the suit land, there
E
was an agreement to sell dated 23.01.1976, in favour of a
Society which had allotted the land in their favour,
therefore, the vendors of the appellant had no right to·
transfer the land in favour of the appellant. The Special
Court by order dated 4.11.1997 held that the appellant
F
was the owner of the suit land and that the respondents
were land grabbers. The respondents filed a writ petition
before the High Court which was dismissed. Thereafter
the respondents filed special leave petition before this
Court 'which was dismissed as withdrawn giving liberty
G to the. respondents to file review petition before the High
Court. The respondents filed a review petition before the
High Court which was dismissed. Thereafter, in
pursuance of the order in execution proceedings passed .
on 7 .11.2002, the appellant was put into possession of
H
MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &
49
ORS.
the suit land on 16.12.2002. The respondents filed writ A
petitions challenging the order dated 7 .11.2002 which
were dismissed by the High Court by order dated
17.12.2002. The review petitions filed thereagainst before
the High Court, were also dismissed.
In 2005, the respondents filed a review applic·ation
B
before the Special Court seeking review of the order
dated 4.11.1997. The respondents subsequently filed the
applications before the Special Court for fresh
declaration that they were the owners. The Special Cour

## Text

_Characters 0–39,997 of 54,649. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39997 for what follows._

[2010) 10 S.C.R. 47
MEGHMALA & ORS.
v.
G. NARASIMHA REDDY & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos.6656-57 of 2010)
AUGUST 16, 2010
,,
"
(/'
[P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]
Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982:
A
Suit land purchased by appellant/applicant by way of a c
registered sale deed - Challenge not made by anyone as to
the validity of the sale deed -
In earlier proceedings,
respondents claiming right ·over suit land - However, not
producing any document to show their right, interest or title in
the suit land - Order attaining finality to the effect that there D
was no misrepresentation or fraud or suppression of material
fact on the part of the app,ellant in respect of his claim over
suit land - Fresh proceedings by respondents raising issue
'of fraud -
Held: Wou°Jd be tantamount to malicious
prosecution as the issue had earlier been adjudicated upon
- Finding of facts. was recorded in earlier proceedings that the
E
appellant was in actual possession of land and was illegally
dispossessed by the respondents - Land grabbing.
s.10 - Allegation of land grabbing - Burden to prove
innocence - Held: Is on the accused - It is not like any other F
criminal case where accused is presumed to be innocent
unless the· guilt is proved - Criminal law - Burden of proof .
Review: Review application - Maintainability of - Held:
In case a review application is filed before filing the special G
/eave· petition and the review application remains pending till
the dismissal of the special leave petition; then the review
application deserves to be considered - However, if a review
application is filed subsequent to dismissal of the special
47
H
48
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 10 S.C.R.
A
leave petition, the process of filing review application would
amount to abuse of process of the court and such an
application is not maintainable - Administration of justice -
Abuse of process of law.
B
Judgment/order: Obtained by playing fraud on court -
Validity of - Held: An act of fraud on court is always viewed
seriously - Order obtained by making misrepresentation or
playing fraud upon the competent authority not valid in the
eyes of law - Fraud is an anathema to all equitable principles
and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or
C saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including
res judicata -:- Equity - Fraud on couff.
The suit land was purchased by the appellant/
applicant by way of registered sale deed dated 21.5.1980.
D The appellant filed a complaint under the Andhra Pradesh
Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 against the
respondents stating that they grabbed his land and
raised construction. thereon. The plea raised by the
respondents was that in respect of the suit land, there
E
was an agreement to sell dated 23.01.1976, in favour of a
Society which had allotted the land in their favour,
therefore, the vendors of the appellant had no right to·
transfer the land in favour of the appellant. The Special
Court by order dated 4.11.1997 held that the appellant
F
was the owner of the suit land and that the respondents
were land grabbers. The respondents filed a writ petition
before the High Court which was dismissed. Thereafter
the respondents filed special leave petition before this
Court 'which was dismissed as withdrawn giving liberty
G to the. respondents to file review petition before the High
Court. The respondents filed a review petition before the
High Court which was dismissed. Thereafter, in
pursuance of the order in execution proceedings passed .
on 7 .11.2002, the appellant was put into possession of
H
MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &
49
ORS.
the suit land on 16.12.2002. The respondents filed writ A
petitions challenging the order dated 7 .11.2002 which
were dismissed by the High Court by order dated
17.12.2002. The review petitions filed thereagainst before
the High Court, were also dismissed.
