# 10 S.C.R. 816 VIKRAM SINGH@ VICKY &ANR. • v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS

- **Citation:** [2015] 10 S.C.R. 816
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2015-08-21
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No.824 Of 2013
- **Bench:** T. S. Thakur, R.K. Agrawal, Adarsh Kumar Goel
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/10-s-c-r-816-vikram-singh-vicky-anr-v-union-of-india-ors-30261
- **Pages:** 55

## Headnote

Penal Code, 1860:
ss. 302 and 364A - Kidnapping and killing of 16 year
old boy demanding ransom of Rs 50 lakh from his father -
Conviction u/ss. 302 and' 364A and imposition of death
sentence - Order attaining finality upto this Court - Writ
D petition by appellant u!Art. 32 challenging vires of s. 364A to
the extent the same prescribes death sentence for anyone
found guilty, dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the
appellants to approach High Court- Thereaft~r, writ petition
before the High Court dismissed, upholding the vires of s.
E 364A - On appeal, held: Provisions of Section 364A in so far
as the same prescribes death or !ife imprisonment is not
unconstitutional on account of the punishment being
disproportionate to the gravity of the crime committed by the
appellants- s. 364A was enacted for the safety and security
F of the citizens and the unity, sovereignty and integrity of the
country-Appellants were held guilty not only uls. 364A, but
even for murder punishable u/s. 302 - Award of death
sentence was considered to be just, fair and reasonable, even
G by the standards of rarest of rare cases...:.. Just because the
sentence of death is a possible punishment that may be
awarded in appropriate cases cannot make it per se inhuman
or barbaric.
s. 364A - When attracted- Held: Kidnapping/abduction
H demanding ransom from private persons also- attracts s.
816
VIKRAM SINGH@VICKYv. UNION OF INDIA
817
364A - Language employed in s. 364A is wide enough to A
cover even cases where the demand for ransom is made not
as a part of any terrorist act but also for monetary gain from a
private individual- Provision does not suggest that the same
is attracted only in ransom situations arising in· acts of
terrorism directed against the Government or any foreign state B
or international inter-governmental organization.
s. 364A - Ingredients of- Stated.
s. 364A - Scope and purport of- Examination of historical
perspective - Explained and discussed.
C
Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 32, 226 -
Writ
jurisdiction - Order attaining finality upto this Court - Writ
petition by appellant u!Art. 32 challenging vires of s. 364A
dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the appellants to 0
approach High Court- Thereafter, writ petition before the High
Court dismissed, upholding the vires of s. 364A - On appeal,·
held: In view of the decision in Rupa Ashok Hurra's case, if
against a final judgment of this Court, a remedy was not
available u/Art.· 32, the same would also not be available u/ E
Art. 226 - Only remedy available, is by invoking this Court's
inherent powers u!Arts. 129, 142 for recall, reversal or
modification of the order passed by this Court in the criminal
appeal filed by appellants- Thus, writ petition before the High
Court for that relief is untenable.
F
Interpretation of statutes - Rule of ejusdem generis -
Applicability - Whether the expression 'any other person'
appearing in s. 364A ought to be read ejusdem generis with
the expression preceding the said words - Held: s. 364A G
made use of only two expressions viz. 'government' or 'any
other person' - Parliament did not use multiple expressions
in the provision constituting a distinct genus class or category
- It used only one single expression viz. 'government' which
does not constitute a genus, even when it may be a specie -
H
818
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 10 S.C.R.
A
Tenor of the provision, the context and .the statutory definition
of the expression 'person' all militate against any attempt tO
restrict the meaning of the term 'person' to the 'government'
or 'foreign State' or 'international inter-governmental
B
organisations' only, thus, the rule is not applicable.
Sentence/Sentencing: Proporlionality of sentence -
Guiding principles - Stated.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
c
HELD: 1. The provisions of Section 364A IPC in so
far as the same prescribes death or life imprisonment is
not unconstitutional on account of the punishment being
disproportionate to the gravity of the c

## Text

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A
B
c
[2015) 10 S.C.R. 816
VIKRAM SINGH@ VICKY &ANR. •
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No.824 Of 2013)
AUGUST 21, 2015
[T. S. THAKUR, R.K. AGRAWAL AND
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, JJ.)
Penal Code, 1860:
ss. 302 and 364A - Kidnapping and killing of 16 year
old boy demanding ransom of Rs 50 lakh from his father -
Conviction u/ss. 302 and' 364A and imposition of death
sentence - Order attaining finality upto this Court - Writ
D petition by appellant u!Art. 32 challenging vires of s. 364A to
the extent the same prescribes death sentence for anyone
found guilty, dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the
appellants to approach High Court- Thereaft~r, writ petition
before the High Court dismissed, upholding the vires of s.