In 2005, the respondents filed a review applic·ation
B
before the Special Court seeking review of the order
dated 4.11.1997. The respondents subsequently filed the
applications before the Special Court for fresh
declaration that they were the owners. The Special Court
dismissed the said applications. The High Court allowed C
the writ petitions filed by the respondents and directed
the Special Court to decide the applications afresh on
merits, as in the opinion of the High Court, the
applications required certain inquiry on factual matters
and the claim of the respondents could not have been D
rejected merely on the determination and attaining finality
of orders in earlier proceedings. The instant appeals were
filed challenging the order of the High Court.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
E
HELD: 1.1. In case a litigant files a review application
before filing the special leave petition before this Court
and it remains pending till the special leave petition
stands dismissed, the review application deserves to be
considered. However, if a review application is filed
F
subsequent to dismissal of the special leave petition, the·
· process of filing review application amounts to abuse of
process of the court. Filing of such a review application
by the respondents at a belated stage amounts to abuse
of process of the court and such an application is not G
maintainable. Thus, the High Court ought not to have
entertained the writ petition against the order of dismissal
of the review application by the Special Court and the
order of the High Court to that extent is liable to be set
aside. [Para 17-18] [66-D-G]
H
50
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 10 S.C.R.
A
1r
Mis .• Kabari Pvt Ltd. v. Shivnath Shroff & Ors. AIR .1996
SC 742;. State of Maharashtra·& Anr. v. Prabhakar Bhikaji
Ingle AIR 1996 SC 3069; Raj Kumar Sharma v. Un«:Jn of India
(1995) 2 Scale 23; Sree Narayana Dharmasanghom Trust
v. Swami Prakasananda & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 3277; .K. Ajit
B
Babu & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1997) 6 SCC 473;
Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty & Ors. AIR
1998 SC 1872; Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm & Anr. v. K.
Santhakumaran & Ors. AIR 1999 SC 1486; Kunhayammed
& Ors . .v. State of Kera/a & Anr. AIR 2000 SC 2587; National
c Housing Coop. Society Ltd. v. State of ·Rajasthan & Ors:
(2005) 12 SCC 149; K. Rajamou/i v. A. V.K.N. Swamy AIR
2001SC2316; Mis. Green View Tea & Industries v. Collector,
Golaghat, Assam & Anr. AIR 2004 SC 1738; Kumaran Silk
Trade (P) Ltd . . v. Devendra AIR 2007 SC 1185, relied on.
D
2.1. The applications filed by the respondents before
the Special Court for fresh declaration that they were the
·owners, were based on the ground's that the earlier
udgment and order were obtained by the appellant/
.ipplicant suppressing the material facts and the suit land
E was not identified properly. However, the respondents
had never been able to show as to under what
circumstances they were interested· in the suit land
because before the Special Court in the first round, they
failed to show any document that land had ever been
F
transferred by the tenure-holders/owners in favour of the
Society or the Society had made any allotment in their
favour or they were members of the said Society or they
obtained any sanction from statutory authority to raise
the construction. [Paras 19, 30] [66-G-H; 70-8-C]
G
H
2.2. It is settled proposition of law that where an
applicant gets an
order/office by making at
misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent
authority, such order cannot be sustained in the eyes of
MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &
51
ORS.
law. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a design A
to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The
. expression "fraud" involves two. elements, deceit and
injury to the person deceived. It is a way of cheating
inten~ed to get an advantage. An act of fraud on court is
always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a
a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a
property would render the transaction void ab initio.
Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a
given case deception may not amount to· fraud, fraud is
an anathema to all equitable principles and any affair c
tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the
application of any equitable doctrine including res
judicata. Even in judicial proceedings, once a fraud is
proved, all advantages gained by playing fraud can be
taken away. In such an eventuality, the questions of nonD
executing of the statutory remedies or statutory bars like
doctrine of res judicata are not attracted. Suppression. of
any material fact/document amounts to a fraud on the
court. Every court has an inherent power to recall its own
order obtained by fraud, as the order so obtained is non
est. [Paras 20, 25, 26, 27, 2B] [67-B; 68-D-E; G-H; 69-A-F] E
S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath
(dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. AIR 1994 SC 853; Lazarus Estate Ltd.
v. Besalay 1956 All. E.R. 349; Andhra Pradesh State
Financial Corporation v. Mis. GAR Re-Rolling Mills & Anr.
F
AIR ,1994 SC 2151; State of Maharashtra & Ors. v. Prabhu ·
(1994) 2 SCC 481; Smt. Shrisht Dhawan v. Mis. Shaw
Brothers AIR 1992 SC 1555; United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
v. Rajendra Singh & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1165; District
Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare G
Residential School Society, Vizianagaram & Anr. v. M.
Tripura Sundari Devi (1990) 3 SCC 655; Union oflndia & Ors.
v. M. Bhaskaran (1995) Suppl. 4 SCC 100; Vice Chairman,
Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Anr. v. Girdharilal Yadav
(2004) 6 SCC 325; State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash H
52
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 10 S.C.R.
A
Babula/sing Parmar (2007) 1 SCC 80; Himadri Chemicals
Industries Ltd. v. Coal Tar Refining Company AIR 2007 SC
2798; Mohammed Ibrahim & Ors. v .. State of Bihar & Anr.
(2009) 8 SCC 751; Dr. Vim/a v. Delhi Administration AIR
1963 SC 1572; Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd.
B (1996) 5 SCC 550; State of Andhra Pradesh v. T.
Suryachandra Rao AIR 2005 SC 3110; K.D. Sharma v Steel
Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. (2008) 12 SCC 481; Regional
Manager, Central Bank of India v Madhulika Guruprasad
Dahir & Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 170; Gowrishankar & Anr. v.
C Joshi Amba Shanker Family Trust & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 2202;
Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi & Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 319;
Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal AIR 2002 SC 33; Ram Preeti
Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School & Intermediate Education
AIR 2003 SC 4628; Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil
D Nadu & Anr. AIR 2004 SC 2836; Kinch v. Walcott (1929) AC
482 28 - relied on.
2 .. 3. There was a registered sale deed dated 21.5.1980
in favour of the appellant/applicant. Nobody had ever filed
any application before the competent court to declare
E said sale deed as null and void. The issue of misrepresentation/fraud, suppression of material fact and
identification of land was in issue in earlier review
petitions before the Special Court and in the writ petitions
before the High Court. In this regard, the Special Court
F
in execution proceedings was fully satisfied regarding
the identity of land on the basis of revenue record and
came to the conclusion that there was no misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the appellant/
applicant .. The Society claimed to have an agreement to
G . sell in its favour which did not confer any title in favour
of the Society. A finding of fact had been recorded in
earlier proceedings that the appellant/applicant was in
actual physical possession of the land and he was
illegally/forcibly dispossessed by the respondents. [Paras
H 31, 33] [72-8-C; 70-E-G]
'·.
MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &
S3
ORS.
3, A person in illegal occupation of the land has to
A
be evicted following the procedure prescribed under the
law. Even a trespasser cannot be evicted forcibly. The
State authorities cannot become the law unto
themselves. Even they cannot dispossess a person by
an executive order. Government can resume possession
only in a manner known to or recognised by law and not
otherwise. Tri~ forcible eviction of the appellant/applicant
·\
by the respondents was unwarranted and unlawful. The
B
proceedings were initiated under the Andhra Pradesh
Land Grabbing (Prol)ibition) Act, 1982. It is a special Act c
to prevent illegaj activities of land grabbing. The
Legislature, in its\ wisdom, constituted a Special Court
presided over by a person who is or is eligible to be the
I
.
.
~
Judge of the High Court, and consisting.of Members who
~-or are ·eligible to become a District Judge and District 0
·-collector. Therefore; persons having enough experience
and who have .acquired a higher status have been given
responsibility to adjudicate upon the disputes under the
A~t. That Special. Court has been conferred with the
powers of civil: or criminal courts. As per the provisions
of Section 10 of the Act, the burden of proof is on the
accused to prove that he is not guilty. Thus, it is not like
any other cri,minal case where accused is presumed to
,be innocent unless the guilt is proved. The presumption
of innocence is a huinan right, however, it is subject to
l
the statutory exceptions, and the said principle .forms the
basis of criminal jurisprudence. For this purpose, the
nature of offence, its, seriousness and gravity thereof has
E
F
to be taken into consideration. Statutes like Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881; Prevention of Corruption· Act,
1988; and Terrorist and Disr~ptive\ Activities (Prevention) · G
Act, 1987, provide for presum~tion of guilt if the
circul!l~tances provided in those statutes are found to be
fulfifled-and shift the burden of proof of innocence on the
accused. Thus, the Legislature has adopted a deviating
H
54
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 10 S.C.R.