E 364A - On appeal, held: Provisions of Section 364A in so far
as the same prescribes death or !ife imprisonment is not
unconstitutional on account of the punishment being
disproportionate to the gravity of the crime committed by the
appellants- s. 364A was enacted for the safety and security
F of the citizens and the unity, sovereignty and integrity of the
country-Appellants were held guilty not only uls. 364A, but
even for murder punishable u/s. 302 - Award of death
sentence was considered to be just, fair and reasonable, even
G by the standards of rarest of rare cases...:.. Just because the
sentence of death is a possible punishment that may be
awarded in appropriate cases cannot make it per se inhuman
or barbaric.
s. 364A - When attracted- Held: Kidnapping/abduction
H demanding ransom from private persons also- attracts s.
816
VIKRAM SINGH@VICKYv. UNION OF INDIA
817
364A - Language employed in s. 364A is wide enough to A
cover even cases where the demand for ransom is made not
as a part of any terrorist act but also for monetary gain from a
private individual- Provision does not suggest that the same
is attracted only in ransom situations arising in· acts of
terrorism directed against the Government or any foreign state B
or international inter-governmental organization.
s. 364A - Ingredients of- Stated.
s. 364A - Scope and purport of- Examination of historical
perspective - Explained and discussed.
C
Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 32, 226 -
Writ
jurisdiction - Order attaining finality upto this Court - Writ
petition by appellant u!Art. 32 challenging vires of s. 364A
dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the appellants to 0
approach High Court- Thereafter, writ petition before the High
Court dismissed, upholding the vires of s. 364A - On appeal,·
held: In view of the decision in Rupa Ashok Hurra's case, if
against a final judgment of this Court, a remedy was not
available u/Art.· 32, the same would also not be available u/ E
Art. 226 - Only remedy available, is by invoking this Court's
inherent powers u!Arts. 129, 142 for recall, reversal or
modification of the order passed by this Court in the criminal
appeal filed by appellants- Thus, writ petition before the High
Court for that relief is untenable.
F
Interpretation of statutes - Rule of ejusdem generis -
Applicability - Whether the expression 'any other person'
appearing in s. 364A ought to be read ejusdem generis with
the expression preceding the said words - Held: s. 364A G
made use of only two expressions viz. 'government' or 'any
other person' - Parliament did not use multiple expressions
in the provision constituting a distinct genus class or category
- It used only one single expression viz. 'government' which
does not constitute a genus, even when it may be a specie -
H
818
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 10 S.C.R.
A
Tenor of the provision, the context and .the statutory definition
of the expression 'person' all militate against any attempt tO
restrict the meaning of the term 'person' to the 'government'
or 'foreign State' or 'international inter-governmental
B
organisations' only, thus, the rule is not applicable.
Sentence/Sentencing: Proporlionality of sentence -
Guiding principles - Stated.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
c
HELD: 1. The provisions of Section 364A IPC in so
far as the same prescribes death or life imprisonment is
not unconstitutional on account of the punishment being
disproportionate to the gravity of the crime committed
by the appellants. A sentence of death in a case of murder
D may be rare, but, if the Courts have, upon consideration
of the facts and evidence, found that the same is the only
sentence that can be awarded, it is difficult to revisit that
question in collateral proceedings like the one at hand.
The Court cannot merely on a hypothetical situation
E strike down a provision disregarding the actual facts in
which the challenge has been mounted. Assumed
hypothetical situations cannot be brought to bear upon
the vi res of Section 364A. The stark facts that have been
held proved in the instant case would at any rate take
F the case out of the purview of any such hypothetical
situation. It is said so because the appellants have been
held guilty not only under Section 364A, but even for
murder punishable under Section 302 IPC. Sentence of
G death awarded to them for bo~h was considered to be
just, fair and reasonable, even by the standards of rarest
of rare cases, evolved and applied by this Court. It is not
a case where the victim had escaped his fate and lived
to tell his woeful tale. It is a case where he was done to
H death, which is what appears to have weighed with the
VIKRAM SINGH @VICKYv. UNION OF INDIA
819
Courts in awarding to the appellants the capital A
punishment. [Para 51] (869-H; 870-A]
2. The writ petition filed by the appellants under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India was dismissed as
withdrawn with liberty reserved to the appellants to s ·
approach the High Court. Even so, in the light of the
pronouncement of this Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra's
case, if against a final judgment of this Court, a remedy
was not available under Article 32 the same would also
not be available under Article 226. If this Court could not C
take resort to Article 32 for reopening for examination its
final judgement, the High Court could also not do so
under Article 226. The only remedy which the appellants
could resort to in terms of the view taken in Ru pa Ashok
Hurra's case is by invoking ~his Court's inherent powers . D
under Articles 129 and 142 for recall, reversal or
modification of the order passed by this Court in the
criminal appeal filed by the appellants. A writ petition
before the High Court for that relief was clearly untenable
in law. (Para 10] (834-G-H; 835-A-B]
E
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Anr. 2002
(2) SCR 1006: (2002) 4 SCC 388- referred to.