A course from ordinary criminal law shifting the burd~n on
the accused to prove that he was not guilty. The High
Court while deciding these cases has not ,considered the
issue of the locus.standi of the respondents to maintain
the application for eviction of the appellant/applicant.
B Chagrined and frustrated .. litigants should notbe permitted
to give vent to their frustratio.ns by cheaply invoking the
jurisdiction of the court. The co~rt proceedings cou.ghtnot
to be permitted to degenerate into a we~pon of
harassment and persecution. [Paras 34, 36, 37) [72-D-H;
c 73-B-H; 74-A-B]
D
Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. ¥· Naresh Narayan Roy
AIR 1924 PC 124; La/Ju Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish
Singh & Ors. AIR 1968 SC 620; Ram Ratan v. State of U.P.
AIR 1977 SC 619; Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v.
Union of India & Ors. AIR 1986 SC 872; Krishna Ram Mahala
v. Mrs. Shobha Vankat Rao AIR 1989 SC 2097; Nagar
Palika, Jind v. Jagat Singh AIR 1995 SC 1377; Bishan Das
v. State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 1570; State of U.P. & Ors. v.
Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Sing/7 & Ors. AIR 1989 SC
E 997; State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Vishnunarayan &
Associates (P) dd. & Anr. (2002) 4 SCC 134, relied on.
Case Law Reference:
F
AIR 1996 SC~742
relied on
Para 9
AIR 1996 SC '3069
relied on
Para 10
i
(19$5) 2 Scale 23
relied on
Para 11
AIR 1997 SC 3277
relied on
Para 11
'
G
(1997) 6 sec 473
relied on
Para.11
AIR 1998 SC 1872
relied on
Para 11
J
AIR 1999 SC 1486
relied on
Para 12
H
MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &
55
ORS.
AIR 2000 SC 2587
relied on
Para 13
A
(2005) 12 sec 149
relied on
Para 14
AIR 2001 SC 2316
relied on
Para 15
AIR.2004 SC 1738
relied on
Para 15
B
AIR 2007 SC 1185
relied on
Para 16 ..
AIR 1994 SC 853
relied on
Para 20 ·
1956 All. E.R. 349
relied on
Para 20
c
AIR 1994 SC 2151
relied on
Para 21
(1994) 2 sec 481
relied on
Para 21
AIR 1992 SC 1555
relied on
Para 22
AIR 2000 SC 1165
relied on
Para 23 . D
(1990) 3 sec 655
relied on
Para 24
(1995) Suppl. 4 sec 100 relied on
Para 24
,
(2004) 6 sec 325
relied on
Para 24
E
(2001) 1 sec 80
relied on
Para 24
AIR 2007 SC 2798
relied on
Para 24
(2009) 8 sec 751
relied on
Para 24
F
AIR 1963 SC 1572
relied on
Para 25
(1996) 5 sec 550
relied on
Para 25
AIR 2005·SC 3110
relied on
Para 25
(2008) 12 sec 481
relied on
Para 25
G
c2008) 13 sec 110
relied on
Para 25
AIR 1996 SC 2202
relied on
Para 26
(2003) 8 sec 319
relied on
Para 26
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
56
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 10 S.C.R.
AIR 2002 SC 33
relied on
Para 26
AIR 2003 SC 4628
relied on
Para 26
AIR 2004 SC 2836
relied on
Para 26
(1929) AC 482
relied on
Para 27
AIR 1924 PC 124
relied on
Para, 34
AIR 1968 SC 620
relied on
Para 34
' ;
AIR 1977 SC 619
relied on
Para 34
AIR 1296 SC 872
relied on
Para 34
AIR 1989 SC 2097
relied on
Para 34
AIR 1995 SC 1377
relied on
Para 35
AIR 1961 SC 1570
relied on
Para 36
AIR 1989 SC 997
relied on
Para 36
c2002) 4 sec 134
relied on
Para 36
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
6656-6657 of 2010.
From the Judgment & Order dated 26.04.2007 of the High
Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ.·
Petition Nos. : 19963 and 19962 of 2006.
P. Vishwanatha Shetty, G. Seshagiri Rao, Sridhar Potaraju
for the Appellants.
M .. v. Durga Prasad, G. Ramakrishna. Prasad, B.
G Suyodhan, Amar Pal, Bharat J. Joshi, T. Anamika, D. Rama
Krishna Reddy, SaFljai Kumar Pathak for the Respondents.
H
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &
57
ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
2. Judicial pronouncements unlike sand dunes are known
A
for their stability/finality. However, in this case, in spite of the
. completion of several rounds of litigation upto the High Court,
and one round of litigation before this Court, the respondents
claim a right to abuse the process of the Court with the
perception that whatever may be the orders of the High Court B
or this Court, inter-se parties the dispute shall be protracted and
will never come to an end.
3. These appeals have been preferred against the
Judgment and Order dated 26.04.2007 of the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh, at Hyderabad, passed in Writ Petition Nos. C
19962-19963 of 2006, by which the High Court has allowed the
said petitions against the Judgment and order of the Special
Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition)
Act, 1982 (hereinafter called, "Act 1982"), dismissing the review
application No. 397/2005 in LGC No. 76/1996 and in LGCSR D
357/2005.
4. Facts and circumstances giving rise to the present
cases are as under :-
(A) V .. Ram Chandra Reddy and his brother (vendors) had
E
a huge chunk of land and a part of it could have been the subject
matter of the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Act, 1976 (hereinafter called the Act 1976). The said vendors
entered into an agreement to sell dated 23.01.1976 for selling
a part of the land (hereinafter called 'suit land') to a cooperative
F
society namely, Gruha Lakshmi Cooperative Housing Society
Ltd. (hereinafter called, "the Society"). The vendors, V. Ram
Chandra Reddy and his brother executed a sale d~ed in favour .
of A. Sambashiva Rao (hereinafter called the appellant/
applicant) which was registered on 21.05.1980 vide document G
No. 4758/80 and the appellants were put in possession of the
suit land.
(B) The appellant/applicant- vendee filed LGC No. 76/1996
against the respondents under the provisions of the Act, 1982
H
58
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 10 S.C.R.
A
alleging that he had been working in Andhra Pradesh State
Road Transport Corporation and was mostly out of station, and
the respondents had forcibly grabbed his land and raised
construction thereon. Thus, he sought the relief of their·
dispossession and action against them under the provisions
B
of the Act, 1982.
(C) After complying with the requirements of the statutory
provisions i.e. taking the sanction etc., the respondents were
issued a show cause notice. The respondents filed their reply
submitting that in respect of the suit land, there was an
C
agreement to sell, dated 23.01.1976, in favour of the society
and once such an agreement to sell had been executed, vendors
had no right to transfer the land in favour of the appellanU
applicant. The society had allotted the suit land in their favour,
therefore, the application was liable to be rejected.
D
(D) The Special Court after appreciating the evidence,
vide Judgment and order dated 4.11.1997 came to the
conclusion that the appellant/applicant was the owner of the suit
land and that the respondents had no right, title or claim over
E
the suit land. They had forcibly occupied the land and they were
land grabbers, thus, they were liable to be evicted and orders
for that purpose were passed.
F
(E) Being aggrieved by the order of the Special Court
dated 4.11.1997, the respondents preferred writ petition No.
33572/1997 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, which
was dismissed vide Judgment and Order dated 3.07.2001.
(F) Being aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the
respondents preferred Special Leave Petition (c) No. 18218/
G
2001 before this Court, which was dismissed as withdrawn vide
order dated 2.11.2001 giving liberty to the respondents to file
review petition before the High Court.
(G) The respondents filed review petition No. 31506/2002
H
MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &
59
ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
before the High Court. However, the said review petition was A
dismissed by the High Court vide order dated 16.12.2002.
(H) In the intervening period, when the review petition was
pending before the High Court, the appellant/applicant fifed
execution proceedings by moving IA No. 518/2002. The 8
Respondents also moved an application to summon the record
of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Secundrabad, pertaining to
the survey of the suit land along with an application for the stay
of Execution proceedings. The Special Court vide order dated
7.11.2002 allowed the Execution Application filed by the
appellant/applicant but dismissed the application filed by C
respondents directing the Revenue Divisional Officer to
implement the order dated 4 .11.1997.
(I) The respondents being aggrieved by the common order
dated 7.11.2002, filed writ petition nos. 22953 and 23105 of D
2002, which were, dismissed by the High Court vide order
dated 17.12.2002.
(J) In pursuance of the order in Execution Proceedings
dated 7.11.2002, the appellants were put into possession of E
the suit land on 16.12.2002.
(K) The respondents being aggrieved by the order of the
High Court dated 17.12.2002, preferred review petitions before
the High Court, which were dismissed by the Court vide order
dated 17.11.2003.