3.1 Section 364A came on the statute book initially F
in the year 1993 not only because kidnapping and
abduction for ransom were becoming rampant and the
Law Commission had recommended that a separate
provision making the same punishable be incorporated
but also because activities of terrorist organisations had G
acquired menacing dimensions that called for an
effective legal framework to prevent such ransom
situations and punish those responsible for the same.
The further amendment to Section 364A in the year 1994
simply added the expressions "foreign state or H
820
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015) 10 S.C.R.
A international inter-governmental organisation" to the
provision without deleting the pre-existing expression
"any other person". The expression "any other person"
appearing in Section 364A IPC right from the time of its
initial incorporation in the Code was meant to apply the
B provisions not only to situations where the Government
was asked to pay ransom or to do any other act but even
to situations where any other person which would
include a private person also was asked to pay ransom.
The subsequent amendment in the year 1994 also did
C not remove the expression "any other person" in Section
364A while adding the expression "foreign State or
international inter Government organisation" to the
provision as it originally existed. There is nothing in the
0
provision to suggest that the same is attracted only in
ransom situations arising in acts of terrorism directed
against the Government or any foreign state or
international inter-governmental organization. The
language employed in the provision is, wide enough to
E cover even cases where the demand for ransom is made
not as a part of any terrorist act but also for monetary
gain from a private individual. [Paras 17, 18, 19] [840-EH; 841-A-D]
F
3.2 Section 364A has three distinct components viz.-
the person concerned kidnaps or abducts or keeps the
victim in detention after kidnapping or abduction;
threatens to cause death or hurt or causes
apprehension of death or hurt or actually hurts or
G causes death; and the kidnapping, abduction or
detention and the threats of death or hurt, apprehension
for such death or hurt or actual death or hurt is caused
to coerce the person concerned or someone else to do
something or to forbear from cioing something or to pay
H ransom. These ingredients are distinctly different from
VIKRAM SINGli@ VICKYv. UNION OF INDIA
821
the offence of extortion under Section 383 IPC. The A
deficiency in the existing legal framework was noticed
by the Law Commission and a separate provision in the
form of Section 364A proposed for incorporation to cover
the ransom situations embodying the ingredients
mentioned. [Para 22] [842-E-H] .
B
4.1 The submission that the expression 'any other
person' appearing in Section 364A ought to be read
ejusdem gen eris with the expression preceding the said
words, cannot be accepted. The rule of ejusdem generis C
is a rule of construction and not a rule of law. Courts
have to be very careful in applying the rule while
interpreting statutory provisions. Having said that the
rule applies in situations where specific words forming
a distinct genus class or category are followed by D
general words. The first stage of any forensic application
of the rule, therefore, has to be to find out whether the
preceding words constitute a genus class or category
so that the general words that follow them can be given
the same colour as the words preceding. In cases where E
it is not possible to find the genus in the use of the words
preceding the general words, the rule of ejusdem generis
would have no application. Section 364A added to IPC
m~de use of only two expressions viz. 'government' or F
'any other person'. The Parliament did not use multiple
expressions in the provision constituting a distinct genus
class or category. It used only one single expression viz.
'government' which does not constitute a genus, even
when it may be a specie. [Paras 23 and 26][843-B-D; 844G
G-H]
4.2 The term 'person' used in the expression 'any
other person', appearing in Section 364A IPC must be
understood as referring to 'person' as defined in Section H
822
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 10 S.C.R.
A
11 IPC. The term 'person' appearing ins. 364A would
include a company or association or body of persons
whether incorporated or not, apart from natural persons.
The tenor of the provision, the context and the statutory
definition of the expression 'person' all militate against
B any attempt to restrict the meaning of the term 'person'
to tile 'government' or 'foreign State' or 'international
inter-governmental organisations' only. [Paras 28 and 29]
[846-E-F, G-H; 847-A]
C
Mis. Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. Unionof
India andAnr. 1989 (1) SCR 214: (1989) 2 SCC
458; Tribhuban Prakash Nayyar v.Union of India
1970 (2) SCR 732: (1969) 3 sec 99, UPSEB v.
Hari Shanker 1979 (2) SCR 355: (1978) 4 SCC
D
1 G; Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs,
Bombay 2002 (2) SCR 945: (2002) 4 sec 297 -
referred to.
SS Magnhild v. Mcintyre Bros. & Co. (1920) 3 KB
E
321 - referred to.
Statutory Construction by Francis Bennion; Statute
Law' by Craies (7th Edn.)- referred to.
F
5. In Section 364A, the Court enjoys the discretion
whether to award the extreme penalty of death or the
lesser alternative of a life imprisonment. Whether life or
death would be the proper sentence is in the absolute
discretion of the Court which the Courts are expected
G to exercise wisely having regard to the facts of the case
and the gravity of the offence and its severity or barbarity.