F
(L) The respondents filed Review Application no. 397/2005
in lGC No. 76 after an inordinate delay; seeking review of the
order dated 4.11.1997. The respondents subsequently filed an
application in LGCSR No. 357/2005 before the Special Court G
for fresh declaration that they were the owners and that the
appellants, who had succeeded throughout the litigation, were
the land grabbers. The, respondents in the said application
impleaded persons other than the appellant/applicant also, i.e.
the vendors of the appellant/applicant and govt. officials etc.,
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[2010] 10 S.C.R.
A
who are the other appellants in these cases. The Special Court
dismissed the said applications vide orders dated 6.7.2006 and
11.7.2006.
\
(M) The respondents, being aggrieved by both the orders,
B fi[ed Writ Petition Nos. 1 S962 and 19963 of 2006, which have.
been allowed by the High Court vide impugned Judgment and
order dated 26.04.2007, directing the Special Court to decide
both the applications afresh on merit, as in the opinion of the
High Court, the applications required certain inquiry on factual
matters and the claim of the respondents could not have been
C
rejected merely on the determination and attaining finality of
orders in earlier proceedings. Hence, these appeals.
5. Sh. P. Vishwanatha Shetty, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellants, has submitted that even if there
D was an agreement to sell by the vendor of the appellants in
favour of the society, such an agreement did not confer any title
in the suit land in their favour. The respondents had not been
the members of the said Society, nor had any allotment ever
been made by the Society in their favour. The earlier
E
F
proceedings came to an end after having several rounds of
litigation upto the High Court and one round upto this Court. The
orders passed therein attained finality and in pursuance of the
same, the appellant/applicant came into possession of the suit
land. Issues of fraud and identification of land had been in issue
in some of the earlier proceedings. Once the respondents had
approached this Court, the question of entertaining the review
petition after an inordinate delay of 7-8 years does not arise.
The respondents have no locus standi to ask the Special Court
to determine under what circumstances the appellant/applicant
G had obtained the suit land. An application to call for certain
records in respect of the suit land from 1972 to 2002, the survey
reports etc. cannot be made by them. The High Court has
gravely erred in interfering with the orders of the Special Court
rejecting both the applications. Thus, the appeals deserve to
be allowed.
H
MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &
61
ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
6. Per contra, Sh. M.V. Durga Prasad, learned counsel
A
appearing for the respondents submitted that the transfer of
land in favour of the appellant/applicant vide registered sale
deed dated 21.05.1980 was itself a fraudulent transaction and
material in this regard was suppressed from the Special Court
while obtaining the orders in their favour. Fraud vitiates
B
everything. The respondents have raised the issue of the
identification of the suit land. Thus, the applications filed by the
respondents were maintainable and the High Court has rightly
reversed the orders passed by the Special Court. The appeals
lack merit and no interference is warranted by this Court.
7. We have considered the rival submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
c
Admittedly, there is a registered sale deed in favour of the
appellant/applicant dated 21.05.1980 and there may be an
D
agreement to sell in favour of the society dated 23.01.1976. It
is settled legal proposition that an agreement to sell does not
create any right, or title in favour of the intending buyer. The
Society did not file suit for specific performance against the
vendors prior to the execution of sale deed in favour of the
E
appellant/applicant on 21.05.1980. The Special Court, after
appreciating the entire evidence on record, came to the
conclusion that the appellant/applicant was the owner and was
in actual physical possession of the land and that the
respondents had grabbed the said land. The Special Court has
F
observed as under:-
"In the cross-examination, RW1 (respondent No.1 herein)
had to admit that they have not filed any document to show
that the said plot was allotted in their favour by the society
and that they have not filed any document to show that they G
are the members of the said society. He also admitted that
without any municipal sanction or permission, they raised
the construction in the scheduled land."
The Special Court further held that the respondents were
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[2010) 10 S~C.R.
A
land grabbers within the meaning of the Act, 1982 and thus,
they were directed to restore the premises to the appellant/
applicant. These findings of fact had been affirmed upto the
High Court.
-
8
8. The record of the case reveals that respondents have
filed review petitions before the Special Court as well as before
the High Court. However, all the applications had been
. dismissed by the Courts concerned. The respondents again
filed an application seeking review of the order dated
4.11.1997. Section 17-A of the Act, 1982 provides that in order
C
to prevent the miscarriage of justice, a review application can
be entertained on the grounds that the order has been passed
under a mistake of fact, ignorance of any material fact or an
error apparent on the face of law. Limitation for filing the review
application before the Special Court has been prescribed
D
under Rule 18 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Rules, 1988, as 30 days from the date of the order
of which the· review is sought. The respondents had earlier
challenged the said order dated 4.11.1997 before the High
E
. Court, as well as before this Court. Review petitions had been
filed before the Special Court, as well as before the High Court.
Thus, question does arise as to whether it is permissible for a
litigant to file a review application after approaching the superior
forum/court.
F
Review - After approaching the Higher Forum:-
9. In Mis. Kabari Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shivnath Shroff & Ors. AIR
1996 SC 742, this Court had taken a view that the court cannot
entertain an application for review if before making the review
application, the superior court had been moved for getting the
G
self-same relief, for the reason that for the self-same relief two
parallel proceedings before the two forums cannot be taken.
10. In State of Maharashtra & Anr_ Vs. Prabhakar Bhikaji
Ingle AIR 1996 SC 3069, this Court held that when a special
H
leave petition from the order of the Tribunal was dismissed by
MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &
63
ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
a non-speaking order, the main order was confirmed by the A
Court. Thereafter, the power of review cannot be exercised by
the Tribunal as it would be "deleterious to the judicial discipline".
11 '. Same view has been reiterated by this Court in Raj
Kumar Sharma Vs. Union of India (1995) 2 Scale 23; Sree
B
Narayana Dharmasanghom Trust Vs. Swami Prakasananda
& Ors. AIR 1997 SC 3277; K. Ajit Babu & Ors. Vs. Union of
India & Ors. (1997) 6 SCC 473; and Gopabandhu Biswa/ Vs.
Krishna Chandra Mohanty & Ors. AIR 1998 SC 1872.
12. In Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm & Anr. Vs. K.
C
Santhakumaran & Ors. AIR 1999 SC 1486, a three Judge
Bench of this Court considered the issue afresh and held that
filing of the review petition after dismissal of the special leave
petition by it against the self-same order amounted to an abuse
of process of the court and the entertainment of such a review D
application was in affront to its order and it was subversive of
judicial discipline.
13. In Kunhayammed & Ors. Vs. State of Kera/a & Anr.
AIR 2000 SC 2587, a three Judge Bench of this Court E
reconsidered the issue and all above referred judgments and
came to the conclusion that dismissal of special leave petition
in limine by a non-speaking order may not be a bar for
entertaining a review petition by the court below for the reason
that this Court may not be inclined to exercise its discretion
under Article 136 of the Constitution. The declaration of law will
F
be governed by Article 141 where the matter has been "decided
on merit by a speaking judgment. In that case doctrine of
merger would come into place and lay down the following
principles:-
G
(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an
order passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority
before superior forum and such superior forum modifies,
reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the
decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
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64
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2010) 10 S.C.R.
by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists,
remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the
eye of law.
(ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the
Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is
upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an
appeal. The second stage commences if and when the
leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition
is converted into an appeal.
(iii) Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or
unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of
jurisdiction exercised· by the superior forum and the content
or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid
shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The
superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing,
modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it.
Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court
may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order
appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction
and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction
disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The
doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former
and not to the latter.
(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a
no11-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it
does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing
special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place
of the order under challenge. A!J that it means is that the
Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to
allow the appeal being filed.
(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order,.
i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the
order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law
contained in the order is a declaration of law by the
MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &
65
ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the
A
Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law,
whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded
fY the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto
and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings
subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the
B
\
Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But,
this does not amount to saying that the order of the court,
tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order
of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition
or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order c
binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings
between the parties.
14. The Court came to the conclusion that where the matter
has been decided by a non-speaking order in limine the party
may approach the High Court by filing a review petition.
D
Similar view has been reiterated in National Housing
Coop. Society Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan & .Ors. (2005) 12
sec 149.
15. In K. Rajamouli Vs. A. V.K.N. Swamy AIR 2001 SC
E
F
2316, this Court considered the ratio of the judgment in
Kunhayammed (supra); and Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm
(supra) and held that if a review application has been filed
before the High Court prior to filing the special leave petition
before this Court and review petition is decided/rejected,
special leave petition against that order of review would be
maintainable. In case the review application has been filed
subsequent to dismissal of the special leave petition it would
amount to abuse of process of the court and shall be governed
by the ratio of the judgment in 'Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm
G
-: (sup,ra). The said judgment has been approved and followed
Jb. y this Court in Mis. Green View Tea & Industries Vs.