[Para 33] [849-F-H]
Mithu etc. v. State of Punjab etc. 1983 (2) SCR
H
690: (1983) 2 sec 277 - distinguished.
VIKRAM Slt-.GH@VICKYv. UNION OF INDIA
823
Malleshi v. State of Karnataka 2004 (4) Suppl.
A
SCR 441: (2004) 8 SCC 95; Suman Sood @
Kama/Jeet Kaur v. State of Rajasthan 2007 (6)
SCR 499: (2007) 5 SCC 634; Vinod v. State of
Haryana 2008 (1) SCR 1141: (2008) 2 SCC 246;
Akram Khan v. State of West Bengal 2011 (13)
B
SCR 459: (2012) 1 SCC 406; Vikram Singh &
Ors. v. State of Punjab 2010 (2) SCR 22 : (2010)
3 sec 56 - referred to.
6. A legislation is presumed to be constitutionally C
valid with the burden of showing the contrary lying
heavily upon any one who challenges its validity. Not
only that, courts show due deference to the
parliamentary wisdom and exercise self restraint while
examining the vires of legislations validly enacted. [Para D
34] [854-C-D]
Maru Ram v. Union of India & Ors. (1981) 1 SCC
107; Bachan Singh v. State of.Punjab (1980) 2
SCC 684; State of M.P. v. Bala alias Balaram 2005
E
(3) Suppl. SCR 859: (2005) 8 SCC 1 - referred
to.
7. The principles as regards the proportionality of
sentences are as follows: (a) Punishments must be F
proportionate to the nature and gravity of the offences
for which the same are prescribed. (b) Prescribing
punishments is the function of the legislature and not
the Courts'. (c) The legislature is presumed to be
supremely wise and aware of the needs of the people G
and the measures that are necessary to meet those
needs. (d) Courts show deference to the legislative will
and wisdom and are slow in upsetting the enacted
provisions dealing with the quantum of punishment
H
824
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015) 10 S.C.R.
A prescribed for different offences. (e) Courts, however,
have the jurisdiction to interfere when the punishment
prescribed is so outrageously disproportionate to the .
offence or so inhuman or brutal that the same cannot be
accepted by any standard of decency. (f) Absence of
B objective standards for determining the legality of the
prescribed sentence makes the job of the Court
reviewing the punishment difficult. (g) Courts cannot
interfere with the prescribed punishment only because
the punishment is perceived to be excessive. (h) In
C dealing with questions of proportionality of sentences,
capital punishment is considered to be different in kind
and degree from sentence of imprisonment. The result
is that while there are several instances when capital
0 punishment has been considered to be disproportionate
to the offence committed, there are very few and rare
cases of sentences of imprisonment being held
disproportionate. [Para 49] [866-E-H; 867-A-E]
8. Given the background in which the law was
E enacted and the concern shown by the Parliament for
the safety and security of the citizens and the unity,
sovereignty and integrity of the country, the punishment
prescribed for those committing any act contrary to
F Section 364A cannot be dubbed as so outrageously
disproportionate to the nature of the offence as to call
for the same being declared unconstitutional. Judicial
discretion available to the Courts to choose one of the
two sentences prescribed for those falling foul of Section
G 364A would doubtless be exercised by the Courts along
judicially recognized lines and death sentences
awarded only in the rarest of rare cases. Butjlist because
the sentence of death is a possible punishment that may
be awarded in appropriate cases cannot make it per se
H
VIKRAM SINGH @VICKYv. UNION OF INDIA
825
inhuman or barbaric. In the ordinary course and in cases A
which qualify to be called rarest of the rare, death may
be awarded only where kidnapping or abduction has
resulted in the death either of the victim or anyone else
in the course of the commission of the offence. Fact
situations where the act which the accused is charged B
with is proved to be an act of terrorism threatening the
very essence of our federal, secular and democratic
structure may possibly be the only other situations
where Courts may consider awarding the extreme
penalty. But, short of death in such extreme and rarest C
of rare cases, imprisonment for life for a proved case of
kidnapping or abduction will not qualify for being
described as barbaric or inhuman so as to infringe the
right to Life guaranteed under Article 21 of the 0
Constitution. [Para 50] [868-G-H; 869-A]
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar etc. v. State of
Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1: 1966 SCR 744;
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P.,
Allahabad AIR 1963 SC 996: 1963 Suppl. SCR
E
885; Maru Ram v. Union of India & Ors. (1981) 1
sec 107 - referred to.