\Collector, Golaghat, Assam & Anr. AIR 2004 SC 1738.
'1s. In Kumaran Silk Trade (P) Ltd. Vs. Devendra AIR
H
66
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 10 S.C.R.
A 2007 SC 1185, this Court held as under:-
B
c
"As a matter of fact at the earlier stage this Court did not
consider the question whether one of the appeals against
the order dismissing the Review Petition on merits was
maintainable. At best the order of remand and the decision
in Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kera/a & Anr. (2000)
6 SCC 359 would enable the petitioner to get over the ratio
of the three Judge Bench decision in Abbai Maligai
Partnership Firm & Anr. v. K. Santhakumaran & Ors.
(1998) 7 sec 386 that the seeking of a review after the
petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed without
reserying any liberty in the petitioner was an abuse of
process."
. '
17. Thus, the law on the issue stands crystallized to the
D effect that in case a litigant files a review petition before filing
the Special Leave Petition before this Court and it remains
pending till the Special Leave Petition stands dismissed, the
review petition deserves to be considered .. In case it is filed
subsequent to dismissal of the Special Leave Petition, the
E process of filing review application amounts to abuse of
process of the court.
18. ln view of the above, we are of the considered opinion
that filing of such a review application by the respondents at a
belated stage amounts to abuse of process of the Court and
F such an application is not maintainable. Thus, the High Court
ought not to have entertained the writ petition against the order
of dismissal of the review application by the Special Court and
the order of the High Court to that extent is liable to be set
aside.
G
19. So far as the other application filed by the respondents
before the Special Court is concerned, it is based on the
grounds that earlier judgment and order had been obtained by
the appellant/applicant suppressing material facts and the suit
H land had not been identified properly, and therefore, the
MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &
67
ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
judgment of the Special Court duly affirmed by the High Court
A
stood vitiated.
Fraud/Misrepresentation: -
20. It is settled proposition of law that where an applicant
gets an order/office by making misrepresentation or playing
B
fraud upon the competent Authority, such order cannot be
sustained in the eyes of law. "Fraud avoids all judicial acts
ecclesiastical or temporal." (Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu
(dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. AIR
1994 SC 853). In Lazarus Estate Ltd. Vs. Besa/ay 1956 All.
C
E.R. 349), the Court observed without equivocation that "no
judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to
stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels
everything."
21. In Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation Vs.
Mis. GAR Re-Rolling Mills & Anr. Al R 1994 SC 2151 ; and
State of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Prabhu (1994) 2 SCC 481,
D
this Court observed that a writ Court, while exercising its
equitable jurisdiction, should not act as to prevent perpetration
E
of a legal fraud as the courts are obliged to do justice by
promotion of good faith. "Equity is, also, known to prevent the
law from the crafty evasions and sub-letties invented to evade
law."
22. In Smt. Shrisht Dhawan Vs. Mis. Shaw Brothers. AIR
F
1992 SC 1555, it has been held as under:-
"Fraud and co7/usion vitiate even the most solemn
proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It
is a concept descriptive of human conduct."
G
23. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rajendra Singh
& Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1165, this Court observed that "Fraud and
justice never dwell together" (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant)
and it is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over
all these centuries.
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[2010] 10 S.C.R.
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24. The ratio laid down by this Court in various cases is
that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and
benefit to the persons who played fraud or made -
misrepresentation ana in such circumstances the Court should
not perpetuate the fraud. (See District Collector & Chairman,
s Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society,
Vizianagaram & Anr. Vs. M. Tripura Sundari Devi (1990) 3
SCC 655; Union of India & Ors. Vs. M. Bhaskaran (1995)
Suppl. 4 SCC 100; Vice Chairman, Kendriya Vidya/aya
Sangathan & Anr. Vs. Girdharila/ Yadav (2004) 6 SCC 32'.S;.
c State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash Babula/sing Parmar
(2007) 1 SCC 80; Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. Vs. C(jjf
Tar Refining Company AIR 2007 SC 2798; and Mohammed
Ibrahim & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2009) 8 SCC 75-1 ).
25. Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an
D egregious nature would vitiate the most solemn proceedings
of courts of justice. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with
a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The___
expression "fraud'' involves two elements, deceit and injury to
the person deceived. It is a cheating intended t9 get an
E advantage. (Vide Dr. Vim/a Vs.