Weems v. United States 217 US 349:54 L.Ed 793:
30 S. Ct 544 (1910); Enmund v. Florida 647 458
F
US 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia 433 US 584
(1977); Herman Solem v. Jerry Buckley Helm 463
US 277, 77 Led 2d 637, 103 s Ct 3001; Ronald
Allen Harmelin v. Michigan 501 US 957; Rumme!
v. Estelle 445 U.S 263; Solem v. Helm 463 US
G
277; Ewing v. California 538 US 11; R. v. Smith
(1987) 1 SCR 1045; R. \/. Goltz (1991) 3 SCR
485; R. II. Fergusson (2008) 1 SCR 96 - referred
to.
·
H
826
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 10 S.C.R.
A
Case Law Reference
1966 SCR 744
referred to.
Para 6
1963 Suppl. SCR 885
referred to.
Para 6
B
2002 (2) SCR 1006
referred to.
Para 6,9,10
1989 (1) SCR 214
referred to.
Para 24
1970 (2) SCR 732
referred to.
Para 25
c
1979 (2) SCR 355
referred to.
Para 25
2002 (2) SCR 945
referred to.
·Para 27
2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 441 referred to.
Para 31
D
2007 (6) SCR 499
referred to.
..Para 31
2008 (1) SCR 1141
referred to.
Para 31
2011 (13) SCR 459
referred to;
Para 31
E
1983 (2) SCR 690
distinguished. Para 33
2010 (2) SCR 22
referred to.
Para 33
(1981) 1sec101
referred to.
Para 34
F
(1980) 2 sec 684
referred to.
Para 35
2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 859 referred to.
Para 36
(1987) 1 SCR 1045
referred to.
Para 46
G
(1991) 3 SCR 485
referred to.
Para 47
(2008) 1 SCR 96
ref~rred to.
Para 48
H
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: CriminalAppeal
No. 824 of2013.
VIKRAM SINGH @ VICKYv. UNION OF INDIA
827
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.10.2012 of the A
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No.
18956 of 2012 (O&M).
Ranjit Kumar, S.G. Neeraj Kishan Kaul,ASG, RS. Sodhi,
Amit Desai, V. Madhukar, AAG, Tripurari Ray, S.S. Billowria, s
Rajinder Singh, Anil Kaushik, Dinesh Kumar Garg, Mohd.
lrshad Hanif, N.A. Usmani, S.A. Haseeb, Binu Tamta, Ranjana
Narayan, Sushma Suri, 8. Krishna Prasad,Anvita Cowshish,
Mohit Nain, Kuldip Singh, Abhishek Singh, Pankaj Sharma,
C. Mukherji, Mohit D. Ram, Hemant Sharma, lndu Sharma, C
Gopalakrishna Shenoy, Dr. AbhishekAtrey, Aakansha Kaul,
Nitesh Daryanani, D.S. Mahra for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
T. S. THAKUR, J. 1. This appeal, by special leave, arises D
in somewhat peculiar circumstances. The appellants were
tried, convicted and sentenced to death for commission of
offences punishable under Sections 302 and 364A of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860. The conviction and sentence awarded to E
them was affirmed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
in appeal and eventually by this Court in Criminal Appeals
No. 1396-1397 of 2008. The appellants did not, however,
give-up. They filed Writ Petition (Crl.) D No.15177 of 2012
before this Court for a declaration that Section 364A inserted
F
in the I PC by Act 42 of 1993 was ultra vires the Constitution to
the extent the same prescribes death sentence for anyone
found guilty. The petitioner further prayed for quashing the death
sentence awarded to the petitioner by the trial court as affirmed
by the High Court and by this Court in Criminal Appeals G
No.1396-1397 of 2008. A mandamus directing commutation
of the sentence awarded to the petitioner to imprisonment for
life was also prayed for. The writ petition was eventually
withdrawn with liberty to the petitioners to approach the
jurisdictional High Court for redress. The appellant, thereafter,
H
828
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 10 S.C.R.
A ·moved the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
in CWP No.18956 of 2012 praying for a mandamus striking
down Section 364A of the IPC and for an order restraining the
execution of the death sentence awarded to them. Reopening
of the case of the appellants and commutation of the death
B sentence for imprisonment for life were also prayed for in the
writ petition. A Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana has, while dismissing the said petition by its judgment
and .order dated 3rd October, 2012, taken the view that the
question whether Section 364A of the IPC was attracted to
C the case at hand and whether a person found.guilty of an offence
punishable underthe'provision could be sentenced to death
was not only raised by the appellants as an argument before
this Court in appeal filed by them, but, was noticed and found
0
against them. The High Court while saying so relied upon the
following passage of the judgment of this Court in the appeal
filed by the appellants against their conviction:
E
F
G
H
" ... A plain reading of the Objects and Reasons which
led to the amendment shows the concern of
Parliament in dealing with kidnapping for ransom a
crime which called for a deterrent punishment, even
in a case where the kidnapping had not resulted in
the death of the victim. The statistics further reveal
that kidnapping for ransom had become a lucrative
and thriving industry all over the country which must
be dealt with, in the harshest possible manner and
an obligation rests on Courts as well. Courts to lend
a helping hand in that direction. In the case before
us, we find that not only was Abhi Verma kidnapped
for ransom which act would by itself attract the death
penalty but he was murdered in the process. It is
relevant that even before the aforesaid amendments,
this Court in Henry's case (supra) observed that death
sentence could be awarded even in a case of·
VIKRAM SINGH @ VICKYv. UNION OF INDIA
829
[T.S. THAKUR, J.]
kidnapping and murder based on circumstantial
A
evidence ... "
2. The High Court further held that the question of quantum
of sentence had also been examined by this Court in the
following paragraph of the judgment delivered in the criminal
B
appeal filed by the appellants:
"24. Some of the judgments aforesaid refer to the
ongoing debate as to the validity and propriety of the
death sentence in a modem society. There are the
c
moralists who say that as God has given life, he alone
has the right to take it away and this privilege cannot
be usurped by any human being. There are others
who believe that the death sentence cannot be taken
as a retributive or deterrent factor as the statistics
D
show that the possibility of a death sentence has
never acted as a deterrent to serious crime. The
theory which is widely accepted in India, however, is
that as the death penalty is on the statute book it has
to be awarded provided the circumstances justify it.
E
The broad principle has been laid in Bachan Singh's
case (supra) as the "rarest of the rare cases". Bachan
Singh case has been followed by a series of
judgments of this Court delineating and setting out
as to the kind of matters that would fall within this
F
category. In Machhi Singh & Ors. Vs. State of
Punjab 1983 (3) SCC 470 this Court gave an
indication as to what could constitute this category ... "
3. The High Court on the above reasoning concluded that G
this Court had considered the nature of the offence and its
gravity and held that the appellants deserved the maximum
punishment prescribed for both the offences proved against
them. The High Court held that the plea now sought to be raised
by the writ-petitioners to the effect that Section 364A of the
H
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[2015) 10 S.C.R.
A
IPC was attracted only when the offence was committed
against the government or a foreign country etc. or that no such
offence was made out in the case of the petitioners, had been
examined and decided againstthe petitioners which plea could
not be re-agitated by them in collateral proceedings. Having
B said t~at the High Court proceeded to examine the plea raised
by the appellants on its merit, referred to the historical
background in which the provisions of Section 364A were
added to the statute book and held that Section 364A of IPC,
even in the form in which it was initially introduced, made
C
kidnapping by any person in the circumstances indicated in
the said provision an offence no matter at lhe time of initial
insertion of Section 364A, India was not committed to the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 1979
0
to which it became a party only on 7th September, 1994. It was
only thereafter that Section 364A was amended to incorporate
the expression "any foreign state or international intergovernmental organization or any other person" to honour
the commitment under the said Convention. The High Court,
E accordingly, repelled the argument that Section 364A was
attracted only in situations where kidnapping was meant to
coerce the government or any international organization to do
or not to do a particular act including the demand for payment
of ransom. The writ petition was, on that reasoning, dismissed
F
by the High Court, which dismissal is what is under challenge
in this appeal before us.
4. When the appeal initially came up before a two-Judge
Bench of this Court, the same was directed to be placed before
G a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement especially
because the appellants had been awarded a death sentence
which stood affirmed by a Bench of coordinate jurisdiction.
That is precisely how the matter has come up before us for
final hearing.
H
5. Appearing for the appellants, Mr. Tripurari Ray followed
VIKRAM SINGH @VICKYv. UNION OF INDIA
831
[T.S. THAKUR, J.]
by M/s Altaf Ahmad and R.S. Sodhi, senior advocates, who A
appeared for the interveners, strenuously argued that Section
364A of the IPC was attracted only in situations where an
offence was committed against the Government, any foreign
State or international inter-governmental organisation. The
provision, argued the learned counsel, had no application to B
situations in which a victim was abducted or kidnapped for
ransom demand from a private individual. The provisions of
Section 364A, it was contended, were meant to deal with
kidnapping by terrorists for ransom or where terrorists take
hostages with a view to compelling the Government or a foreign C
State or international in.ter-gov~rnmental organisation to do or
abstain from doing any act including payment of ransom.
6. On behalf of the respondents, it was contended by Mr.
Ranjit Kumar, Solicitor General, that the question whether D
Section 364A IPC was attracted to the fact situation of the
case at hand was examined and decided by this Court in the
criminal appeal filed by the appellants against their conviction
and sentence. The view taken by this Court in the appeal having
attained finality, it was not open to the appellants to re-agitate E
the issue in collateral proceedings. Reliance in support of that
submission was placed upon the decisions of this Court in
Naresh ShridharMirajkaretc. v. State of Maharashtra (AIR
1967SC1), Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner,
F
U.P., Allahabad (AIR 1963 SC 996) and Rupa Ashok Hurra
v. Ashok Hurra and Anr. (2002) 4 SCC 388.
7. Alternatively, it was contended that Section 364A of the
IPC was widely worded to cover not only situations where
terrorists take hostages to compel the Government or a foreign
G
State or any international inter-governmental organisation but
also where any person abducts or kidnaps the victim for no
more than compelling payment of ransom by the family of the
victim. It was contended thatthe High Court had rightly analysed
H
the provisions, examined the historical perspective to hold that
832
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015) 10 S.C.R.
A
Section 364A was not confined only to cases involving acts of
terrorism but was attracted even in cases where the crime is
committed for securing ransom.
8. There is no gainsaying that in an appeal directed
B against an order of conviction and sentence, the appellant is
entitled to urge all such contentions as are open to him in law
and on facts. One of the contentions open to the aggrieved
convict in such cases is that the provision under which he has
been convicted has no application to his case or that the
C
ingredients of the offence with which he has been charged are
not established to justify his conviction. It follows that the
contention that Section 364A was not attracted in the present
case was open to the appellants and was in fact advanced on
their behalf in the appeal filed by them. Not only that, the
D contention was examined and rejected. So long as that
rejection holds the field, there is no room for this Court or any
other court for that matter to take a contrary view. The writ
petition filed by the appellants to the extent the same sought to
urge that section 364A was not attracted to the case at hand
E was, thus, not maintainable in law.
9. In Rupa Ashok Hurra's case (supra), a Constitution
Bench of this Court examined the options available to a litigant
aggrieved of a final judgmenUorder of this Court after the
F
dismissal of the review petition filed by him. This Court
reviewed the case law on the subject and held that a final
judgmenUorder passed by this Court cannot be assailed in an
application under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by an
aggrieved person regardless whether he was or was not a
G party to the case. This Court also examined the competing
considerations of giving finality to the judgments of the Court
of last resort, on the one hand, and the need to dispense justice
on reconsideration of a judgment on the other and held that in
H rarest of rare situations, a final judgment of the Court may
VIKRAM SINGH@VICKYv. UNION OF INDIA
833
[T.S. THAKUR, J.]
require re-consideration to set right the miscarriage of justice A
complained of. In such cases it would not only be proper but
even obligatory for the Court to both legally and morally rectify
the error. This Court further held that the duty to do justice in
such rarest of rare cases shall prevail over the policy of certainty
or finality of judgments. The following two passages from the
8
decision are apposite:
"40. The petitioners in these writ petitions seek reconsideration of the final judgments of this Court after
they have been unsuccessful in review petitions and in C
that these cases are different from the cases referred
to above. The provision of Order XL Rule 5 of (he
Supreme Court Rules bars further application for review
in the same matter. The concern of the Court now is
whether any relief can be given to the petitioners who D
challenge the final judgment of this Court, though after
disposal of review petitions, complaining of the gross
abuse of the process of Court and irremedial injustice.
In a State like India, governed by rule of law, certainty of E
law declared and the final decision rendered on merits
in a /is between the parties by the highest court in the
country is of paramount importance. The principle of
finality is insisted upon not on the ground that a
judgment given by the apex Court is impeccable but F
on the maxim "Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium".
41.xxxxxxxxxx
42. The concern of this Court for rendering justice in a
cause is not less important than the principle of finality G
of its judgment. We are faced with competing principles
- ensuring certainty and finality of a judgment of the
Court of last resort and dispensing justice on
reconsideration of a judgment on the ground that it is
vitiated being in violation of the principle of natural H
834
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015) 10 S.C.R.
justice or giving scope for apprehension of bias due to
a Judge who participated in the decision making
process not disclosing his links with a party to the case
or on account of abuse of the process of the court. Such
a judgment, far from ensuring ·finality, will always remain
under the cloud of uncertainty. Almighty alone is the
dispenser of absolute justice - a concept which is not
disputed but by a few. We are of the view that though
Judges of the highest Court do their best, subject of
course to the limitation of human fallibility, yet situations
may arise, in the rarest of the rare cases, which would
require reconsideration of a final judgment to set right
miscarriage of justice complained of In such case it
would not only be proper but also obligatory both legally
and morally to rectify the error. After giving our anxious
consideration to the question, we are persuaded to hold
that the duty to do justice in these rarest of rare cases
shall have to prevail over the policy of certainty of
judgment as though it is essentially in public interest
that a final judgment of the final court in the country
should not be open to challenge, yet there may be
circumstances, as mentioned above, wherein declining
to reconsider the judgment would be oppressive to
judicial conscience and cause perpetuation of
. irremediable injustice."
10. In the case at hand, the writ petition filed by the
appellants under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was
dismissed as withdrawn with liberty reseNed to the appellants
G to app'roach the High Court. Even so, in the light of the
pronouncement of this Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra's case
(supra), if against a final judgment of this Court, a remedy was
not available under Article 32 of the Constitution the same would
also not be available under Artide 226. If this Court could not
H take resort to Article 32 for reopening for examination its final
VIKRAM SINGH @VICKYv. UNION OF INDIA
835
[T.S. THAKUR, J.]
judgement, the High Court could also not do so under Article A
226. The only remedy which the appellants could resort to in
terms of the view taken in Ru pa Ashok Hurra's case (supra)
is by invoking this Court's inherent powers under Articles 129
and 142 of the Constitution of India for recall, reversal or
modification of the order passed by this Court in the criminal
B
appeal filed by the appellants. A writ petition before the High
Court for that relief was clearly untenable in law.
11. Legal impediments in the choice of the remedy
available to the appellants have not dissuaded the High Court C
from examining and answering the contentions sought to be
raised on the merits of the case. We too propose to go into
the merits of the contentions urged on behalf of the appellants,·
no matter it may not be necessary to do so in the light of what
we have said about the maintainability of the proceedings D
brought by the appellants. We do so not only because the
matter was argued at considerable length before us but also
because the lives of the appellants hang in the balance. We
will, therefore, be loathe in shutting out the arguments advanced
on behalf of the appellants on a technical ground touching the E
maintainability of the petition filed by the appellants.
12. Any attempt to properly understand the true scope and
purport of Section 364A must, in our opinion, start with the
historical background in which the provision came on the
F
statute book. When we do so, we find that the proposal for
addition of Section364A to the Indian Penal Code was first
modified by the Law Commission of India in its 42"d Report
submitted in 1971. The relevant portion of the report reads as
und~
G
"16. 100 We consider it desirable to have a specific
section to punish severely kidnapping or abduction for
ransom, as such cases are increasing. At present, such
kidnapping or abduction is punishable under Section H
836
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B
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 10 S.C.R.
365 since the kidnapped or abducted person will be
secretly and wrongfully confined.
We also considered the question whether a provision
for reduced punishment in case of release of the person
kidnapped without harm should be inserted, but we
have come to the conclusion that there is no need for
it. We propose the following section:-
"364A. Kidnapping or abduction for ransom - Whoever
kidnaps or abducts any person with intent to hold that
person for ransom shall be punished with rigorous
imprisonment for a term which may extend to 14 years,
and shall also be liable to fine."
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Chapter25
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
25.1.xxxxxxxxxxx
A brief summary of the principal recommendations
made in each chapter is given below:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(14) Kidnapping or abduction for ransom should be
an aggravated form of the offence of kidnapping or
abduction punishable with rigorous imprisonment
upto fourteen years and fine."
13. The recommendations of the Law Commission appear
to have languished for nearly two decades before the Criminal
Law (Amendment) Bill, 1992 was presented to the Parliament
by the Government proposing to add to the I PC Section 364A
H in a form slightly different from the one in which the Law
VIKRAM SINGH @VICKYv. UNION OF INDIA
837
[T.S. THAKUR, J.]
Commission had recommended such addition. What is A
important is that in the statement of Objects and Reasons,
accompanying the bill •. a two-fold justification was given by the·
Government for the proposed addition namely: (i) that
kidnappings by terrorists for ransom for creating panic amongst
the people and for securing release of their associates and B
cadres had assumed serious dimensions and (ii) The Law
Commission had in its 42"d Report recommended a specific
provision to deal with the menace of kidnapping and
abductions for ransom. The Bill eventually led to the Criminal
Law Amendment Act 1993 (Act 42 of 1993), introducing C
Section 364A to the Indian Penal Code with effect from 22nd
May, 1993, in the following words:
"364A. Kidnapping for ransom, etc.- Whoever
kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in D
detention after such kidnapping or abduction and
threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or by
his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension
that such person m~y be put to death or hurt, or causes
hurt or death to such person in order to compel the E
Government or any other person to do or abstain from
doing any act or to pay a ransom, shall be punishable
with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be
liable to fine."
F
14. Shortly after the introduction of the above provision
arose the need for an amendment to the same. The amendment
was necessitated by reason of India acceding to the
international convention against the taking of hostages adopted
by the General assembly of the United Nations on 17th G
December, 1979 in the background of Iranian hostage crisis.
The Convention aimed at fighting international terrorism, came
into force with effect from 3rd June, 1983 but was acceded to
· by India with effect from 7th September, 1994.
H
838
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 10S.C.R.
A
15. The Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill 1994, Bill
No.LXVof 1994 was, in the above background, introduced in
the Rajya Sabha on 25th August, 1994 to.amend Section 364A
so as to substitute the expression "any other person" by the
words "any foreign State or international inter-governmental
B organisation or any other person" in the said section. The
Statement of Objects and Reasons for the amendment also
gave the background in which the amendment was considered
necessary.